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What happened? That was the question most Australians were asking 
when facing the result of the May 2019 federal election. Even the victor 
described it as a miracle.
Scott Morrison became Australia’s 30th prime minister against the 
predictions of all the national opinion polls. His Liberal–National 
Coalition had suffered a major swing in the Victorian State election just 
over six months earlier. He had himself been prime minister for only nine 
months, following the ousting of Malcolm Turnbull, which precipitated 
a by-election with another Liberal loss.
This volume investigates what happened. It is drawn from the contributions 
of 36 political scientists, analysts, journalists and commentators who 
took part in a post-election workshop sponsored by the Academy of the 
Social Sciences in Australia. It explores the new circumstances of  this 
election. The  loss of trust in political institutions seen across most 
Western democracies has been accompanied by the disengagement of 
citizens at least from the mainstream political process. We have seen 
the rise of populism, derision over ‘fake news’ and the way that social 
media fragments public discussion. And in the 2019 election we saw the 
influence of former federal MP Clive Palmer, who spent more money on 
the campaign than both major parties combined.
Morrison’s Miracle provides in-depth analysis of the usual contributors to 
election wins and losses: patterns of voter behaviour and the campaign 
strategies of political parties and third parties. It also analyses regional 
variations in voting, the rise of Independents, the performance of the 
polls, the ideological contests and the role of the media. This is the ninth 
in the academy’s election series covering federal campaigns. It builds on 
the preceding work and offers more in terms of comparing the 2019 
election with those that went before.
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I commend this book to all readers—scholars, practitioners, students and 
interested Australians—seeking to understand what happened in 2019. 
I congratulate and thank the editors for this important work. 
Jane Hall
President




ANALYSING THE 2019 
AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL 
ELECTION
Anika Gauja, Marian Sawer and Marian Simms
On the night of the 2019 election, Prime Minister Scott Morrison 
thanked the ‘quiet Australians’ for delivering a ‘miracle’ result, re-electing 
the Liberal–National Coalition and returning his government to power. 
Morrison was Australia’s first Pentecostal prime minister and an exponent 
of the prosperity gospel, as well as miracles—redefining the Australian 
mantra of the ‘fair go’ as ‘a fair go for those who have a go’. Morrison 
ended his victory speech with the words ‘God bless Australia’—probably 
the first Australian leader to use such words since John Curtin in the 
depths of the Second World War.
The election result was very much at odds with expectations, given that 
national opinion polls had long been predicting a Labor win rather 
than the re-election of the centre-right Coalition. The backdrop was the 
declining level of trust in politicians and the media. Trust in politicians 
had reached its lowest level since first measured in Australia in 1969 
(Cameron and Wynter 2018) and trust in the media was also at a low 
point (Edelman 2018). The discourse of ‘fake news’ was used to discredit 
news media, although the term was also used to describe disinformation 
campaigns spread on social media platforms for political purposes 
(Buckmaster and Wils 2019). Lack of trust and disengagement from 
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party politics provided fertile ground for populist appeals and negative 
campaigning, particularly through social media. Labor leaders blamed 
the influence of populist parties and the cashed-up scare campaign 
around taxes, particularly the mythical ‘death tax’, for their defeat. Labor, 
with its plethora of policy offerings, seemed unable to cut through to 
disengaged and distrustful voters while simpler negative messaging was 
more successful.
Populist minor parties on the right, such as Pauline Hanson’s One 
Nation (PHON) and Clive Palmer’s United Australia Party (UAP), made 
extensive use of social media, including platforms such as Facebook. This 
reflected a global shift whereby radical right parties and organisations were 
more than matching the left in their use of digital technology. In addition, 
in 2019, the Liberal Party’s social media strategy was more successful than 
Labor’s—for example, gaining more than twice the number of views for 
its Facebook page. This was unlike the 2013 and 2016 federal elections 
when Labor and the Greens were notably more active than the Coalition 
on social media platforms such as Twitter (see Bruns and Moon 2018). 
Few seats changed hands, with the governing Coalition gaining one 
additional seat to give it 77 of the 151 seats in the House of Representatives, 
while Labor lost one seat. Reflecting the loss of trust in the major 
parties, the share of the vote going to minor parties and Independents 
continued to rise in the House of Representatives, although there was 
a slight dip in their Senate share (from 35.5 per cent in 2016 to 33 
per cent in 2019). PHON did particularly well in Queensland and its two 
Queensland senators will share the balance of power on the crossbench 
with four other senators when Labor and the Australian Greens oppose 
the government. The Greens held all their Senate positions, increasing 
their vote significantly in South Australia and Queensland, while the 
Labor vote collapsed in Queensland, where it won only one Senate seat. 
The Nick Xenophon Team (NXT), renamed the Centre Alliance, retained 
a lower house seat and had two continuing senators. Palmer’s UAP ran an 
expensive campaign but failed to secure a seat; Cory Bernardi’s party, 
the Australian Conservatives, was disbanded soon after the election, 
with Bernardi continuing to sit as an Independent senator up until his 
resignation from the Senate in January 2020. 
The ‘modern’ gender gap in the voting characteristics of recent Australian 
elections continued in 2019, with women voting to the left of men—
that is, the 2019 Australian Election Study (AES) showed women were 
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again more likely than men to vote Labor, more likely to vote Green and 
significantly less likely than men to vote for the Coalition.1 The shift of 
women to the left or, more accurately perhaps, the shift of men to the 
right, reflects broader social changes, including employed women now 
having a higher union density than men and taking leadership positions 
in the trade union movement.
Election themes
Our aim in this chapter is to highlight the key themes of the campaign as 
they emerged in our election workshop discussions. For many observers, 
the 2019 federal election appeared to be a watershed, awash as it was 
with huge amounts of money paying for negative campaign material and 
contributing to the loss of civility on the campaign trail. The trend to 
personalisation continued, with the emphasis on leaders or candidates 
rather than on the parties for which they were standing. At the same time, 
distrust and disengagement on the part of many voters contributed to the 
success of negative campaigning targeting leaders and candidates.
Digital technology had broad consequences in terms of the fragmentation 
of the public sphere and the fact that many voters accessed their political 
news from echo chambers that confirmed their own views rather than 
exposing them to a diversity of opinion and debate. Negative campaigning 
thrives in such echo chambers, in what is often characterised as a ‘post-
truth’ environment, and digital technology gives added emphasis to visual 
elements such as memes and GIFs and the affect conveyed by visual 
images. One good example in the 2019 campaign was a photoshopped 
image of Bill Shorten in the bath posted by PHON with the words 
‘Bill couldn’t run a bath let alone a country’. The intersection between 
populism, personalisation and digital technology is a major theme of this 
book, along with its relationship to voter distrust. 
1  A larger proportion of female respondents (37 per cent) than male respondents (33 per cent) 
indicated that they voted for Labor. Similarly, 15 per cent of female respondents voted for the Greens, 
compared with 9 per cent of male respondents. This pattern was reversed for the Coalition, with 
48 per cent of male respondents voting for the Liberal and National Coalition parties, compared with 




Also contributing to voter distrust has been the laissez-faire attitude of the 
Australian Government towards the regulation of political finance and the 
consequent perceived purchase of political access and influence by ‘a few 
big interests’ at the expense of the people as a whole. The 2019 federal 
election campaign will be remembered for the more than $80 million 
spent by billionaire Clive Palmer—an outlay that delivered preferences 
for the Coalition but failed to win Palmer’s UAP a seat. The role of private 
money in federal elections makes Australia increasingly out of step with 
campaign finance regulation in comparable democracies. The cost of paid 
electronic advertising—banned in many comparable democracies—has 
driven Australian political parties to chase ever-greater private donations 
(Sawer 2019). Both political donations and the negative advertising these 
buy increase distrust in politicians and political parties.
Compounding the distrust stemming from the access bought by political 
donations are the perceived ‘rorts’ or abuse of entitlements by politicians, 
such as charging private or party travel to the public purse. Posts 
on social media platforms about such rorts quickly go viral, as in the 
helicopter memes that brought down former Speaker of the House of 
Representatives Bronwyn Bishop (Sawer and Gauja 2016). Australia 
differs from comparable democracies not only in its laissez-faire attitude 
to the role of private money in elections, but also in its attitude to the 
use of public money, such as parliamentary allowances, for electioneering. 
Under 2017 legislation, travel by staffers to assist parliamentarians in their 
re-election, including travel until the day before election day to work at 
party campaign headquarters, may be considered official business.
Populist discourse feeds on the distrust of democratic representatives or 
‘career politicians’ arising from the perceived abuse of public office. At the 
same time, populist discourse promotes suspicion of courts and tribunals, 
dismissing issues of governance and accountability as concerns of the 
‘Beltway’ or the ‘Canberra bubble’. In a video released after he became 
prime minister, Morrison invoked these sentiments when he said: 
‘The Canberra bubble is what happens down here, when people get all 
caught up with all sorts of gossip and rubbish, and that’s probably why 
most of you switch off any time you hear a politician talk’ (Coorey 2018). 
Mobilising resentment of selected elites is a feature of both left-wing 
populism (directed against the ‘big end of town’) and the more successful 
right-wing populism (directed against special interests with supposed 
contempt for the values of ordinary citizens but a desire to spend their 
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taxes). The latter form of populist discourse was very successfully wielded 
by former Prime Minister John Howard (see Sawer and Laycock 2009; 
Snow and Moffitt 2012). Such populist discourse was deployed relentlessly 
in the 2019 campaign by the Coalition in social media ads such as: ‘Labor 
can’t manage money, so they come after yours.’ 
The election result, while surprising to most, was perhaps 
‘overdetermined’—in other words, any one of a number of causes might 
have been sufficient to account for it. In addition to overly complex 
policy messages and an unpopular Labor leader, there was the populist 
discourse feeding off voter distrust, the ubiquitous negative campaigning 
funded by Palmer and other private donors and the media dominance of 
Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp. Not only is the concentration of media 
ownership in Australia among the highest in the world, but also the 
Murdoch mastheads and Sky News overwhelmingly campaigned against 
Labor during the campaign.
While the ubiquitous negative campaigning was seen as a new low in 
Australian politics, there was at least one positive development: the 2019 
election was the first since the 2001 ‘Tampa’ election not to mobilise 
anti-Islamic fears (Jensen 2019: 44). The closest the Prime Minister came 
to these previous campaigns was the repeated commitment to ‘keeping 
Australians safe’. Following the massacre of worshippers in two mosques 
in New Zealand in March, which drew attention to the links between 
anti-Islamic hate speech and violence, the Coalition eschewed the kind of 
fear campaign seen in preceding Australian elections. Candidates found to 
have expressed anti-Islamic views were more or less promptly disendorsed. 
The themes of this election had much in common with those dominating 
recent European elections, including voter distrust, populism and 
the personalisation of politics. Hence this book brings in comparative 
perspectives wherever possible, as well as consideration of the type of 
reforms desirable to boost public confidence in political institutions. 
The changing techniques of political persuasion are subjected to close 
examination, as are the methodologies used for public opinion polling 
and the changing patterns of voter behaviour, including the shift to early 
voting. Overall, the book provides a comprehensive overview of the actors 
and campaigns in the 2019 federal election and the rules of the game and 




Table 1.1 2019 federal election timetable
11 April Prime Minister announces the election will be held on 18 May
Postal vote applications open
Writs issued for the House and half‑Senate elections
18 April Electoral rolls close
21 April ‘Bulk’ (registered political parties) candidate nominations for the House 
of Representatives close
23 April Nominations of all candidates close
24 April Declaration of candidates; draw for positions on the ballots
29 April Early voting, mobile voting and checks on declaration envelopes 
commence, but no vote counting until close of voting at 6 pm on 18 May
15 May Postal vote applications close at 6 pm
18 May Election day
31 May All declaration (e .g . postal and absent) votes due
21 June Writs due; Parliament must sit within 30 days
Source: AEC (2019) .
The continuing tradition
As noted in the 2016 federal election book, Double Disillusion, Australian 
political scientists have produced election books or special issues of journals 
analysing federal election campaigns since 1958. This is the 17th of such 
volumes—a series supported since the 1996 election by the Academy of 
the Social Sciences in Australia (ASSA). After each election there is an 
academy-sponsored workshop identifying the key themes of the campaign 
as well as focusing on patterns of voter behaviour, the campaign strategies 
of political parties and third parties, the performance of the opinion 
polls, ideological contests and the role of the media. The current volume 
brings together 36 contributors, ranging from established to early career 
scholars, and has benefited from commentary by the political journalists 
and practitioners present at the federal election workshop.
To address the themes of voter distrust, personalisation, populism and 
digital disruption and to explain the result, this volume is divided into 
four parts: 
1. The context, covering the rules of the game, the campaign, candidates 
and preselection, ideology and leadership, marginal seat polling and 
the national polls.
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2. The results in the House, Senate, the States and Territories, and 
electoral behaviour.
3. The actors, including the political parties and third parties.
4. The media, including the traditional media, campaign communications 
and the visual campaign.
The first part of the book examines the campaign and its context, beginning 
with an overview by Marian Simms. Simms argues that Morrison 
inherited  a party room dogged by instability, ideological divisions and 
personal rivalries and his task was to show that the ‘uncertainty’ in the 
Coalition was over. Morrison’s subsequent presentation of himself 
as a  political outsider—an ‘accidental’ leader—was an example of 
personalised politics, as was Bill Shorten’s injection of family stories and 
personal questions to the audience. This personalised and charismatic 
style may be used by mainstream parties to compete with the smaller 
populist parties and Independents.
Simms suggests that, due to a number of factors, the campaign is not 
restricted to the period between the announcement of the election 
and election day. These factors include the advent of the continuous 
campaign (accelerated by social media), Australia’s short election cycles 
(especially with State electoral matters bleeding into federal politics) 
and the politicisation of the federal Budget. Hence the chapter covers 
the campaign context: the ‘long campaign’, from about November 2018 
to Budget week starting on 1 April 2019; and the ‘real’ campaign, from 
Budget day on 2 April through to polling day.
Simms shows that, alongside his personal style, Morrison managed to 
deliver a carefully crafted and highly focused campaign, based largely on 
the economy. He was bland about policies but sharp in his criticisms of 
the track record and plans of the Australian Labor Party (ALP). In stark 
contrast, Labor had been crafting policies since before the 2016 federal 
election under a broad redistributive agenda, which it said contrasted with 
the Coalition’s plans to support the big end of town. Arguably, Labor’s 
strategy of attacking the Liberals as representing corporate Australia failed 
miserably against Morrison’s persona and his statements and activities 
with regard to congestion-busting/drought-breaking. 
In the next chapter, ‘The rules of the game’, Marian Sawer and Michael 
Maley set out the ways in which the regulatory regime for federal elections 
has improved and the ways it has fallen behind best practice in comparable 
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democracies. Enrolment practice has finally been modernised, so the 
electoral roll is more comprehensive than ever; previous resistance to 
making enrolment easier has faded. Less positive is the continuing lack of 
restrictions on campaign expenditure at the federal level and the further 
liberalisation of the use of parliamentary resources for electioneering. 
The lack of any ‘truth in political advertising’ provision at the federal 
level became the subject of debate with the prevalence of misleading and 
deceptive claims—in particular, concerning Labor’s tax policy. The shift 
to social media, however, meant any attempt to regulate content was 
even more challenging. Notable in 2019 was the continued rise in early 
voting—an unforeseen consequence of much earlier changes to the 
Commonwealth Electoral Act. Just over 40 per cent of electors voted before 
polling day, including a significant number before the major parties held 
their campaign launches. This raised both deliberative concerns and 
concerns over a level playing field, considering the resources needed to 
have a presence at pre-polling centres for a three-week polling period.
In Chapter 4, ‘Candidates and preselection ’, Anika Gauja and Marija 
Taflaga argue that, while candidate selection is an extremely important 
process in determining the representativeness of the Australian 
Parliament, it is one in which relatively few people participate, being 
largely dominated by executives and factions and shrouded in secrecy. 
Using an original dataset created for the chapter, they show that, for the 
2019 federal election, only a handful of preselection contests was actually 
competitive and the majority received no media coverage. Gauja and 
Taflaga document the most controversial contests and analyse the impact 
of gender. They show that, in 2019, only 34 per cent of those who stood 
for party preselection were women. Overall, a higher percentage of women 
candidates was elected to the Senate than to the House of Representatives, 
but the overall composition of both houses is still heavily determined by 
the fact that the majority of incumbent parliamentarians are men. 
In ‘Ideology and populism’ (Chapter 5), Carol Johnson sees the 2019 
election as distinctive in presenting voters with a clear ideological choice 
between, on the one hand, a well-developed policy agenda to address 
stagnating wages and rising inequalities and, on the other, neoliberal 
opposition to such tax-and-spend policies (albeit in a form that 
emphasised a ‘fair go’ for ordinary Australians). While there might have 
been this choice, Labor did not succeed in communicating it effectively 
and its own past policies of economic deregulation and dismantling 
centralised wage-fixing may have reduced trust in its capacity to deliver. 
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In 2019, Labor engaged in populist discourse against ‘the big end of town’ 
in particular. The Morrison team also engaged in populist discourse, 
mobilising the people against big government and the spending of their 
money (‘I don’t think the Government knows better than you do about 
where your money should go’). The emphasis was on attacking Labor and 
Johnson suggests the Coalition was increasingly aware of the difficulty of 
selling a more explicitly neoliberal agenda of its own. Morrison himself 
combined neoliberal ideological beliefs and the compatible Pentecostal 
‘prosperity gospel’. 
Paul Strangio and James Walter argue in Chapter 6, ‘The personalisation 
of the campaign’, that the personalisation of the election contest was both 
a continuation of previous trends and the deliberate crafting of personae 
by the leaders—notably, Scott Morrison. Strangio and Walter show 
how Morrison was able to emerge from relative obscurity—a political 
unknown—to appear as a well-liked ordinary bloke (see also Kelly 2018). 
Shorten, in contrast, was well-known for his long track record as ALP 
leader and a senior minister before that. Somehow, Shorten’s experience 
became a liability, especially given the perception of his history in unseating 
previous leaders and engaging in dubious union deals. The authors 
conclude Shorten was no Bob Hawke, resembling more the hapless Bill 
Hayden, who stood aside to enable Hawke’s leadership in 1983.
In Chapter 7, ‘National polling and other disasters’, Luke Mansillo and 
Simon Jackman examine the failure of the national polls conducted 
before the election to anticipate the result. The national polls—which 
had been reasonably accurate predictors of election outcomes in recent 
years—powerfully shaped expectations among the public, journalists 
and politicians themselves that Labor would win the election. Mansillo 
and Jackman fit a ‘state-space model’ to the public opinion polls fielded 
between the 2016 and 2019 federal elections, identifying the estimated 
trajectory of voting intentions between the two elections, house effects 
(biases specific to each polling organisation) and the discontinuity in 
public opinion associated with the transition from Malcolm Turnbull 
to Morrison as prime minister in August 2018. Polling error in 2019 
was largely associated with underestimating Coalition support, while 
overestimating support for minor parties, especially on the part of YouGov 
Australia. Some of this polling error could have been anticipated given the 
observed biases in polls fielded before the 2016 federal election (Jackman 
and Mansillo 2018), but most of the 2016–19 error was new. What was 
especially striking about the polling errors in 2019 was that: a) errors 
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in estimates of first preferences did not ‘wash out’ when converted to 
two-party-preferred estimates, such that b) the resulting errors in the two-
party-preferred estimates were large by historical standards, and c) they 
led to an incorrect prediction as to which party would form government, 
at which point larger-than-typical ‘poll error’ became a fully fledged crisis 
of confidence in polls and the polling industry. The chapter identifies 
pollster malpractice through ‘herding’; published polls during the 
campaign period were far too close, suggesting adjustment of weighting 
procedures to match estimates from rival polling organisations.
In ‘The perilous polling of single seats’ (Chapter 8), Murray Goot 
forensically examines the opinion surveys undertaken in individual seats 
and, more often, in groups of seats. He discusses the decline in the number 
of such polls compared with previous elections and their methodological 
limitations and lack of transparency. Notably, not all single-seat polls are 
in the ‘marginals’ and may be undertaken for other reasons. For example, 
while the federal seat of Deakin was not marginal, it was considered 
potentially winnable by the ALP due to the anti-Liberal swing in the 
equivalent Victorian State seats. Goot notes that ‘provincial’ seats were 
overpolled compared with both rural and metropolitan ones. These 
polls overestimated both the ALP primary vote and the UAP primary 
vote. More worrying were the conflict-of-interest issues whereby a single 
company undertook polling for different clients who assumed the results 
were confirmatory rather than duplicated! Goot’s chapter raises issues of 
‘trust’ in both single-seat and national polls.
The second part of the book analyses the results of the 2019 federal 
election. This is done across four chapters, with chapters presenting a 
detailed breakdown of the House of Representatives and Senate results, 
a chapter analysing regional variations in the campaign and another chapter 
that explores patterns of individual voter behaviour. Such a multifaceted 
analysis is necessary to fully understand the complexity of Australian 
federal elections, which comprise two discrete elections using different 
voting systems—one for the House of Representatives and one for the 
Senate.2 It is also necessary to understand the role and importance of 
regions in Australia’s federated democracy and to appreciate the dynamics 
of class, age and ethnicity that underlie patterns of voting.
2  State senators have six-year terms, while House of Representatives terms are three years; typically, 
a House election coincides with a so-called half-Senate election.
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In Chapter 9, Ben Raue presents the results of the House of Representatives 
vote, highlights the key contests in each of the States and Territories and 
explains the electoral redistributions and by-elections that took place 
during the previous parliamentary term. Raue reports that the primary 
vote for minor parties in the House in 2019 increased to a historic high 
of 25.2 per cent, and preferences (particularly those for Palmer’s UAP 
and PHON) played an important role in the outcome of the election. 
The 2019 election was also notable for the growth in postal and pre-poll 
voting, which favoured the Coalition, and the gap in the two-party-
preferred vote between those who voted early and those who voted on 
election day was wider than in the preceding six elections.
Reporting the results of the Senate contest, Antony Green analyses the 
impact of changes to the Senate voting system that were designed to make 
voting more transparent and proportionate by abolishing group voting 
tickets. The number of groups and candidates contesting the election fell 
compared with the previous half-Senate election in 2013. The new system 
also produced a result that achieved what it was intended to do: to favour 
political parties with a substantial vote before the allocation of preferences 
and to make it much more difficult for parties to be elected on the basis 
of preference deals. 
The 2019 election was notable for the variation in electoral support for 
the Coalition and Labor among the Australian States, Territories and 
regions. In Chapter 11, Nick Economou, Zareh Ghazarian, Narelle 
Miragliotta, Will Sanders, Rodney Smith, John Warhurst and Paul 
Williams briefly analyse the campaign in the States and Territories. They 
discuss previous State and Territory election results, economic conditions, 
specific policy promises and campaign visits from the major party leaders. 
They highlight key contests and analyse notable regional variations within 
each jurisdiction.
In Chapter 12, on voter behaviour, Shaun Ratcliff, Jill Sheppard and 
Juliet Pietsch examine the impact of age, economic status and ethnicity 
on how Australians vote. Using new data from the Cooperative Australian 
Election Survey, they show that higher-income homeowners supported 
the Coalition, whereas lower-income renters voted for Labor. They argue 
that Labor’s policy on housing affordability and inequity was an electoral 
liability; while support was concentrated among Labor voters, opposition 
was diffuse. The authors show that ethnic minorities did not favour the 
Coalition, nor did their views on same-sex marriage push them to vote for 
the Coalition parties in the election. 
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The third part of the book turns to the role of party actors and Independents 
in the campaign as well as third parties. In Chapter 14, Nicholas Barry 
explores continuities in the Liberal campaign such as the discursive strategy 
of identifying Labor with class warfare but also new elements such as the 
party’s social media strategy, which was much more successful than in 
2016. He describes Morrison as a ‘conservative’ who successfully brought 
together conservatives, moderates and former Turnbull supporters. 
He also examines the Liberal Party’s ‘women problem’: its failure to put 
more women into parliament, their treatment while in parliament and the 
parallels with the underrepresentation of women in conservative parties in 
Europe and elsewhere. Meanwhile, the rural-based Coalition partner, the 
National Party, more than held its own despite the diminished rurality of 
its electorates, a leadership scandal, mismanagement of water allocations 
in the Murray–Darling Basin and the conflicting interests of miners and 
farmers elsewhere. Geoff Cockfield notes that among the policy dilemmas 
confronting the Nationals is that of migration, where the traditional social 
conservatism of the party has to be balanced with regional demands for 
labour for agricultural industries.
The hollowing out of support for centre-left parties across Europe forms 
the backdrop of Rob Manwaring’s analysis of the structural factors 
affecting Labor, including the erosion of its support base in the unions. 
He also compares Labor and Coalition policies, noting how the relatively 
policy-rich offerings of Labor failed to gain traction compared with 
the concentrated negative message of the Coalition’s campaign. It was 
a different story for the Greens, who were surging across Europe in the 
May elections for the European Parliament but making only relatively 
small gains in Australia. In Chapter 16, Stewart Jackson explores why 
climate change did not become—as expected—a key focus of the election. 
He finds a number of reasons: internal party problems, particularly in 
Victoria; the presidential-style campaign waged by Morrison against 
Shorten, which became the focus of attention; and the fact the Greens 
campaigned on a range of issues, not just climate change.
Minor populist parties on the right—such as PHON and Clive Palmer’s 
UAP, Katter’s Australian Party (KAP) and the Jacqui Lambie Network 
(JLN)—were catching up with the Greens in the scale of their social 
media and digital campaigning, which is something closely analysed 
by Glenn Kefford in Chapter 17. Electors continued to vote for a wide 
range of minor parties and Independents, with their choice depending 
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on the State or region in which they lived. There was no evidence of any 
significant return to historical patterns of strong identification with the 
major parties.
The exploration by Jennifer Curtin and Jill Sheppard of the Independents’ 
campaigns again highlights the disaffection with the major parties and 
the search for alternatives. In the rural Victorian seat of Indi, there was a 
unique community-based process to replace retiring Independent, Cathy 
McGowan. ‘Voices of Indi’ volunteers determined a succession process 
through which Helen Haines was chosen as preferred candidate and 
became the first Independent to succeed another in a federal electorate. 
Meanwhile in Warringah, Independent Zali Steggall was successful in 
defeating former prime minister Tony Abbott. The authors place her 
among a new group of socially progressive but economically conservative 
women Independents, alienated by the Liberal Party’s lack of attention to 
climate policy and failure to develop a culture more inclusive of women. 
One such woman, Dr Kerryn Phelps, was unsuccessful in retaining the 
usually safe Liberal seat of Wentworth, which she had managed to win in 
a 2018 by-election.
Whereas unions were high-profile actors in the 2019 election, business was 
not, and is described by John Wanna in Chapter 19 as ‘missing in action’. 
The slack, however, was taken up by business-oriented commentators—
some from third parties and others from the media, including Sky News 
commentator and former Liberal Party adviser Chris Kenny. Big business 
was not active in the campaign, in contrast to preceding federal elections, 
and in some instances was supportive of ALP policy positions such as 
reviewing the level of payments of the Newstart allowance for the 
unemployed. Advertising and campaigning were conducted by other peak 
councils, such as the Australian Property Council and Master Builders 
Australia, which joined the chorus of opposition to the ALP’s plans to 
abolish negative gearing and capital gains tax discounts.
In Chapter 20, Andrew Scott examines the role of a range of specific 
unions in the policy debates and advertising campaigns. The peak union 
body, the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU), did not reach 
the highwater mark achieved in its 2007 election campaign, when it 




In 2019, a number of feminised unions—in industries with 
a predominantly female workforce—ran strong campaigns. Scott discusses 
grassroots and advertising campaigns by nurses’ and teachers’ unions. The 
ACTU and the Victorian Trades Hall Council—the latter emboldened 
by the pro-Labor swing in the 2018 State election—undertook surveys 
and campaigns in targeted seats. Mining and energy interests effectively 
created a wedge between parts of the union movement and the ALP, so 
there were no united voices over big election issues such as the proposed 
Adani coalmine in central Queensland.
In Chapter 21, on third parties and think tanks, Ebony Bennett argues 
that activist group GetUp! used the same strategy it had used in 2016 but 
with limited success. It targeted ‘right-wing blockers’ in seven seats and 
campaigned in a further 22. Its main success was in the seat of Warringah, 
which saw the defeat of Abbott; small swings were achieved elsewhere. 
GetUp! itself also became a target, was forced to withdraw a tasteless 
advertisement, and was accused of bullying and harassment by Liberal 
candidate (now MP) Nicolle Flint. 
A conservative counterpart, Advance Australia (AA), was formed in 
late 2018 and worked in the targeted seats of Warringah, Mayo, Indi 
and Flinders. AA’s memorable ‘Captain GetUp’ was possibly more 
effective at promoting GetUp! than opposing it. Bennett also analyses 
the policy contributions of the think tanks The Australia Institute 
and the conservative Institute of Public Affairs (IPA).
The fourth part of the book examines the role of the media in the 
campaign,  ranging from traditional print media to YouTube videos. 
In Chapter 22, Andrea Carson and Lawrie Zion find that the front-page 
emphasis on tax increases and Labor spending supported the Coalition’s 
campaign narrative, particularly in the Murdoch mastheads and the 
Australian Financial Review. The Murdoch-owned Sky News also reinforced 
negative messages about Labor (and positive messages about PHON). 
The Coalition’s social media strategy—particularly its use of video posts—
was notably more successful than Labor’s, attracting more than twice as 
many Facebook viewers. Social media also provided a platform enabling 
third parties and other actors, as well as the Coalition, to spread a fear 
campaign falsely claiming that Labor would introduce a ‘death tax’.
In Chapter 23, Stephen Mills compares Liberal and Labor campaign 
communications strategies, finding that Labor adopted a ‘challenger-style, 
policy-centred strategy incorporating a largely positive and broad-based 
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message of change’. The Liberals, by contrast, adopted a largely negative 
incumbency-style strategy, policy-free and focused on leadership. This 
resulted in a campaign fought over the Opposition’s policy rather than the 
record of the Coalition Government. Mills analyses how these campaign 
strategies were implemented—in particular, the flaws in Labor’s campaign 
advertising compared with the simpler and more effective Liberal ads, 
including one in which a framed family photo is being squeezed in a rusty 
old vice called Labor. The pun used elsewhere was also effective: ‘Labor: 
The Bill Australia can’t afford.’ Both parties had separate teams organised 
to deliver such messages through news media, electronic advertising 
and digital media, and Labor also had a separate team for direct voter 
contact (doorknocking and phone banks)—something into which the 
Coalition has traditionally put less effort. Despite Labor (and ACTU) 
experience with such fieldwork and its increased scale in 2019, it was 
relatively unsuccessful compared with the determined and highly negative 
incumbency campaign.
The visual elements in campaigning are of increasing importance and 
Lucien Leon analyses the contrasting functions of memes—familiar images 
transmitted with brief witty captions—in Chapter 24. While memes are 
often called the new political cartoons, they are also the form increasingly 
taken by everyday political engagement. However, they can be weaponised 
by political parties and have the capacity to polarise and misinform 
the electorate as they go viral. The intervention of political players had 
consolidated since 2016 and most of the memes featured in mainstream 
news media came from six Facebook groups, including Clive Palmer’s Put 
Australia First, Australian Young Greens and Labor and Liberal–oriented 
groups. The memes circulating during the campaign focused on tax, the 
economy, climate change, Liberal leadership and distrust of Bill Shorten, 
and Leon argues they provided a reliable gauge of the electoral mood. 
A selection of memes, cartoons and videos is included in this chapter, 
illustrating responses to the campaign by political cartoonists, partisan 
players and engaged citizens.
Aftermath: Morrison’s mandate
Bill Shorten’s resignation from the ALP leadership on election night 
created speculation over his replacement; in the event, Anthony Albanese 
was the sole candidate when the nominations closed, and the three other 
leadership positions were also uncontested, with much behind-the-scenes 
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discussion. The new ALP team comprised Anthony Albanese (NSW) as 
Leader, Richard Marles (Victoria) as Deputy Leader, Penny Wong (South 
Australia) as Senate Leader and Kristina Keneally (NSW) as Deputy Senate 
Leader. Shorten opted to remain an MP and is a member of Albanese’s 
Shadow Cabinet, which comprises 12 women and 12 men.
Morrison’s new ministry was sworn in on 29 May, with a mix of existing 
ministers and others in new roles—notably, Ken Wyatt as the first 
Aboriginal Minister for Indigenous Australians and Senator Bridget 
McKenzie as the first woman Minister for Agriculture. McKenzie did not 
last long in this position. She resigned in February 2020 and returned 
to the backbench after she was found to have breached the Statement of 
Ministerial Standards for her involvement in the sports grants scandal 
(Coorey 2020).
Ministers Josh Frydenberg (Treasurer) and Mathias Cormann (Senate 
Leader and Minister for Finance) would be responsible for delivering the 
Coalition tax cuts that passed the Senate on 4 July. While the delivery of 
personal tax cuts was Morrison’s core promise, arguably his ‘mandate’ was 
open-ended.
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Scott Morrison—reminiscent of Tony Abbott in the 2013 federal 
election—campaigned until the last moment of the 2019 election 
campaign, ending up in the marginal seat of Bass, Tasmania, on election 
morning, 18 May. The previous day, he had crisscrossed Queensland and 
finished in the marginal coastal seat of Gilmore in New South Wales. The 
Coalition was rewarded with one additional seat and majority government. 
The House of Representatives is finely balanced; the Coalition is a bad by-
election away from relying on the Speaker’s casting vote. While few seats 
changed hands in the election, the outcome was ‘transformative’.
Some jurisdictions formally recognise that campaigning commences well 
before the actual election announcement; the United Kingdom, for example, 
acknowledges a ‘pre-campaigning’ period of about three months—generally 
known as the ‘long’ campaign (White 2015). In Australia, there was a clear 
policy divide between the major parties, with the Coalition promising tax 
cuts and the Australian Labor Party (ALP) supporting new welfare and energy 
initiatives funded by closing tax loopholes—a divide that had developed 
over several Budget cycles. In an era of the ‘continuous campaign’, most of 
Labor’s new policies and the government’s new expenditure commitments 
1  Marian Simms was Executive Director, Social, Behavioural and Economic Sciences, at the 
Australian Research Council in the industry and education portfolios from 2011 to 2017. The views 




were released well ahead of the election announcement. The 2019 election 
campaign, like the 2013 campaign and to a degree the 2016 one, was 
fought not ‘principally on policy issues, but on personalities’ (Johnson et al. 
2015: 1; Gauja et al. 2018: 3).
This chapter is therefore divided into four parts: distinctive features of 
the overall campaign; the campaign context (the legacy of Malcolm 
Turnbull’s prime ministership); the long campaign (from the beginning 
of Scott Morrison’s prime ministership), covering critical issues and events 
well before Morrison called the election on 11 April 2019 for an 18 May 
House and half-Senate election; and the ‘real’ campaign, commencing 
with the federal Budget speech a week before the election was called.
Distinctive features of the campaign
The interrelated themes of the campaign were leadership, by-elections, 
State elections, opinion polls and the emergence of issues such as 
migration limits and refugees, urban infrastructure, housing affordability, 
religious freedom, the recognition of West Jerusalem as the capital of 
Israel, aged care, ‘closing the gap’ strategies, terrorism, the economy and 
specifically the Budget surplus, domestic violence, medical research, a levy 
on banks, taxation, emissions targets, the ‘living wage’ and Australian 
citizenship.2 The politics of personality and different strands of populism 
were features of the 2019 election campaign. They are interrelated, as 
personalised parties led by charismatic leaders that attack mainstream 
parties and institutions as ‘untrustworthy’ are one kind of populism that 
fills a perceived representation gap (Taggart 2002: 62).
Prior to the election campaign and during the campaign itself, the use 
of social media was important. For example, claims about the ALP’s 
alleged plans to introduce a ‘death tax’ were virulent on social media 
and were used in Liberal Party campaign advertising—as in the words of 
a campaign brochure distributed by the Canberra Liberals (2019): ‘Labor 
will tax, your rent, your home, your car, your retirement—LABOR WILL 
TAX YOU TO DEATH.’3
2  This list is taken from formal policy announcements and major speeches by the Coalition and 
Labor leaders.
3  US Republican pollster Frank Luntz is generally credited with organising the widespread use 
of the term ‘death tax’ in the mid-1990s as a way of mobilising public opinion against estate taxes.
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Shorten wasted valuable time during the election campaign issuing 
denials. Ultra-right groups played on fears that the ALP was anti-growth, 
anti-mining and anti-jobs, running social media campaigns through 
Facebook and producing social media posts on Corflute signs during the 
Longman by-election (28 July 2018).
In the lead-up to the election announcement, the Coalition, its associated 
groups and sections of the print and electronic media depicted the ALP’s 
longstanding policies to remove tax breaks as plans to introduce ‘new’ 
taxes. This was from the Abbott playbook, borrowed from US Republican 
strategists, as in Abbott’s claims in 2013 that Labor would put a big tax 
on everything (see Johnson et al. 2015) and his later attacks on Turnbull’s 
‘tax on coal’. Retiring Liberal Member of Parliament (MP) Christopher 
Pyne letterboxed his electorate in Adelaide with pamphlets saying Labor’s 
proposed negative gearing changes would create a ‘housing tax’ and 
a new recession. Conservative think tank the Institute of Public Affairs 
(IPA) also argued that the living wage policy would create a recession 
(Creighton 2019: 5).
The 2017–18 and 2018–19 federal Budgets had provided opportunities 
for the political leaders to articulate policies and develop themes; some 
issues had carried over from the 2016–17 Budget and the 2016 election. 
Clear differences emerged between the two sides of politics on fiscal 
policies, with the Coalition’s flatter tax structures and corporate tax cuts 
versus Labor’s slanting of tax reform towards lower-income workers. 
Labor would initiate a major review of the Newstart Allowance for the 
unemployed, which the Coalition strenuously opposed. The Coalition 
saw itself as providing opportunities, rewarding success and supporting 
business investment—in line with Turnbull’s signature National 
Innovation and Science Agenda. The ALP could depict itself as the ‘fair 
go’ party versus the Coalition’s ‘mates’ rates. Such a strategy may have 
looked effective against Turnbull but would not stick so easily against 
Morrison. See, for example, Shadow Minister for Finance Jim Chalmers’s 
(2019) tweet about Minister for Finance Mathias Cormann and Prime 
Minister Morrison’s travel ‘perks’ from corporate friends.
Turnbull had released an overarching signature policy and rearranged 
the Commonwealth bureaucracy to support this,4 whereas Morrison 
and his opponent, Bill Shorten, made policy-oriented set-piece speeches 
(see Table 2.1).
4  The National Innovation and Science Agenda provided little ‘new’ money but considerable 
repurposing of funds, especially around research grants and business and university incentives.
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While leadership remained an issue throughout the formal campaign, 
many of the pre-campaign issues were muted, while others re-emerged 
with intensity—notably, the economy, taxation, housing and urban 
infrastructure or ‘congestion’ and the Adani coalmine. Religion re-emerged 
in the third and final leaders’ debate—only because the compere, the 
ABC’s Sabra Lane, asked both leaders for their views on the recent sacking 
of rugby union player Israel Folau by Rugby Australia due to his comments 
on social media, inter alia, that gay people would go to hell.
A number of these key campaign issues had also played out during the 
by-elections held in 2017 and 2018.5 Other issues—notably, the bad 
behaviour of the banks—did not provide a ‘framework’ for the 2019 
election, despite journalist Paul Kelly’s prediction (Kelly 2019: 1). Overall, 
the Coalition’s strategy of accepting the banking royal commission’s 
findings and ‘moving on’ reduced Labor’s strategy of reminding voters 
that Morrison had opposed calls for a royal commission to ‘nothing more 
than a populist whinge’ (McIlroy 2019: 7).
The 2019 election would be fought along new boundaries, after a 2017–18 
redistribution enlarged the House to 151 from 150 and gave Victoria 
and the Australian Capital Territory new seats, removing one from South 
Australia (see Raue, Chapter 9, this volume). This was thought likely to 
benefit the ALP, especially in Victoria, as Melbourne expanded into the 
regions, and the naming of new and existing seats was contentious.
The context: The Turnbull prime 
ministership
Malcolm Turnbull fared well after taking over the leadership from Tony 
Abbott in September 2015, especially in the preferred prime minister 
ratings of the opinion polls, where he overshadowed Bill Shorten. Such 
was Turnbull’s standing it was widely anticipated he would call an early 
election. Instead, he persevered with a double-dissolution strategy over 
contentious industrial relations legislation and set a 55-day campaign. 
Turnbull came close to losing the ‘unlosable’ election; the Coalition 
scraped home with a narrow majority of 76 seats (see Gauja et al. 2018). 
Despite Shorten’s personal unpopularity and the ALP’s low primary vote, 
there was a solid two-party-preferred swing to Labor.
5  These were due mainly to MPs’ ineligibility under Section 44(i) of the Australian Constitution.
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2017
Turnbull’s credibility had suffered a blow and he staggered through 2017 
facing multiple challenges, not the least being the long-running imbroglio 
over the eligibility to sit in the parliament of a number of senior Coalition 
figures (along with minor party MPs) during 2017—an issue in which 
ALP figures came to be embroiled the following year after months of 
declaring the party had robust processes for checking candidate eligibility.
Sussan Ley, Turnbull’s Minister for Health, Aged Care and Sport, had 
resigned her portfolio in January 2017 over some of her travel claims 
failing the ‘pub test’. Travel issues had previously been a headache for the 
Abbott Government, ensnaring Abbott himself and National Party Leader 
and Deputy Prime Minister Barnaby Joyce. Then Speaker of the House of 
Representatives Bronwyn Bishop was forced to resign the speakership in 
2015 over live footage of her arrival via helicopter at a regional golf course 
in late 2014. Abbott subsequently initiated a comprehensive review of 
‘parliamentary entitlements’, which reported to Turnbull in 2016. As well 
as fuelling a lack of respect for and lack of trust in the federal parliament, 
these events potentially fed the perception that the  Coalition was 
rorting the system and cavorting with the rich and famous while many 
constituents were doing it tough.
After the High Court found in October 2017 that National Party Leader 
Joyce was ineligible to sit in parliament,6 his seat of New England was 
immediately declared vacant and writs were issued for a 2 December 
by-election.7 Soon after, Liberal John Alexander resigned his Sydney seat 
of Bennelong, also over concerns relating to Section 44(i) of the Australian 
Constitution, and a by-election was set for 16 December. 
The loss of two Coalition MPs sent Turnbull into minority government, 
relying on crossbenchers Rebekha Sharkie and Cathy McGowan during 
the last parliamentary session of 2017. Both Joyce and Alexander were 
returned, although Alexander suffered a 5.3 per cent negative swing in 
6  The High Court sits as the Court of Disputed Returns on references from the House and/or 
Senate, the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) or petitions from an eligible voter or candidate. 
See High Court (2017).
7  Joyce survived the by-election only to be caught in a major scandal in early 2018; he received 
a major telling off from Turnbull and was sent on enforced leave. An update to the Ministerial Code 




the primary vote, whereas his opponent, the ALP’s seasoned campaigner 
and former NSW premier Kristina Keneally, gained a positive swing. 
Her primary vote was up 7.3 per cent.
With the Coalition in minority government, Labor flexed its muscles in 
the House, again urging the Coalition to call a royal commission into 
the banks, following a Senate inquiry into the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC) in 2014 and media exposés of sharp 
practices by the banks especially regarding housing and farm finance.8 
Sections of the National Party were angry at the banks’ mishandling 
of farm loans, were threatening a private member’s bill and pushed the 
government to act, helped by the big banks requesting an inquiry. Finally, 
the Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation 
and Financial Services Industry was announced, in late November 2017 
(Ziffer 2019: 4–7).9
2018
The eligibility issue recurred in 2018, this time implicating high-profile 
ALP MPs David Feeney and Katy Gallagher, among others; Feeney 
resigned and Senator Gallagher was found to be ineligible. The March by-
election for Feeney’s Victorian seat of Batman was won by his successor, 
Ged Kearney, a popular former union leader (see Scott, Chapter 20, this 
volume). A cluster of by-elections was scheduled for ‘Super Saturday’, 28 
July, with nine-week campaigns. Both the timing and the length of the 
campaigns were controversial: there was a clash with the date long set for 
the ALP’s national conference. Leader of the Opposition in the Senate, 
Penny Wong, quizzed the electoral commissioner at a Senate Estimates 
Committee hearing, declaring him to be partisan: ‘The timeline in relation 
to this by-election is demonstrably, substantially different to the timelines 
which were applied in seats which were previously held by government 
members, which looks partisan’ (see Brown 2018a).10
8  Bill Shorten had promised a royal commission into the banking and financial sector in the lead-
up to the 2016 election.
9  The report was delivered in February 2019; subsequently, the CEO and the chair of the National 
Australia Bank announced their resignations. The former resigned almost immediately and the latter 
remained until a new chair was appointed.
10  Technically, the Speaker announces the dates of by-elections on advice from the AEC.
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In the by-elections, four of the five seats were held by the ALP, while the 
fifth was held by the Centre Alliance: Braddon (Tas.), Justine Keay (ALP); 
Fremantle (WA), Josh Wilson (ALP);11 Longman (Qld), Susan Lamb 
(ALP); Mayo (SA), Rebekha Sharkie (Centre Alliance); and Perth (WA), 
Patrick Gorman (ALP), who was running in place of former member 
Tim Hammond, who had resigned for family reasons. 
The senators found to be ineligible were replaced by countback (on the 
complexities of this, see Sawer and Maley, Chapter 3, this volume). Some 
processes were complicated, such as the disqualification in New South 
Wales of Fiona Nash, whose replacement, Hollie Hughes, was also found 
to be ineligible; under Section 44(iv), the replacement was former military 
official Jim Molan (of the conservative wing of the NSW Liberal Party).12 
The results of the July 2018 ‘Super Saturday’ by-elections had negative 
outcomes for the Liberals. The ALP and Centre Alliance held on to their 
seats, with swings against the Liberals in all seats. The outcome was also 
detrimental to Turnbull’s leadership, alongside other factors such as internal 
party and Coalition divisions over his signature National Energy Guarantee 
(NEG) policy,13 and the retention on the Senate’s agenda of the proposed 
corporate tax cuts for big business. In Longman (Qld), for example, the 
Liberals’ private research showed locals were deeply unhappy about 
the proposed corporate tax cuts for big business benefiting the banks and 
about possible consequential health Budget cuts (Savva 2019: 203). In a 
complicated process, the Coalition had reshuffled the corporate tax package 
first mooted in the 2016 Budget, but as late as winter 2018, it was still 
hoping to pass the second tranche of tax cuts for businesses worth more 
than $50 million. In the event, Pauline Hanson withdrew her support for 
the corporate tax package ahead of the Longman by-election (on 28 July 
2018). However, despite Hanson not campaigning in person—due to 
‘exhaustion’—and being replaced with a carboard cut-out figure of herself, 
Pauline Hanson’s One Nation (PHON) received a swing of 6.49 per cent.
11  Wilson was brought in at the last minute for the 2016 election, as the original candidate had 
been disendorsed for failing to disclose two convictions (Foster 2016).
12  In December 2017, the Turnbull Government established an inquiry into Section 44 by the Joint 
Standing Committee on Electoral Matters. In May 2018, the committee recommended a referendum 
to change Section 44(i). Molan was relegated to an unwinnable spot for the 2019 Senate ticket and 
campaigned on a below-the-line strategy, in which he garnered more than 100,000 votes but was 
ultimately unsuccessful. However, in November 2019, Molan was selected by the NSW Liberal Party 
to fill a casual vacancy caused by the resignation of Senator Arthur Sinodinos.




Arguably, the by-election wins created future problems for Labor. The ALP 
had issued or reissued policies throughout 2018, including the immediate 
abolition of franking credit cash refunds and the end of negative gearing 
for new investors in old stock rental properties from 2020. It had taken 
these and other policies to the 2018 by-elections and, in the case of its 
negative gearing reforms, to the 2016 election. Longman is a retirement-
belt constituency and, although there was negative campaigning, 
Labor’s primary vote had increased to nearly 40 per cent. Some negative 
campaigning was around Labor’s links with the Greens, as per the polling 
booth placards put out by the ultra-right (and posted on Facebook): 
‘This year Bill Shorten, and Susan Lamb voted with the Greens 100% 
of the time (#THETRUTHMATTERS 2018)’. In the March 2018 
Batman by-election in Victoria, the Greens pitched to conservative voters 
to preference Greens ahead of Labor on account of the ALP’s franking 
credits policy (Carey 2018). Labor subsequently adjusted its ‘no franking 
credits’ policy to exclude all pensioners and part-pensioners.
Despite positive signs in 2018 for the Coalition, with the Liberals 
winning State elections in South Australia and Tasmania, the messiness 
of the Section 44 situation and the passing of the 30 bad polls milestone 
for Turnbull in April led to leadership rumblings—based on fears that the 
Coalition was heading for defeat at the next federal election, which was 
due by late May 2019.14 Turnbull’s public fight with Joyce over the latter’s 
affair with a staffer had not helped relations with the National Party, 
which, for largely pragmatic reasons, resented the loss of Joyce—a strong 
grassroots campaigner—in February 2018. The marriage equality 
debate had already opened old wounds between progressives and social 
conservatives in the Coalition.
The promised personal tax cuts from the 2018–19 Budget went awry in 
the Senate as Pauline Hanson went cool on the package. The Turnbull–
Morrison economics team had earlier backed away from the increase in the 
Medicare Levy for high-income earners proposed in the 2017–18 Budget. 
Labor had promised better tax cuts for low-income workers, an education 
funding package for the Technical and Further Education (TAFE) 
sector and more health infrastructure. Shorten’s general philosophy in 
developing policy was ‘transparency’—in terms of debating issues at the 
ALP’s national conference and promulgating those policies with a unified 
team (Marr 2015: 2). 
14  If a half-Senate election were to be held alongside the House election.
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The ALP’s retention of Longman in July with a 9 per cent swing against 
the Liberals, and a high PHON primary vote of 17 per cent, worried 
Queensland Liberals in nearby marginal seats, including the Minister 
for Home Affairs, Peter Dutton, in the Brisbane seat of Dickson. The 
fourth week of August 2018 was a political circus, resulting in Turnbull 
losing the leadership to Morrison on a second contest after Turnbull 
called a leadership ‘spill’ and saw off an initial challenge from Dutton (see 
Strangio and Walter, Chapter 6, this volume).
The long campaign: The Morrison prime 
ministership
2018
Malcolm Turnbull’s resignation from parliament after he lost the prime 
ministership in August triggered a by-election in Wentworth (NSW) 
on 20 October 2018. Independent candidate Dr Kerryn Phelps won 
narrowly and took her seat in parliament on 26 November; the Morrison 
Government was in a minority.15 Its minority status was reiterated the 
next day when Julia Banks—an outspoken critic of bullying by men 
within the Liberal Party and of the dumping of Turnbull—resigned from 
the Liberal Party and joined the crossbench (see Curtin and Sheppard, 
Chapter 18, this volume).16 After the Wentworth by-election, the next 
major test of Morrison’s performance was the Victorian State election of 
24 November 2018; State Labor received a positive swing and moved into 
Liberal heartland seats. As outlined by Nick Economou et al. (Chapter 11, 
this volume), this was widely seen as indicating that, federally, the Liberals 
would have serious trouble in Victoria. 
15  In August, as a protest against the Liberal leadership changes, Kevin Hogan, Nationals MP for 
Page, moved to the crossbench, while still attending National Party meetings and continuing to be 
a National Party MP; he promised supply and confidence. He was backed by National Party Leader, 
Michael McCormack.
16  Banks apparently did so without providing advance notice to the party leadership and while 
Morrison was giving a press conference. Banks was the only Coalition candidate to win a seat from 
the ALP in the 2016 election.
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Address to the Lowy Institute, Sydney: ‘The foreign policy 
of the next Labor Government’
Scott Morrison
19 November 2018
Bradfield Address, Sydney: migration limits, population 
policy and urban infrastructure
Bill Shorten
22 November 2018
Energy policy launch, Sydney, with Chris Bowen (Shadow 
Treasurer) and Mark Butler (Shadow Minister for Energy 
and Climate Change): emissions reductions, solar storage 
battery subsidy; NEG back on the table  
Bill Shorten
16–18 December 2018
ALP National Conference, Adelaide: housing affordability 
theme
Treasurer Josh Frydenberg 
and Minister for Finance 
Mathias Cormann
17 December 2018
Mid‑Year Economic and Fiscal outlook (MYEFo) released: 
surplus foreshadowed by next financial year
Bill Shorten
14 January 2019
Announces $50 million for diabetes research; major 




Announces additional funding for Kakadu National Park (NT) 
and Australia Day citizenship policy at a press conference 
with Indigenous Country Liberal Party candidate Jacinta 
Price at Jabiru, which is surrounded by Kakadu 
Scott Morrison
29 January 2019
Speech to Brothers Rugby Union Club, Brisbane: Coalition 
will deliver jobs and growth
Scott Morrison
11 February 2019
Address to National Press Club, Canberra: government 
to increase aged care funding by $662 million
Scott Morrison
5 March 2019
Australian Financial Review (AFR) Business Summit, 
Sydney: Labor would be bad for the economy
Bill Shorten
6 March 2019
AFR Business Summit speech, Sydney: next election 
would be a referendum on wages; ALP needed to work 
with business and unions
Bill Shorten
26 March 2019
‘Living wage’ policy press release
Bill Shorten
31 March 2019
Press release for 1 April: climate change, emissions 
reductions and waste strategies (Mark Butler’s electric car 
target tweet the previous day)
Treasurer Josh Frydenberg
2 April 2019




Budget reply speech: ALP opposed second and 
third stages of tax cuts; unveiled $2 .3 billion cancer 
care package
Address to Labor Business Forum, Canberra
Scott Morrison
5 April 2019
Royal Commission into Violence, Abuse, Neglect and 
Exploitation of People with Disability announced
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Morrison, speaking after the resumption of parliament on 26 November, 
warned Shorten not to get too ‘carried away’ with the State election 
results,  arguing the next federal election would be different—it would 
be Morrison versus Shorten. John Howard said Shorten was expecting 
a ‘coronation’ (Karp 2019). Morrison was active on the policy front—
setting up an aged care royal commission (which commenced its work on 
18 January 2019), dumping plans to raise the retirement age to 70 from 
67 for aged pension eligibility, apologising in the parliament to victims of 
institutional child abuse and bringing Abbott and Joyce back into the fold 
with roving ambassadorial briefs for Indigenous affairs and the drought, 
respectively. The Commonwealth–State National Drought Summit was 
held at Old Parliament House in Canberra on 26 October 2018. Morrison’s 
headland Project Sydney Bradfield Oration of 19 November (sponsored 
by Sydney’s Daily Telegraph) supported limits on immigration and the 
bolstering of urban infrastructure in Sydney and north Queensland, 
among other places (see Morrison 2018).
Morrison attended to party discipline and, on 3 December, called a special 
meeting of the federal Parliamentary Liberal Party to change its rules to 
require a two-thirds majority to initiate any future leadership ballot. 
Morrison’s Sydney Institute speech of 14 December 2018 promised to 
recognise West Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. 
The ALP’s national conference—postponed from July due to the clash with 
the Super Saturday by-elections—was held on 16–18 December 2018 
in Adelaide—and in retrospect was a dress rehearsal for the ALP’s 2019 
policy launch on 5 May 2019. Social policies were highlighted, especially 
on housing affordability, and a compromise on refugees was announced 
(an increased intake overall but firm policy on strong borders). Shorten’s 
set-piece speech was well received (e.g. Wright 2018). The conferral of 
life membership of the ALP on former prime ministers Kevin Rudd, 
Julia Gillard and Paul Keating foreshadowed their appearance at the ALP 
policy launch.
2019
Early in 2019, Morrison made policy announcements on jobs and 
economic growth, a boost to aged care expenditure, Indigenous education, 
emissions reduction and domestic violence, and attended a mosque open 
day. He established a review into ‘best practices’ for dealing with internal 
Liberal Party complaints, such as those over bullying; he cut permanent 
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migration, gave a huge funding boost to regional infrastructure, including 
increased spending on Kakadu National Park and surrounding roads, and 
defended the Budget.
Most of these announcements were positive campaigning. There were two 
striking examples of the ‘negative’ Morrison: his address to the Australian 
Financial Review Business Summit (on 5 March), in which he made 
a  scathing attack on Labor’s economic credentials; and his appearance 
on the TV show The Project in late March, during which he attacked 
host Waleed Aly. Morrison was retaliating over Aly’s recent claim that 
Morrison had used Islamophobia for political gain in 2010–11. In the 
wake of the Christchurch, New Zealand, terror attack of 15 March 2019, 
Morrison condemned anti-Muslim statements, denied the Coalition was 
anti-Muslim and saw to it that Liberal candidates who had made anti-
Muslim comments were disendorsed.17
While candidates and preselection are discussed in Anika Gauja and Marija 
Taflaga’s Chapter 4 (this volume), it is worthwhile mentioning Morrison’s 
installation (via the NSW State Executive) of Indigenous business leader 
Warren Mundine in the marginal NSW coastal seat of Gilmore as a rare 
example of a questionable decision.18 
The Nationals’ Assistant Minister to the Deputy Prime Minister Andrew 
Broad resigned from the rural Victorian seat of Mallee in January 
2019 following his resignation from the ministry (in December 2018) 
over a  scandal exposed in the women’s magazine New Idea. There were 
rumours that Bridget McKenzie, the Nationals’ Deputy Leader, would 
resign from the Senate to contest Mallee or Indi; she had already moved 
her senate office to Wodonga in the electorate of Indi, from Bendigo 
(D’Agostino and Johnston 2018). Indi was held by popular Independent 
MP Cathy McGowan.
The results of the NSW State election on 23 March 2019 were more 
heartening for the federal Liberals, although not for their National Party 
counterparts, than the Victorian results, as the State Coalition government 
retained office. Subsequently, State ALP Leader Michael Daley was forced 
17  He also carpeted the Turkish Ambassador over anti-Anzac comments made by the Turkish Prime 
Minister in response to the Christchurch shootings.
18  Gilmore had seen running factional battles between rival Liberal groups and, as an open seat, the 
National Party had endorsed a high-profile former MP. It was targeted by the ACTU as a potentially 
winnable seat.
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to step down due to some historical anti-Asian remarks of his that had 
been recorded; it was some days before he announced he would not 
recontest. Labor went into the 2019 federal election campaign in New 
South Wales awkwardly, with a caretaker State leader.19 
Ministerial retirements and new candidate picks dominated media 
discussion in the first quarter of 2019, as did speculation over whether 
various Turnbull-orientated Liberals would resign. Kelly O’Dwyer 
announced her intention to resign on Saturday, 19 January. Late the 
following week, Coalition ministers Michael Keenan and Nigel Scullion 
also announced they would not contest the upcoming election. Former 
Liberal MP for the marginal seat of Chisholm, Julia Banks, was running 
as an Independent for the Victorian seat of Flinders, which was held by 
Liberal Minister for Health, Greg Hunt—originally a ‘moderate’ but 
over time a supporter of conservatives Abbott and Dutton.20 In February, 
former foreign minister and failed leadership contender Julie Bishop said 
she would not recontest the seat of Curtin (WA). The retirements of 
ministers Christopher Pyne and Steve Ciobo were confirmed on 2 March 
2019, and former Army Reserve brigadier Linda Reynolds replaced Ciobo 
as Minister for Defence Industry on 4 March (and her shift to the Defence 
Ministry after the election, in place of Pyne, was foreshadowed). The 
Sunday papers featured Julie Bishop ‘blaming’ Pyne, as well as Mathias 
Cormann, for undermining her in the previous year’s Liberal leadership 
ballot, claiming she would have been well-placed to win the May election 
(Spagnolo 2019). Former staunch Turnbull supporter and small business 
minister Craig Laundy announced his retirement in March—stepping 
down as the Member for Reid, which became an open seat and a venue 
for Coalition and Labor events. John Howard campaigned strongly on 
behalf of the new Liberal candidate in Reid, Fiona Martin (Clench 2019).
There were other high-profile announcements and retirements—notably, 
of Cathy McGowan, the Independent MP for Indi (announced via a tweet 
on 14 January). She had tweeted her successor’s name, Helen Haines, 
the previous day. On 15 January, Rob Oakeshott (a former Independent 
19  There were concerns about federal implications, especially for those seats with high proportions 
of Asian voters. The ALP’s primary vote was 33 per cent and it won only two seats. The Coalition 
lost two National Party seats to the Shooters, Fishers and Farmers Party as part of a backlash over the 
problematic water policy.
20  Hunt supported Abbott in the 2015 Liberal Party leadership contest and Dutton in the 2019 
Liberal leadership contest, from which Morrison emerged as Liberal leader.
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Member for Lynne) stated via a video post on his website that he would 
run for the nearby seat of Cowper—sensing an opportunity with the 
sitting National Party MP retiring.
On the Labor side, Bill Shorten’s campaign bus was launched, the ALP’s 
National Executive signed off on factional picks for the 2019 election, 
Labor’s primary vote in Newspoll fell from 41 to 38 and veteran ALP 
Senator Jacinta Collins announced she would not contest the next 
election, citing family and health reasons, and headed off to a senior role 
in the Catholic education sector. 
As in late 2017 when Turnbull was briefly the prime minister of 
a  minority government, Labor began to seize the political initiative. 
Shorten established a review of the recent catastrophic mass fish deaths 
in the Murray–Darling river system, commissioning the Australian 
Academy of Science to provide a timely report. Two days later, Morrison 
set up an independent inquiry into the fish deaths by the Commonwealth 
Agriculture Department. 
The most significant example of governing while in opposition was the so-
called Medevac legislation, which allowed the timely medical evacuation 
of ill people from Manus Island and Nauru, fulfilling a major campaigning 
plank of Phelps’s and supported by Labor and the Independents on the 
Senate crossbench.21 This was designed to be a humiliation for Morrison; 
instead, he gained the advantage, devising amendments to give power to 
the minister to assess transfers in a timely fashion. This was the first major 
occasion where Labor underestimated Morrison (Jensen 2019). Shortly 
after the Bill’s passage at the beginning of March, Minister for Home 
Affairs Dutton reopened the asylum seeker camp on Christmas Island (off 
the north-west coast of Australia), predicting the arrival of many refugee 
boats now that medical transfers could easily guarantee entry to Australia.
Having announced its policies on excess franking credits (as amended) 
and negative gearing/capital gains tax discounts in 2018 and 2016, 
respectively, in February 2019, in the wake of the devastating banking 
royal commission’s ‘Hayne report’, Labor announced its ‘fairness fund’ 
levy on banks. The levy would be used to support financial counselling 
for disadvantaged bank customers. The Australian newspaper labelled it 
a ‘$640 million hit on banks’ (Brown 2019: 1). 
21  Senators Hanson and Cory Bernardi opposed the ‘Medevac’ amendments to a government Bill 
in the Senate. 
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In March, Shorten and Chalmers said the election would be about wages, 
with the Fair Work Commission having a central role. The ALP’s ‘living 
wage’ policy was released on 25 March 2019. It was attacked by the 
conservative IPA, which claimed it would push Australia into recession, 
and the negative gearing changes were also presented as a ‘housing tax’ 
that would create a bigger recession. Interestingly, the Chief Executive 
Officer of the Business Council of Australia (BCA), Jennifer Westacott, 
welcomed the living wage, and had earlier supported an increase in 
Newstart, alongside the Minerals Council of Australia.
At his speech to the AFR Business Summit in early March, Shorten pushed 
fair wages as his theme and accused the Prime Minister of denigrating 
workers in his speech the previous day; Shorten invoked the Hawke–
Keating accord era while stepping away from a formal accord himself 
(see Table 2.1).
Labor fell in with the decision of the Coalition’s Expenditure Review 
Committee (ERC) to restrict annual migration to 160,000, replacing the 
previous cap of 190,000 per annum. The Coalition would also develop 
an integrated settlement policy to ease congestion in Melbourne and 
Sydney. Labor reluctantly agreed while attacking the announcement as 
‘dog whistling’.
The leaking of footage showing PHON’s Steve Dickson and James 
Ashby in the United States the previous September appearing to solicit 
a large donation from the National Rifle Association (NRA) was 
shown on Australian television in March; Bill Shorten questioned the 
Coalition’s preferencing policy, while Morrison responded two days later, 
recommending Liberals preference PHON below Labor (Worthington 
2019). Those LNP politicians in the National Party room, however, 
indicated they would not preference Labor above PHON.
The Greens (2019) outlined their environment policy in late March, 
foreshadowed by their Environment Spokesperson, Adam Bandt, 
depicting coal as the ‘modern-day asbestos’ (Brown 2018b). Former 
Greens leader Bob Brown led the anti-Adani convoy, arriving in Brisbane 
on 22 April for a rally outside Adani’s offices: ‘Ahead of the march, Brown 
hit out at media reports detailing posts made by a commenter on a private 
Facebook page likening people who support the Adani mine to “Nazis 
who worked in gas chambers”’ (Layt 2019). 
MoRRISoN'S MIRACLE
36
On 1 April, Shorten officially announced a new strategy on climate change, 
emissions targets and waste, building on the party’s 2018 national platform 
(ALP 2018: 74–91).22 The previous day, Shadow Minister for Climate 
Change and Energy, Mark Butler (2019), had tweeted the ALP’s historic 
electric car policy: 50 per cent of new cars would be electric by 2030. 
The electric car policy and its costings provided a target for the Coalition.
The ‘real’ campaign: The 2019 Budget 
and the 2019 election campaign
The Treasurer’s Budget speech on 2 April followed by his speech to the 
National Press Club on 3 April were well received and showed a degree 
of pragmatism—for example, by belatedly adding Newstart to the list 
of benefits to receive a special energy supplement payment of $75, in 
line with single pensioners.23 The ‘Budget bounce’ of 2 percentage points 
was reflected in the next week’s fortnightly Newspoll. The debate over 
the Budget marked the real beginning of the 2019 election campaign—
notably, the delivery of the Budget was brought forward five to six 
weeks from the traditional date of the second Tuesday in May, to allow 
time for an election campaign for a late-May election. Morrison sought 
a mandate for the tax package, which, if the Coalition were re-elected, 
would be introduced immediately after the resumption of parliament. 
(On  a  different note, Morrison announced a royal commission into 
disability abuses at the end of Budget week.)
The ALP amended its taxation policy in line with some of the Budget 
surprises, such as the Coalition ditching the Budget repair levy for high-
income earners, but retained the essentials of the tax policy taken to the 
2018 ALP conference—notably, providing additional tax relief to those 
earning less than $40,000 (Shorten 2018). 
A new expenditure item was the cancer care package, which became 
a theme of Labor’s campaign strategy and a target for Frydenberg’s attacks 
on the ALP’s lack of economic credibility.
22  Shorten had pre-released the press statement on 31 March.
23  See ABC (2019a). Morrison ultimately blamed being in a minority government.
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The expected election announcement did not happen on the weekend of 
6–7 April; however, a few days later, Morrison said the Liberals would 
not run election advertisements on Good Friday, Easter Sunday or Anzac 
Day; Shorten agreed not to advertise on Good Friday or Anzac Day. 
Morrison announced the election on 11 April (see Table 2.2), releasing 
a video (Fernando and Palin 2019) and making a strong speech, which 
consolidated his recent Budget statements while repeating a strong 
negative line on Labor’s policies (variants of this approach were replayed 
throughout the campaign by Morrison and were echoed by Treasurer 
Frydenberg [Lewis and Riordan 2019]):
There is a clear choice … that will determine the economy that 
Australians live in, not just for the next three years but for the 
next decade … between the government that is delivering a strong 
economy and will continue to do so, or Bill Shorten’s Labor party 
that we always know can’t manage money, [between] lowering 
taxes for all Australians [and] Bill Shorten’s Labor party that will 
impose higher taxes that will weigh down our economy. It’s taken 
more than five years to turn around Labor’s budget mess. Now is 
not the time to turn back. (ABC 2019b)
Labor responded with Shorten announcing via tweet a ‘fair go’ election 
and Deputy Leader Tanya Plibersek (2019) counteracting Morrison’s 
claims regarding Labor’s economic credentials and calculating that the 
mooted surplus would be built on a gross underspend in the National 
Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS). 
Table 2.2 The ‘real’ campaign
Name Date Event
Scott Morrison 11 April 2019 Visits Governor‑General to call an election, 
Canberra . Speech: ‘A strong economy’ and ‘lower 
… taxes’ with the Coalition; ‘Labor can’t manage 
money’ and will introduce ‘higher taxes’ (ABC 
2019b) .
Bill Shorten 11 April 2019 Tweet from Melbourne’s Moonee Ponds: ‘Bring it on! 




11 April 2019 Media interview in Melbourne: Labor can manage 
the economy; Coalition’s projected surplus for 
2019–20 based on serious NDIS underspend
Independents 12 April 2019 NSW Liberal Party complaint to the Australian 
Electoral Commission alleging orchestration of 
the funding of four Independents: Zali Stegall 
(Warringah), Kerryn Phelps (Wentworth), Julia 









13 April 2019 Apologises for ‘gaffe’ about disabled ALP 
candidate for Dickson, Ali France
Bill Shorten 14 April 2019 Rally for ALP volunteers, with Tanya Plibersek, 
Senator Kristina Keneally (former ALP NSW 
Premier), Chris Bowen (Shadow Treasurer) and 
Senator Penny Wong (Labor Leader in the Senate), 
Burwood, Sydney (seat of Reid): outlining local 
effects of ALP health policy, such as major upgrade 
of Concord Hospital, and defending tax changes—
critiquing ‘retiree tax’ label
Bill Shorten 20 April 2019 Press release: attacking social media scare 






26 April 2019 Liberal preferences would not go to Fraser Anning 
(selected as a replacement for PHoN’s Malcolm 
Roberts, he became an Independent, subsequently 
joining KAP, from which he was expelled in october 
2018 for his controversial inaugural speech)
Bill Shorten and 
Tanya Plibersek
26 April 2019 Labor’s Women’s Policy launch, Women’s Hospital, 
Melbourne
Bill Shorten 28 April 2019 ‘Fair Go for Australia’ rally, Box Hill, Melbourne: 
childcare support package, dental care for children 
and pensioner/health cards
Scott Morrison 28 April 2019 Western Sydney ‘Congestion busting’ rally at 
Homebush Stadium (seat of Reid), with NSW 




29 April 2019 Perth . Shorten won 52:12 of the audience vote; 
11 were undecided
Pauline Hanson 30 April 2019 Steve Dickson resigns from PHoN over release of 
secretly recorded footage of him meeting with NRA 
in New York . Hanson’s tearful interview on Channel 
Nine’s A Current Affair and other TV programs
Warringah 
Debate between 
Tony Abbott and 
Zali Steggall
2 May 2019 No winner declared; both seen by audience 
members as energetic and enthusiastic, and 
Steggall seen as the frontrunner in the campaign
Second Leaders’ 
Debate
3 May 2019 Brisbane . Shorten won 43:41 of the audience vote; 
16 were undecided
Bill Shorten 5 May 2019 ALP policy launch, ‘A Fair Go’, Brisbane: focus on 
health, tax cuts for small business, constitutional 
recognition for Indigenous Australians
7 May 2019 ‘Mother of invention’ front‑page Daily Telegraph 
[Sydney] story accuses Shorten of omitting key 
facts from his election launch story about his 
mother’s sacrifices for her family
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8 May 2019 National Press Club, Canberra: testy exchanges 
between Shorten and Morrison
Scott Morrison 12 May 2019, 
Mother’s Day
Liberal Party policy launch, ‘Building our Economy, 
Securing Your Future’, Melbourne: major new 
promise of deposit guarantee scheme for first 
homebuyers (matched by Labor); attacks on 
Labor’s so‑called housing tax
Election day 16 May 2019 Melbourne’s Herald Sun releases YouGov/Galaxy 
polls for 10 marginal seats showing outcome 
tightening and Liberals leading in Deakin and Flynn
At this stage, Morrison and Frydenberg were focusing on the economy, 
allowing resources minister Matt Canavan (see Doran and Sweeney 2019) 
and home affairs minister Peter Dutton to probe Labor’s divisions over 
the Adani coalmine, which was proposed for the Galilee Basin in central 
Queensland (SBS 2019). While ALP Shadow Assistant Treasurer Andrew 
Leigh was sharply critical of Adani, Deputy Leader Tanya Plibersek was 
more nuanced, maintaining she and the party were sceptical, believing 
the benefits were ‘overstated’ and the detrimental environmental impacts 
‘understated’ (quoted in Doran and Sweeney 2019). The ALP Member 
for Herbert (Qld), Cathy O’Toole (ABC 2019c), was a rare Labor voice 
defending Adani.
Based on the national published polls—especially their two-party-
preferred vote—a united team and the careful development of a suite 
of policies over several years, Labor appeared to be in the ascendancy, 
whereas the Coalition had endured two leadership changes, disaffected 
frontbenchers and backbenchers and several scandals. There were few 
policy achievements and, arguably, the passage of the same-sex marriage 
legislation in December 2017—and the preceding postal survey—was 
forced on the Coalition.
The campaign effected a reversal, with the Coalition setting a clear 
agenda:  to continue the approach started by Morrison late in 2018. 
The Coalition’s main theme was set from the start: there was a stark choice 
between the Coalition, with its consistent track record on managing 
the economy and introducing lower taxes, and Labor’s record of failing 
to manage the economy and introducing higher taxes. This theme was 
a  continuation of the Coalition’s line from early 2019, if not earlier. 




Both leaders—as discussed in other chapters of this volume—crafted 
policy announcements relevant to the specific location, and campaign 
expenditure focused on marginal seats (see Table 2.2 for key campaign 
events, the debates, party launches and themes). Labor (Shorten 2019) 
had committed to a strong women’s policy compared with the Coalition.
The three formal debates were opportunities for both sides to press their 
policies and showcase their leadership styles. Shorten was ‘engaging’ well, 
especially in the first two debates, in which he opted for a personalised 
approach. Morrison seemed to have a checklist of issues to cover in these 
debates, such as franking credits, Labor’s taxes and border protection 
(DailyBulletin.com.au 2019). His eagerness to expose Shorten’s lack of 
economic credibility—as in the zinger question about the cost of electric 
vehicles in the first debate—did not resonate with the audience. Shorten’s 
response was to frame Morrison as a leader who could not be trusted due 
to the preference deal with Clive Palmer’s UAP announced a few days 
earlier. Shorten asked whether Palmer would be the next prime minister.
For the two debates on free-to-air television, audience figures were 
considerably higher than in 2016, suggesting a higher level of citizen 
engagement than was generally expected; the second debate, on Sky News 
(and Night Sky), compered by David Speers, had much lower figures but 
was rebroadcast on social media (see Moran and Rota 2019; Dyers 2019). 
Shorten’s personalised style was on display towards the end of his official 
policy launch on 5 May when he invoked his mother’s story of hardship 
as inspiring his commitment to ‘a fair go’. Sydney’s Daily Telegraph 
ridiculed Shorten’s depiction of his mother under the very negative 
headline of ‘Mother of invention’, which generated controversy, as the 
other Murdoch-owned tabloids had chosen not to run the story. Arguably 
Shorten’s strongest speech was his concession speech on election night 
(ABC 2019d).
The Coalition’s policy launch was held on the final Sunday of the 
campaign, in line with the longstanding convention that ministers may 
not claim travelling allowances from that day. The Mother’s Day theme 
featured MP Sarah Henderson from the marginal Victorian seat of 
Corangamite (notionally Labor after the 2018 redistribution). Morrison’s 
motto was ‘Building our economy, securing your future’. He recited well-
used themes, such as Labor’s ‘housing tax’, and introduced a new deposit 
guarantee scheme for first homebuyers (immediately matched by Labor).
41
2 . ELECTIoN CAMPAIGN oVERVIEW
Morrison’s quiet launch in Melbourne, with his immediate family and 
senior ministers, contrasted with Shorten’s political family of colleagues 
and former Labor prime ministers—missing Bob Hawke, who was ill and 
passed away a week or so later. Kevin Rudd campaigned in Queensland. 
Former Liberal prime minister John Howard campaigned actively 
alongside Morrison and various marginal-seat MPs, saying Shorten would 
be the ‘most left-wing Prime Minister since world war two’ (Karp 2019).
The Labor team had spent much of the campaign on a defensive footing—
defending its record on the economy, publicising its ‘fairness’ agenda and 
trying to explain its tax ‘loopholes’ reform as part of that fairness. Good 
policies were lost in the narrowcasting of the agenda by the Coalition, and 
other policies were criticised or dismissed—for example, in claims that 
Labor’s free cancer treatment policy was ill advised as public treatment 
was already free, or that the electric car proposal was dictatorial and would 
be expensive, wasteful of energy and involve costly recharging stations. 
Even after the ALP costings were approved by the Parliamentary Budget 
Office on Friday, 10 May, Frydenberg and others airily dismissed the 
open-ended nature of the ALP’s energy plan.
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THE RULES OF THE GAME
Marian Sawer and Michael Maley
In 2019 the federal election campaign was awash with money as never 
before, prompting many to wonder whether billionaires could now 
buy elections in Australia and what exactly were the rules of the game. 
The  money bought an onslaught of negative advertising and resulted 
in a  substantial number of complaints to the Australian Electoral 
Commission (AEC). It prompts questions about how far Australia is now 
lagging behind best practice in the regulation of campaign finance and 
other aspects of electioneering in the digital age. As we shall see in this 
chapter, there are a number of ways in which Australia departs from the 
principles of the ‘level playing field’ for electoral competition, as laid 
down in international guidelines.
The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (the Electoral Act) has been 
the vehicle for some of Australia’s most distinctive electoral reforms, 
including compulsory voting, preferential voting, single transferable vote 
proportional representation for Senate elections, independent electoral 
administration and a process for the redistribution of electoral boundaries 
that is widely recognised as one of the world’s best. From its original length 
of 62 pages, the Act has grown over the century to its current length of 
639 pages. Its growth reflects the increasing complexity of electoral 
processes but also a lack of trust that political parties will comply with 
the rules unless they are laid down in great legislative detail. In some 
areas, however, regulation has retreated—for example, the original limits 
on campaign expenditure were finally withdrawn in 1980.
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Our aim here is not to describe the whole of the regulatory framework 
for the election, but rather to focus on parts that have been the subject 
of controversy and a focus for reform efforts. We will not include 
elements that are important but relatively uncontroversial, such as the 
redistribution process, which is covered in Chapter 9 of this volume. 
We deal with enrolment, political party registration, candidate nomination 
(and  disendorsement), campaign funding and advertising, and early 
voting. We conclude with some reflections on current trends in federal 
electoral reform. 
Enrolment
In April 2019, the AEC announced it had achieved ‘the best electoral roll 
in history’, with 96.8 per cent of eligible voters (more than 16 million) 
now enrolled.1 Youth enrolment had also reached its highest level, with an 
estimated 88.8 per cent of eligible 18–24-year-olds enrolled (AEC 2019a). 
That achievement was driven by major changes in the preceding 10 years. 
Prior to 2009, there was an antiquated system whereby names could 
be added to the electoral roll only after receipt of a hardcopy electoral 
enrolment form completed by the claimant. Then, in September 2009, 
an online ‘SmartForm’ was introduced, which could be downloaded from 
the AEC website, although it still had to be signed and lodged manually. 
Next, in July 2010, a process was introduced whereby a person already 
on the roll could update their details online, without having to lodge 
a  hardcopy form. At last, in 2012, the Electoral Act was amended to 
permit the AEC to update electors’ details on the roll and to add new 
electors to the roll without receiving an enrolment form from the elector 
at all. This represented a fundamental shift from the system that had 
applied for about a century and that had placed the onus on voters to get 
on the roll and update their details when they moved address. In 2019, 
approximately two-thirds of all electoral enrolment was done by the AEC 
(see Chapter 12, this volume).
1  It should be noted that an enrolment of 96 per cent of eligible voters was already claimed in 
1903—the highest enrolment of a national population anywhere for democratic purposes—but it 
was admitted at the subsequent conference of Commonwealth electoral officers that there had been 
some overenrolment in two States (Sawer 2003: 53).
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While the Liberal and National parties opposed the 2012 reforms in 
the parliament, the relevant provisions of the Electoral Act have been left 
untouched since the return of the Coalition to power in 2013, and it seems 
unlikely that attempts will be made to wind them back. Indeed, the Joint 
Standing Committee on Electoral Matters (JSCEM) has recommended, 
among other things, that the Electoral Act be amended ‘to allow for online 
enrolment in all enrolment circumstances, provided that an appropriate 
digital identity verification process is in place’ (JSCEM 2018b: 41).
Apart from improvements through the provision of online and automatic 
enrolment, there was a surge in youth enrolment before the 2017 
same-sex marriage postal survey. While there was speculation that having 
a more complete roll would result in lower turnout (the percentage of 
people on the roll who actually vote), in fact the 2019 (House) turnout 
of 91.9 per cent was greater than the 91 per cent achieved in 2016.
Political party registration
There was widespread concern over the success at the 2013 Senate election 
of ‘micro-parties’ with little community support, such as the Australian 
Motoring Enthusiasts Party, which won a Senate seat in Victoria despite 
gaining only 0.5 per cent of the first-preference votes. The majority of the 
votes that elected these micro-party candidates came from supporters of 
other parties and were collected through a ‘preference harvesting’ strategy 
first attempted at the 1999 NSW Legislative Council election. 
While the 2016 reforms to the Senate voting system (which abolished 
the group voting ticket system) put a stop to preference harvesting, 
the number of registered political parties did not drop between 2016 
and 2019. New parties registered since the 2016 election include Love 
Australia or Leave (with a registered logo of a map of Australia stamped 
‘Full’) and the Involuntary Medication Objectors (Vaccination/Fluoride) 
Party. The application fee for party registration has remained at $500, 
and the number of members required in support of an application has 
remained at 500. The provision made in the Electoral Act for an existing 
federal parliamentarian to be able to apply to register a party without 
meeting a requirement for a minimum number of party members has, 
however, looked increasingly anomalous.
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When party registration was introduced in 1984, there was an assumption 
that any MPs or senators making an application for party registration 
would previously have been elected in their own right. The rate at which 
senators have recently been leaving the parties through which they were 
elected was not envisaged. Senator Fraser Anning provides a striking 
example: he was elected on the ticket of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation 
(PHON) following the disqualification of Senator Malcolm Roberts 
in 2017 but decided to enter the Senate as an Independent. He then 
joined Katter’s Australian Party (KAP) for a few months in 2018 but was 
expelled after making a widely criticised speech in the Senate in which he 
referred to the ‘final solution to the immigration problem’. Because he was 
a senator, he was able to register Fraser Anning’s Conservative National 
Party without any membership requirement and ran unsuccessfully for 
it in 2019. The JSCEM recommended in its report on the 2016 election 
that this anomaly be done away with, but it was still in existence in 2019.
Candidates and nominations
Typically, it is only at election time that details of electoral regulation are 
of much interest to the media and the public. However, the departure from 
the parliament of seven MPs and eight senators in 2017–18 as a result of 
breaches of Section 44 of the constitution, whether because they were 
found to be dual citizens or for other reasons, figured prominently in 
the news. 
The various rulings of the High Court on the interpretation of Section 
44 have served to clarify the law to some extent, but there are points 
that remain unclear. In particular, the mechanism applied in the case of 
a disqualified senator, under which the ballots are recounted as though 
the departed senator had never been on the ballot, means it is possible for 
another senator whose qualification is undisputed to fail to be elected in 
the recount (Bonham 2017). It is unclear at this point whether the High 
Court would declare such ‘unelection’ to be legally possible or whether 
it would instead treat such a senator’s position as being beyond dispute. 
While more senators than MPs lost their seats, the political impact of 
Section 44 was felt primarily in the House of Representatives, as previous 
High Court rulings meant the House vacancies had to be filled through by-
elections—with seven ultimately held in an eight-month period—rather 
than a recount process. Of particular significance was the ‘Super Saturday’ 
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of voting on 28 July 2018. This saw the government poll poorly in the 
Queensland seat of Longman, which was a catalyst for the removal of 
Malcolm Turnbull as prime minister, and a further by-election following 
his resignation from parliament, at which his seat of Wentworth was lost 
to an Independent (see Chapter 2, this volume).
The travails arising from Section 44 generated much debate and an inquiry 
and report by the JSCEM (2018a). One outcome was an amendment to 
the Electoral Act, requiring candidates to provide ‘qualification checklists’ 
to the AEC, covering in much more detail than previously anything that 
could impact on their qualification under Section 44. The checklists 
must be published, but the AEC has no power to reject a nomination on 
the strength of shortcomings in the checklist or associated documents, 
as long as all ‘mandatory questions’ in the checklist have been answered. 
On 24 April 2019, the AEC (2019b) did, however, announce in relation 
to a WA Senate candidate, Rodney Culleton, that given his previous 
disqualification by the High Court, it was referring his nomination form 
to the Australian Federal Police to examine whether a false statement had 
been made concerning his status as an undischarged bankrupt. 
The mechanisms by which a challenge to a candidate’s qualification may 
be put before the High Court have also been clarified in a 2018 case 
(Alley v Gillespie). The only processes for obtaining a High Court ruling 
now are a petition to the Court of Disputed Returns following an election 
or a referral from the relevant House of the parliament. In the final 
week of sittings of the 45th Parliament, each House adopted a bipartisan 
resolution setting out procedures to be followed before making such 
a referral. The effect of those would be to limit the court’s involvement 
to cases referred on the basis of fresh information not disclosed in the 
relevant qualification checklist.
In the aftermath of the election, there was speculation on social media 
about whether the disqualification of a defeated candidate could be the 
basis for challenging an election in the Court of Disputed Returns. 
That scenario has been examined in detail by Graeme Orr (2015) and is 
highly unlikely.
Finally, it is noteworthy that 1,056 candidates stood for the House of 
Representatives in 2019—an increase from the 994 who stood in 2016. 
They were not deterred by the increase shortly before the election in the 
deposit required of candidates, raising it from $1,000 to $2,000 and 




The 2019 election was also notable for the number of cases in which 
a candidate whose endorsement by a party had been announced was 
subsequently ‘disendorsed’. According to a running tally compiled by 
Kevin Bonham (2019), 33 intending candidates were disendorsed, 
resigned or withdrew from the election after it was announced, with 
10 of those cases arising only after the close of nominations. A substantial 
number of the cases that arose before the close of nominations were the 
result of difficulties the candidates faced in confirming that they were 
not disqualified under Section 44. The cases arising after the close, on 
the other hand, flowed mainly from the discovery of sexist, anti-Muslim 
or homophobic statements they had made on social media. Bonham 
has argued plausibly that the onerous nature of Section 44 checking 
may have left party organisations with less time and fewer resources to 
check candidates’ social media history thoroughly enough. High-profile 
casualties included (before the close of nominations) a former ALP MP 
for Fremantle and Commonwealth minister Melissa Parke; and (after the 
close) the Queensland leader of PHON and former State MP and minister, 
Steve Dickson.
The full implications of the disendorsement of a candidate after the 
close of nominations are not, however, clear. The Electoral Act makes no 
provision for such a step; a statement of disendorsement at that stage is 
essentially a political rather than a legal act. A candidate so ‘disendorsed’ 
remains on the ballot paper and is still shown as the candidate of the 
disendorsing party. In addition, votes for the candidate are still treated as 
votes for the party in the vote totals published by the AEC. A question the 
disendorsing parties generally left up in the air was how their disendorsed 
candidates would be treated post election should they win. As it happened, 
only one of the disendorsed candidates—the erstwhile Liberal candidate 
in Lyons—was running in a seat that the disendorsing party had any real 
chance of winning, and she did not in fact win.
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Campaigning and electoral funding
The election was marked by an unusual level of controversy surrounding 
campaign activities and spending, electoral advertising and its authorisation 
and the level of regulation of such activities. Public funding for parties and 
candidates who received more than 4 per cent of the vote was introduced 
at the federal level in 1984 but failed in the objective of reducing party 
reliance on private funding. Under legislation enacted in 2018, the 
amount of public funding is currently $2.801 per vote or the amount of 
electoral expenditure, whichever is lower. The role of private money in 
Australian elections was highlighted by the ubiquitous campaign presence 
of billionaire Clive Palmer, founder and leader of the United Australia 
Party (UAP). With expenditure that dwarfed that of the major parties, he 
was able to flood the print media, airwaves, social media and billboards 
with his advertising. As Nielsen data show, between 1 September 2018 
and 18 May 2019, Palmer spent $53.6 million on television, radio and 
newspaper advertising alone, while the Liberal Party spent $14.5 million 
and Labor $13.3 million (Figure 3.1). 
Figure 3.1 Political party advertising spending, 1 September 2018 – 
18 May 2019
Source: Nielsen Ad Intel Portfolio, TV, print and radio ad spend, 1 September 2018 – 
18 May 2019 . Courtesy Nielsen .
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In the final two weeks of the campaign, this was mostly negative 
advertising directed against Labor, using slogans such as ‘Labor will hit us 
with an extra trillion dollars of taxes & costs. Tell Shifty he’s dreaming.’ 
Although Palmer’s party polled only 3.4 per cent of the vote in the House 
of Representatives, with many candidates losing their deposits, he claimed 
success in defeating the ALP through the effect of his advertising and 
preference flows.
As noted above, since 1980, Australia has had no limits on campaign 
expenditure at the federal level, unlike most countries in the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Neither does it 
have limits on political donations at the federal level. Declared donations 
of more than $40 million were made for the 2016 federal election, quite 
apart from donations below the (high) disclosure threshold (Wood and 
Griffiths 2018: 10, 34). A dampener was put on campaign finance 
reform by the 1992 High Court decision in the case of Australian Capital 
Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth that the Hawke Government’s attempt 
to ban paid political advertising in the electronic media contravened an 
implied freedom of political communication.
Subsequent cases have, however, confirmed that the High Court will 
not necessarily strike down reasonable (proportionate) regulation of 
political finance. In 2015 in McCloy v New South Wales, the court 
upheld a cap on political donations and a ban on political donations by 
property developers, finding that the restrictions on freedom of political 
communication were defensible in the light of the benefits of ensuring the 
integrity of the political system and ‘equality of opportunity to participate 
in the exercise of political sovereignty’. 
The constitutionality of regulating political donations was reaffirmed 
in April 2019 by the High Court in the case of Spence v Queensland. 
The Commonwealth Parliament had passed amendments to the Electoral 
Act to enable Commonwealth law to override the tighter regulation 
of political donations at the State or Territory level. This provision 
(Section 302CA) was overturned by the High Court and Queensland’s 
ban on developer donations was upheld, despite an attempt by the 
plaintiff, former Queensland Liberal National Party president Gary 
Spence, to argue it burdened the freedom of political communication.
The lack of any restrictions on the amount of political expenditure or 
political donations at the federal level, despite the High Court’s recent 
rulings, has given rise to perceptions among voters that government is 
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run primarily for the benefit of ‘a few big interests’. In 2019, as in 2016, 
56 per cent of respondents to the Australian Election Study believed 
this (Cameron and McAllister 2019: 16). Indicative of how far Australia 
has fallen behind in regulating the role of private money in elections, the 
Perceptions of Electoral Integrity survey now places Australia 26th out of 
33 OECD countries on the campaign finance dimension (Cameron and 
Wynter 2018: 172). Highly regulated industries are the largest donors, 
and spikes in donations occur when policy changes are proposed affecting 
industries such as gambling or mining (Wood and Griffiths 2018: 42–43). 
The 2018 Democracy 2025 survey, conducted well before Palmer’s cash 
splash, found that, of possible reforms to rebuild trust, by far the strongest 
support was for limits on political donations and campaign expenditure 
(Stoker et al. 2018: 44). 
Another change enacted at the end of 2018 (apart from the reintroduction 
of campaign expenditure as the basis for public funding) was the banning 
of ‘foreign’ donations of more than $100 made for the purpose of funding 
electoral expenditure. The registration of foreign lobbyists was also 
required. Otherwise, there was a continuing lack of transparency about 
the sources of many donations, due to the high threshold for disclosure 
and other loopholes, such as allowing the splitting of donations between 
different divisions of a party. Forty per cent of the money received by 
political parties at the 2016 election had no identifiable source (Wood and 
Griffiths 2018: 31). Timeliness also continued to be a problem, with 
disclosures only published in the February following the financial year 
in which they were made (that is, up to 18 months after the donation 
was made) rather than the ‘real-time’ disclosure being adopted in other 
jurisdictions such as Queensland. 
The use of public resources 
for campaigning
The laissez-faire approach adopted at the federal level to the use of private 
money in elections also extends to the use of government and parliamentary 
resources for campaign purposes. This is contrary to international standards 
that specify that party regulation should prevent incumbent parties or 
candidates from using state resources to obtain an unfair advantage 
(OSCE 2011). In Australia, incumbent governments regularly benefit 
from the use of government advertising for partisan purposes and spikes 
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in such advertising occur in the run-up to elections. While guidelines in 
place since 2008 require campaigns to be objective and not directed at 
promoting party-political interests, this has done little to stop the use 
of emotive language and images to foster a positive impression of the 
incumbent government. In 2019, the government engaged in saturation 
advertising of its infrastructure programs and tax reforms in the period 
before the issue of the writs. For example: ‘The Australian Government 
is building a better tax system, so hard-working Australians can keep 
more of their money’ (Australian Government Campaign: bettertax.gov.
au/campaign.html). There are also important benefits from the pork-
barrelling associated with discretionary grants programs. It was estimated 
that, in the marginal Victorian seat of Corangamite, 41 promises were 
made on behalf of the Liberal candidate, adding up to $26,500 per voter 
(Wright and Irvine 2019; see also Chapter 11, this volume).
One use of parliamentary resources for political campaigning that was 
extraordinary even by relatively loose Australian standards was the setting 
up of a parliamentary inquiry into the opposition’s tax reform policy. This 
was the House of Representatives Economics Committee inquiry into the 
implications of removing refundable tax credits, begun in September 2018. 
The chair set up a website in the committee’s name, stoptheretirementtax.
com, and used Twitter to direct people ‘worried about Labor’s retirement 
tax’ to register on the website to attend hearings and make statements. 
Initially, those wishing to register were required to sign a petition opposing 
the Labor policy. The well-attended townhall-style meetings held around 
Australia at public expense proved highly successful in reframing Labor’s 
proposed reform as a ‘retirement’ or ‘retiree’ tax. The committee’s chair, 
Tim Wilson, justified his use of parliamentary resources by saying that 
the ‘parliamentary purpose’ was to ‘campaign against a piece of policy’ 
(Evershed and Knaus 2019).
Apart from this somewhat exceptional use of a parliamentary committee, all 
incumbent parliamentarians also benefit from resources such as electorate 
staff and parliamentary allowances. Many also benefit from ‘personal 
employees’—staff employed under the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 
1984 (MOP(S) Act). These ‘personal employees’ are normally employed 
by ministers, office holders, shadow ministers and former leaders, except 
in the case of crossbenchers. They are in addition to the four electorate 
staff to which each MP or senator is entitled. In February 2019, the 
government had 452 personal employees compared with 95 for the ALP 
Opposition and 17 for the Greens. In addition, three personal employees 
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were provided for each of the crossbenchers in the Senate and the House of 
Representatives (increased to four after the 2019 election)—an indication 
of their significance in the balance of power. The Department of Finance 
website advises that employees under the MOP(S) Act are employed to 
assist with parliamentary duties, not for party-political purposes, and 
‘accordingly’ may ‘undertake activities in support of their employing 
senator or MP’s re-election but not in support of the election or re-election 
of others’. These parliamentary resources are unequally distributed both 
between incumbent parties and, more especially, between candidates of 
such parties and candidates of other parties and Independents who do not 
have access to parliamentary resources.
Supposedly, such staff and allowances are provided for parliamentary 
and electorate purposes, with any other effects, such as promoting the 
re-election of the parliamentarian, only incidental. However, the use of 
allowances for electoral campaigning purposes has been normalised and 
has long been recognised as unfairly advantaging incumbents. In 2010, an 
independent review of parliamentary entitlements, appointed by the Rudd 
Government, recommended that access to printing and communications 
entitlements be removed from the date of the announcement of a federal 
election, along with travelling allowance for parliamentary staff working 
at party campaign headquarters. The review committee noted the latter 
created the ‘not unreasonable perception that staff were engaged in party 
political business at public expense’ (Belcher et al. 2010: 74–76).
No progress was made in implementing these particular 
recommendations. Indeed, the Parliamentary Business Resources Act 2017 
(PBR Act) and associated determinations made it clear that travel to assist 
parliamentarians in their re-election, including travel to work at party 
campaign headquarters, could be considered official business. Moreover, 
such travel-related resources for the hundreds of MOP(S) Act staff and 
electorate staff could be accessed until the day before polling day, unlike 
the previous convention that such travel be paid for by political parties in 
the period after their election campaign launches. Under the PBR Act, it 
was made clear that electioneering activities could be regarded as official 
business and hence undertaken at Commonwealth expense (IPEA 2019). 
The 2018 Guidance on Caretaker Conventions provided by the Department 
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet did, however, continue to refer to 
the ‘long-standing convention that Ministers do not claim travelling 
allowance from the day of the Prime Minister’s campaign launch to the 
day after polling day’ (PM&C 2018: 7.2.5).
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Under the PBR Act, the parliamentary allowances of federal 
parliamentarians (now called office expenses) could be spent on not just 
printed or other forms of communication, but also advertising on social 
media. However, an attempt in February 2019 by the government to 
remove a restriction on the use of office expenses for radio and television 
content was disallowed by the Senate in April. Australia remains out of 
step with comparable democracies such as Canada, New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom in allowing both the use of parliamentary allowances for 
electioneering and access to the services of the Parliamentary Library after 
parliament is dissolved. As already noted, this is contrary to the principle 
that incumbent parties or candidates should be prevented from using state 
resources to obtain unfair electoral advantage (Sawer and Gauja 2016: 11).
Authorisation of advertisements 
and deceptive advertising
A new requirement in the Electoral Act (since 2017) is for authorisation 
of advertising on social media. It is not yet clear how effective this will 
be, not least because, for all their expanded scope, the new provisions 
only cover certain forms of social media communication and do not 
apply to unpaid viral messages shared by people who are not ‘disclosure 
entities’ as defined in the Act. In addition, the 48-hour ban on advertising 
in broadcast media before election day does not apply to social media. 
There was a huge amount of negative advertising on social media on the 
Thursday and Friday before the 2019 election, including the ubiquitous 
‘death tax’ advertising, with video clips of ALP frontbenchers saying the 
words ‘death tax’ when trying to deny the rumour of such a tax.
Although the AEC has entered into a cooperative arrangement with 
Facebook, there were almost 500 complaints about election advertising 
during the campaign, including 87 cases of advertising found by the 
AEC to have failed to meet the authorisation requirement (Knaus and 
Karp 2019).
At the federal level, the main requirement is that campaign advertisements 
be authorised and there is no requirement for ‘truth in advertising’. 
The  only prohibition of misleading advertising in the Electoral Act is 
restricted to the process of casting a vote. The prevalence of misleading 
and deceptive advertising during the campaign—particularly the torrent 
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of claims on social media that the ALP intended to introduce a ‘death 
tax’—led to renewed calls for broader regulation (Knaus and Evershed 
2019; Murphy et al. 2019; Steketee 2019). When Essential Research 
undertook focus groups in June, it found that ‘at least three members 
in each group thought the death tax was a real thing’ (Lewis 2019). Two 
weeks before the election, there were also reports of unauthorised ‘news’ 
circulating in chat rooms on the Chinese-language platform WeChat to 
the effect that under an ALP government there would be an enormous 
increase in the number of refugees entering Australia, at the expense 
of taxpayers (see Chapter 14, this volume).
It needs to be emphasised that election campaigning based on the 
dissemination of deliberate falsehoods represents a fundamental challenge 
to the democratic process. Responding effectively to that challenge is, 
however, by no means straightforward (Maley 2019). Truth in advertising 
provisions have an interesting history in Australia. Prior to the second 
conscription referendum in 1917, the Hughes Government prohibited 
under the War Precautions Act the publication of ‘any false statement 
of fact of a kind likely to affect the judgment of electors in relation to 
their votes’. In early 1984, the Hawke Government enacted a provision 
based on the 1917 regulation, which, however, was quickly repealed after 
the Joint Select Committee on Electoral Reform (1984) highlighted the 
difficulties involved in enforcing it. These included not only the danger 
of suppressing public debate, as in 1917, but also difficulty in classifying 
statements about the future as either true or false and the risk of turning 
campaigns into a lawyers’ picnic. Until now, Australia’s main experience 
with such provisions has arisen from the rules applying in South Australia 
(Renwick and Palese 2019: 22–30) and the Northern Territory. 
An example of advertising that fell within the currently prohibited 
category was the Liberal Party signage at polling places in the Victorian 
electorates of Chisholm and Kooyong. The Chinese-language signs 
mimicked an AEC notice, using the same shade of purple, and told voters 
the ‘correct’ way to vote was to ‘vote 1 Liberal Party’ (see Plate 3.1). Faced 
with complaints on election day, the AEC noted that the authorisation 
requirements of the Electoral Act had not been breached (there was 
authorisation in tiny letters at the bottom of the signs) and that it did 
not have a monopoly on the use of particular colours. The publication of 
electoral matter in languages other than English, particularly on polling 
day, constitutes a significant challenge for electoral regulators. On 31 July 
2019, the matter was taken to the Court of Disputed Returns. The results 
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in Kooyong and Chisholm were challenged on the ground that the posters 
were in breach of the Electoral Act prohibition of misleading and deceptive 
conduct, with the mimicry of an AEC notice indicating an intention so to 
deceive. The court ultimately held the display of the posters to have been 
in breach of the law. However, to force a fresh election in such situations 
it must also be shown that the election outcomes were likely to have been 
affected (Orr 2019), and the court was not satisfied of that. A longer-
term solution may be to amend Subsection 339(2) of the Electoral Act to 
prohibit use of material that could reasonably be taken to be an official 
AEC notice.
It is clear that the rise of social media has fundamentally changed the 
environment in which elections are conducted when compared with 1917 
or even 1984, to the point where it would be virtually impossible for 
the truth of published statements to be comprehensively policed or even 
monitored. Short of closing internet access during election campaigns, 
it is hard to see progress being made on this issue.
Plate 3.1 Chisholm polling place sign mimicking an AEC notice
Photo: Courtesy of the Victorian Trades Hall Council .
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Campaigning at polling places
The presence outside polling places of third-party campaigners, especially 
from the union movement and from organisations such as GetUp!, 
has long been a matter of concern to some Coalition figures. During 
the 44th Parliament (2013–16), the JSCEM commenced an inquiry 
into campaigning at polling places, but it lapsed on the dissolution of 
the parliament and was not resumed. After the 2019 election, it was 
reported (Norington 2019) that the re-elected Coalition Government was 
considering ‘introducing rules to restrict spruikers outside polling booths 
to volunteers who are attached to registered parties and independent 
candidates’. Any such restriction would inevitably be challenged in 
the High Court as imposing an impermissible burden on the implied 
constitutional freedom of political communication.
Early voting, counting and results
In 2019, the incidence of early voting rose to unprecedented levels. 
The Electoral Act specifies seven modalities for voting before the day fixed 
for polling. Five of those (voting in the Antarctic, telephone voting by 
blind or vision-impaired electors and mobile polling in special hospitals, 
prisons and remote areas) are used by a relatively small and stable number 
of people. The remaining two—pre-poll and postal voting—reached 
record levels in 2019 (see Figure 3.2). The greatest boom came in the 
pre-poll numbers: 4,766,853 such votes were cast—31.6 per cent of votes 
cast in the election. Just over half of those pre-poll votes were cast in 
the five days immediately before polling day. Postal voting, however, also 
increased: 1,291,364 postal votes were received by the AEC, representing 
8.6 per cent of those who voted. 
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Figure 3.2 Proportion of House of Representatives votes by 
voting method
Source: Constructed by Ben Raue from AEC data .
This growth represented a continuation, but also an accentuation, 
of a trend developing over a long period. It had its roots in two significant 
changes to the Electoral Act in 1984. The first made it possible for an elector 
attending an AEC office to make an ‘oral application for a postal vote’ that 
could then be recorded on the spot. As this process became more popular, 
it was renamed ‘pre-poll voting’. The second change relieved those seeking 
a postal vote of the obligation to state the specific ground on which they 
were applying. For all practical purposes, this meant that, from then on, 
anyone who wished to cast a postal vote rather than an ordinary vote for 
reasons of personal convenience could do so, not least because a number 
of the prescribed qualifications were purely within the knowledge of the 
voter, such as the voter’s travel plans for election day, and could not be 
objectively tested. These changes were viewed at the time as ones of minor, 
primarily administrative, significance; where they would ultimately lead 
was certainly not foreseen. 
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By 2007, however, the rising popularity of early voting could not be 
denied. In the aftermath of that year’s election, the AEC (2008: 41) 
argued to the JSCEM that: 
With close to 2 million votes being cast before polling day in 
2007 (either at early voting centres, or through the post), it is now 
misleading to conceive of an election as taking place on a single 
polling day: there is, in fact, a polling period.
The AEC further put it to the committee that, in the face of the trend, 
there were basically three options open to the parliament: do nothing, 
attempt to wind back early voting or embrace the trend and be prepared 
to modify and resource the process to enhance its efficiency. The JSCEM 
(2009: 190–91) supported the third option, leading directly to 
another major change: pre-poll votes cast within a voter’s own electoral 
division—which  until then had had to be recorded and counted as 
declaration  votes—could instead be cast as ordinary votes, making the 
pre-poll voting experience for such voters essentially identical to that of 
voting on polling day.
The point reached in 2019—with just over 40 per cent of votes recorded 
before polling day (see Figure 3.3)—has certainly generated concerns. 
One is the effect on the deliberative quality of election campaigning when 
large numbers of votes are cast before parties have released all their policies 
or even had their campaign launches (Mills and Drum 2019). Another is 
the concern about a level playing field, that a three-week period for pre-
poll voting disadvantages Independent candidates and minor parties who 
may not have the resources to hand out how-to-vote cards at pre-polling 
centres for such a prolonged period.
In its report on the 2016 election, the JSCEM (2018b: 88) recommended 
that the Electoral Act be amended to restrict pre-poll voting to no more 
than two weeks before election day. Although there was no response in 
time for the 2019 election, the committee will certainly revisit the issue. 
But limiting the period for pre-poll voting is unlikely to make much 
difference to its growing popularity; in 2019, 86 per cent of pre-poll votes 
were cast in the fortnight before polling day anyway. In addition, the 
option voters now have of applying for a postal vote via the AEC website 
has made postal voting so easily accessible that restrictions on pre-poll 
voting could well have the effect of increasing postal voting, rather than 
encouraging a return to ordinary voting.
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Figure 3.3 Rise in proportion of House of Representatives votes cast 
before election day
Source: Constructed by Ben Raue from AEC data .
The rise of early voting has created various difficulties for the AEC. 
With  fewer people voting on polling day, it has come under pressure, 
including from the Australian National Audit Office (Brent 2014), to cut 
back on resourcing of polling booths; but if that were done too vigorously, 
it could lead to queueing and delays on polling day, which could tip the 
balance further in favour of more convenient early voting. At the same 
time, the AEC remains under pressure to deliver a result on the Saturday 
night of an election if possible; that now requires each electoral division to 
organise a discrete count of tens of thousands of pre-poll ordinary votes, 
staffed by a cohort of casuals separate from those who have worked at the 
polling booths during the day.
The 2019 count was also the subject of a High Court case (Palmer & Ors 
v Australian Electoral Commission & Ors) seeking to restrain the AEC from 
publishing the results of ‘two-candidate-preferred’ counts on election 
night until after 9.30 pm Australian Eastern Standard Time. This was the 
moment when the polls would close in the Territories of Christmas Island 
and Cocos (Keeling) Islands, three and a half hours after they closed on 
the eastern seaboard. Palmer argued that electors might be influenced by 
hearing these counts before voting but the court was unanimous in its view 
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that the application should be dismissed. This is in line with the ongoing 
reluctance of the court to interfere with the very considerable latitude 
given by the constitution to parliament to devise electoral processes.
Trends in the rules of the game
The experience of the 2019 election highlights a number of regulatory 
issues arising from the rapidly changing electoral environment. Australia 
has now shifted from having a polling day to having a polling period. 
This change may turn out to be irreversible; it will be difficult to place 
restrictions on convenience voting when it has proved so popular. 
In addition, it is notable that, while the rise in early voting may encourage 
parties to release more policies in the early part of the campaign period, 
parties still tend to have their formal campaign ‘launches’ ridiculously 
close to polling day.
Another issue relates to timing. As noted earlier, the inquiry by the 
JSCEM into campaigning at polling places lapsed on the dissolution of 
the 44th Parliament, while the committee’s report on the 2016 election 
took so long to produce that action to implement its recommendations 
proved impossible prior to the 2019 election. The comparative shortness 
of the federal parliamentary term is clearly a constraint, but the relatively 
leisurely approach to the conduct of inquiries and production of final 
reports taken by the committee in recent times does not bode well for its 
future as a vehicle of reform.
On the other hand, it is notable that some matters long the subject 
of partisan contestation seem to be slowly fading from the scene. 
For example, the issue of proof of identity for enrolment has essentially 
been resolved by technological change. In addition, a number of players 
with a US Republican Party–inspired reform agenda focused on the 
supposed dangers of electoral fraud have now left the political arena.
One major continuing issue is the failure to introduce political finance 
reform at the federal level and the way this undermines the efforts of 
States and Territories to reduce the influence of private money in elections. 
While the Greens and many nongovernmental organisations have long 
been campaigning for reform, and the ALP is now committed to caps on 
expenditure as well as much greater transparency around donations, there 
is little confidence that progress will be made under the federal Coalition, 
which has consistently opposed reforms in this area. 
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Finally, it is clear that the growth of social media, and the ways in which it 
rapidly evolves, gives rise to great difficulties both for the structuring and 
for the administration of appropriate schemes of regulation. At present, 
there seem to be no obvious solutions to these difficulties.
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Anika Gauja and Marija Taflaga
Between them, the Coalition parties, the ALP, the Greens and Pauline 
Hanson’s One Nation (PHON) fielded 520 candidates in 151 House of 
Representatives seats for the 2019 Australian federal election. Candidate 
selection—more commonly known as ‘pre-selection’ in Australia—is the 
process by which a political party decides who will be its endorsed election 
candidates. It is a high-stakes activity, involving personal, professional and 
factional ambitions. Depending on how a party chooses its candidates, it is 
also one of the best opportunities party members have to exercise power 
within their parties and to indirectly influence public policy outcomes.
Candidate selection is equally important beyond political parties because 
it shapes the choice before voters, the composition of parliaments, the 
interests most likely to be heard in policy debates and legislative outcomes 
(Cross 2008: 598). As Hazan and Rahat (2010: 10) argue, ‘candidate 
selection affects the fundamental nature of modern democratic politics 
and governance’. Yet, as Gallagher and Marsh (1988) contend, despite 
their importance in determining the composition of the legislature, 
candidate selection contests resemble the ‘secret garden’ of politics. 
Although political parties are defined by the Commonwealth Electoral Act 
1918 as organisations seeking to promote the election of one or more 
candidates to the House of Representatives and the Senate, they are not 
required to disclose how this selection takes place, nor are they mandated 
to use a particular method. While it is relatively straightforward to obtain 
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information on the formal rules governing pre-selections through party 
rules and constitutions, finding any data on the contests themselves and 
how these rules are applied in particular cases is far more difficult.
For this chapter, we have created an original database of pre-selection 
contests and candidate data for the 2019 House of Representatives and 
Senate elections, compiled by the authors from local and national media 
accounts, party websites and AEC candidate information. The database 
covers the Coalition parties—the Liberal Party, the National Party and 
the Queensland Liberal National Party (LNP)—the ALP, the Greens and 
PHON in all 151 House of Representatives seats and the Senate tickets for 
these parties. It provides information on publicly reported pre-selections, 
whether the contest was competitive, who participated and who was 
selected as the official party candidate. We also collect information on all 
candidates selected, including incumbency and gender.
The chapter begins by analysing the number of reported and competitive 
House of Representatives pre-selection contests. It then outlines the variety 
of mechanisms used by Australian parties to select their candidates and the 
stages in the process. We then focus on the 33 pre-selection contests that 
were competitive—that is, contested by two or more candidates. We end 
by examining the democratic implications of pre-selection and analysing 
the candidates selected for the House of Representatives and Senate by 
incumbency and gender.
Pre‑selection contests for the 2019 
Australian federal election
Gallagher and Marsh’s (1988) assertion that candidate selection is the 
‘secret garden’ of politics is largely confirmed by our data. Of the 520 
candidate selections we know occurred, we were able to find publicly 
reported information on only 326 contests (63 per cent). The presumption, 
then, is that the selection events that were not publicly reported on 
consisted of the routine endorsement of incumbent candidates—contests 
for which there were no challengers for the position—or selections 
made exclusively by a party executive (appointments), including those 
made at short notice with limited candidates available. In New South 
Wales, for example, the Liberal Party State Executive voted to endorse 
all sitting members (Murphy and Davies 2018). Only in 33 instances 
across Australia (6  per cent of the total pre-selection events) could we 
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find evidence of a competitive pre-selection contest—that is, a selection 
with more than one candidate (Table 4.1). If we examine the number 
of competitive contests by State and Territory, the Australian Capital 
Territory is the clear outlier: 56 per cent of pre-selections in the Territory 
were competitive, compared with a maximum of 6 per cent in New South 
Wales, Queensland and Western Australia. 












ACT 3 9 6 5
NSW 47 148 88 9
NT 2 6 3 0
Qld 30 119 67 7
SA 10 30 16 1
Tas . 5 20 18 1
Vic . 38 121 86 6
WA 16 67 42 4
Total 151 520 326 33
Source: Authors’ own data .
Table 4.2 presents the number of competitive pre-selection contests for 
the House of Representatives, by party. The Liberal Party staged the 
greatest number of competitive pre-selection contests, by some margin. 
Although more Coalition parliamentarians retired before the election 
was called than did Labor parliamentarians,1 this alone does not account 
for the difference. Part of the explanation may be the decision by Labor, 
which was the frontrunner, to quickly resolve damaging and messy pre-
selection contests. The most extreme case of Labor’s efforts to settle 
disputes internally occurred within its Victorian division, where a factional 
dispute broke out between the Left and the Right. Labor Leader Bill 
Shorten secured the intervention of Labor’s powerful national executive 
to administer its pre-selections and imposed a $500 fee on candidates 
to suppress ‘vexatious’ factional candidacies (Brown 2018). PHON did 
not stage a single competitive contest, which is explained by the fact 
that candidates were chosen exclusively by the party’s State and national 
1  Ten Coalition lower house parliamentarians retired, compared with six Labor parliamentarians. 
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executives. The Greens held only one reported competitive lower house 
contest, in the Queensland seat of Brisbane. This could be explained by 
the relatively high cost of resourcing such contests and finding available 
candidates, which could be difficult for a smaller party to meet.
Table 4.2 Pre‑selection contests by party: 2019 Australian federal 





Ratio of competitive to 
reported contests (%)
LIB/LNP 106 21 20
ALP 67 9 13
Greens 83 1 1
PHoN 51 0 0
National Party 19 2 11
Source: Authors’ own data .
The diversity of pre‑selection methods 
in Australia
Candidate selection is typically conducted in three stages: 1) establishing 
both the eligibility and the nomination of candidates (before the contest); 
2) a selection process (during the contest); and 3) vetting and endorsement 
(after the contest). Parties retain high levels of control over candidates 
because they are the institutional interface between candidates and the 
AEC. All candidates, including incumbents, must be endorsed by their 
party before appearing on the ballot under the party name. As noted 
above, there is significant variation within, and between, the Australian 
political parties at all three of these stages. 
The typical requirement for nomination in Australia is party membership, 
often for a minimum period (ranging from three months in the South 
Australian Liberal Party to three years in the Queensland ALP). Additional 
criteria that may be imposed include trade union membership (in the ALP), 
attendance at a minimum number of party meetings and nomination by 
a prescribed minimum number of party members. However, in almost all 
cases, party executive bodies can override these nomination requirements. 
For example, the NSW ALP Administration Committee can decide to 
waive minimum membership requirements if it considers ‘there would be 
a significant advantage to the party if the member concerned was allowed 
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to contest the selection ballot’ (Rule no. 11). Political parties also exercise 
a power of veto over candidate nominations, which are subject to review. 
These powers can be extremely broad. For example, the South Australian 
Liberal executive may refuse to accept a nomination if it is in the ‘best 
interests of the division and shall not be bound to give any reasons’. 
Therefore, despite the formal rules that govern candidacy requirements, 
political parties possess significant scope and flexibility to intervene where 
it may be electorally desirable to do so.
The easiest way of distinguishing between all the different ways of 
selecting candidates currently used by Australian parties is to focus on 
which groups or individuals are able to participate in making the decision 
(the ‘selectorate’) (see, for example, Cross and Gauja 2014). Selectorates 
can range from being highly exclusive, with candidates chosen by a single 
party leader, to highly inclusive, where a candidate might be selected 
in a primary-style pre-selection open to all voters in the region (see Hazan 
and Rahat 2010: 35). 
Parties’ pre-selection methods for their 2019 candidates spread across 
the entire spectrum. At one end of the spectrum are processes involving 
a rank-and-file vote. For example, the Labor and Liberal parties conduct 
rank-and-file pre-selection plebiscites in the Australian Capital Territory 
and the Northern Territory. Several parties, including the ALP and the 
National Party, have previously held more open selection contests involving 
participation from local communities (Gauja 2017), though this was 
not a feature of the 2019 pre-selections. A more common method is by 
a selection committee comprising representatives/delegates from various 
areas of the party organisation (for example, branches, parliamentarians, 
State council and so on). This is used by the West Australian Liberals to 
select candidates for the House of Representatives. At the other end of 
the spectrum are highly exclusive selection processes, such as that used 
by PHON. In Queensland, for example, candidates are selected by the 
party’s four-person State executive. The national executive continues, 
however, to exercise significant discretion over the selection of candidates: 
The State Executive must ensure that best practices in relation to 
the vetting of Candidates [are] per instruction from the National 
Executive which may vary and change from time to time as 
deemed necessary in the best interests of the Party.2 
2  Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Queensland State Constitution 2017, s. 5.2.
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Apart from the freedom given to State parties to implement their own 
selection processes as they see fit, many parties retain a significant degree 
of freedom in being able to alter those processes at short notice. 
The final stage of the candidate selection process is receiving the 
endorsement of the party after the selection contest has taken place. 
As with nomination procedures, political parties possess the ability to 
intervene at this point to refuse endorsement. This can occur at both 
the State and the national levels. For example, the ALP’s administrative 
committee in Queensland shall not endorse a candidate for public office 
if ‘such person’s record shows failure, without good and cogent reasons, to 
vote for and/or defend Labor’s legislation or if that person’s candidature 
may prejudice Labor’s prospects’.3 Party executives may also intervene to 
disendorse candidates after the close of nominations, which occurred in 
several instances in 2019 (see Sawer and Maley, Chapter 3, this volume). 
One Labor, two Greens and four Liberal Party lower house candidates 
were either disendorsed or resigned under pressure from the party after 
social media commentary was uncovered that revealed sexist, homophobic 
and racist comments.4 
Candidate selection in the Senate operates differently from that in the 
House of Representatives. This is the product of different voting systems, 
which sees parties produce party list tickets. As parties are organised 
federally, there is variation across and within Australian Senate candidate 
selection procedures. However, as a general rule, Senate contests tend to 
be more centralised and have the greater potential to be influenced by the 
party’s central office. Again, PHON represents one extreme, where the 
party appoints candidates, and the Greens are at the other, where some 
States hold party-wide membership ballots. For both these parties, it is 
the Senate contest that really matters. By contrast, the Liberal and Labor 
parties tend to use mixed systems, with a combination of membership 
representation and central organisational representatives (Cross and 
Gauja 2014), and have been disinclined to introduce radical reform of 
procedures (Miragliotta 2013). 
3  2018 Rules of the Australian Labor Party (State of Queensland), s. 49(3). 
4  ALP: Luke Creasey (Melbourne); Greens: Jay Dessi (Lalor), David Paull (Parkes); Liberal: 
Jeremy Hearn (Isaacs), Peter Killin (Wills), Jessica Whelan (Lyons) and Gurpal Singh (Scullin). 
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Senate contests are usually competitive, in so far as there is a competitive 
process for allocating winnable positions on the Senate ballot. What 
may not always occur is the entrance of non-incumbent candidates to 
this process. As parties are likely to secure, at best, three senators, the 
real contest on Senate tickets is to resolve the order of names. Senators, 
compared with members of the House, tend to have stronger backgrounds 
in the party organisation and are more likely to have had a ‘careerist’ 
trajectory into politics (van Onselen 2015; Miragliotta and Errington 
2012). For this reason, Senate contests are regularly the cause of factional 
manoeuvrings, and it is through this lens that much scrutiny of Senate 
pre-selection contests arises in the news.
Notable pre‑selection contests for the 
2019 Australian federal election
House of Representatives
Table 4.3 provides the details of all the competitive pre-selection 
contests held by the major parties and the Greens for the 2019 House 
of Representatives election. As the table shows, a major reason for 
a  competitive pre-selection is the retirement or resignation of a sitting 
parliamentarian. 
The creation of the new seat of Bean in the Australian Capital Territory 
saw both the Liberals and Labor hold pre-selections in which multiple 
candidates contested. The ALP’s pre-selection contest was won by David 
Smith, who had served in the Senate since May 2018, when Katy Gallagher 
was disqualified for failing to properly renounce her UK citizenship 
(for details on the citizenship crisis, see Taflaga and Curtin 2018, 2019). 
The Liberal Party pre-selected Ed Cocks, who competed with Jane Hiatt, 
a small business owner (Whyte 2018b). Following the resignation of the 
ALP’s Gai Brodtmann in the seat of Canberra, competitive contests were 
also held by both parties in that seat. The ALP’s contest was won by Alicia 
Payne, running against four men, in a contest that saw the intervention 
of the party’s national executive to investigate the distribution of flyers 
making damaging claims against one of the candidates (Whyte 2018a). 
The pre-selected Liberal candidate, Mina Zaki, was plagued by allegations 















Bean ACT ALP David Smith 3 New seat n .a .
Bean ACT LIB Ed Cocks 2 New seat n .a .
Canberra ACT ALP Alicia Payne 5 Retiring MP +4 .1
Canberra ACT LIB Mina Zaki 3 Retiring MP 
(other party)
–4 .1
Fenner ACT LIB Leanne Castley 2 +1 .3
Cowper NSW NAT Patrick 
Conaghan
3 Retiring MP +2 .2
Eden‑
Monaro
NSW LIB Fiona Kotvojs 5 +2 .1
Gilmore NSW LIB Grant Schultz* 2 Retiring MP –3 .3
Hughes NSW LIB Craig Kelly** 2 +0 .5
Lindsay NSW LIB Melissa McIntosh 4 Retiring MP 
(other party)
+6 .2
Mackellar NSW LIB Jason Falinski** 2 –2 .5
Page NSW ALP Patrick Deegan 2 –7 .1
Parramatta NSW LIB Charles 
Camenzuli
3 +4 .2
Reid NSW ALP Sam Crosby 2 Retiring MP 
(other party)
+1 .5
Bowman Qld LNP Andrew Laming 2 +3 .2
Brisbane Qld GRN Andrew Bartlett 3 –1 .0
Capricornia Qld ALP Russell 
Robertson
2 –11 .7
Dickson Qld ALP Ali France 2 –2 .9
Flynn Qld NAT Ken o’Dowd 2 +7 .6
Moncrieff Qld LNP Angie Bell 5 Retiring MP +0 .8
Ryan Qld LNP Julian Simmonds 2 –3 .0
Mayo SA LIB Georgina 
Downer
2 –2 .2
Braddon Tas . LIB Gavin Pearce 3 +4 .8
Chisholm Vic . LIB Gladys Liu 9 MP resigns 
from party
–2 .3
Higgins Vic . LIB Katie Allen 8 Retiring MP –6 .1
79










Indi Vic . LIB Steve Martin 3 Retiring MP 
(other party)
+4 .1
Jagajaga Vic . ALP Kate Thwaites 2 Retiring MP +1 .0
Macnamara Vic . LIB Kate Ashmor 3 Retiring MP 
(other party)
–5 .0
Mallee Vic . NAT Anne Webster 6 Retiring MP –3 .6
Curtin WA LIB Celia Hammond 5 Retiring MP –6 .4
Hasluck WA ALP James Martin 3 –3 .3
Moore WA LIB Ian Goodenough 5 +0 .6
Pearce WA ALP Kim Travers 2 –3 .9
n .a . not applicable
LIB = Liberal Party
NAT = National Party
GRN = Greens
* Grant Schultz was chosen by Liberal Party members as the candidate for Gilmore, but this 
was not endorsed by the State executive . 
** Incumbent MP Craig Kelly was challenged by NSW State President Kent Johns, but 
Prime Minister Scott Morrison and the State executive intervened to endorse Kelly as the 
candidate . Incumbent Jason Falinski was also endorsed under this process (Murphy and 
Davies 2018) . 
Source: Compiled by the authors .
Several Liberal Party pre-selections in New South Wales were controversial. 
In Gilmore, local party members chose Grant Schultz as the preferred 
candidate, but this decision was overruled by the party’s executive, 
which installed Warren Mundine as the official candidate (Fist 2019). 
Schultz consequently resigned from the party and contested the seat as 
an Independent. Labor’s Fiona Phillips won the seat and the Liberals 
suffered a 16.1 per cent primary vote swing against Mundine. In both 
Hughes and Mackellar, the Liberal Party executive intervened to endorse 
the incumbent members, Craig Kelly and Jason Falinski, respectively, 
from challenges by local members. Interestingly, the Queensland LNP 
executive did not intervene in the seat of Ryan to re-endorse sitting MP 
Jane Prentice, who was beaten by local councillor and former staffer Julian 
Simmonds in a pre-selection challenge (McGowan 2018). 
Women were selected in two competitive Liberal pre-selection contests, 
in the Victorian seats of Chisholm and Higgins. In Chisholm, Gladys Liu 
was selected from a field of nine candidates to replace Julia Banks, who 
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resigned from the Liberal Party after making allegations of bullying against 
others in the party (Preiss 2018). In Higgins, paediatric gastroenterologist 
Dr Katie Allen was pre-selected to replace the retiring Kelly O’Dwyer 
(Kehoe 2019). In the West Australian seat of Curtin, former Curtin 
University vice-chancellor Celia Hammond was chosen to replace retiring 
Liberal Party minister Julie Bishop (Burrell 2019). 
Senate
Several Senate selection contests proved controversial, highlighting 
continuing strife within some State party divisions. In the Victorian 
Liberal Party, pre-selections due to be held in May 2018 were cancelled at 
the eleventh hour as a result of manoeuvrings by the conservative faction 
within the State council (Norman 2018a). Moderate Senator Jane Hume 
was perceived to be the primary focus of the conservative faction’s efforts 
to organise, though speculation that conservative MP Kevin Andrews 
would be unlikely to survive pre-selection was also reported. In August, 
the Victorian party automatically endorsed all sitting MPs, avoiding 
a vote of members (Crowe 2018), and in September, as one of his first 
acts as prime minister, Scott Morrison intervened to see both Victorian 
senators re-endorsed (Norman 2018b). When the remaining spots on the 
Victorian Liberal ticket were finalised remains unclear. 
In New South Wales, both the Liberals and the Greens had competitive 
and controversial pre-selection processes. In New South Wales, incumbent 
senator and frontrunner for the NSW ticket, Jim Molan (right faction), 
was relegated to fourth—an unwinnable spot on the Coalition Senate 
ticket. The moderates Hollie Hughes and Andrew Bragg won 199 and 
157 votes, respectively, to Molan’s 141 votes. It was believed the surprise 
result was the consequence of centre-right faction leader Alex Hawke’s 
withdrawal of support from Molan at the last minute (Hunter and 
Loussikian 2018). The Nationals pre-selected Perin Davey, who took 
the third spot on the ticket. This deal within the Coalition was viewed 
with bitterness, because many Nationals believed the third spot was 
unwinnable given the government’s poor performance. Tensions were 
raised again when Senator Molan ran a below-the-line campaign that saw 
him garner 132,000 below-the-line votes (a record high) (Chang 2019; 
Grattan 2019). Despite the campaign’s success, and the Coalition’s strong 
performance, it was not enough; Davey was the only senator elected for 
the Nationals.
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A major contest developed when left Greens Senator Lee Rhiannon was 
challenged by Mehreen Faruqi. Rhiannon’s position within the Greens had 
come under pressure as a result of the NSW Greens’ practice of binding 
members to vote in defiance of decisions made by the federal party. 
Rhiannon’s actions had prompted her suspension from the Greens’ party 
room until the NSW Greens undertook internal reforms (Gartrell 2017). 
Faruqi won pre-selection over Rhiannon with 60.7 per cent of the vote, in 
a result seen as a major blow for the left faction (Nicholls 2017).
Turning to other States, minor skirmishes between the factions broke out 
in the South Australian Labor Party. An unfavourable redistribution saw 
Mark Butler without a safe seat. The eventual deal between the left and 
right factions saw the left exchange one of its Senate spots in return for 
the seat of Adelaide, held by the retiring Kate Ellis of the right (Puddy 
et al. 2018). In Queensland, the LNP achieved generational renewal when 
controversial Senator Barry O’Sullivan failed to achieve endorsement and 
Senator Ian Macdonald was relegated to fourth position on the ticket 
(Owens 2018). Macdonald took the decision badly, declaring the party 
was failing to represent north Queensland, and urged supporters to vote 
for him below the line (AAP 2019). Similar concerns about regional 
representation were raised within the ALP, with members fearful of 
a takeover by Brisbane and the Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining 
and Energy Union (CFMMEU) (Killoran 2018). Finally, the unaligned 
Tasmanian Senator Lisa Singh was relegated to the fourth spot on Labor’s 
ticket as a result of a factional deal between the right and left, despite 
winning second place on the membership ballot (Denholm 2018). 
The consequences of pre‑selection: 
Who contests and who is elected?
There is some debate among political scientists about whether women are 
disadvantaged in relatively more competitive and open selection contests 
(see, for example, Pruysers et al. 2017). Table 4.4 reports the proportion 
of women candidates who participated in pre-selection contests for the 
House of Representatives against the proportion of candidates who were 
chosen. Evidence from the 2019 Australian federal election pre-selections 
shows that, while women are still in the minority in such contests in 
the  House, they are just as likely—if not more likely—to be selected 
as the party’s official candidate. 
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This was the case for all parties except the Greens (for whom only one 
competitive pre-selection contest was publicly reported) for the House 
of Representatives. The ALP had the largest share of women as both 
pre-selection candidates and officially endorsed candidates (44 per cent), 
followed by the Liberal Party and the National Party—mirroring the 
partisan patterns of representation observed in the federal parliament 
(Hough 2019). The existence of Labor’s quota rule, which see contests 
spilled if an insufficient number of women are put forward, likely drives 
the result for this party. For the Liberal Party, it may be the threat of 
intervention from State executives or the effect of public pressure given 
recent and sustained criticism of the low levels of female representation 
within that party (McMahon 2018). 
Table 4.4 Competitive contests: Candidates by party and gender in the 
House of Representatives
Party No. of House of Representatives 
pre‑selection candidates














ALP 14 9 39 5 4 44
LIB/LNP 42 23 35 11 8 42
Greens 2 1 33 1 0 0
Nationals 10 2 17 2 1 33
Total 68 35 34 19 13 41
Source: Compiled by the authors .
Table 4.5 Candidates nominated for the Senate compared with 
those elected
Party Candidates at pre‑selection Elected to 
the Senate




















ALP 39 37 15 22 59 5 8 62
LIB/LNP 37 31 20 11 35 11 6 35
Greens 37 35 5 30 86 2 4 67
Nationals 8 8 3 5 62 0 1 100
PHoN 12 12 9 3 25 1 0 0
Total 133 123 52 71 58 19 18 50
Source: Compiled by the authors .
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Table 4.5 shows that women were a little more likely than men to be 
selected as Senate candidates and that they went on to win 50 per cent 
of the seats contested by the five parties considered in this chapter. 
However, this result is not distributed evenly across all parties. Labor 
nominated 22 (59 per cent) women and saw eight (62 per cent of their 
successful candidates) elected. Of the 35 candidates nominated by the 
Greens, 30 (86 per cent) were women, and they succeeded in electing six 
senators, 67 per cent of whom were women. The Greens’ figures reflect 
the historically stronger performance of smaller parties in achieving 
women’s representation. It may also reflect the party’s policy platform and 
institutional organisation, which make it a more welcoming environment 
for women. 
On the right, the results were mixed. The Nationals nominated more 
women than men (62 per cent) at this year’s election. This may be because 
the party considered its chances of electoral success were limited because 
of the nature of its Coalition agreements with the Liberals. However, it 
succeeded in electing one woman, Perin Davey from New South Wales. 
The Liberal Party was once again the laggard; only 35 per cent of its 
nominations were women (a higher proportion than in the House) and 
it succeeded in electing six women (35 per cent). 
The data presented in Table 4.6 illustrate the effect of incumbency. 
Women candidates make up a much higher proportion of non-incumbent 
candidates selected by each of the parties but perform better in the Senate 
than in the House. This reflects both the current gender imbalance in 
the federal legislature and historically observed stronger representation 
for women in the upper chamber. Both the Liberal Party and the ALP 
nominated a similar percentage of women non-incumbent candidates in 
the House, but only 15 per cent of Liberal MP incumbents were women. 
In the Senate, the situation was somewhat reversed: both parties had 
similar levels of women incumbents (50 per cent ALP versus 42 per cent 
Liberals), but Labor had one-third more women non-incumbents, 
reflecting a higher level of women’s participation overall. Given the 
much greater likelihood that incumbents are re-elected, these patterns, 
especially in the lower house, arguably perpetuate rather than address 
gender disparities in the parliament. Indeed, following the result, women 
will make up 47 per cent of Labor parliamentarians and only 23 per cent 
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Conclusion
Although candidate selection is key to determining the composition of the 
legislature, Australian parties’ pre-selection processes for the 2019 federal 
election illustrate the closed nature of the majority of these events. Only 
a tiny proportion of pre-selection contests could be considered competitive. 
In reality, the decision as to who will be a candidate is often determined 
by just a handful of people. For party pre-selections to the Senate, this 
democratic deficit is compounded by factional manoeuvring, culminating 
in this election, for the Liberal Party, in prime ministerial intervention in 
Victoria. Some pre-selections are contested, particularly those where an 
incumbent parliamentarian is retiring, but these are infrequent events. 
Given the public scepticism about and distrust of parties and politicians 
in Australia, the closed and secretive nature of pre-selection processes 
appear to amplify rather than resolve this problem. 
Pre-selection contests also have concrete outcomes for the election of 
women to the federal parliament. On a positive note, our data show 
that where women do contest competitive pre-selection contests, they 
are not disadvantaged. However, the effect of incumbency (that is, 
a  predominantly male parliament) continues to perpetuate the gender 
imbalance in the legislature. This effect is particularly pronounced for 
parties that have eschewed quotas. With the Coalition parties struggling 
to improve organisational practices and facilitate more opportunities for 
women, the underrepresentation of conservative women’s voices in the 
legislature will continue to be an issue leading into the next election. 
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IDEOLOGY AND  
POPULISM
Carol Johnson1
The 2019 Australian federal election campaign offered voters a clear 
ideological choice. However, this was largely due to Labor’s ambitious 
agenda that sought to address issues of rising inequality and to increase 
government revenue to fund government services and benefits. The Liberal 
Party’s ‘small target’ strategy articulated its more neoliberal ideological 
position largely via critiquing Labor’s tax and spending policies. 
The election campaign also displayed elements of both left-wing and right-
wing populism, in which ‘we the people’ are mobilised against a perceived 
predatory enemy: ‘them’. In a shift away from neoliberal ideological 
perspectives, Labor depicted itself as representing the people (particularly 
the working and middle classes) against the more economically privileged 
‘top end of town’. Scott Morrison took a more neoliberal populist 
position, mobilising the people against big government by depicting 
himself as an ordinary bloke trying to stop Labor from ripping off and 
spending taxpayers’ money. Two minor right-wing parties displayed more 
fully blown populist agendas and were a significant source of preferences 
for the Coalition Government—namely, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation 
(PHON) and Clive Palmer’s United Australia Party (UAP).
1  This chapter draws on some material from an Australian Research Council–funded project 
(DP140100168), ‘Expanding equality: A historical perspective on developments and dilemmas in 
contemporary Australian social democracy’. My thanks to the discussants (Frank Bongiorno and 
Mark Evans), the convenors and other participants at the 2019 federal election workshop for their 
feedback on the initial draft of this chapter.
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Given that much of the Liberals’ campaign was focused on critiquing 
Labor’s economic policy, this discussion will begin with an analysis of 
Labor’s position, before moving to an analysis of the Liberals’ position 
as the major party in the Coalition. It will then analyse the populism 
exhibited by PHON and the UAP. I argue, contrary to Jan-Werner Müller 
(2016), that it is important to identify populist elements in mainstream 
politicians’ discourse even if they do not exhibit the full-blown populism 
displayed by minor parties such as PHON and the UAP or by iconoclastic 
politicians such as Donald Trump in the United States.
Labor
Labor had been developing its policies, focusing on creating a more 
equal society, since well before the 2016 election, although the 2019 
campaign saw some new policies added (see Chapters 13 and 20, this 
volume). Labor pledged to improve wages and conditions in a time of 
wage stagnation and rising economic inequality, to support racial, ethnic 
and same-sex equality and to raise revenue to better fund government 
services, including in child care, health and dental care and education. 
In these respects, Labor was espousing a relatively traditional Australian 
social-democratic ideological agenda, albeit one that emphasised 
providing a ‘living wage’ (Shorten 2019b) rather than providing a welfare 
state as extensive as in some European social democracies (Castles 1985). 
However, it was a post-Whitlamite and 21st-century version of that 
agenda that addressed a range of inequality issues wider than just those of 
class (see further Johnson 2019). For reasons that will be discussed later 
in this chapter, Labor’s broader equality agenda did not become a major 
issue during the election in terms of the key debating points between 
the Liberals and Labor, although some anti-Labor forces did raise issues 
regarding Labor’s support for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer 
and intersex (LGBTQI) rights. Rather, the debate between the two major 
parties during the election campaign focused on critiquing Labor’s tax 
policies, and those are what will be discussed in most detail in this chapter. 
Indeed, one of Labor’s problems in the campaign was that it had difficulty 
framing the debate around its chosen issues, rather than ones highlighted 
by the Liberals.
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Although some media commentators characterised Labor’s tax policies as 
involving a radical move to the left, they were often merely winding back 
tax concessions and loopholes that had been introduced by the Howard 
Government during the heady days of the mining boom. For example, 
Howard had changed Keating-era legislation to provide franking credits 
to those who had not paid tax and had reduced Labor’s capital gains 
tax. Similarly, the Hawke–Keating Government had originally tried to 
abolish negative gearing altogether before industry pressure made them 
reintroduce it. The real estate and housing industries also campaigned 
against Labor’s negative gearing and capital gains tax changes in 2019 
(see Wanna, Chapter 19, this volume). 
Nonetheless, Labor’s ideological position differed from that espoused 
during the Hawke and Keating years, despite both past Labor leaders’ 
endorsement of Bill Shorten (Hawke and Keating 2019). Labor under 
Shorten did not emphasise the positive role of the market and private 
business in the way Hawke and Keating had. Rather, Shorten (2019b) 
focused on addressing issues of rising economic inequality. He argued 
‘that capital in this country is taxed very lightly, but income is taxed very 
heavily’, which had major implications for ordinary Australians, from 
young people to pensioners (ABC 2019b). Meanwhile, Shorten stated 
that government spending benefited the privileged: 
When you say ‘big spending’, let’s tell the truth here—this 
government is spending money. They spend it in tax cuts—
$77 billion for the top tier of tax earners. They spent three years 
trying to give away $80 billion to the big end of town in corporate 
tax cuts. (ABC 2019c)
Shorten also argued that ‘income has been redistributed from wages to 
profits’ (quoted in Hartcher 2019). Labor emphasised the need to raise 
wages given wage stagnation and also the need to tackle the gender 
wage gap (NewCompany.com.au 2019b), including via government-
funded wage subsidies in the female-dominated areas of early childhood 
education and care work. Labor’s position on industrial relations also 
marked an ideological shift from the neoliberal-influenced Hawke 
and Keating years (as well as aspects of the Gillard years), particularly 
in regard to deficiencies in the existing enterprise bargaining regime 
and other rules constraining unions, including restrictions on pattern 
bargaining (see further Johnson 2019: 125–29). While Shorten claimed 
he would work with business, among others, in the spirit of Hawke and 
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Keating’s accord (Shorten 2019a), he seemed to overlook the fact Hawke 
and Keating had offered business wage restraint initially (and later real 
wage cuts), subsidised by government spending on the social wage, and 
had also overseen a major transfer from wages to profits (see further 
Johnson 2019: 118–20). By contrast, Shorten tried to reframe the idea of 
what good economic management was, arguing: ‘This government loves 
to talk about a strong economy but strong for who? Corporate profits are 
up 39 per cent but wages are only up 5 per cent’ (ABC 2019b). However, 
Shorten argued on a number of occasions that increasing wages would 
be good for the economy because ‘more money in the pockets of wage-
earners, means more trade for shops in the high street and more confidence 
across the board. That is what we call a win-win, good for business, good 
for workers, and good for Australia’ (Shorten 2019b). 
Nonetheless, as in the 2016 election campaign (see Johnson 2016: 
63–64, 73) and despite increased attempts to talk to business leaders 
(see Chapter  19, this volume), in 2019, Labor arguably did not make 
a frequent enough case that its policies would benefit both labour and 
at least some key sections of capital. Yet, that argument had long been 
a central part of Labor’s traditional social harmony ideology (see further 
Johnson 1989: 4, 24, 102), helping make their case for Labor being better 
economic managers of a capitalist economy than the Liberals. Such issues 
pose a challenge for reforming social-democratic governments because 
they can be important to the many voters whose jobs and incomes are 
dependent on private sector investment. Yet, once again, in partially 
moving beyond its neoliberal positions of the 1980s and 1990s, Labor 
seemed to have forgotten how it had previously nuanced its economic 
management arguments. While previous Labor governments had 
sometimes evoked populist arguments to target particular sections of 
capital—for example, the banks under Ben Chifley or the multinationals 
under Gough Whitlam—generally they had argued that their policies 
would benefit both the economy as a whole and other key sections of 
capital, for example, the Australian manufacturing industry (Love 1984: 
165–81; Johnson 1989: 21–26, 55–62). 
Furthermore, Labor also failed to make a strong case during the election 
campaign for the economic management credentials of previous Labor 
governments. Instead, Labor tended to rely on its argument that it had 
made the tough revenue-raising decisions that would produce bigger 
surpluses than the Liberals and a greater reduction in debt (Bowen 
2019). Yet Labor could have made a stronger case that its Keynesian 
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stimulus policies during the Global Financial Crisis had helped to save 
the Australian economy from recession and that the Rudd and Gillard 
deficits were relatively low by international standards at the time and 
largely due to falling revenue (see, for example, the claims by Rudd 2013; 
Swan 2012). Interestingly, Paul Keating (and a then terminally ill Hawke) 
seemed to recognise the need to defend Labor’s past economic policies 
more than Labor’s current leadership team (Hawke and Keating 2019). 
Labor officials subsequently acknowledged that their advertising failed to 
counter some of the key Liberal critiques of their policies, which will 
be discussed below (Jensen 2019: 68). Meanwhile, Labor’s key positive 
arguments were lost in a mass of policy detail (see Chapters 13 and 23, 
this volume).
The Liberals
By contrast, the Liberals mounted a small-target campaign around 
a number of key themes and images. While neoliberal ideology still 
underpinned their position, especially in regard to critiquing big-spending 
and big-taxing governments, it was in a restricted, more palatable form that 
suggested the Liberals were increasingly aware of the difficulties of selling 
more explicit neoliberal ideology to the broader electorate (see Huntley 
2019). Rather, the Liberals focused on undercutting Labor’s slogans, as 
listed on the ALP website of 18 May 2019, of supporting ‘a fair go for 
Australia’ and ‘standing up for middle and working Australia’ against the 
‘top’ or ‘big’ end of town.
First, after by-election losses, the Liberals advocated tax cuts for lower-
income earners to challenge those proposed by Labor (Bowen 2019). 
The Liberals also reaffirmed that they would not take their previously 
proposed tax cuts for big business to the election. Significantly, Morrison 
(ABC 2019a) admitted that corporate tax cuts did not have public support 
and business needed to rebuild public trust, although it was claimed that 
his alternative tax agenda would still disproportionately benefit higher-
income earners and undermine progressive taxation rates in the longer 
term (RMIT ABC Fact Check 2019). 
Second, the Liberals argued that it was actually Labor that was being unfair. 
Morrison’s slogan, ‘A fair go for those who have a go’ (Morrison 2019d), 
suggested the Coalition Government was the real supporter of fairness 
while Labor would be spending taxpayers’ hard-earned money on 
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those who were less worthy—for example, welfare recipients. In short, 
Morrison was potentially mobilising ressentiment against welfare recipients 
(see  further Hoggett et al. 2013). Morrison’s neoliberal position here 
was also compatible with the Pentecostal ‘prosperity gospel’ (see further 
Wrenn 2019: 426) in which those who believe in God are rewarded by 
being wealthy while ‘the ungodly become poor’ (Almond 2019).2 In a very 
successful scare campaign, the Liberals contentiously branded Labor’s 
measures designed to close expensive tax concessions and loopholes as 
new ‘taxes’ (Henriques-Gomes and Koukoulas 2019), suggesting they 
would have a much broader impact than Labor claimed was the case 
(LP 2019a). Labor’s franked dividend policies were branded the ‘retiree 
tax’, while its negative gearing measures were branded the ‘housing tax’, 
with claims the latter would both reduce house values and increase rents. 
In addition, Coalition advertisements erroneously suggested that Labor 
planned to introduce a ‘death tax’ on inheritance. The clear message of 
a suite of Liberal Party advertisements was that a Labor government 
would be a risk to voters’ standard of living and the economy in troubling 
global economic times (LP 2019b). Meanwhile, Labor’s big spending on 
the suite of policies discussed earlier was criticised. Labor was ‘The Bill 
Australia can’t afford’ (LP 2019b). In short, the Liberals ran an effective 
campaign with simple and consistent messages that were designed to cut 
through and played on feelings of economic insecurity. 
Fourth, Scott Morrison undermined Labor’s argument that the Coalition 
Government supported the ‘top end of town’ by depicting himself as 
‘ScoMo’, an ordinary Australian, the daggy dad from the suburbs who 
loved sport and having a beer down the pub. Morrison also mobilised his 
suburban dad persona to criticise Labor’s environmental policies, arguing, 
for example, that Labor’s electric car policy would ‘end the weekend’ 
given that, unlike the four-wheel-drives that families loved, the electric 
cars Shorten advocated people buy would not tow a trailer or boat or ‘get 
you to your favourite camping spot with your family’ (quoted in Remeikis 
2019). While Turnbull’s wealthy, elitist image potentially reinforced 
Labor’s narrative, Morrison’s image intentionally undercut it. Furthermore, 
unlike Turnbull in 2016, Morrison did not repeatedly denounce Labor as 
anti-business or emphasise the trickle-down benefits of corporate tax cuts, 
despite his own previous statements (cited in Hutchens 2017). Indeed, 
as already mentioned, he had acknowledged that business had to rebuild 
2  For a more detailed analysis of the impact of Pentecostalism on Morrison, see Almond (2019). 
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public trust after various scandals, including the findings of the banking 
royal commission that he had originally strongly opposed establishing. 
Instead of being associated with big business, Morrison had previously 
made a point of identifying himself with the ‘quiet Australians’—those 
Australians who were not ‘shouty voices on the fringes telling us what 
we’re supposed to be angry and outraged about’ but instead getting on 
with their everyday lives, working hard while looking after their families 
and supporting their local communities (Morrison 2019a). He argued 
that, while Labor was going on about division and ‘class war’, the job of 
Liberals was to get on with governing and to provide Australians with the 
basic services they needed (Morrison 2019a).
Nonetheless, there were still neoliberal underpinnings to the Liberals’ 
arguments, including the populist ones mobilising the people against big 
government. They evoked the old neoliberal positions that the source of 
exploitation of ordinary people lies in the state ripping off their money 
(rather than exploitation in the labour market) and that the best way 
of improving voters’ income is therefore to give them tax cuts. While the 
Coalition Government claimed to be returning the Budget to surplus, 
Labor was depicted as the party of debt: ‘Labor can’t manage money: 
That’s why they are coming after yours’ (LP 2019a). Similarly, Morrison 
raised old neoliberal arguments about reward and choice, arguing:
All Australians who work hard should … keep more of what 
they earn … when it’s in your hands, you’re making the choices 
about where it’s spent. I don’t think the Government knows better 
than you do about where your money should go. That’s why 
I believe in lower taxes for everybody. (Morrison, in NewCompany.
com.au 2019a) 
Morrison also depicted himself as supporting a neoliberal aspirational and 
self-reliant citizen as opposed to ‘Bill Shorten, who just wants to tax all of 
those aspirations more’ (Morrison 2019b).
However, some previous aspects of the neoliberal agenda were downplayed 
during the election campaign, including Howard-era culture war arguments 
that elite, politically correct ‘special interests’ were ripping off taxpayers 
(Hindess and Sawer 2004: 9). Despite his own socially conservative 
ideology, and the previously cited references to his ‘quiet Australians’ 
eschewing ‘shouty voices on the fringes’, Morrison avoided issues that 
would unleash divisions between conservatives and moderates within the 
Liberal Party or antagonise former moderate Turnbull voters. It also seems 
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likely that Liberal pollsters had picked up a more progressive mood for 
change in large sections of the electorate that they were trying to neutralise 
(Huntley 2019). Consequently, Morrison emphasised  the  number of 
women in his Cabinet and claimed that he believed in ‘an Australia where 
you are accepted and acknowledged, regardless of your age, your ethnicity, 
your religion, your gender, your sexuality, your level of ability, or your 
wealth or your income’ (Morrison 2019b). Meanwhile, the Christchurch 
(New Zealand) massacre had highlighted the risks of evoking ethnic and 
racial divisions.
Morrison’s previous culture war interventions over issues ranging from the 
role of Captain Cook in Australian history (Morrison 2019c) to critiques 
of ‘gender whisperers’ in schools (Morrison 2018b) were largely put on 
hold. For example, Morrison sidestepped a question about Tasmanian 
legislation that would make specifying a gender on birth certificates 
optional, by supporting State sovereignty (Norman 2019). In the 2016 
campaign, Morrison had highlighted claims of discrimination against 
Christians. Yet, in the 2019 Third Leaders’ Debate, it was Shorten who 
stated that rugby player Israel Folau should not be sacked for proclaiming 
that homosexuals would go to hell while Morrison was more circumspect 
(NewCompany.com.au 2019b). Rather, Morrison relied on an image of 
his worshipping in his Pentecostal church, with arm raised, to reassure 
conservative Christian voters. Campaigning over such issues tended to 
be left to conservative community groups and to News Corp. Various 
religious leaders claimed that their campaigns over so-called religious 
freedom (including the right for religious schools to sack teachers who did 
not endorse their ethos) had reduced Labor’s vote (Kelly and Shanahan 
2019). An article in The Australian also accused Shorten of having ignited 
an ‘unholy war’ (Kelly 2019) and of illegitimately targeting Morrison’s 
religious beliefs when Shorten expressed surprise that Morrison had 
initially evaded answering a journalist’s question regarding his own views 
on whether gays went to hell (Crowe 2019). 
Although Morrison eventually stated that he did not believe gays went 
to hell, he had opposed same-sex marriage and was one of the MPs who 
abstained from voting on the issue in parliament after the public voted 
overwhelmingly in favour during the postal plebiscite. It was noticeable 
that Morrison’s speeches during the election campaign rarely evoked the 
biblical allusions that had peppered some of his previous speeches 
(for  example, Morrison 2018a). However, Morrison’s faith was very 
evident in his election victory speech, which was unusually religious in 
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tone by Australian standards. Morrison (2019e) wished Bill Shorten and 
his family ‘God’s blessing’, while affirming that he had ‘always believed in 
miracles’ and ‘tonight we’ve been delivered another one’. Morrison ended 
his speech with the words: ‘God bless Australia.’3 
Minor parties and populism
While this chapter has argued that both the Labor and the Liberal 
campaigns reflected some populist elements, the ideological position of 
PHON and the UAP more closely meet Mudde’s (2017: 4) definition 
of full-blown populism, including ‘an ideology that considers society to 
be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, 
the “pure people” and “the corrupt elite”’. While the Greens’ preferences 
generally favoured Labor, the Coalition’s formal and informal preference 
arrangements with PHON and the UAP enabled it to benefit from more 
explicitly right-wing populist agendas, without having to enunciate 
them itself.
Morrison justified the Coalition’s preference deal with Clive Palmer 
(and  indirectly, the preference deals some Queensland LNP members 
agreed with PHON) by suggesting the Greens’ environmental and climate 
change policies were a greater threat to Australia than Clive Palmer 
(Shanahan and Kelly 2019). The Greens’ policies would exacerbate Labor 
policies on climate change that Liberals had already suggested would ruin 
the economy and cost working-class jobs in the mining sector (Canavan, 
cited in Livingston and Osbourne 2019). 
Pauline Hanson has been described as the ‘the quintessential radical 
right-wing populist’, who anticipated the mobilisation of anti-elitism 
and opposition to foreign immigration that have ‘become central to 
current radical right wing populist discourse’ (Betz 2019; see also Grant 
et al. 2019). Her party’s 2019 election campaign policies continued this 
tradition. For example, PHON supported removing Australia from the 
international refugee convention, massively reducing the immigration 
intake and introducing a Trump-style travel ban for people from ‘extremist’ 
countries (PHON n.d.). 
3  According to Middleton (2019), Morrison’s commonly used expression ‘How good is …’, which 




The UAP’s mining magnate leader, Clive Palmer, funded an approximately 
$60 million advertising campaign that particularly targeted Labor’s tax 
agenda, depicting it as ripping off ordinary Australians (Palmer 2019). 
The  UAP is a sometimes unusual populist party—for example, UAP 
policy supported increasing the parliamentary representation of women 
(UAP 2019b). Nonetheless, the UAP’s populism was evident in its rhetoric 
that the party would ‘make Australia great again’ by standing up for the 
people against self-interested politicians (Palmer 2019). In particular, the 
UAP argued that the existing political elite had been selling out Australia to 
Chinese commercial interests and the Chinese Communist Government 
might try to take over the country (UAP 2019a; Loomes 2019). Fear 
of China has been mobilised by other populists internationally—most 
prominently by Donald Trump.
Despite PHON and UAP preferences assisting the Coalition in retaining 
government, radical right-wing populism has not had as much electoral 
success in Australia as in some European and Asian countries. PHON 
won one Senate seat; the UAP won no seats. 
Conclusion
As the overall analysis in this book establishes, election outcomes are 
usually determined by multiple factors. This chapter suggests that Labor 
lost the 2019 election in part because it did not win the ideological contest 
over the discursive framing of economic issues. Labor believed it could 
win the economic arguments because economic inequality was rising 
and wages were stagnating. Labor was convinced that only a  relatively 
small number of voters would be negatively financially impacted by its 
election policies while far more would benefit from the revenue raised. 
However, the Liberals ran an effective campaign that succeeded in 
convincing sufficient numbers of voters that Labor’s policies would impact 
detrimentally on most Australians and that the real risk to people’s living 
standards was big-taxing and big-spending government. In so doing, the 
Liberals drew on neoliberal ideological positions that Labor had itself 
once reinforced, including cutting taxes. Previous Labor governments 
had also arguably inadvertently undermined many voters’ confidence in 
the ability of governments to improve standards of living. As Robinson 
(2019) has noted: ‘In the 1990s, Labor had laid waste to the institutions 
of centralised wage-fixation and economic regulation that established 
for many otherwise conservative voters a plausible linkage between 
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politics and material conditions.’ Labor also did not manage to convince 
sufficient voters that it could improve their standard of living by managing 
a capitalist economy effectively. In statements more in tune with classic 
Labor social harmony ideology that has been discussed earlier, new Labor 
Leader, Anthony Albanese, argued that: ‘The language used was terrible 
… unions and employers have a common interest. Successful businesses 
are a precondition for employing more workers’ (quoted in Benson et al. 
2019). The new Shadow Treasurer, Jim Chalmers, concurred that some of 
the language used, such as ‘top end of town’, did not strike the right chord 
in the Australian community (ABC 2019d). In other words, key Labor 
figures now believe that Labor’s attempts at using elements of populism, 
by mobilising the people against the ‘big’ or ‘top’ end of town, were 
counterproductive. By contrast, the Liberals’ use of populist strategies, 
especially mobilising the people against big government, appears to have 
cut through more effectively. 
Labor’s failure to win the economic arguments against a pared down and 
more electorally palatable version of neoliberalism potentially has lessons 
for social-democrats pursuing more left-wing policies in the United 
Kingdom and Europe, for left-wing Democrats in the United States and 
for those advocating left-wing forms of populism (Mouffe 2018: 66, 92). 
However, the right is not unscathed. While its critique of Labor policies 
succeeded, it is not clear how much of the government’s broader economic 
narrative remains, or what levers a government promising surpluses will 
be able to pull to manage the economic difficulties that lie ahead. 
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Paul Strangio and James Walter
This chapter considers the characteristics of the leaders of the major parties, 
Scott Morrison and Bill Shorten, the circumstances with which they were 
confronted and the way opportunities were seized or lost to confound the 
widespread expectations that had preceded the 2019 election campaign.
The media’s inordinately ‘leader-centric’ bias in campaign reporting is long-
established. Yet it might have been thought that the bitter experience of 
leadership turmoil in both parties of government over the previous decade 
would have put a brake on public expectations that the ‘right’ leader would 
provide the solution to present dilemmas. Indeed, some commentators 
remarked that ‘Australia has had enough of messianic leaders for a while’ 
(Hartcher 2019a). The Labor Party’s campaign—choreographed as a team 
effort—seemed apt if such a transition in leadership style proved better 
attuned to the zeitgeist. For their part, Liberal Party MPs were reportedly 
unhappy with the ‘presidential’ aspect of Malcolm Turnbull’s campaign at 
the 2016 election and reluctant to see a reversion to the leader ‘standing 
in’ for the party (Crowe 2019). And yet, this was precisely what defined 
the campaign, as Morrison, ‘the Messiah from the Shire’, contrived what 
had seemed an improbable victory. Leader-centrism appears once more to 
have been endorsed.
Observers argued that Morrison had ‘to carry the operation because there’s 
no alternative’ (Murphy 2019b). On the other hand, it rapidly became 
apparent that playing the lone fighter, battling the odds against what 
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appeared to be an ascendant Labor Party, suited Morrison’s combative 
temperament and played to his strong suit. He proved a formidable 
campaigner—energised on the hustings, a big personality and ‘a natural 
one-man-band, filling the stage, pounding the drums’ (Grattan 2019b). 
Morrison the extrovert’s love of such showmanship, combined with 
a capacity to play the everyman, chatting amiably with all-comers on the 
campaign trail, contrasted with Shorten’s more wooden persona. It was 
not that Shorten lacked people skills, but he was most adept in small 
groups and face-to-face encounters in which his ability to persuade and 
negotiate had been honed during his work as a senior trade union official. 
He only rarely managed to translate those skills on to bigger stages.
Shorten was further constrained from matching the leadership grandiosity 
of the Morrison campaign by his perennially poor popularity ratings. 
Possessing neither an easy appeal nor magnetism, he had also been 
dogged by a perception of shiftiness originating from his part in bringing 
down two former Labor prime ministers, Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard. 
The settled, unflattering view of Shorten as a factional machine man 
accentuated the contrast with the cleanskin and everyman Morrison. Yet 
Shorten’s team-orientated approach was also a product of his background 
and instinct. As Labor leader, he had applied his union experience in 
orchestrating groups and negotiating deals to cauterise the party’s wounds 
from the infighting of 2010–13. Together with a unified Shadow Cabinet, 
Shorten had developed an extensive policy agenda (see also Manwaring, 
Chapter 13, and Scott, Chapter 20, this volume). Now he would present 
as a team director—or ‘coach’, as he liked to characterise his leadership 
role—consistently flanked by senior colleagues who shared the articulation 
of Labor’s ambitious program. 
The scene was set, then, for an unusually clear differentiation between 
what the Coalition and Labor offered the public and how the leaders 
presented. Nothing illuminated the distinctions more starkly than the 
campaign launches of the major parties. Shorten joined his entire Shadow 
Cabinet on stage, foreshadowing a raft of policies packaged as delivering 
fairness and equality, with past Labor prime ministers in the front row, 
including the recent mortal enemies, Rudd and Gillard, to prove that old 
divisions had been transcended. In contrast, despite introductory speeches 
by a handful of others, the dominant image of the Liberal Party launch 
was of Morrison alone on the stage, with only his family for support at the 
end, speaking of the ‘promise of being Australian’ and allowing Australians 
‘quietly going about their lives, to realise their simple, honest and decent 
aspirations—quiet, hardworking Australians’. It was, in effect, a launch 
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of Scott Morrison, aiming to consolidate the personalisation to which 
the entire campaign had been directed. The result would amount to a test 
case of the appeal of leader pre-eminence versus collaborative leadership 
in the electorate—or at least the capacity of Morrison and Shorten to ‘sell’ 
the relative advantages of each. 
The creation of ‘ScoMo’
In the course of a 12-year career in federal politics, Scott Morrison 
perfected the technique of presenting a public persona—hardworking, 
capable, approachable, positive and straightforward—that plays to 
advantage on the political stage, but masks the driven, ambitious political 
operator, adopting whatever tactic suits his ends in pursuing his objectives. 
Despite an early career in marketing, which peaked with his appointment 
(by the Howard Government) as inaugural director of Tourism Australia 
(2004–06), he entered politics as a political apparatchik, having served 
as director of the NSW Liberal Party (2000–04) before winning a 
controversial pre-selection battle for the NSW seat of Cook in 2006. 
Morrison was elected to the Commonwealth Parliament in 2007.
That pre-selection process was an early manifestation of Morrison’s 
predilection for hardball politics. Competing against Michael Towke, 
Morrison lost the first round of voting 82 votes to eight. Immediately, 
a series of damaging stories in Sydney’s Daily Telegraph, and an equally 
damaging file presented to the NSW party executive, put paid to Towke’s 
ambitions; Morrison was endorsed. Labor Party MP and fixer Senator 
Sam Dastyari had compiled the file but said he handed over the material 
to Morrison’s ‘factional lieutenants’, remarking later: ‘I would never 
underestimate Scott Morrison because I would never underestimate a guy 
who would turn to one of his political opponents to take out one of his 
own … a guy who will do that will do anything’ (see Martin 2019).
A modus operandi had been established: Morrison was adept at attracting 
supporters who, as in this case, would play crucial roles in later episodes that 
furthered his career, but allowed plausible deniability about his own agency 
in what transpired. Thus, when Malcolm Turnbull challenged Tony Abbott 
in 2015, Morrison demonstrated his support for the leader—even showing 
his vote for Abbott to colleagues—but let his parliamentary supporters vote 
for Turnbull (Kelly 2018: 25). ‘If he had wanted his supporters to back Tony’, 
said a senior Liberal, ‘it would have happened’ (Snow 2019a: 33). Likewise, 
in the remarkable events of late August 2018 that saw Turnbull deposed, 
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Morrison was represented as ‘the accidental prime minister’, only standing 
for the position when Turnbull realised his leadership was beyond salvation 
and released him to do so. Yet the double dealing of Morrison’s supporters 
in the initial ballot precipitated by Peter Dutton that undermined Turnbull, 
and in contriving to edge out Julie Bishop while ensuring the defeat of 
Dutton in the second ballot, later became known (Savva 2019b; Sky News 
2019; Williams 2019). 
As a senior minister in both the Abbott and the Turnbull Coalition 
Cabinets,  Morrison had shown himself to be tough, pragmatic 
and  adaptable. As Minister for Immigration and Border Protection 
(2013–14), he took pride in having devised, with former major-general 
and later  Senator Jim Molan (see Chapter 2, this volume), Operation 
Sovereign Borders to stop asylum seeker boats. Insiders thought he 
pursued policy aggressively, sometimes as a hard man, with a predilection 
for secrecy, and used his authority to lean on others. As Minister for Social 
Services (2014–15), he adopted a more ‘caring’ demeanour as a negotiator 
with the welfare lobby. Then as Treasurer (2015–18), he changed gear 
again to seem the enlightened technocrat. His technique for dealing 
with controversy was to invent a rationale that prevented him answering 
questions, or, if they could not be avoided, to imply he had no personal 
responsibility for events: ‘I did the job that I had to do in that situation’ 
(see  Kelly 2018: 25). While competent and reliable with a prodigious 
appetite for work and impatience with anyone who got in his way, 
Morrison was not, according to a leading business figure, ‘a particularly 
deep thinker … he is very transactional’ (quoted in Snow 2019a: 33). 
Sean Kelly argues that Morrison developed a capacity to do whatever was 
needed to scramble through the ranks while revealing as little as possible, 
leaving no trace. It allowed him to assume the prime ministership as 
a cleanskin, free of the taint of political wheeling and dealing. The cost 
was that he remained relatively unknown. The solution, however, was to 
be found in the consolidation of a persona that had started to take shape 
as Morrison got closer to the top of the game: ‘ScoMo’.
ScoMo—a self-deprecatory nickname redolent of locker room banter—
is the tag of an ‘ordinary bloke’, albeit one doing an extraordinary job. 
It is an appellation peculiarly suited to the story being constructed around 
the Morrison persona. In the frantic months before the campaign proper, 
Morrison turned to filling in the clutter-free outline of ScoMo with the 
broad brushstrokes that would characterise his campaign performance 
(see Kelly 2018: 30). 
111
6 . THE PERSoNALISATIoN oF THE CAMPAIGN
ScoMo signified authenticity, and Morrison’s supporters supplied 
the details. Of the daggy, blokey, suburban dad schtick that became the 
abiding impression of ScoMo, friend (and former Howard staffer) Dave 
Gazard insisted: 
What you see is what you get. He wants to go to the footy, he 
wants to see the Sharks [his rugby team], he walks around in 
a T-shirt and shorts, he wears a baseball cap, he goes to church. 
That is him … He is the son of a cop, grew up in suburban Sydney, 
a curry night cooking at home is his idea of a great night. He is a 
pretty normal guy. (Snow 2019a: 33)
The ScoMo persona also benefited from Morrison’s avowed religiosity. 
While not unique among Australian politicians in professing his 
Christian faith, Morrison was unusual among prime ministers in his 
adherence to an evangelical creed, Pentecostalism. For him, however, it 
was a private issue, a matter of faith and conduct, not a ‘policy handbook’ 
(see Snow 2019a: 33). Questions about the disparity between the harsh 
border regime he had instituted and ‘Christian compassion’, or about 
policies directed to material acquisition for the enterprising while welfare 
provision was trimmed, could be subsumed by Pentecostalism’s focus 
on God and the hereafter, attention to personal salvation rather than 
collective justice, preferment for those who have been ‘saved’ and belief 
that material success flows to the godly (Almond 2019). Hardball politics 
could be justified in the battle against evil. However, Morrison showed 
little inclination to proselytise; it did not fit the relaxed, suburban dad 
schtick he was developing. Yet the sincerity of his beliefs could be read 
as a manifestation of principle—a shield against the charge of being 
a calculating opportunist (see Boyce 2019).
What you see is what you get—well, not exactly, as we argue, but ScoMo 
was the screen that made the hitherto anonymous prime minister someone 
to whom you could relate and obscured what he had done to get to the 
top. It replaced the tarnished Liberal brand: ‘The government brand 
became Morrison himself ’ (Crowe 2019: 6). It signalled the Coalition’s 
connection to and understanding of ‘quiet Australians’. It was given 
momentum by Morrison’s self-belief; he could persuade himself of any 
position that he determined to be right and he believed in the schtick. 
And it facilitated the relentless simplification of the Coalition’s campaign 




Once the campaign was under way, Morrison proved remarkably effective 
on the road. His self-confidence and determination were manifest, but the 
affable ScoMo was careful to appear positive rather than confrontational 
in these settings. The impression of authenticity was all important. 
Constantly travelling between different settings, cities, States and marginal 
seats, his stamina and task orientation were extraordinary. 
His savvy marketing skills and long-established habit of controlling 
communication served him well. Ready with simplistic slogans and 
aphorisms (‘If you have a go, you’ll get a go!’), but adept in smothering 
unwelcome questions with verbosity and talking over the top of his 
interlocutors (see, for example, ABC 2019b), he stayed relentlessly on 
message. The core of the message was always the assertion of the danger 
of a Labor victory, summed up by the slogan ‘The Bill you can’t afford’, 
which had been workshopped by the Liberal campaign team. The tactic 
was to turn every question into a question about the Labor Party, its 
ambitious program and especially its leader: ‘It’s a choice between me 
and Bill Shorten, nothing else’, Morrison said repeatedly, including at his 
campaign launch. 
This emphasis on personalisation was calculated to disrupt Labor’s efforts 
to focus the debate on policy. Such commitments as Morrison made 
were inordinately general—‘It is my vision … to keep the promise of 
Australia’—and typically framed as a counter to the Labor risk: tax cuts 
against Labor’s ‘class warfare’ tax reform proposals; cheaper energy versus 
Labor’s unrealistic emissions abatement targets and reckless commitment 
to costly transitions in energy supply; cuts to immigration (with many 
references to Labor’s failure to secure the borders); and maintenance 
of a sound economy, ‘back in the black’, as opposed to Labor’s alleged 
incapacity to manage money. There was, however, no broader agenda. 
In three leaders’ debates, Shorten tried to target this lack, but as Katherine 
Murphy observed: 
The Liberal leader has a well-honed talent for getting out from under 
… Morrison is a politician who thinks like a campaign director 
and carries an invisibility cloak. Going up against Morrison in a 
head-to-head is a bit like wrestling smoke. (Murphy 2019b)
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Instead, Shorten was pushed back by Morrison’s interjections and 
questions into elaborating the detail of Labor’s policies, leaving himself 
open to interrogation on costings and equivocation on issues that were not 
yet fully resolved. Arguably, the constant disruption and confrontation in 
which Morrison indulged during the debates—including standing over 
Shorten in the final debate, which prompted the riposte, ‘You’re a classic 
space invader’—worked against the affable ScoMo persona; the studio 
audiences gave the debates to Shorten. But, interestingly, the response 
of television viewers appeared to contradict that of those in the room, 
perhaps indicating the doubts among voters about Labor’s ambition and 
an appreciation of Morrison’s efforts to force Shorten to ‘come clean’.
While Morrison was the star performer, holding the stage, both the content 
and the targeting of what he presented relied on the ground campaign run 
by the Liberal Party’s Federal Director, Andrew Hirst, and his deployment 
of key operatives from the polling and research firm Crosby Textor Group 
(C|T), which had been associated from its beginnings with the Liberal 
Party. Hirst, who had worked for Abbott and later for C|T, called on 
particular C|T colleagues to assist the Liberal campaign. Their skill was 
in the polling that indicated the path to victory in marginal seats, in 
social media targeting of people most likely to respond to the Coalition’s 
message and in the tactics of the negative campaign (Bourke 2019; Lau 
and Rovner 2009; Martin 2004; and see Chapter 23, this volume). 
While Liberal strategists claimed that Morrison effectively tapped into 
the aspirations of middle Australia (see Snow 2019c), the reality was more 
complicated and illustrated how targeted messaging, fostering negative 
affect, drew on social division and fostered the aggregation of localised 
resentment. Middle Australia’s aspirations were not the drivers; the schism 
was between young workers in the cities and retirees and underemployed 
people in the regions. It was the fears of the latter to which the Coalition 
spoke, and it was in these regions that Morrison was most active 
(Dennis 2019; Megalogenis 2019; and Part 2 of this volume). 
Bill Shorten: The unequal protégé?
Two days before polling day came news of the passing of Labor’s 
longest-serving prime minister, Bob Hawke. The loss of a Labor legend 
and the parallels in background between Shorten and Hawke meant 
that conjecture focused particularly on how it might influence voter 
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sentiment towards the Opposition. In his 2016 memoir cum personal 
political manifesto, Shorten had written that his political coming of age 
occurred in the early 1980s, coinciding with the election to office of the 
Hawke Government (Shorten 2016: 23–27). He was, in other words, 
a Hawke-era Laborite. Shorten’s pre-parliamentary career as an Australian 
Workers’ Union (AWU) official, culminating in a high-profile stint as 
its national secretary, had long invited comparisons with Hawke. It was 
during his time in the trade union movement, according to Shorten, 
that he fashioned an operating style of consensus leadership that was also 
redolent of Hawke. Considering these symmetries between the men, the 
timing of Hawke’s passing—on the cusp of what was widely anticipated 
to be a likely Shorten victory—had almost a providential feel.
Yet, ironically, the Shorten campaign of 2019 was, in its fundamentals, 
designed around the reality that he was no Hawke. His leadership path 
to the contest more closely resembled, if anything, that of the rival 
Hawke dramatically deposed on the day of the calling of the 1983 federal 
election, the luckless Bill Hayden (for an account of these events, see 
Kelly 1984). Like Hayden, Shorten had inherited the leadership following 
a demoralising Labor election loss (albeit in Hayden’s case he became leader 
following the second of two landslide Labor defeats suffered under Gough 
Whitlam in 1975 and 1977). Like Hayden, Shorten had made substantial 
ground in his first election as leader to place Labor within striking 
distance of government. Both had won regard for building around them a 
stable and united shadow ministerial team and for overseeing a substantial 
renovation of Labor’s policy program. Like Hayden, however, Shorten 
was continuously dogged by questions about his lack of personal appeal 
to the electorate. Both men were the butt of regular criticism for their 
stolid communication style and ungainly appearance. In Hayden’s case, 
the nagging doubts caused by his relative unpopularity were ultimately 
what precipitated him being pressured by his parliamentary colleagues 
to step aside for Hawke on the day that Malcolm Fraser (caught out by 
the Labor leadership change) triggered the 1983 election. In words that 
became part of Australian political folklore, Hayden bitterly declared at 
his parting press conference: ‘I believe that a drover’s dog could lead the 
Labor Party to victory the way the country is and the way the opinion 
polls are’ (quoted in Kelly 1984: 388).
The difference in 2019 was that Labor had no Hawke-like messiah 
waiting in the wings and, even if there had been an obvious charismatic 
alternative, the party’s revised 2013 rules for the selection and deselection 
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of leaders would have impeded any five-minutes-to-midnight change. 
For Labor, it was the unpopular Shorten or bust. To put it another way, 
the Labor campaign became a test of whether the so-called drover’s dog 
could actually win (Strangio 2019).
The Shorten campaign: The weight 
of expectation
Amid the leadership instability that had been a defining feature of Australian 
politics over the previous decade, Shorten stood out as an exception 
as he embarked on the 2019 election campaign. In his nearly six years as 
Labor leader, he had been pitted against three different Coalition prime 
ministers and he was the first Opposition leader to enjoy such security 
of tenure since Kim Beazley (1996–2001). Before that, Whitlam, Arthur 
Calwell, H.V. Evatt and Robert Menzies were the only other Opposition 
leaders since the Second World War to have gone to the electors in at 
least two consecutive elections, and of them, only Whitlam and Menzies 
became prime minister. Yet, unlike Shorten, neither of these two giants of 
Australian politics had been directly crowned Opposition leader following 
their party’s loss of government. In that respect, Shorten was attempting 
to create his own piece of political history at the 2019 election. 
If Morrison’s persona was a work in progress in the minds of voters, 
Shorten’s comparative longevity as Opposition leader meant he was 
a  known commodity within the electorate. A trawl through past 
Newspolls confirms that his leadership ratings were chronically poor. 
Apart from a brief honeymoon in the months following his election as 
Opposition leader in October 2013, approval of his performance had 
outstripped disapproval only on a handful of occasions and then only 
barely. He had mostly trailed badly on the question of preferred prime 
minister. Eventually, the Labor Party’s own post-election review conceded 
that Shorten’s unpopularity contributed to the election loss (Emerson and 
Weatherill 2019: 8, 24–26).
The results of the 2016 Australian Election Study (AES) provide insight 
into the nature of Shorten’s image problem among voters. Though Shorten 
scored creditably on the qualities of intelligence and knowledgeability 
(albeit not as highly as Turnbull), survey respondents marked him low 
on the qualities of honesty, trustworthiness and inspirational  leadership 
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(Bean  2018:  244). Leadership trait polling on the leaders on the cusp 
of the 2019 campaign suggested this perception issue for Shorten was 
baked in. While the characteristics most associated with Morrison were 
‘well intentioned’, followed by ‘smug’ and ‘arrogant’, for Shorten, it was 
‘untrustworthy’ (Bickers 2019). The responses to the leaders by voter focus 
groups initiated by The Age and The Sydney Morning Herald suggested 
Shorten received some kudos for his doggedness and policy initiative. 
Yet the comment about Shorten that was singled out as having elicited 
‘knowing laughter and nodding’ was that ‘he’s someone you’d like to 
punch in the head, really’ (T. Wright 2019; Hartcher 2019b). Arguably, 
the publication of this was as revealing of a blithe normalising of incivility 
in public discourse as it was of sentiment towards the Labor leader. 
Despite the liability of his unpopularity, Shorten entered the campaign 
favoured by the polls, the pundits and the bookies to become prime 
minister. In a series of profiles preceding and coinciding with the 
calling of the election, a motif was that of Shorten as a collegial leader 
anchored firmly in his party: ‘Shorten is in fact selling Labor, not himself. 
The “team” dominates the talking points, and the “team” flanks Shorten 
… 2019, for Labor, is a brand campaign, not a presidential one’ (Murphy 
2019a). Shorten consistently constructed his own leadership in those 
terms: ‘The Labor Party is too big to be run by one person. The country 
is too big to be run by a messiah or by a dictator or by a one-trick pony’ 
(Bramston 2019a). ‘I’m not going to be a messiah. I don’t believe in the … 
authoritarian strongman’ (ABC 2019a). It was a theme that reprised 2016 
yet Shorten also emphasised it was an approach to leadership that had 
been confirmed by his experience over the previous six years. He stressed 
that Opposition had tested him and he had ‘learnt a lot about myself … 
These days I listen a lot more than I talk’ (Bramston 2019a).
The delegation of policy initiative extended to ambitious elements of 
Labor’s policy program such as negative gearing reform and the abolition 
of tax credits on franked dividends (see also Simms, Chapter  2, and 
Manwaring, Chapter 13, this volume). It was said that Shorten had 
required significant persuasion and time to embrace these and other 
measures. He explained it this way: ‘I’m willing to take policy risks after 
I have thought about all the angles’ (Snow 2019b). The boldness of 
the program implied confidence in Labor’s position. But, according to 
Shorten, it was also informed by recent political history, particularly the 
predicament in which the Coalition found itself in 2013 after it won 
office on the back of an Abbott-led crusade that accentuated the negative 
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and was threadbare in constructive policies. Shorten compared recent 
incoming governments and prime ministers to ‘the proverbial dog that 
caught the truck. What do we do now?’ (quoted in Tingle 2019: 30).
Favouritism imposed a heavy weight of expectation on Shorten and, in 
combination with the party’s substantial reform agenda, it would be noted 
that this impacted on the dynamics of the campaign: the onus of proof was 
inverted, with the Opposition leader viewed more akin to an incumbent 
than a prime ministerial aspirant (Aly 2019). Shorten’s campaign inner 
circle comprised his deputy, Tanya Plibersek, shadow treasurer Chris 
Bowen and Labor’s Senate Leader, Penny Wong (Bramston 2019b). 
Wong’s fellow Senator Kristina Keneally was ‘captain’ of the campaign’s 
‘Bill Bus’ and was described as playing a mix of ‘confidant, sounding 
board, media wrangler, morale booster and, where necessary, attack dog’ 
(S. Wright 2019). While behind the scenes men were equally integral 
to Shorten’s campaign team—it was reported his chief of staff, Ryan 
Liddell, was the person he trusted above anyone else (Bramston 2019b)—
the public prominence of women in Shorten’s entourage was not lost 
on commentators (for example, Overington 2019). This culminated 
at Labor’s official launch when Shorten was introduced by a quartet of 
women: Queensland Premier, Annastacia Palaszczuk, Wong, Plibersek 
and his wife, Chloe. The launch itself represented a celebration of Shorten’s 
achievements in healing the party’s wounds of 2010–13, building 
a unified team and enabling a comprehensive program as telegraphed by 
the choreographed images of the joint entrance of Rudd and Gillard and 
of Shorten accompanied on stage post policy speech by his entire shadow 
ministry. The program was described as ‘the sum of their collective effort, 
not a postscript trailing a presidential figure’ (Murphy 2019c).
For all the determined construction of Shorten as a team captain, modern 
election campaigns inevitably default to a principal spokesperson. 
Shorten began scratchily in that light, fumbling details on complex areas 
such as superannuation and the costings of Labor’s climate policy. Though 
minor missteps, they were eagerly seized on by his critics in the News 
Corp media (for example, Kenny 2019; see also Wanna, Chapter  19, 
this volume). Shorten subsequently conceded an initial sluggishness: 
‘The first week of the campaign smartened me up. I stepped up a gear, 
no question … [I realised] the years of policy work itself won’t do the 
story … I need to tell the story’ (Snow 2019b). In retrospect at least, 
a failure to distil a focused, readily understood and reassuring narrative 
from Labor’s extensive agenda would be recognised as a weakness of 
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Shorten’s presentation throughout the campaign: ‘I didn’t hear Shorten, 
as his party’s chief storyteller, tell a persuasive story about his policies … 
[by polling day] what most voters had seen and heard from Labor was 
clutter’ (Carney 2019). 
Shorten was judged by studio audiences to have bested Morrison in 
the first two of the three televised leadership debates (see above) and a 
reasonable assessment of the final contest hosted by the ABC was that 
the Prime Minister was ‘across detail’ whereas his opponent was ‘more 
emotive and vibrant’ (Shanahan 2019). Probably Shorten’s most arresting 
media performance of the campaign was a solo appearance on the ABC’s 
Q&A program in which he gave flesh to his aspiration to provide equality 
of opportunity for all Australians by relating the story of his mother’s 
unfulfilled career aspirations, which also featured in his campaign launch 
(McMahon 2019). That moment became engulfed in controversy when 
Sydney’s Daily Telegraph and some other Murdoch tabloids ran a tawdry 
story cavilling at the accuracy of Shorten’s account of his mother’s 
employment history (Caldwell 2019)—an overreach that inspired an 
emotional rebuttal by the Opposition leader and elicited public sympathy 
for him from Morrison, although the Prime Minister shrewdly used it to 
reinforce his core campaign message by declaring that the election was ‘not 
about our families … it’s about the choice between Bill Shorten and myself 
as prime minister’ (Worthington 2019). The veteran journalist Michelle 
Grattan wrote that, in the wake of Shorten’s passionate denunciation of 
the News Corp report, some ‘old Labor hands’ were comparing it to his 
appearances during the 2006 Beaconsfield mine disaster when, as an AWU 
official, he had first captured national attention. Shorten, who ‘over the 
years has been unable to persuade voters to like him’, observed Grattan 
(2019a), ‘had suddenly been humanised’. 
By election day, the final opinion polls showed Shorten’s leadership ratings 
had inched up during the campaign but were still in the negative. Yet with 
Labor maintaining a decisive edge in the two-party-preferred estimates, 
he remained overwhelming favourite to become prime minister. In the 
meantime, two events 48 hours out from polling day—one planned 
(Shorten delivering his last major set piece address at Blacktown Hall, the 
scene of Whitlam’s famous 1972 campaign launch) and one unforeseen (the 
announcement of Hawke’s death that same evening)—had the combined 
effect of reinforcing the impression of a campaign and a leader firmly 
in the embrace of Labor history. On polling morning, another veteran 
commentator, Paul Kelly, while sharing the expectation that Shorten was 
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likely to lead his party to victory, nonetheless noted ominously that he 
had failed to engender inspiration to the last: ‘At the end Shorten … 
invoked the Whitlam spirit trying to energise his campaign and inject it 
with the 1972 “it’s time” enthusiasm that it has manifestly been missing’ 
(Kelly 2019a). 
Conclusion
The drover’s dog could not win. In the post-mortems that followed Labor’s 
unexpected defeat, including that conducted by his own party, Shorten’s 
lack of personal appeal was identified as a significant contributing factor. 
One columnist demanded: ‘How was it possible the party saddled itself 
with a leader who, by any reasonable measure, was one of the least popular 
and most distrusted politicians in the entire country’ (Walker 2019). 
It  was an assessment backed by suggestions since before the campaign 
and acknowledged by Labor retrospectively that Shorten was particularly 
poorly received in Queensland (Savva 2019a; Emerson and Weatherill 
2019: 26)—the State that was instrumental in the party’s defeat. Liberal 
insiders divulged the fact that pivotal to the Coalition’s revival strategy and 
victory had been the twin targeting of Shorten’s leadership and Labor’s 
tax reform measures as encapsulated in the slogan: ‘The Bill you can’t 
afford’ (Bourke 2019; Markson and Devine 2019). The post-mortems—
again, including the party’s own—also attached blame to Labor’s policy 
overreach, but here, too, Shorten was implicated both for misreading the 
electorate’s mood and for his deficiencies in translating that program into 
a clear and compelling case for change. 
There was speculation following the election that Shorten might not have 
been fully reconciled to elements of Labor’s election agenda and that his 
support for them had been the price ‘to buttress his leadership internally’ 
(Kelly 2019b). This notion added to an impression—accentuated in 
hindsight—that Shorten had effaced himself in relation to his party by 
his campaign: running on an audacious reform agenda that belied his 
natural political caution and eschewing predominance in favour of the 
team. This conjured up an observation made at the time of the 2016 
election about the test that still lay ahead for Shorten as Labor leader. 
He had proved himself skilled at harnessing the talents of his colleagues 
and tending to relationships within the party, but the finest Labor leaders 
had balanced that art with being ‘prepared, where necessary, to cajole and 
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impose their will on the party’, to transcend it by building an autonomous 
following to augment its appeal (Strangio 2016). Fatally weakened by 
his inability to create a connection with the public, Shorten had never 
managed that evolution. Instead, as one commentator noted at the start 
of the 2019 campaign, his time at the head of the party was ‘a study of 
recessing himself in the Labor leadership’ (Murphy 2019a). 
On the other hand, the Coalition victory was an unambiguous triumph 
for Scott Morrison—success against expectations. Where Labor had 
counted on a program-driven appeal, the Coalition eschewed policy 
detail for tactics: the creation of doubt about everything Labor proposed, 
sophisticated social media analytics and the presentation of a leader who 
claimed sound economic management and emphasised his understanding 
of the challenges and the aspirations of ‘quiet Australians’. 
The election outcome highlights the disparity between the expectations 
of political insiders and those of the many for whom the demands of 
daily life dominate and who seek short cuts to simplify their decision 
and a  leader whose message substantiates their concerns or clarifies 
options. The gamble on personalisation worked; Morrison proved just 
such a  leader. Despite his rise in the party, he had contrived to remain 
an enigma. Relatively unknown outside the ‘Canberra bubble’, he could 
construct a persona—ScoMo—attuned to the needs of the campaign: the 
ordinary bloke who understood common people and could give substance 
to their concerns by amplifying doubts about Shorten, his all-too-well-
known opponent. 
The circumstances of the 2019 election result—the pronounced 
personalisation of the Coalition’s campaign and the thinness of its 
re-election policy program—undeniably bestowed on Morrison 
enormous authority and unusual latitude. As well placed as any leader 
to end the prime ministerial instability that has been a defining feature 
of Australian politics for a decade, his task would now be to capitalise on 
that opportunity.
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7
NATIONAL POLLING AND 
OTHER DISASTERS
Luke Mansillo and Simon Jackman
Perhaps one of the most important and unexpected features of the 2019 
Australian federal election was the fact that public polls ‘got it wrong’. 
Polls pointing to a Labor win dominated pre-election prognostication, 
while lamentations and dissection of polling error dominated post-
election analysis.
As we argue below, polling errors in the 2019 election were large, but 
not completely unprecedented. Following generally good performances 
in 2016 and 2013, few commentators or analysts recalled that the 2010 
election saw large errors in the polls. What was especially noteworthy 
about 2019 was the consistency of the poll results indicating Labor would 
win, and the extent to which Australian political actors—politicians, 
media and the public—‘locked in’ behind these poll-shaped but wrong 
expectations that had shaped the content and conduct of Australian politics 
not just during the election campaign, but also for some years previously.
The large and extensive influence of polls on mass and elite politics is 
well documented in the political science literature. Polls shape how elites 
develop and implement public policy (Burstein 2003), how they decide 
whether to engage in leadership ructions (Brown 1992) and the decisions 
of individual politicians to resign from politics (Stone et al. 2010). We note 
that 13 Liberal–National Coalition parliamentarians retired ahead of the 
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2019 election, nine of them from the ministry. Individual and corporate 
donors also rely on the polls in assessing whether, and to whom, to make 
campaign contributions (Fuchs et al. 2000).
Polls also provide politicians with opportunities to advance issues and 
agendas on behalf of their constituencies or their parties or to serve 
more personal causes, such as leadership ambitions (Meyer and Minkoff 
2004; Petersen et al. 2008). Critically, in Westminster systems—in which 
party leadership is in some sense under constant scrutiny, coupled with 
the advent of a more ‘presidentialised’ prime ministership (Hart 1992; 
see also Chapter 6, this volume)—polling has taken on even greater 
political significance. Polls provide backbenchers from marginal seats 
with  a  regular barometer of their party’s chances at the next election. 
Indeed, a key feature of Australian politics over the past decade has been 
the way poll results have driven leadership challenges and turnover, with 
profound consequences for who governs and how they govern.
Hence, understanding the magnitude and sources of polling error 
in the 2019 Australian election is not a mere technical exercise, but is 
fundamental to understanding Australian politics, policies and leaders. 
Estimating poll bias
We begin by estimating the magnitude of the polls’ errors, or biases, in 
the 2019 election cycle. We rely on a methodology that one of us helped 
pioneer (Jackman 2005, 2009) and is used widely by polling analysts in 
Australia (Mark the Ballot 2017) and internationally (Ellis 2017; Pickup 
et al. 2011). We previously deployed this modelling strategy to analyse 
polls leading up to the 2016 Australian federal election (Jackman and 
Mansillo 2018).
We fit a statistical model to public polls fielded between the 2016 and 2019 
elections. For each poll, we usually observe the following: 1) estimates of 
voting intentions, which are typically reported as an integer percentage; 
2) the field dates; 3) the number of poll respondents; 4) the population 
of interest (typically, all adult Australian citizens); and 5) the identity of 
the polling company conducting the poll. Most media reports of polls 
do not contain even this much information. Sometimes reports omit 
information such as the number of respondents or field dates, sampling 
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methodologies and weighting procedures applied after data collection, 
which almost never appear in media reports of polls or in the polling 
companies’ description of their methods.
Nonetheless, with this basic information from a series of polls, we set 
about recovering the day-by-day trajectory of voting intentions between 
the 2016 and 2019 elections. Let t index the T = 1,051 days between the 
2016 and 2019 elections and let ξt denote true (but ‘latent’ or indirectly 
observed) voting intentions on day t. Of great utility is that ξ is revealed 
on election day, both in 2016 and in 2019 on days t = 1 and t = T = 
1,051, once the AEC publishes final election results.1 These two election 
day ‘endpoint’ observations serve as ‘anchors’ or fixed points that let us 
reconstruct the trajectory of voting intentions from observed polls, at the 
same time as we estimate and correct for biases in the polls.
Poll p fielded on day t by polling company j supplies an estimate of ξt, 
reported as proportion yp ∈[0,1] (conventionally reported after rounding 
to two digits of precision), with sample size np. We assume that the 
variance of each poll estimate is Vp(t) = yp(1 – yp) /np(t), which is a reasonable 
approximation absent detailed information about the polls’ sampling and 
weighting methodologies.2
Each poll result, yp, is assumed to be a sum of the true but unobserved 
state of voting intentions on the corresponding day, ξt(p), and the bias of 
the corresponding pollster, denoted as δj(p).
3 Averaging over the random 
error produced by sampling, we assume E(yp) = ξt(p) + δj(p). For polls with 
the sample sizes considered here, we can conveniently assume a normal 
law for the poll results—that is, yp ∼ N(ξt(p) + δj(p), Vp).
4
1  Treating the published election results as errorless measures of the corresponding ξt assumes no 
meaningful errors in the national vote counts nor any sizeable electoral fraud; these assumptions seem 
valid in the context of both the 2016 and the 2019 Australian federal elections.
2  This variance can be interpreted as a measure of the uncertainty one possesses about true voting 
intentions, ξt, given an unbiased poll of sample size np acquired via simple random sampling. If 1) poll 
p is biased or 2) simple random sampling was not deployed, the actual variance will differ slightly 
from the expression in the text.
3  We use the notation t(p) to refer to the day(s) in which poll p was in the field and j(p) to refer 
to the polling house j that fielded poll p. The total sample of a poll np we divide by t(p) days in poll p to 
give the incorporate information from each over each day of fielding with the correct precision. This 
produces a smoother estimate of voting intentions than the previous attempts that used the median 
date of fielding (Jackman 2005; Jackman and Mansillo 2018).
4  Most polls have a multiday field period, which we accommodate with the following procedure. 
A poll fielded between days t and t + r is modelled as a function of ξt, … , ξt+r, spreading the polls’ 
sample n(p) uniformly over the r + 1 field days; this ‘per field day’ sample size, np /(r + 1), appears in the 
denominator of the expression for V(p) given in the previous paragraph.
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The model also exploits the fact that, despite political upheavals such as 
leadership spills, voting intentions change relatively slowly. We assume 
that a priori voting intentions on day t are, on average, unchanged 
from the previous day. Day-to-day changes in the ξt follow a normal 
distribution, with a small but unknown variance, ω2—that is, ξt ∼ N(ξt-1, 
ω2). We augment the model to include a discontinuity (or ‘jump’) on 28 
August 2018, the day Morrison replaced Turnbull as Liberal leader and 
prime minister.5
The inferential task is to recover estimates of: 1) the sequence of latent 
voting intentions, {ξt}; 2) the house effects, δj; 3) the innovation variance 
parameter, ω2; and 4) the discontinuity parameter, γ. Technical details 
on estimation and underlying computation appear in Jackman (2009). 
We derive estimates separately for the ALP, Liberal–National Coalition, 
the Australian Greens and other primary voting intentions as well as 
two-party-preferred voting intentions.
Data
First, we analyse a dataset of 226 polls, fielded between the 2016 
and 2019 elections. These polls span six distinct polling companies and 
methodology sets, shown in Table 7.1. We treat three Galaxy polls fielded 
in 2019 as in the ‘Newspoll’ category, as they were fielded a considerable 
time after YouGov had acquired Galaxy but with the identical online and 
interactive voice response (IVR) interview modes that Galaxy Research 
had used for the Newspoll-branded polls commissioned by The Australian 
newspaper.
The 12 YouGov/Fifty Acres–branded polls were conducted online, 
administered to respondents drawn from the YouGov national panel, with 
quota sampling designed to produce a nationally representative sample 
with respect to age, gender and region. YouGov partnered with Fifty 
Acres, a government and public relations firm, to produce these polls. 
Public polling is highly concentrated in the hands of a small number of 
firms; weekly polls from Essential are the sole, high-frequency alternative 
to Newspoll/Galaxy/YouGov polls. The Newspoll/Galaxy polls use 
a  combination of IVR phone and online panel surveys (details of the 
5  On that day the model becomes ξt ∼ N(ξt-1 + γ, ω
2), in which γ is the jump parameter. We make 
no a priori assumption as to whether γ is positive or negative.
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proportions of each are not public knowledge), while Essential uses only 
online panel surveys and Ipsos uses live-interviewer computer-assisted 
telephone interviewing surveys. The few Roy Morgan polls were all 
conducted with face-to-face interviews as part of their regular consumer 
and market research surveys.
To establish historical benchmarks for the errors of the 2019 polls, we 
also analyse a dataset of 1,624 polls, fielded between the 2004 and 2019 
elections. The analysis described above is repeated for the four prior 
parliamentary periods.
Table 7.1 Polls by survey house





Roy Morgan (Face‑to‑Face) 12
YouGov 12
Source: Authors’ calculations .
Estimated trajectories of voting 
intentions, 2016–19
The circular symbols in Figure 7.1 correspond to estimates from public 
polls of the ALP’s share of first-preference vote intentions, 2016 to 
2019. The two horizontal reference lines indicate the 2016 and 2019 
election results, with Labor winning 34.7 per cent and 33.3 per cent of 
first preferences, respectively. The darker, thicker line undulating across 
the graph is the output of our model, the sequence of daily estimates 
of ξt between the 2016 and 2019 elections; the effect of the ‘endpoint’ 
constraints are clearly visible, with the estimates of true public opinion 




Figure 7.1 ALP first-preference voting intentions between the 2016 and 
2019 federal elections
Notes: The darker, thicker line is the output of our model, connecting the daily estimates of 
the true state of public opinion, given our model and the observed 2016 and 2019 election 
results; the shaded region is a pointwise 95 per cent credibility interval around the daily 
estimates . Circles are poll results, used as input to our model .
Source: Authors’ calculations .
Figure 7.1 also makes clear that the polls typically overestimated Labor’s 
share of the vote; the bulk of the polls lie well above the estimated true 
state of public opinion. Observe also—with the benefit of hindsight—
that: 1)  at no point between the 2016 and 2019 elections was Labor’s 
share of first preferences any stronger than in the 2016 election, even 
in the immediate aftermath of the Turnbull-to-Morrison leadership 
transition; and 2) there was a steep deterioration in Labor’s first-preference 
vote share in the six months leading up to the 2019 election, of about 
1.8 percentage points. This fall in support for Labor is more than twice 
the boost in Labor voting intentions that occurred at the time of the 
Turnbull–Morrison transition.
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Figure 7.2 Coalition first-preference voting intentions between the 
2016 and 2019 federal elections
Notes: The darker, thicker line is the output of our model, connecting the daily estimates of 
the true state of public opinion, given our model and the observed 2016 and 2019 election 
results; the shaded region is a pointwise 95 per cent credibility interval around the daily 
estimates . Circles are poll results, used as input to our model .
Source: Authors’ calculations .
The equivalent graph for Coalition voting intentions is shown in 
Figure 7.2. Just as the polls tended to overstate the true level of Labor 
support, support for the Coalition was almost always understated, with 
almost all of the polls (the points in Figure 7.2) lying below the estimated 
true level of Coalition support.
Again, with the benefit of hindsight, we see that Coalition support did 
fall in the months immediately after the July 2016 election, stabilising 
around the 39 per cent level for most of 2017 (some 3 percentage points 
below the 2016 election result). A modest recovery in 2018 was reversed 
in the months preceding the Liberal leadership transition in August 2018. 
Over the course of Morrison’s tenure, Coalition support recovered more 
than 2 percentage points, from 39 per cent to the 41.4 per cent result 
obtained at the May 2019 election. 
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Critically, not a single public poll reported Coalition first-preference 
support above 39.5 per cent in the period between Morrison becoming 
leader in August 2018 and the May 2019 election—far below the actual 
level of Coalition support during this period and indicative of the 
magnitude of poll bias in the 2016–19 cycle. It is understandable how this 
fed low expectations for the Coalition’s electoral prospects. In previous 
work, Jackman (1994) applied the Tufte (1973) log-vote share on log-seat 
share model to Australian federal elections between 1949 and 1993 and 
found the typical value for the Coalition to win 50 per cent of House of 
Representatives seats is 49.1 per cent of the two-party-preferred vote.6 
Only for the briefest point after Morrison became the prime minister in 
August 2018 was the Coalition past this critical threshold.
Figure 7.3 Coalition two‑party‑preferred voting intentions between the 
2016 and 2019 federal elections
Notes: The darker, thicker line is the output of our model, connecting the daily estimates of 
the true state of public opinion, given our model and the observed 2016 and 2019 election 
results; the shaded region is a pointwise 95 per cent credibility interval around the daily 
estimates . Circles are poll results, used as input to our model .
Source: Authors’ calculations .
6  This was found to be invariant in Jackman (2009) and Mansillo and Evershed (2016) with the 
addition of more data.
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A similar set of findings holds with even greater force for Coalition 
two-party-preferred support, shown in Figure 7.3. Few polls overestimated 
Coalition support; most estimated the Coalition to be underperforming 
relative to its 2016 two-party-preferred result. The polls did pick up 
a  recovery in Coalition two-party-preferred support over the course of 
Morrison’s tenure, but generally were biased by a considerable margin.
Pollster biases
Estimates of the biases specific to each polling organisation—the 
‘house effects’ or δ parameters in our model—appear in Figures 7.4 
and 7.5. Of the six polling organisations considered, four systematically 
overestimated Labor’s first preferences: Morgan, ReachTEL, Essential and 
Newspoll. YouGov and Ipsos did not overestimate Labor’s vote share but 
both organisations did underestimate Coalition first preferences, as did 
every polling organisation. The underestimates of Coalition first preferences 
are large in several cases, reaching almost 5 percentage points for YouGov, 
more than 4 percentage points for ReachTEL and 3 percentage points for 
Newspoll. Newspoll also overestimated support for the Australian Greens 
by 1 percentage point.
YouGov’s large underestimate of Coalition first preferences is accompanied 
by a large overestimate of support for minor parties and Independents, by 
almost 5 percentage points. This bias is the largest polling error we observe 
for minor parties and Independents and is large relative to the actual level 
of support for minor parties and Independents in 2019 (14.8 per cent). 
Experimental methods may be a useful strategy for future research to 




Figure 7.4 First-preference voting intentions house effects, 2016–19
Notes: Each point indicates an estimate of each polling organisation’s bias with respect 
to the first preferences for the indicated party; horizontal bars cover 95 per cent credible 
intervals . Positive quantities are overestimates; negative quantities are underestimates .
Source: Authors’ calculations .
Bias with respect to two-party-preferred voting intentions is shown in 
Figure 7.5. Consistent with Figure 7.3, all survey organisations, except 
YouGov, systematically underestimated the Coalition’s share of the 
two-party-preferred vote, and by large margins: 2.5 to 3 percentage 
points. One possible source of Newspoll’s underestimation of Coalition 
two-party-preferred support could be the assumption that only 
60 per cent of PHON’s preferences would flow to the Coalition. As it 
transpired, about 65 per cent of PHON preferences made their way to 
the Coalition from its 59 registered candidates, who secured 3.08 per 
cent of the national vote (see Chapters 4, 8 and 17, this volume); PHON 
did not run candidates in the other 92 seats. Even if PHON had fielded 
candidates in every seat and secured the same vote share, it would have 
secured 7.88 per cent of the vote (similar to where Newspoll and Essential 
placed the party in March 2019). This overestimate of PHON support—
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and the minor underestimate of preference flows to the Coalition—
explains a mere 0.4 percentage points of Newspoll’s two-party-preferred 
2.5 percentage point underestimate.
We also note that, despite considerable variability in biases with respect to 
first-preference voting intentions (see Figure 7.5), there is far less variation 
in two-party-preferred bias across survey organisations. This finding is 
provocative, suggesting less dispersion across polling companies in two-
party-preferred estimates relative to the variation in first-preference poll 
estimates. Two possible mechanisms for this are: 1) first-preference errors 
might fortuitously ‘cancel out’ when converted to two-party-preferred 
estimates, as appears to be the case with YouGov; or 2) pollsters use the 
mapping from first preferences to two-party-preferred—and assumptions 
about preference flows—to shade their results towards an industry 
consensus, which is an instance of the phenomenon known as ‘herding’.
Figure 7.5 Coalition two‑party‑preferred voting intentions house 
effects, 2016–19
Notes: Each point indicates an estimate of each polling organisation’s bias; horizontal 
bars cover 95 per cent credible intervals . Positive quantities are overestimates; negative 
quantities are underestimates .




Herding by pollsters has been observed at general elections in the United 
States (Panagopoulos et al. 2018), the United Kingdom (Sturgis et al. 
2016), Canada (Whiteley 2016) and France (Evans and Ivaldi 2018). 
Herding is common in professions such as stock trading (Rülke et al. 2016) 
because of the incentive structures at play. There is safety in numbers: 
better to all be wrong together than risk being alone publishing a poll 
estimating an outcome wildly distant from the actual result. It requires 
a great deal of confidence for a pollster to take that sort of risk. Lonergan 
Research’s Chris Lonergan admitted being embarrassed and jettisoning 
a poll he conducted because ‘no one wants to release a poll that is wildly 
out of step … we didn’t want to be seen as having an inaccurate poll’ 
(Koziol 2019).
Call it herding, harmonisation or looking over your shoulder; pollsters 
take stock of the competition and the available information each election 
cycle. This can be achieved by either not publishing the results of a poll 
conducted, such as in the Lonergan case, or ‘deliberately adjust[ing] their 
methodology to produce certain results’ (Prosser and Mellon 2018), 
which in effect suggests pollsters were playing the weighting game.
House effects in 2019 are large by historical 
standards
We gain historical perspective on 2019 polling errors by repeating 
this analysis with polls published prior to the 2007, 2010, 2013 and 
2016 elections, utilising the same statistical model described above.7 
Newspoll before July 2015 was conducted with live phone interviews 
and we distinguish this from the subsequent period when Newspoll was 
conducted with online panel and IVR interview and sampling methods. 
Nielsen polls, employing live phone interviews, ceased in July 2014.
7  The models include discontinuities for Kevin Rudd becoming the Labor leader (replacing Kim 
Beazley), Julia Gillard becoming prime minister (replacing Rudd), Rudd ousting Gillard to become 
prime minister again and the Abbott to Turnbull transition.
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Comparing the 2019 two-party-preferred house effects with historical 
elections in Figure 7.6, it is clear that most pollsters, with the exception 
of YouGov, had very large misses. What is sobering is that, in 2010, every 
pollster managed to underestimate the Coalition’s two-party-preferred 
vote. Newspoll was only 0.75 percentage points worse in 2019 than its 
2010 performance. Essential and Roy Morgan in 2010 had estimates 
worse than any poll in 2019. The polls plainly ‘got it wrong’ across the 
board in 2019, as in 2010; biased estimates are not unique to 2019.
For the major parties’ primary votes, we find little improvement in Figures 
7.7 and 7.8. Every pollster underestimated the Coalition’s primary vote 
and only YouGov, ReachTEL and Ipsos did so considerably more than 
the median house bias for the five elections. The last time Newspoll had 
not systematically underestimated the Coalition’s primary vote was for the 
2007 election. Ipsos’s estimate for Labor deteriorated markedly between 
2016 and 2019.
The general difficulty pollsters had in 2019 was underestimating the 
Coalition’s primary vote—a similarity with 2010, when all pollsters 
systematically underestimated it, too. One avenue for future research 
would be to assess the available historical information on how the rate of 
undecided voters and their treatment affect the estimates of vote choice. 
Gelman et al. (2016) found during the 2012 US presidential election 
campaign that the swinging voter was mythical, with the swings observed 
in the polls related to the contacted sample’s partisan enthusiasm and 
willingness to participate in surveys during the election campaign. Events 
in an election campaign can elicit survey bias as an artefact of sampling 
non-response, with their primes conditioning partisan response rates. It is 
more than plausible that a government’s messy internal party turmoil 
could affect Australian partisans in a similar way to American partisans 
responding to their party candidate’s performance in a presidential 
debate and associated media commentary. It is arguably more possible, 
since the breakdown of civil political norms—that is, the ousting of 
prime ministers—should elicit more ire than a comparatively poor 
television debate performance. If Labor partisan willingness to be polled 
was dampened after Julia Gillard became prime minister in 2010 and 
Coalition partisan willingness to be polled was dampened after Morrison 
became prime minister in 2018, there should be a relationship between the 
number of reported uncommitted respondents and the underestimates of 
the respective parties. This is not limited to leadership altercations; many 
other things could depress partisan spirits.
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Figure 7.6 Coalition two‑party‑preferred voting intentions historical 
house effects, 2004–19
Notes: Each point indicates an estimate of each polling organisation’s bias; horizontal 
bars cover 95 per cent credible intervals . Positive quantities are overestimates; negative 
quantities are underestimates .
Source: Authors’ calculations .
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Figure 7.7 Labor first-preference voting intentions historical house 
effects, 2004–19
Notes: Each point indicates an estimate of each polling organisation’s bias; horizontal 
bars cover 95 per cent credible intervals . Positive quantities are overestimates; negative 
quantities are underestimates .
Source: Authors’ calculations .
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Figure 7.8 Coalition first-preference voting intentions historical house 
effects, 2004–19
Notes: Each point indicates an estimate of each polling organisation’s bias; horizontal 
bars cover 95 per cent credible intervals . Positive quantities are overestimates; negative 
quantities are underestimates .
Source: Authors’ calculations .
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What is herding and how can we detect it?
As mentioned before, pollsters are susceptible to herding. In the case of 
election polling, pollsters who stray from the herd and meet an unexpected 
election result will suffer very real commercial consequences: vanishing 
clients. For pollster survival, it is safer to be in the herd than alone in 
the field.
Survey houses have a few choices about weighting once data have been 
collected and before publishing the results. Very few pollsters state which 
variables, such as age and gender, go into their weights, and none is 
open about how these weighting covariates are cut. For instance, age is 
a continuous variable that can be cut at different points on the population 
age structure into different groups with different sizes. Whether the data 
collected on these covariates are imbalanced (or what degree of imbalance 
exists), the public is not told. There are trade-offs that must be made 
when weighting. However, there comes a point when increasing weight 
complexity (and its variance), while reducing the estimate’s bias, induces 
more error than the amount of bias removed. This opaque corner of 
polling should be made more transparent. The paucity of detail—such 
as what exactly is in the weighting scheme’s ‘secret sauce’—is a norm in 
Australian political polling, allowing pollsters to get away with shoddy 
workmanship undetected before an election.
Theory: Herding manifests as underdispersion
We leverage one of the oldest and most well-known theorems in 
statistics, the Central Limit Theorem (CLT), to test for herding in the 
polls immediately before the past five elections. Polls that herd should 
be underdispersed, displaying less variability than what we should see 
under the CLT. Suppose the true level of voting intentions is π ∈ [0,1], 
a proportion between 0 and 1. Then via the CLT,8 a series of unbiased, 
simple random samples of size n will produce estimates of π denoted by 
?̂?𝜋 that follow a normal distribution with mean π and variance V(?̂?𝜋 ) = π 
(1 – π) /n.
8  Or actually, a special case of the CLT, the De Moivre–Laplace Theorem, dating to 1738 in the 




Putting to one side the bias that we have already analysed, we now 
compare the observed dispersion of the polls with the theoretically 
expected dispersion, given: 1) the polls’ stated sample sizes, np; and 2) an 
assumption about π, that voting intentions are generally unchanged from 
the days immediately preceding election day to the day of the election. 
In particular, we assume no change in voting intentions for d days prior to 
the election. Let D(d) denote the set of polls fielded within d days of the 
election, with the standard deviation of those polls’ estimates of π denoted 
as sd ≡ sD(d)(?̂?𝜋 ). We then repeat the following calculations over a range of 
values of d: 1) simulate poll results for each poll, p∈D(d)—that is, 𝑦𝑦"∗   ∼ 
N(π,Vp), Vp = π(1–π)/np; 2) round each yp to the same degree of precision 
as in the corresponding reported poll; and 3) compute 𝑠𝑠"∗  , the standard 
deviation of 𝑦𝑦"∗  . We then see—over many repetitions of the preceding 
steps—the rate at which 𝑠𝑠"∗  > sD(d). That is, is the variability of actual 
polls, D, smaller, larger or indistinguishable from what the CLT tells us 
we should see under simple random sampling? We apply this procedure 
to polls from the past five election campaigns.
Strong evidence of underdispersion in 
the Coalition’s primary and two‑party‑
preferred polling
The major party primary and two-party-preferred voting intentions are 
plotted in Figure 7.9. The dispersion of polls estimating the two-party-
preferred vote in 2019 is well below what the CLT would require. This is 
indicated by the black line being below the shaded 95 per cent credibility 
intervals of where the optimum amount of dispersion would be given 
the estimates published and the sample sizes involved. The two-party-
preferred estimates’ dispersions were mostly within the optimum bands 
for the 2013 and 2016 elections but not for the 2010 and 2007 elections, 
which were overdispersed for the most part.9 There were large biases 
observed for these years (see Figure 7.6).
9  In 2013, pollsters transitioned from overdispersion to underdispersion, suggesting herding 
occurred as the election neared.
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Figure 7.9 Dispersion before an election, 2004–19
Notes: For the polls conducted within each set of days until the election, the black 
line represents the observed dispersion in the polls and the orange line represents the 
theoretically expected dispersion . The poll dispersion coverage period sets take the value 
of 14 through to 90 days before each election .
Source: Authors’ calculations .
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For the 2019 major party votes, only the Coalition’s primary vote was 
underdispersed, but less than the two-party-preferred, while estimates 
for Labor’s support were as theoretically expected. There is a fair 
amount of overdispersion in historical primary votes; for the 2010 and 
2013 elections, recent leadership changes made actual change to voter 
intensions plausible, especially for Labor partisans. The overdispersion 
observed might alternatively be suggestive of the non-response bias issues 
Gelman et al. (2016) identify, which pollsters, given their limited options, 
have attempted to paper over with extreme weights (Ansolabehere and 
Rivers 2013; Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983), inducing more variance and 
thereby error while reducing the observed bias in an imbalanced sample.
Conclusion: Polls and other disasters
The polls certainly missed the mark in 2019. The poll errors in 2019 
were large and persistent across the 2016–19 cycle, shaping expectations 
about the election outcome with consequences for the way politics was 
conducted towards the election, spanning substantive matters such as 
policy debates and the parliament’s agenda, through to media coverage 
and politicians’ career decisions.
While large and enduring—and hence of immense political consequence—
the magnitude of the poll errors in 2019 was not unprecedented. 
Our analysis of historical poll errors in Australian federal elections reveals 
that there were large poll errors in 2010. Any discussion of poll error 
in that election cycle was displaced with intense media interest in the 
fact that the 2010 election produced the first hung Commonwealth 
Parliament since 1940. Good poll performance in the 2013 and 2016 
election cycles further helped to erase the prospect—and reality—of poll 
error from collective political memory. Hence, we have the alchemy of the 
2019 election cycle, in the transformation of the uncertainty in random 
sampling, which produces estimates of public opinion into certainty.
Part of this alchemy was herding among the polls—a clustering of poll 
results reflecting the shared consensus that Labor would win the election. 
We provide clear evidence of underdispersion in the polls fielded in the 
lead-up to the 2019 election—a signature of herding. As unprofessional as 
herding may seem—and is—the commercial imperatives for it are clear. 
But the 2019 election cycle also makes clear the harm to the polity that 
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follows when herding and poll bias occur at once. Pollsters might not be 
able to do much about the latter. Bias only manifests ex ante, but herding 
happens along the way.
We also note the steady shift in Australian polling from live interviewer, 
random-digit dialling methods to the use of other survey modes such as 
pre-recruited panels of respondents taking surveys online, IVR or ‘robo 
polls’ and SMS or Facebook Messenger polls. Faster and less expensive 
ways  of conducting surveys do present considerable challenges for 
data quality.
These newer survey modes are almost surely more susceptible than older 
methods to errors of coverage (are all members of the target population 
capable of being reached with a given sampling technology and its specific 
implementation?) and non-response bias (after contact, the decision 
about whether to participate in the survey is correlated with variables 
being measured by the survey). Remediating these biases usually involves 
weighting after data collection, with reference to a trusted data source such 
as the Australian census. But what variables are pollsters to weight on, and 
how aggressively to do this? And, until an election reveals the true state 
of voting intentions, survey companies are flying blind when deploying 
new survey modes. The temptation to look over one’s shoulder at the 
competition in this environment must be immense, as is the scope for 
doing so given the vast array of choices to be made when weighting data.
We invoke an adage applicable in many fields of science: sunlight is the 
best disinfectant. That is, there is a strong scientific case—and perhaps 
a commercial case as well—for greater transparency in how poll data are 
collected and weighted to ensure representativeness. We note that long-
time pollster John Stirton (2019: 310–13) has called for urgent reform 
in this direction.
Given the errors in the 2019 election, there would seem to be a strong 
normative case, too, for Australia’s pollsters pulling back the curtain, 
even a little, to help us better understand why and how they generate 
the numbers they do. The quality of political discussion, the salience and 
content of the nation’s policy agenda—indeed, the health of Australian 
democracy—would gain from a commitment to this transparency around 
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THE PERILOUS POLLING 
OF SINGLE SEATS
Murray Goot1
For a contest that was to be decided, many insisted, by hand-to-hand combat 
in various seats, we might have expected commentators on the progress of 
the 2019 election campaign to have focused on the polling in particular 
seats rather than on the national polls. But they did not. While there were, 
as there long has been, many fewer national polls than single-seat polls—
mostly, though not entirely, in seats classified officially as ‘marginal’—when 
it came to anticipating the outcome, the scorecards from the single-seat 
polls certainly did not displace the traditional focus on the national polls.
Given the media’s interest in contests where Coalition MPs were under 
threat from Independents or the Greens, and in contests where Coalition 
candidates were mounting credible challenges against Independent MPs, 
we might also have expected the media to have commissioned polls in 
a number of these seats. But only in Mayo (SA), where Rebekha Sharkie 
(Centre Alliance) was facing a Liberal challenge to regain the seat, was 
there any media-sponsored polling in seats of this kind. 
1  My thanks to Kevin Bonham, William Bowe; David Briggs, Angela Smith and Campbell 
White at YouGov Galaxy; David Bednall, Andrew Bunn, Jessica Elgood at Ipsos; Carol Johnson, 
Malcolm Mackerras, Gary Morgan of Roy Morgan Research; Marian Simms, Mark Textor of the C|T 
Group; James Stewart from uComms; John Utting of Utting Research; and a number of journalists 
who would probably prefer to remain unnamed. The author is a panel member of the Inquiry into 
the Performance of the Opinion Polls at the 2019 Australian Federal Election, established by the 
Association of Market and Social Research Organisations. The views expressed in this chapter, however, 
are his own. The research was supported by the Australian Research Council under DP150102968.
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At the same time, we might have expected polls in single seats, with their 
smaller samples, to have performed more poorly than the national polls. 
While many did perform more poorly, almost as many performed better. 
The single-seat polls that proved the best guides, on average, were those 
conducted in New South Wales and in Victoria; in New South Wales, 
they were more accurate than the national polls. The worst polls—much 
worse than could be explained by sample size alone—were the single-seat 
polls conducted in Queensland and Western Australia, which were the 
States where the Coalition did best. It was in these States that the national 
polls may have been the poorest guides as well. 
In this chapter—in addition to noting how many single-seat polls there 
were, which seats were polled and how well the polls did in comparison 
with the national polls—I ask: who commissioned the polls in single seats 
(the major media groups), when were they  conducted (mostly, towards 
the end of the campaign and not more than once) and which market 
research firms conducted them (just two; one, arguably, with a conflict of 
interest). I set out what pollsters reported about their respondents’ vote 
choice: first preferences and two-party preferred—a measure that was 
pollster-constructed. I look at how closely the polls came to forecasting 
the results in individual seats, either in terms of their proximity to the 
final figures (a statistician’s measure) or in terms of picking the winners 
(a journalist’s concern). That ‘the polls’ got it wrong is a judgement based, 
for the most part, on the national polls. Would the view of the polls’ 
performance be different were it based on the single-seat polls? 
I also review various accounts of where the single-seat polls went wrong: 
late deciders, samples too small, the ‘undecided’ ignored and margins of 
sampling error not adequality acknowledged. I conclude by asking how 
these polls could have performed better; and, in commissioning and 
publishing them, how the media could have better managed their risks. 
The answers to both questions suggest that not a lot is likely to change.
The polls: For whom, where and when
During election campaigns, polls help sell newspapers. If they can afford 
it—and most metropolitan mastheads can—the press, and occasionally 
a television network, commission polls of various kinds and promote 
them as ‘exclusives’. During the 2019 campaign, the results of 18 national 
polls were published, each with its own estimate of how Australians 
151
8 . THE PERILoUS PoLLING oF SINGLE SEATS
would vote. Six were commissioned by The Australian, the national daily 
owned by News Corp Australia; two by the Australian Financial Review 
(AFR ), Sydney Morning Herald and Melbourne Age, which were formerly 
owned by Fairfax but are now owned by Nine Entertainment; and two 
by News Corp’s metropolitan mastheads the Daily Telegraph (NSW), 
Herald-Sun (Victoria), The Courier-Mail (Queensland), The Advertiser 
(South  Australia) and the Mercury (Tasmania). The other eight were 
conducted by market research firms with no media contracts: five by 
Roy Morgan Research and three by Essential Research, which released its 
results to The Guardian (see Table 8.1).
Over the same period, News Corp, Seven West Media and Network 10 
released, in varying detail, the results of 43 single-seat polls conducted 
in 35 seats (Appendix Tables A8.1–A8.3); of these, 32 were marginal 
seats. Ten days after the election had been called, Newspoll ran polls for 
The Australian in Pearce (WA), Herbert (Qld), Deakin (Vic.) and Lindsay 
(NSW). A week or so out from the election, on 9–11 May, it followed 
up with polls in Herbert and Lindsay and two other seats, Corangamite 
(Vic.) and Bass (Tas.). Mid-campaign, YouGov Galaxy conducted polls 
for Seven West Media in three West Australian seats (Cowan, Pearce 
and Swan), following up on the final Tuesday and Wednesday of the 
campaign with polls in these seats and two others (Hasluck and Stirling). 
On  Monday and Tuesday of the final week of the campaign, YouGov 
Galaxy conducted polls in 11 ‘crucial seats’—Dickson, Flynn, Forde, 
Herbert and Leichhardt (Qld); Deakin, Higgins and La Trobe (Vic.); 
and Gilmore, Macquarie and Reid (NSW)—for the News Corp Australia 
Network. The  results of these polls were released one by one, hour by 
hour, from 10 am Eastern Standard Time the day before the election 
(News Corp Australia Network 2019), a pattern designed to encourage 
interested readers to take out a  subscription to the relevant masthead. 
First—and last—out of the blocks was uComms, commissioned by 
News Corp’s Geelong Advertiser, shortly after the election was called, to 
test opinion in the very marginal seat of Corangamite (Vic.) in which 
the newspaper circulated (Jefferson 2019, the poll mistakenly attributed 
to ReachTEL), and to test opinion for Network 10’s The Project, shortly 
before the election, in 12 seats (including Corangamite) drawn from all 
six States. Every poll was a robo-poll, using interactive voice recognition 
(IVR), with questions asked on the telephone, but not by a live interviewer, 
and answered by someone in the household, though not necessarily the 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Having one firm (Galaxy, in 2016; YouGov, in 2019) using identical 
methods and responsible for two brands—Newspoll and YouGov 
Galaxy—raised potential conflicts of interest. In seats polled by both, 
could the results published under one brand be very different from 
those published under the other? Three seats—Deakin (Vic.), Herbert 
(Qld) and Pearce (WA)—were polled and sometimes repolled by both 
Newspoll and YouGov Galaxy (Table 8.1). But they were polled by one, 
followed by the other, either two weeks apart (Pearce) or four weeks apart 
(Deakin, Herbert). This may have avoided questions being raised about 
inconsistent results, but where the results were consistent it risked raising 
the question of herding. That few seats were polled by both Newspoll 
and YouGov Galaxy could be read in different ways: reassuringly, as an 
outcome that minimised any conflict; worryingly, as a sign of how the 
conflict constrained seat selection; or as sheer coincidence, determined 
not by two not-very-independent polling operations, but by two entirely 
separate clients. 
Of greater concern to The Australian was its discovery—though not until 
after the election—that YouGov Galaxy had been doing Labor’s single-seat 
polling as well. The pollster’s failure to disclose its involvement with Labor 
meant that journalists who thought they were cross-checking Newspoll’s 
figures with an independent source (Labor) were doing nothing of the 
kind. Liberal sources expressed their disbelief in the figures Newspoll 
was producing for The Australian since they were at odds with the figures 
the Crosby Textor Group (C|T) was generating for the Liberals. Labor 
sources, on the other hand, were happy to confirm that the single-seat 
figures Newspoll was reporting were very like their own. Journalists either 
did not ask who was doing Labor’s polling or were not told.
In terms of which outlets commissioned polls and from which pollsters, the 
contrast with 2016 was marked. In 2016, no polls were commissioned by 
Seven West Media or the News Corp Australia network, and uComms did 
not exist. News Corp’s metropolitan mastheads commissioned single-seat 
polls of their own, either from YouGov Galaxy or from ReachTEL; the 
latter had also polled for 7 News and Fairfax Media (subsequently, part of 
Nine Entertainment). In 2019, ReachTEL conducted no polls; in 2016, 
it conducted polls in 21 seats. In 2019, Morgan undertook no single-seat 
polling; in 2016, it had conducted polls in 31 seats (Goot 2018: 117–22). 
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As remarkable as the decline—from 47 in 2016 to 26—in the number 
of seats polled was the decline in the number seats polled more than 
once, which was down from 18 (including three polled as many as four 
times) in 2016 to 11 (only one polled four times). Long gone were the 
days when, courtesy of one pollster or another, a seat might be polled 
up to eight times (Goot 2009: 123). Filling the gaps, journalists paid 
increasing attention to what they could glean about the state of play from 
the political parties, interest groups or other ‘activists’.
The decline in the number of single-seat polls the media commissioned, 
and the reduction in the number of seats they polled more than once, 
reflects cost pressures and concerns about the credibility of single-seat 
polls. Costs—a perennial consideration—had been pressing on media 
managers with increasing force, notwithstanding that robo-polls are 
cheap compared with traditional methods. Credibility, by contrast, was 
a relatively new concern. Whereas journalists not so long ago would express 
regret at the inability of their organisations to fund more single-seat polls, 
now they were more inclined to qualify their reports by referring to the 
unreliability of such polls (for the most forensic analysis, see Jackman and 
Mansillo 2018: 149). 
The seats
Of the seats requiring a swing of less than 6 percentage points to 
change—the AEC’s definition of a marginal seat—21 were held by the 
Coalition and 22 by Labor (including Corangamite and Dunkley, which 
were notionally Labor as a result of a redistribution). Yet the seats that 
were polled were not drawn in equal numbers from the two sides. Nor 
would one expect them to be. The election, after all, was a contest that 
Labor was expected to win—an expectation due in no small measure 
to an uninterrupted string of national polls that showed Labor ahead. 
Consequently, the number of Liberal seats polled (23) was twice the 
number of Labor seats (11)—the ratio being constant for YouGov Galaxy, 
Newspoll and uComms. The number of Liberal seats polled at least twice 
(eight) was four times the corresponding number of Labor seats. 
Though most of the seats polled were marginal, they were not always 
the most marginal. Seats polled for Seven West Media included two 
that required swings of close to 4 percentage points but excluded one 
(Perth) that required a swing closer to 3 percentage points. The Australian 
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organised polls in the third most marginal Liberal seat in Western 
Australia; the most marginal Labor seats in Queensland, Victoria and New 
South Wales; a Liberal seat in Victoria (Deakin) that was not classified 
as marginal; and a seat (Bass) that was Labor’s second most marginal, 
not its most marginal, seat in Tasmania. News Corp chose Labor’s most 
marginal seat in Queensland (Herbert) plus the Coalition’s eighth most 
marginal (Leichhardt) and three of its four most marginal seats, but not 
its most marginal (Capricornia); three Liberal seats in Victoria, only one 
of them (La Trobe) a marginal seat; and in New South Wales, Labor’s 
second most marginal seat (Macquarie) plus the Liberals’ most marginal 
(Gilmore) and fourth most marginal seat (Reid). Network 10’s The Project 
chose Page—the only National Party seat to figure in any of the single-seat 
polling—and Reid, which were, respectively, the second and fourth most 
marginal Coalition seats in New South Wales; Casey and Higgins (as well 
as Corangamite), which were the third and 13th most marginal Liberal 
seats in Victoria; Dickson, Forde and Leichhardt, which were the second, 
fourth and eighth most marginal LNP seats in Queensland; Hasluck 
and Pearce, the most marginal and third most marginal Liberal seats in 
Western Australia; and Boothby and Braddon, the most marginal Liberal 
and Labor seats in South Australia and Tasmania, respectively. 
Notable for their absence were Warringah (NSW), where former prime 
minister Tony Abbott was being challenged (successfully) by Zali 
Steggall (Independent); and Kooyong (Vic.), where the Treasurer, Josh 
Frydenberg (Liberal), was being challenged (unsuccessfully) by Julian 
Burnside (the  Greens). Also ignored were Wentworth (NSW), where 
Kerryn Phelps (Independent) was being challenged (successfully) by Dave 
Sharma (Liberal); and Indi (Vic.), where Helen Haines (Independent), 
hoping to succeed Cathy McGowan (Independent), was being challenged 
(unsuccessfully) by Steve Martin (Liberal). These contests (discussed by 
Curtin and Sheppard, Chapter 18, this volume) involved Independent 
candidates who were women.
The National Party seats ignored included some considered to be at risk 
from independents—chief among them: New England (NSW), where 
former deputy prime minister Barnaby Joyce was being challenged 
(unsuccessfully) by Adam Blakester (Independent); and Cowper (NSW), 
where the newly pre-selected National Party candidate Patrick Conaghan 
was being challenged (unsuccessfully) by the former member for Lyne, 
Rob Oakeshott (Independent). 
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Across the largest States, the polls were relatively thinly spread; across 
the smaller States, the coverage was greater. In the most populous States, 
the number of seats polled—New South Wales (eight), Victoria (seven), 
Queensland (nine) and Western Australia (six)—was roughly the same. 
Across the remainder—South Australia (three) and Tasmania (two)—it was 
numerically smaller but disproportionately large. Inner metropolitan and 
outer metropolitan seats, each of which accounted for 26 per cent of the 
seats in the outgoing House, were slightly underrepresented in the media 
polls; each made up about 30 per cent of the seats. Underrepresented, 
too, were rural seats (18 per cent) that made up one-quarter of the 
outgoing House. Overrepresented were provincial seats: 30 per cent of 
the seats polled, but only half that proportion on the floor of the House 
(see  Table  8.1). If seat selection is any guide, the media thought this 
election was not going to be decided only in the metropolitan suburbs, let 
alone in the metropolitan suburbs of the largest States.
Sharing an assumption that this was an election at which more Liberal 
than Labor seats would fall, there was considerable overlap between the 
seats the media polled and the seats polled by the ALP and the ACTU. 
(The Liberal Party’s list of target seats was tightly guarded). Of all 20 seats 
polled by the ALP, 70 per cent were also polled for the media; of the 
16 seats polled by the ACTU, the proportion polled for the media was 
almost the same. Of the 26 seats polled by either the ALP or the ACTU, 
less than 40 per cent were the same (Table 8.1)—a division of labour or 
a disagreement among allies about which seats offered the greater prospect? 
The results
How well did the polls do in the single seats chosen by the media? 
The standard way of answering this question—standard for a statistician, 
if not for a journalist—is to look at the size of the differences between 
what the polls reported and what the election results showed. Standard for 
a journalist, if not for a statistician, is to look at whether the polls predicted 
the winners. We can run these tests for Newspoll and YouGov Galaxy, but 
we cannot run them for uComms since it produced no estimate of the 
first preferences, seat by seat, that took account of how the ‘undecided’ 
might divide, nor a seat-by-seat estimate of the two-party-preferred vote.
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Looking only at those polls completed in the final week of the campaign—
the 16 conducted by YouGov Galaxy and the four by Newspoll—the 
errors seem grim. Two-party preferred, the mean difference between 
the polls’ estimates and the actual results was 4.1 percentage points for 
YouGov Galaxy and 3.0 percentage points for Newspoll; the median 
differences—3.8 percentage points (YouGov Galaxy) and 2.9 percentage 
points (Newspoll)—were very similar (Table 8.2). 
Table 8.2 Differences between the polls’ estimate of party support 
and the actual vote in single seats, two‑party preferred, Galaxy and 
Newspoll (percentage points)
Pollster Fieldworkǂ Seats Mean Median
YouGov Galaxy 13–15 May 16 4 .1 3 .8
Newspoll 9–12 May  4 3 .0 2 .9
ǂ Polls concluded more than 10 days before the election are excluded .
Sources: See Appendix Table A8 .1 for YouGov Galaxy; Table A8 .2 for Newspoll .
In Queensland, as Table 8.3 shows, the errors were considerably higher, 
6 percentage points, on average; in Victoria (2.6), Tasmania (2.4) and New 
South Wales (1.7), they were markedly lower; and in Western Australia (4.3), 
they sat around the mean. In almost every case, the polls underestimated 
the Coalition’s share of the two-party-preferred vote. Ipsos, the only 
polling organisation to have released State-by-State breaks from its final 
national poll, showed a similar pattern, with its biggest underestimate of 
the Coalition’s two-party-preferred vote being for Tasmania (7.5 percentage 
points), followed by Queensland (5.7), Western Australia (4.6), South 
Australia and the Northern Territory (about 3.1), New South Wales (1.1) 
and Victoria (where it overestimated, not underestimated, the Coalition’s 
two-party-preferred vote by 1.1 percentage points). 
Table 8.3 Mean overestimates (+) or underestimates (–) of the two‑party‑
preferred and first-preference vote in single seats, by party, Galaxy and 
Newspoll (percentage points)
Seats TPP First preferences
State No. (Coalition) ALP Coalition Greens UAP PHON Other
WA 5 –4 .3 +6 .0 –2 .7 –2 .3 +1 .2 –1 .6 –0 .6
Qld 6 –6 .0 +5 .7 –2 .1 –1 .4 +3 .2 –5 .2 –2 .9
Vic . 4 –2 .6 +0 .8 –2 .5 +1 .8 +1 .7 ‑ –0 .6
NSW 4 –1 .7 +0 .5 –2 .1 –1 .5 +2 .1 ‑ –0 .8
Tas . 1 –2 .4 +4 .3 –2 .3 –0 .5 –0 .9 ‑ –0 .6 
‑ PHoN had no candidates in seats polled in Victoria, New South Wales and Tasmania .
Sources: See Appendix Table A8 .1 for YouGov Galaxy; and Table A8 .2 for Newspoll .
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The main source of the differences between the polls’ estimates and 
the election results, not surprisingly, was the polls’ estimates of Labor’s 
first preferences—and, to a lesser degree, the first preferences won by 
Clive Palmer’s UAP. As Table 8.3 shows, polls conducted in single seats 
overestimated Labor’s share of the vote—most egregiously in Western 
Australia (6 percentage points, on average), Queensland (5.7) and 
Tasmania (4.3), though hardly at all in Victoria (0.8) or New South 
Wales (0.5). The polls overestimated support for the UAP in Queensland 
(3.2 percentage points), but also in New South Wales (2.1), Victoria (1.7) 
and Western Australia (1.2). Conversely, the same polls underestimated 
support for the Coalition (the size of the errors being fairly uniform), 
the Greens (except in Victoria, where it overestimated them) and 
PHON—especially in Queensland. The contrast with 2016, when the 
polls underestimated Labor’s support and overestimated support for 
the Coalition (Jackman and Mansillo 2018: 146), is striking.
Were the pollsters caught out by not polling closer to the election? If any 
of them thought this, none of them said it—and with good reason. 
Despite polling earlier, Newspoll (9–12 May) was closer to the mark in its 
seats than was YouGov Galaxy (13–15 May) in its seats (see also Jackman 
and Mansillo 2018: 150). Indeed, in two South Australian seats (Boothby 
and Mayo) polled before the final week of the campaign, YouGov Galaxy 
got closer to the mark than it did in most of the seats it polled during 
the final week (Appendix Table A8.1). During the final seven days of 
the campaign, only Newspoll conducted more than one national poll. It 
showed no tightening—if anything, the reverse (Benson 2019c).
After the election, at least one pollster wondered whether the (national) 
polls had erred in assuming the ‘don’t knows’ would split along the same 
lines as other respondents (Lewis 2019). Did the ‘don’t knows’ break 
disproportionately in favour of the Coalition? Evidence from two national 
post-election surveys suggests they did not. A JWS poll shows virtually 
no difference in the proportion of Coalition (39 per cent) and Labor 
respondents (37 per cent) who said they had decided on their vote in 
the final week, including on election day (JWS 2019: 10–11). Even if we 
ignore the fact that 49 per cent of Greens respondents also said they had 
decided late, these figures do not point to late deciders disproportionately 
favouring the Coalition. An Essential poll shows those who made up their 
mind on election day favoured the Coalition (38 per cent) over Labor 
(27 per cent). From this, The Guardian inferred that the Coalition did 
especially well from late deciders (Murphy 2019). But the figures showing 
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that, of those who voted either Coalition or Labor at the last minute, 
58 per cent voted Coalition and 42 per cent voted Labor almost exactly 
match the 41.4:33.3 division (equivalent to 55:45) in the share of the vote 
recorded by the Coalition and Labor at the election (Goot 2019). 
Had pollsters found some defensible way of allocating most of the ‘don’t 
knows’ to the Coalition, they would have reduced the differences between 
their figures and the election results in both the single-seat polls and the 
national polls. But to have really made a difference—to have closed the 
gap by 1 or 2 percentage points—the ‘don’t knows’ would have needed 
to be much bigger than 1 or 2 per cent. In the 16 single-seat polls 
produced by YouGov Galaxy, 10 reported a ‘don’t know’ figure of just 
1  or 2 per cent. Of the four single-seat polls conducted by Newspoll, 
only one reported a figure for the ‘don’t knows’; it was 1 per cent. True, 
the figures for the ‘undecided’ published by uComms averaged 5 per cent 
(Appendix Table A8.3), but these derived from responses to uComms’ 
initial question (‘Which of the following parties will receive your first-
preference vote?’), not from responses to this question plus the follow-
up asked of the ‘undecided’ about the party or individual they had ‘even 
a slight leaning’ towards—a ‘leaner’ having preceded the figures published 
by YouGov Galaxy and Newspoll with which the uComms figures need 
to be compared.
Whether, ideally, ‘don’t knows’ should be pushed—asked a ‘leaner’—
is a separate matter. Is reducing the ‘undecided’ to no more than 1 or 2 
per cent of the sample really credible, when none of the national polls had 
a final ‘undecided’ of less than 4 per cent and at a time when so many 
respondents appeared to be uncertain about their choice? According 
to the post-election poll conducted by Essential, 26 per cent of voters 
did not make up their mind until the final week(s) of the campaign 
(Murphy 2019). JWS Research (2019) estimated that the proportion who 
made up their mind in the final week was as high as 40 per cent.
A quite different way of looking at the performance of the polls is to 
consider how accurately they anticipated who would win each seat. 
‘We  were the most accurate in showing the seats likely to be won or 
lost in Queensland’, said David Briggs, managing director of YouGov 
Galaxy, and in ‘showing that Labor were not picking up seats they 
needed there’ (quoted in Tabakoff 2019). However, since: 1) Briggs ran 
the only company polling single seats and producing figures that could 
be compared with the election results (uComms did not allocate the 
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‘undecided’); 2) YouGov Galaxy had the Coalition ahead in only two of 
the four Queensland seats in which it polled; and 3) Labor not only failed 
to win seats in Queensland, but also lost two seats (in only one of which 
either YouGov Galaxy or Newspoll polled), it is difficult to see Briggs’s 
claim amounting to much.
Neither YouGov Galaxy nor Newspoll made as bad a fist of it as they 
might have made. None of the seats polled by YouGov Galaxy and only 
one of the seats (Bass) polled by Newspoll had Labor winning seats they 
were not  going to win, and neither YouGov Galaxy nor Newspoll had 
the Coalition losing seats they were not going to lose. The problem 
with YouGov Galaxy was having five of its 16 seats on an estimated 
two-party preferred of 50:50—seats that the Coalition went on to win 
(as Appendix Table A8.1 shows) either comfortably (Swan, 52.8 per cent; 
La Trobe, 54.5 per cent) or handsomely (Hasluck, 55.2 per cent; Herbert, 
58.4 per cent; and Forde, 58.6 per cent). 
Conclusion
Not for the first time in an Australian election, many thought the contest 
would be decided by local battles in individual seats (see, for example, 
Simms 1997). Not for the first time, some thought they discerned in this 
something new; one journalist wrote of a ‘new hyper-localism’ in political 
campaigning (Irvine 2019). And not for the first time in an Australian 
election, the single-seat polling proved neither particularly accurate in 
estimating vote shares (first preferences or the two-party preferred) nor 
especially good at forecasting which party in the various seats would win. 
Since elections allow polls to showcase their value, failing to come up with 
a tolerably good estimate of the vote shares or failing to predict a number 
of the winners is no small thing.
What might be done to improve them? One suggestion—dating from the 
early days of polling—is that pollsters, and the press, do more to emphasise 
the fact that polls provide estimates, not precise measures. At a meeting 
of Gallup Poll directors held after the 1948 American polling debacle, 
the director of the Italian Institute of Public Opinion announced that at 
the next election he would ‘give the figures ±3’; if the figure in the poll 
was 50, he would report it as lying in the range 47–53. Piero Luzzatto 
Fegiz was intending to draw his readers’ attention not to a poll’s sampling 
error, but to the vagaries of electoral turnout (Gallup 1949: 8)—a source 
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of non-sampling error. No matter. Would Australian readers have been 
happy to be told that the 50:50 results YouGov Galaxy reported in so 
many seats did not mean they were all on a ‘knife-edge’, but that there 
was a 95 per cent probability (with a sample size of about 500) that the 
two-party vote was somewhere between 54.5 (ALP) and 45.5 (Coalition), 
which would be a comfortable win for Labor, and 45.5 (ALP) and 54.5 
(Coalition), which would be a comfortable win for the Coalition? Hardly. 
A poll on the eve of an election that does not double as a predictive device 
is a poll that has little commercial value. There is a reason for ‘margins of 
error’ being buried in the fine print, for the meaning of the phrase not 
being clarified and for the possible sources of non-sampling error passing 
without mention. 
Thinking about ways of handling the ‘don’t knows’, other than by assuming 
they will divide in much the same way as other respondents, makes more 
sense. At the same meeting of the ‘Gallup family’, George Gallup stressed 
that at the next American election: 
He would say ‘The decided will vote in this way …’ and then 
devote two or three paragraphs to explaining the problem of 
the undecided vote—e.g. how it could be reduced by a ‘leaning’ 
question and how the rest could be distributed—e.g. (a) in the 
same proportions as the rest of the vote, or by past preference. 
He might even say to the reader:
‘Here are the latest figures: this is what the (sampled) electorate 
said 7 days before the election day. What’s your guess what will 
happen? Which party will gain votes, which one [will] lose, what 
will the net result be?’ … In other words, let the reader actively 
participate in the game so that it isn’t Dr Gallup but the reader 
himself who will get the laurels … or eat crow. (Gallup 1949: 5–6) 
Reflecting on the performance of the Australian polls 70 years later, Peter 
Lewis, managing director of Essential, suggested that pollsters could have 
published a set of percentages for each party and the ‘don’t knows’ that 
added to 100 rather than a set of percentages that added to 100 excluding 
the ‘don’t knows’ (Lewis 2019). Whether pollsters would have been 
better advised to report the ‘don’t knows’ after the ‘leaner’ or without the 
‘leaner’, Lewis did not say. Publishing a set of percentages for each party 
and the ‘don’t knows’ without a ‘leaner’, seat by seat, that added to 100 
163
8 . THE PERILoUS PoLLING oF SINGLE SEATS
was precisely what uComms had done. However, while having pollsters 
report figures in this way might guarantee they were never wrong, it would 
hardly allow them to claim that they ever got it right. 
The media, too, is in the prediction business—a business parasitic on the 
polls. Much media coverage is framed in terms of which of the parties is 
ahead, which is behind and whether the gap is opening or closing. It follows 
that few would want to publish seat-by-seat figures of the kind uComms 
produced for Channel 10; uComms did not produce a set of individual 
seat figures that excluded the ‘don’t knows’, though it did publish a two-
party-preferred figure for the 12 seats overall (putting the Coalition ahead 
52:48) after pressing the ‘don’t knows’ with a ‘leaner’ and excluding any 
who remained ‘undecided’. In these seats, the Coalition would prevail, 
54.5:45.5. Underestimating the Coalition’s vote by 2.5 percentage points 
(54.5, not 52) put uComms on a par with the underestimates made by 
the national polls (Appendix Table A8.4). 
Pollsters who do not predict the winner are asked by the media to 
explain—or, in the case of Ipsos (arguably the best of the national polls), 
do not have their contract renewed. Gallup thought the public’s belief 
that pre-election polling had but one purpose—‘to pick the winner’—
was ‘a misconception’ (Gallup 1949: 5). But if that was the case, it was 
a misconception pollsters knew they lived by—one they could never hope 
to correct and still expect to have newspaper contracts at election time. 
Not that a pollster has ever been sacked on the basis of their single-seat 
polls, only on the basis of their nationwide polls. 
On this occasion, the single-seat polls were never sufficiently extensive, 
consistent or reliable to override the message delivered by the national 
polls—all of them having delivered the same message for a long time. 
At  the beginning of the final week of the campaign, The Australian, 
under the heading ‘Marginals tumble into Coalition ledger but Labor 
clings to winning lead’, published the results of its final single-seat polls 
(Benson 2019a). On election day, under the heading ‘Voters’ bob each 
way’, it published the results of its final national poll. ‘Despite the half-
point break towards Labor in the final week’, Simon Benson (2019c) 
reported, ‘party strategists on both sides believe the swing is patchy 
and “hand-to-hand” battles in about 20 seats will decide the election’. 
The two headlines, and accompanying stories, captured much that was 
problematic in the way the polls were covered: the vision, however 
prescient, of marginal seats tumbling to the Coalition when only four 
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had been polled, two of them showing Labor ahead; the idea that polls 
could measure changes of 0.5 percentage point, despite a footnote about 
a sampling error of ±1.8 percentage points, which, as it happens, was 
precisely the size of Newspoll’s median error between 1993 and 2010 
(Goot 2012: 106); and the suggestion that a lead in the polls meant a lead 
in the seats—something that had not held true in two of the previous 
10 elections, in 1998 and 1990. 
That pollsters are not well enough resourced to do their job well seems 
clear. They may need to improve their sampling frames or change 
sampling modes, boost their response rates (currently in single figures for 
IVR), especially among the disengaged, and attend to the way they weight 
their data (including education, and possibly religion, might help). To do 
this, they will need to ask more questions. They should include questions 
that better inform their readers, including questions that allow them to 
distinguish between respondents firmly committed to their vote choice 
and respondents who are not. Getting the polls off the hook may also 
require a change in the way journalists understand and report the polls. 
At the risk of adding another poor prediction to an already large pile, my 
guess is that most of these problems are unlikely to be resolved. Unlike 
pollsters with their predictions, however, I would be happy to be wrong.
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The Liberal–National Coalition Government obtained a small swing 
towards it at the 2019 Australian federal election, gaining a handful of 
seats. This result restored the government’s narrow majority, which now 
stands at 77 (of 151) seats. This is an increase of one from 2016, although 
the government had subsequently lost that majority through various 
by-elections in the final months of the previous parliament. This chapter 
covers the results of the 2019 election in the House of Representatives 
(the House), in individual seats and looking at the overall trends in terms 
of preference flows, the impact of early voting and the varying swings 
across the country.
2016 election
To place the 2019 House results in context, it is worth recapping the 
main results of the previous election. In 2016, the first-term Coalition 
Government went into the election with a sizeable majority, but the loss 
of 14 seats left it with the slimmest of majorities. The Coalition won 76 
seats in the House of Representatives. Labor won 69 seats, which was 
a net gain of 14 seats. The Greens and Katter’s Australian Party (KAP) 
retained one seat each, as did two Independent MPs. The Nick Xenophon 
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Team (NXT) also gained a single seat in the House of Representatives. 
The Coalition suffered a swing of 3.5 per cent against it on primary votes. 
Labor gained a 1.3 per cent swing, alongside a 1.6 per cent swing to 
the Greens. The NXT gained 1.9 per cent in its first outing. The Palmer 
United Party (PUP), which had polled 5.5 per cent in 2013, ran in only 
one electorate and polled 0.4 per cent in that seat.
Table 9.1 Results of the 2016 federal election by party
Party Votes Percentage Swing Seats Seat change
Liberal–National Coalition 5,693,605 42 .04 –3 .51 76 –14
ALP 4,702,296 34 .73 1 .35 69 14
Greens 1,385,650 10 .23 1 .58 1 0
NXT 250,333 1 .85 1 .85 1 1
KAP 72,879 0 .54 –0 .50 1 0
PUP 315 0 .00 –5 .49 0 –1
Independents 380,712 2 .81 1 .44 2 0
other 1,055,311 7 .79 3 .28 0 0
Source: Compiled by author from Australian Electoral Commission data (AEC 2016g, 2016c) .
Redistribution of electoral boundaries
Redistributions in Australia are conducted independently of political 
parties and partisan officials, and electoral boundaries are drawn with 
little regard to their political impact. Australia does not see the partisan 
decision-making that is present in many States in the United States 
or the gerrymandered electoral boundaries those decisions produce 
(see Newton-Farrelly 2015).
Electoral redistributions are required when one of three criteria is met: 
• The number of members to which a State or Territory is entitled 
changes.
• Seven years has elapsed since the last redistribution process.
• The number of electors in more than one-third of electorates deviates 
from the average divisional enrolment by more than 10 per cent for 
a period of more than two months.
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In the term of parliament prior to the 2019 federal election, the House 
of Representatives electoral boundaries were redrawn in six of eight 
jurisdictions: Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, the 
Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory. The changes 
were minor in Queensland, Tasmania and the Northern Territory, but 
were much more dramatic in Victoria, South Australia and the Australian 
Capital Territory.
Redistributions in Queensland, Tasmania and the Northern Territory 
were triggered due to seven years passing since the last redistribution. 
The number of electorates did not change in any of these jurisdictions, 
and no seat experienced sufficient changes to shift the electorate’s notional 
status from one party to another. The Hobart-based electorate of Denison 
in Tasmania was renamed ‘Clark’. In Victoria, South Australia and the 
Australian Capital Territory, redistributions were necessary as these 
jurisdictions’ entitlements for members had changed. The entitlement 
of members for each State and Territory was calculated in August 2017, 
and it was found that Victoria’s entitlement had increased from 37 to 38 
members, while South Australia’s entitlement dropped from 11 to 10 and 
that of the Australian Capital Territory increased from two to three. 
This change in entitlements necessitated significant redrawing of the 
electoral boundaries in these three jurisdictions. Two new notionally 
Labor electorates were created: the seat of Canberra in the Australian 
Capital Territory and the seat of Fraser in Victoria. The Labor-held seat 
of Port Adelaide in South Australia was abolished. Two Liberal-held seats 
in Victoria were redrawn as notionally Labor seats: Corangamite and 
Dunkley. These changes resulted in a net gain of three seats for Labor 
and a net increase of one seat overall. This left the governing Coalition 
with just 74 seats, alongside 72 for Labor and five for minor parties 
and Independents.
By‑elections
Nine federal by-elections were held during the 2016–19 parliamentary term. 
This was the second-largest number of by-elections held during a single 
parliamentary term, only exceeded by the 10 held during the term of the 
20th parliament from 1951 to 1954. Seven of these nine by-elections were 
triggered by the sitting member falling foul of the prohibition on candidates 
being elected if they held foreign citizenship (see Chapter 3, this volume), 
while the two others were caused by the local member’s retirement.
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Table 9.2 By‑elections held during the 2016–19 parliamentary term
Electorate Date Outgoing MP Result
New England 2 December 2017 Barnaby Joyce (NAT) +7 .2% to NAT (2CP)
Bennelong 16 December 2017 John Alexander (LIB) +4 .8% to ALP (2CP)
Batman 17 March 2018 David Feeney (ALP) +3 .4% to ALP (2CP)
Braddon 28 July 2018 Justine Keay (ALP) +0 .1% to ALP (2CP)
Fremantle 28 July 2018 Josh Wilson (ALP) +11 .6% to ALP (primary)
Longman 28 July 2018 Susan Lamb (ALP) +3 .7% to ALP (2CP)
Mayo 28 July 2018 Rebekha Sharkie (CA) +2 .6% to CA (2CP)
Perth 28 July 2018 Tim Hammond (ALP) +2 .0% to ALP (primary)
Wentworth 20 october 2018 Malcolm Turnbull (LIB) 51 .2% to Ind . (2CP)
CA = Centre Alliance
2CP = two‑candidate preferred
Source: Compiled by author from AEC data .
The first by-election, in the NSW seat of New England, was triggered 
in October 2017 when the High Court ruled that four senators and 
Deputy Prime Minister Barnaby Joyce were ineligible to be elected at 
the time of their nomination in 2016. Joyce was comfortably re-elected 
in December with almost 65 per cent of the primary vote and 73.6 per 
cent of the two-party-preferred vote, which was a swing of 7.2 per cent 
since 2016. Liberal MP John Alexander and Labor MP David Feeney 
both resigned from parliament prior to any High Court ruling that would 
have disqualified them. Alexander was re-elected to his seat of Bennelong 
(NSW) in December 2017 despite a 4.8 per cent two-candidate-preferred 
swing that halved his margin. Feeney did not run for re-election and his 
seat of Batman (in Victoria) was won by Labor candidate Ged Kearney 
with a 3.35 per cent two-candidate-preferred swing against the Greens 
from the March 2018 by-election.
A series of five by-elections was triggered for 28 July 2018. Four of the 
sitting members resigned due to irregularities with their renunciation 
of citizenship prior to the 2016 election, while the fifth member 
(Tim Hammond in Perth) chose to retire for reasons unrelated to any 
citizenship problem. All five of these by-elections saw the incumbent 
party gain a swing towards it. Sitting Labor MPs Justine Keay (Braddon), 
Josh Wilson (Fremantle) and Susan Lamb (Longman) all gained swings, 
as did new Labor candidate Patrick Gorman in Perth and Centre Alliance 
(CA) MP Rebekha Sharkie in Mayo.
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The final by-election of the term was triggered in late 2018 by the 
removal of Malcolm Turnbull as Liberal leader and thus as prime minister. 
Turnbull resigned from parliament a week after his removal from office, 
necessitating a by-election in his seat of Wentworth in New South Wales. 
The subsequent by-election was won by Independent candidate Kerryn 
Phelps with 51.2 per cent of the two-candidate-preferred vote.
Candidate nominations
Figure 9.1 Total House of Representatives candidates per election, 
1990–2019
Sources: Raue (2013); AEC data (2016e, 2019h) .
Despite an increase in the nomination deposit for the House of 
Representatives, from $1,000 to $2,000 (see Chapter 3, this volume), 
1,056 candidates nominated to run for the 151 House of Representatives 
seats at the 2019 federal election. This was roughly in line with the norm 
for elections since 1998, although it was an increase of 62 candidates from 
2016 (see Figure 9.1). Labor, the Greens and the UAP each nominated 
a full slate of 151 candidates. The Liberal–National Coalition ran 162 
candidates, thanks to the Liberal and National parties running candidates 
against each other in 11 seats. A total of 97 Independents ran for election, 
along with 344 members of other parties, including 59 members of 
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PHON, 48 members of Fraser Anning’s Conservative National Party 
and 46 members of the Animal Justice Party. The 2019 Australian federal 
election was notable for the abnormally large number of candidates 
disendorsed by their party, either before or after the close of nominations, 
with 10 candidates disendorsed by their party following the close of 
nominations (see further, Chapters 3 and 4, this volume).
National result
The election produced a mixed result. Both the Coalition and Labor 
suffered negative primary vote swings. A majority of seats swung towards 
the Coalition on a two-party-preferred basis, but a substantial number 
of seats swung towards Labor. The Coalition polled 51.53 per cent of the 
two-party-preferred vote, which was a swing of 1.17 per cent from 2016 
(Table 9.3). The Greens’ primary vote stayed steady at 10.2 per cent, while 
there was a vote of more than 3 per cent each for the UAP and PHON (a 
swing of 1.8 per cent for the latter). More than one-quarter of all formal 
votes were cast for minor parties or Independents, which is the highest 
recorded in the House of Representatives under the modern party system, 
exceeding the previous record of 23.5 per cent at the 2016 election (see 
Chapter 17, this volume).
Table 9.3 Results of the 2019 federal election by party
Party Votes Percentage Swing Seats Seat change
Liberal–National Coalition 5,906,875 41 .44 –0 .60 77 1
ALP 4,752,160 33 .34 –1 .39 68 –1
Greens 1,482,923 10 .40 0 .17 1 0
UAP 488,817 3 .43 3 .43 0 0
PHoN 438,587 3 .08 1 .79 0 0
KAP 69,736 0 .49 –0 .05 1 0
CA 46,931 0 .33 –1 .52 1 0
Independents 479,836 3 .37 0 .56 3 1
other 587,528 4 .12 0 .25 0 0
Source: Compiled by author from AEC data (2019c, 2019g) .
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Seats changing hands
As discussed, the redistributions that occurred prior to the election 
resulted  in the Coalition losing two notional seats and Labor gaining 
three notional seats. As shown in Table 9.4, at the 2019 election, the 
Coalition gained five seats from Labor, while Labor gained one seat from 
the Coalition, resulting in a net gain of four seats for the Coalition. 
The  Coalition also won back the seat of Wentworth, which was lost 
to an Independent in the 2018 by-election, but lost the nearby seat of 
Warringah to another Independent. Therefore, compared with the 2016 
election result, there was a net increase of one seat for the Coalition and 
a net loss of one seat for Labor. The Greens, KAP and Centre Alliance each 
retained one seat, while two other seats were retained by Independents.
Table 9.4 Seats that changed party at the 2019 election
Seat State Incumbent Winner Margin (%)
Bass Tas . ALP LIB 0 .4
Braddon Tas . ALP LIB 3 .2
Corangamite* Vic . LIB ALP 1 .0
Dunkley* Vic . LIB ALP 2 .6
Gilmore NSW LIB ALP 2 .5
Herbert Qld ALP LNP 8 .4
Lindsay NSW ALP LIB 5 .2
Longman Qld ALP LNP 3 .3
Warringah NSW LIB Independent 7 .2
Wentworth NSW Independent LIB 1 .5
* Seat was redistributed prior to the 2019 election .
Source: Compiled by author from AEC data (2019l) .
Differences between States
There were big differences in the election results between different States, 
with swings in different directions producing larger than normal gaps 
between the larger States (Table 9.5). Labor won the two-party-preferred 
vote in three States, with Labor polling particularly strongly in Victoria. 
The Coalition also won a majority in three States, with a particularly strong 
result in Queensland. This result was the continuation of a  recent trend 
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that had seen Victoria pull ahead as a strong Labor State, while Queensland 
moved towards the Coalition and New South Wales positioned itself as close 
to the centre of Australian politics (see further, Chapter 11, this volume).
Table 9.5 Two‑party‑preferred vote by State
State ALP TPP Coalition TPP Swing to Coalition
NSW 48 .22 51 .78 1 .26
Vic . 53 .14 46 .86 –1 .30
Qld 41 .56 58 .44 4 .34
WA 44 .45 55 .55 0 .90
SA 50 .71 49 .29 1 .57
Tas . 55 .96 44 .04 1 .40
ACT 61 .61 38 .39 –0 .49
NT 54 .20 45 .80 2 .87
Australia 48 .47 51 .53 1 .17
Source: AEC (2019i) .
Figure 9.2 shows the difference between Labor’s two-party-preferred vote 
in each State and its two-party-preferred vote in the remainder of the 
nation since 1958 for the three largest States.
Figure 9.2 Labor two‑party‑preferred vote in each State compared 
with the remainder of the country, 1958–2019
Source: Constructed by the author from data provided by Antony Green .
187
9 . HoUSE oF REPRESENTATIVES RESULTS
The Coalition performed better in Queensland than in the remainder 
of the nation in 2019 than at any other election in the past six decades. 
Labor polled 6 per cent better in Victoria than in the remainder of the 
nation, which was just slightly below its relative performance in that 
State in 2010. Labor has traditionally underperformed in Victoria and 
overperformed in New South Wales, but there has been a long-term trend 
that has seen Labor improve in Victoria and lose ground in New South 
Wales, which now looks about average compared with the remainder of 
the country. Meanwhile, Queensland has become a State in which Labor 
consistently underperforms, with a particularly large gap in the two-party-
preferred vote in 2019.
Reversal of 2016 swings
There was variation in swings not just between States, but also between 
different electorates within each State. The Coalition gained a swing on 
two-party-preferred votes in 92 electorates, while Labor gained a swing 
in the other 59 electorates. Labor generally gained more of a swing in 
more affluent and better-educated areas, while the Coalition tended 
to gain ground in less affluent areas (Evershed 2019). This manifested 
geographically in swings to Labor in more inner-city electorates 
(both  Labor and Liberal seats), while the Coalition gained ground in 
outer suburban areas and rural electorates (such as northern Tasmania 
and northern Queensland) (see Chapter 11, this volume). These swings 
in part reversed some of the stronger trends at the 2016 election, which 
saw the Coalition do particularly badly in some of the same areas where 
they gained ground in 2016. For example, a 10.1 per cent swing to Labor 
in Bass in 2016 was partly cancelled out by a 5.9 per cent swing to the 
Liberal Party in 2019. 
The impact of preferences
The continued increase in support for minor parties and Independents 
means that preferences are becoming increasingly important in deciding 
winners in individual electorates. One-quarter of all formal votes in the 
House of Representatives were cast for candidates other than the Coalition 
or Labor, which is the highest it has been under the modern party system. 
This figure has been steadily climbing from just 14.5 per cent in 2007.
MoRRISoN'S MIRACLE
188
Labor won 58.6 per cent of preference flows, which is down from 
62.2 per cent in 2016. This partly reflects the increased vote for right-
wing minor parties such as PHON and the UAP. About 65 per cent of 
preferences from voters who gave their first preference to these two parties 
favoured the Coalition over Labor, while 82 per cent of Greens voters 
favoured Labor over the Coalition. As a comparison, just over 50 per cent 
of PHON voters preferenced the Coalition in 2016, while less than 
54 per cent of voters for the PUP preferenced the Coalition over Labor 
in the PUP’s last iteration in 2013.
Figure 9.3 shows there was a slight increase in the number of seats for 
which it was necessary to distribute preferences. The winning candidate 
polled less than half of the formal vote in 105 of 151 seats—up from 102 
of 150 seats at the 2016 election. While preferences were necessary to 
decide the result in more than 100 seats, the candidate leading on primary 
votes went on to win in almost every case. There were 12 electorates 
where the candidate leading on primary votes did not win. In 10 of these 
seats, the Labor candidate overtook the Coalition candidate. The Liberal 
candidate was overtaken by the Centre Alliance candidate in Mayo and by 
an Independent candidate in Indi.
Figure 9.3 Seats decided on preferences, 1993–2019
Sources: Constructed by the author from AEC data (1998, 2001, 2004d, 2007d, 2010e, 
2013e, 2016h, 2019h) .
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Difference between election day 
and early votes
There has been a significant increase in the proportion of votes cast before 
election day, primarily via pre-poll voting. The proportion of formal votes 
cast via pre-poll increased from 4.9 per cent in 2001 to 32.7 per cent in 
2019. Postal voting also experienced an increase, from 4.1 per cent 
in 2001 to 8.5 per cent in 2019, with most of the growth taking place 
between 2007 and 2013 (see Chapter 3, this volume).
The Coalition has tended to do consistently better among early voters, 
and  the increasing volume of early voters has not shifted this trend. 
The  gap  between the two-party-preferred vote among voters who cast 
their votes early and that among those who voted on election day was 
wider in 2019 than in any election since at least 2001 (Table 9.6). 
The Coalition polled 5.3 per cent better on the early vote than on election 
day, which compares with a gap of 4.8 per cent in 2016 and a gap as low 
as 3.8 per cent in 2007.
Table 9.6 Labor two‑party‑preferred vote before and on election day 
(percentage)




Difference Proportion voting 
on election day
2001 49 .5 44 .8 4 .6 90 .4
2004 47 .7 43 .8 3 .9 88 .3
2007 53 .2 49 .5 3 .8 85 .5
2010 50 .9 46 .7 4 .2 81 .6
2013 47 .8 43 .1 4 .7 72 .4
2016 51 .2 46 .4 4 .8 67 .6
2019 50 .7 45 .4 5 .3 58 .0
Sources: Compiled by the author from AEC data (2004a, 2004b, 2007a, 2007b, 2010a, 
2010b, 2013a, 2013b, 2016a, 2016b, 2019a, 2019b) .
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As Table 9.6 and Figure 9.4 illustrate, Labor has not won the early vote at any 
of the past seven elections, coming closest when they polled 49.5 per cent 
of the two-party-preferred vote in 2007. Yet that constituency has become 
much larger since 2007, and this growth in the early vote has not made 
these voters look any more like election-day voters. Labor managed to win 
a majority of the election-day vote in both 2016 and 2019, despite losing 
the overall two-party-preferred vote at both elections, thanks to a large 
differential with the early vote. This emphasises the importance of the 
early vote for deciding elections. With almost half of voters casting their 
vote early, a dominant position for the Coalition on the early vote can win 
elections even when Labor wins a majority on election day.
Figure 9.4 Labor two‑party‑preferred vote before and on election day
Notes: Election‑day votes include ordinary, absent and provisional votes . Early votes 
include remote, mobile, special hospital, pre‑poll and postal votes . 
Sources: Compiled by the author from AEC data (2004a, 2004b, 2007a, 2007b, 2010a, 
2010b, 2013a, 2013b, 2016a, 2016b, 2019a, 2019b) .
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Informal votes
There was an increase in informal votes at the 2019 election compared 
with the previous election, although the rate was still lower than it was at 
the 2010 and 2013 elections (Figure 9.5). The rate of informal voting in 
2019 was 5.54 per cent of all votes cast for the House of Representatives. 
This was an increase from a rate of 5.05 per cent in 2016, but still less 
than the 5.55 per cent and 5.91 per cent recorded at the 2010 and 2013 
elections, respectively. Despite an increase in informal votes, the effective 
participation rate increased again, as it did at the 2013 and 2016 elections. 
Some 84 per cent of all Australians who were eligible to vote cast a formal 
ballot in 2019—up from 80 per cent in 2010.
Figure 9.5 Informal voting rate at federal elections, 1990–2019
Sources: Constructed by the author from Carr (1990); and AEC (1998, 2001, 2004c, 
2007c, 2010c, 2013c, 2016d, 2019d) .
These trends varied significantly by State. In New South Wales, 7 per cent 
of all votes were informal, while the next highest rate was 5.4 per cent, 
in Western Australia. Victoria experienced a decline in the informal rate 
while the rate in Western Australia was a significant increase. New South 
Wales still has a higher effective participation rate than Queensland, 
Western Australia and the Northern Territory despite a much higher 
informal rate (Table 9.7).
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NSW 7 .01 0 .84 84 .14
Vic . 4 .66 –0 .11 85 .39
Qld 4 .95 0 .25 82 .81
WA 5 .44 1 .44 81 .77
SA 4 .81 0 .63 85 .97
Tas . 4 .39 0 .40 87 .67
ACT 3 .49 0 .72 89 .13
NT 4 .69 –2 .66 62 .23
National 5.54 0.48 84.04
Sources: Compiled by the author from AEC (2019d, 2019j, 2019k) .
Labor–Coalition contests: State by State
New South Wales
There were 10 NSW seats held by Labor and the Coalition on margins of 
less than 6 per cent prior to the 2019 election. Two of these seats changed 
hands, with the Liberal Party and the ALP each gaining one seat off the 
other. Labor’s Fiona Phillips gained the South Coast electorate of Gilmore 
with a 3.3 per cent two-party-preferred swing, while Liberal candidate 
Melissa McIntosh gained the Western Sydney electorate of Lindsay with 
a 6.2 per cent swing, finishing up with 55 per cent of the two-party-
preferred vote. Sitting member effects played out badly in both seats, with 
Emma Husar removed as the Labor candidate in Lindsay after one term 
and Ann Sudmalis stepping down as Liberal MP in Gilmore, leading to 
both Coalition parties running along with an ex-Liberal Independent.
The Liberal Party gained swings across Western Sydney and came close 
to winning the seat of Macquarie, where Labor’s Susan Templeman won 
a  second  term by just 371 votes (with 50.2 per cent of the two-party-
preferred vote), following a 2 per cent swing to the Liberal Party. Labor 
also suffered swings in other Western Sydney seats, with Greenway and 
Parramatta pushed into the marginal seat category. Labor also suffered swings 
on the Central Coast and in the Hunter region. Swings of 9.5 per cent, 
5.7 per cent and 5.5 per cent in the seats of Hunter, Paterson and Shortland, 
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respectively, put all three of these Hunter region seats into the marginal 
seat category, while Labor’s hold on Dobell was weakened and the Liberals’ 
hold on Robertson was strengthened by a swing of just over 3 per cent. 
Labor frontbencher Joel Fitzgibbon was left with a margin of only 3 per cent 
in his seat of Hunter following a vote of 21.6 per cent for PHON—the 
highest vote for that party in any House of Representatives electorate.
Labor held hopes of making gains in two mid-suburban Liberal seats in 
more multicultural parts of Sydney, but made only modest gains in one 
of these seats, with a 1.5 per cent swing in Reid, where sitting Liberal MP 
Craig Laundy had retired. Liberal minister David Coleman did much better 
in the southern Sydney electorate of Banks, bolstering his 1.4  per  cent 
margin with a 4.8 per cent swing. Labor retained two marginal seats in 
more regional parts of New South Wales, narrowly retaining the south-
eastern seat of Eden-Monaro in the face of a 2.1 per cent swing, and also 
retaining the far north coast electorate of Richmond after a very small swing 
to Labor MP Justine Elliot. Nationals MP Kevin Hogan strengthened his 
hold on the neighbouring seat of Page with a 7.2 per cent swing.
Victoria
Most of the interesting contests in Victoria took place in seats held by 
the Liberal Party, but very few seats changed hands. Labor won two seats 
that had been redrawn into notionally Labor seats prior to the election 
and gained a 1 per cent swing in Corangamite and a 1.7 per cent swing 
in Dunkley, strengthening its hold in two Liberal-held seats that had been 
redrawn with Labor majorities. The Liberal Party suffered swings but held 
on to two key seats in the eastern suburbs of Melbourne. Liberal MP 
Michael Sukkar suffered a 1.7 per cent swing in Deakin, while in the 
neighbouring seat of Chisholm new Liberal candidate Gladys Liu was 
elected despite a 2.3 per cent swing to Labor.
A big boost in Labor’s primary vote saw it pull ahead of the Greens in 
the inner eastern Melbourne seat of Higgins, where Liberal MP Kelly 
O’Dwyer had retired. Labor gained a 6.1 per cent swing on a two-party-
preferred basis, leaving new Liberal MP Katie Allen holding her newly 
marginal seat by just 3.9 per cent. Three other marginal seats, on the outer 
fringe of Melbourne, did not move as much. Senior Liberal minister Greg 
Hunt suffered a 1.4 per cent swing against him in Flinders, while fellow 
Liberals gained small swings towards them in the outer eastern seats of 




Queensland is famous for a large proportion of its electorates being 
marginal, and this was certainly true in 2019, although large swings in 
a series of Queensland’s marginal seats means there will be fewer marginal 
seats in the State at the next election. A lot of attention was focused on 
a string of five marginal seats on the central and northern coast, stretching 
from Gladstone to Cape York. Four of these five seats were held by the 
Liberal National Party (LNP), with the Townsville-area seat of Herbert 
won by the slimmest of margins by Labor’s Cathy O’Toole in 2016. Big 
swings to the LNP in four of these seats saw them regain Herbert with an 
8.4 per cent swing and strengthen their hold in Capricornia (11.7 per cent 
swing), Dawson (11.2 per cent) and Flynn (7.6 per cent). The LNP’s 
Warren Entsch was re-elected in the far northern seat of Leichhardt by 
a 4.2 per cent margin, with a swing of just 0.2 per cent.
The LNP also gained sizeable swings in three marginal seats on the outer 
northern fringes of Brisbane, regaining the Labor seat of Longman with 
a 4.1 per cent swing and retaining Petrie with a 6.8 per cent swing and 
Dickson with a 3 per cent swing. The LNP’s Bert van Manen pushed his 
Logan-area seat of Forde out of the marginal seat category with a swing 
of 8 per cent.
Two Labor seats closer to central Brisbane were made more marginal 
thanks  to swings to the LNP. Labor suffered a 2.1 per cent swing 
in Moreton  and a 5 per cent swing in Lilley. Labor just held on, by 
a  0.4  per  cent margin, in Lilley following the retirement of former 
treasurer and deputy prime minister Wayne Swan. Labor did better in the 
inner-city seats of Brisbane and Griffith. Labor MP Terri Butler increased 
her margin by 1.4 per cent in Griffith, while LNP MP Trevor Evans had 
1.1 per cent shaved off his margin in Brisbane.
Western Australia
The Liberal Party gained a swing of just under 1 per cent of the two-
party-preferred vote in Western Australia, but most seats experienced only 
small swings, with no seats changing hands. Of the five seats held by 
margins of less than 6 per cent prior to the election, there were swings 
to Labor in three and swings to the Liberal Party in the other two. Labor 
gained a swing in its two marginal seats but suffered negative swings in 
its safer seats. Anne Aly gained a small, 0.15 per cent swing in Cowan, 
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while Patrick Gorman gained a 1.6 per cent swing in Perth. The Liberal 
Party suffered a small, 0.9 per cent swing in Steve Irons’s seat of Swan but 
gained swings in excess of 3 per cent in both Pearce and Hasluck.
South Australia
Both major parties gained large swings in South Australia due to the 
reduced presence of the Centre Alliance (previously called the Nick 
Xenophon Team), which polled 4.4 per cent, compared with more than 
21 per cent at the 2016 election. No seats in South Australia changed 
hands. There was only one marginal seat, which was a contest between 
Labor and Liberal, in Liberal MP Nicolle Flint’s seat of Boothby. She held 
this seat by a 2.7 per cent margin prior to the election, and this margin 
was reduced to 1.4 per cent.
Tasmania
The Coalition bounced back from a poor performance in Tasmania in 
2016, gaining two seats and a two-party-preferred swing of 1.4 per cent 
Statewide. Liberal candidates Bridget Archer and Gavin Pearce, 
respectively, won their northern Tasmanian seats of Bass and Braddon 
with two-party-preferred swings of 5.8 per cent and 4.8 per cent. The 
Liberal candidate for Lyons, Jessica Whelan, was disendorsed shortly after 
the close of nominations, leading to the Liberal Party supporting the 
Nationals candidate, Deanna Hutchinson, who managed 15.7 per cent, 
but it was not enough to overtake the official Liberal candidate.
Australian Capital Territory
Labor retained all three ACT electorates, gaining a 4.1 per cent swing in 
the newly created inner-city electorate of Canberra while suffering swings 
of 1.3 per cent in the two outer suburban electorates of Bean and Fenner.
Northern Territory
Labor retained the two electorates in the Northern Territory but suffered 
swings to the Country Liberal Party (CLP) in both. The CLP gained 
a two-party-preferred swing of 3 per cent in the Darwin-area electorate of 




The AEC defines a seat as ‘non-classic’ if the final two candidates after 
the distribution of preferences are not a Labor candidate and a Coalition 
candidate. Non-classic seats can include races where an Independent 
or minor party comes in the top two or where the final distribution of 
preferences is between two Coalition candidates.
Figure 9.6 Non‑classic races in federal elections, 1990–2019
Sources: Constructed by the author from Carr (1990); and AEC (1998, 2001, 2004a, 
2007a, 2010d, 2013d, 2016f, 2019f) .
The number of non-classic contests peaked at 17 of 150 seats at the 2016 
federal election after a steady climb since 2010 (Figure 9.6). It declined 
slightly in 2019, down to 15 of 151 seats. There were seven contests 
in which an Independent made it to the top two, which is the highest 
number over the period analysed. There was a decline in the number of 
contests involving a minor party in the top two—down from 12 to eight. 
This decline was primarily due to the absence of the NXT. The NXT had 
come in the top two in four electorates in 2016, while its successor party 
came in the top two in only a single seat. The Greens also made it to the 
final count in only five seats in 2019, down from six.
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Contests between the Liberal Party and 
the Nationals
The Liberal Party and the Nationals ran against each other in 11 seats, 
but in most cases only one of the two candidates was a serious contender. 
In addition to Gilmore and Lyons (mentioned above), which were 
ultimately won by Labor, the only other seat worth mentioning is Mallee. 
Mallee covers the north-western corner of Victoria and was held by 
retiring Nationals MP Andrew Broad. His retirement opened the door for 
the Liberal Party to contest the seat, along with Labor and two relatively 
prominent Independents. The Liberal Party narrowly outpolled Labor 
on primary votes to come second but was narrowly overtaken by Labor on 
the distribution of preferences.
The Greens
The Greens contested every electorate, but there was only a handful of 
seats where they made the top two and had any chance of winning, most 
of them in a contiguous area in inner Melbourne. Greens MP Adam Bandt 
further solidified his hold on the seat of Melbourne, with 71.8 per cent 
of the two-candidate-preferred count. Julian Burnside came second in the 
inner eastern seat of Kooyong, trailing Liberal Party Deputy Leader, Josh 
Frydenberg, with 44.3 per cent of the two-candidate-preferred vote. The 
Greens had come second in the neighbouring seat of Higgins in 2016, 
but a big surge in the Labor vote and a small drop in the Greens vote saw 
them fall into third place here. The Greens also went backwards in two 
inner northern seats, which had been their closest chances in 2016. They 
suffered a 3.2 per cent swing in Wills and a much larger, 13.4 per cent 
swing in neighbouring Cooper (previously named Batman).
Other minor parties and Independents
Three other minor party candidates made it to the final two in the 
distribution of preferences. Bob Katter was re-elected for a 10th term as 
Member for Kennedy, representing his KAP, with a 2.3 per cent swing. 
Rebekha Sharkie won a second full term as Member for Mayo representing 
the Centre Alliance, with a 2.2 per cent swing (although this was less than 
the margin she achieved at the 2018 by-election). Rosemary Moulden, 
running for Pauline Hanson’s One Nation, polled 27.5 per cent of the 
two-candidate-preferred vote in Maranoa.
MoRRISoN'S MIRACLE
198
Independents came in the top two in seven electorates and three of 
those Independents were elected. Incumbent MP Andrew Wilkie was easily 
re-elected in his Hobart-area electorate of Clark with a 4.4 per cent swing. 
Cathy McGowan retired from her northern Victorian electorate of Indi, 
and endorsed fellow Independent Helen Haines, who won the seat with 
51.4 per cent of the two-candidate-preferred vote (a 4.1 per cent swing 
compared with McGowan in 2016). Zali Steggall defeated former Liberal 
prime minister Tony Abbott in his northern Sydney seat of Warringah, 
with 57.2 per cent of the two-candidate-preferred vote. Kerryn Phelps 
was unsuccessful in her eastern suburbs electorate of Wentworth, losing 
to Liberal candidate Dave Sharma after defeating him in the 2018 by-
election. Phelps managed 48.7 per cent of the two-candidate-preferred 
vote in 2019.
Former Independent MP Rob Oakeshott made a second attempt at 
a comeback in the NSW north coast seat of Cowper but fell short with 
just 43.2 per cent of the two-candidate-preferred vote. Independents also 
challenged Coalition MPs in two other seats, along the Murray River. 
Albury Mayor Kevin Mack came second in the southern NSW electorate 
of Farrer, polling 39.1 per cent of the two-candidate-preferred vote. Two 
Independents ran in the north-western Victorian seat of Mallee, polling 
almost 20 per cent between them but falling short of winning the seat.
Conclusion
The 2019 federal election produced a result that was very similar to that 
of the previous election in 2016, with a slim majority for the Coalition 
counterpoised against a large crossbench and a relatively strong Labor 
Opposition. Yet the interpretation of this result has typically been very 
different, thanks to high expectations for Labor in the context of poor 
government polling. Apart from the slim victory for the Coalition, the 
other major development in the 2019 election was the continuing slow 
growth of the minor party vote, with a record high number of votes cast 
for minor parties or Independents and six crossbench members elected 
to the House of Representatives. This relatively close election result sets 
up the next election as one that is very winnable for either major party 
and leaves the government with a stable but not strong majority for the 
next three years.
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The Morrison Government’s narrow re-election was accompanied by 
a significant strengthening of its position in the Senate. The Coalition 
gained four seats from non-Green minor parties and reduced the number 
of minor parties from eight to four. These gains allowed the Coalition’s 
numbers to draw level with the unchanged representation of Labor and 
the Greens. Combined with the smaller crossbench, this will simplify the 
government’s task of passing legislation through the new Senate.
When the Greens vote with Labor, the Morrison Government will need 
support from four of the six non-Greens senators to pass legislation, 
or three of five after former Liberal Senator Cory Bernardi resigned from 
the Senate.1 This compares with six of the eight non-Greens crossbenchers 
in the government’s first term in office and nine of 11 in its second. 
The Coalition’s gains also leave Labor and the Greens with less scope to 
initiate Senate committees aimed at embarrassing the government.
1  South Australian Senator Cory Bernardi was elected as a Liberal in 2016 and allocated a six-year 
term. He resigned from the party in February 2017 and registered a new party, the Australian 
Conservatives. Bernardi deregistered his party after the election and resigned from the Senate in 
January 2020. As required by Section 15 of the Constitution, Bernardi’s replacement was Liberal.
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Table 10.1 Composition of the Senate, 2014–2022
Senate term Coalition Labor Greens Others
2014–16 33 25 10 8
2016–19 30 26 9 11
2019–22 35 26 9 6
Note: Party representation is based on the first sitting of newly elected senators and does 
not take into account subsequent changes in party membership .
Source: Party representation calculated by author from AEC results .
As will be explained in this chapter, the Coalition’s improved position was 
not due to changes in voter support for the Coalition or minor parties. 
The government’s gains stemmed from two issues related to the mechanics 
of Senate elections. The first was the large number of crossbench senators 
facing re-election, having been allocated three-year terms after the 2016 
double-dissolution election. The second flowed from new electoral rules 
that were first used at the 2016 election, but the political impact of which 
could be tested only by their first use at a half-Senate election.
The Senate electoral changes ended full preferential voting, transferred 
control of interparty preferences from parties to voters and gave voters 
more options to pick and choose between candidates on party lists. 
As will be shown, the 2019 results matched expectations that the changes 
would increase the importance of voters’ first-preference choice while 
diminishing the role of preferences from excluded parties and candidates.
Some background on Senate elections
The two chambers of the Australian Parliament have always been elected 
with different representational bases and using different electoral systems. 
Representation by State in the House of Representatives is based on 
population, but original States have equal representation in the Senate. 
Since 1903, the House has been elected from single-member electorates, 
while the Senate has been elected from Statewide multi-member 
electorates, using proportional representation by single transferable vote 
(PR-STV) since 1949. Significant changes to the operation of PR-STV 
were introduced in 1984 and 2016.
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Electors complete separate ballot papers for House and Senate elections 
and, while terms for the two chambers are not tied, elections are usually 
held on the same day.2 The Australian Constitution includes a deadlock 
provision allowing a ‘double dissolution’ in which the Senate’s fixed terms 
can be broken, sending the House and the whole Senate to election 
together.
Candidates have been grouped on the Senate ballot paper since 1922, 
with parties determining the order in which their candidates are listed 
since 1940. Most votes are cast for the top of each party’s ticket, and 
the trickle down of preferences means PR-STV within parties generally 
operates as a form of party list proportional representation (List-PR). 
PR-STV diverges from List-PR in the allocation of seats to parties with 
a remaining vote of less than a quota. Where List-PR usually uses highest 
remainder or highest average methods to allocate final seats, Senate 
PR-STV fills the final seats by distributing preferences from excluded 
parties and candidates. The ability of parties to influence or control the 
flow of preferences on exclusion therefore determines how much PR-STV 
deviates from simple List-PR.3
Before 1984 there were no party names on ballot papers and voters were 
required to express a sequence of preferences for all candidates on the 
ballot paper. Only parties that actively campaigned by distributing how-to-
vote material could hope to influence the flow of interparty preferences. 
Most minor parties struggled to influence results by preferences.
Changes introduced in 1984 created strong control over interparty 
preferences, delivering the same power to both major and minor parties. 
A thick horizontal line was included on the ballot paper, providing an area 
‘above the line’ where voters could mark one party box that was imputed 
to carry the complete list of preferences of that party, or electors could 
vote for candidates as before by expressing preferences for all candidates 
listed ‘below the line’. An example of the current ballot paper is shown in 
Figure 10.1, differing from the pre-2016 version by including party logos 
and new instructions.
2  All 18 elections since 1974 have been joint elections, 13 as House and half-senate elections and 
five as double dissolutions.
3  Background on the development of Australia’s electoral system can be found in Farrell and 
McAllister (2006), while the more recent Senate changes introduced in 2016 are explored in Green 
(2018) and McAllister and Muller (2019).
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Figure 10.1 Example of the Senate ballot paper
Source: AEC .
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The asymmetry in effort between the two voting methods herded voters 
into accepting the party tickets—a problem made worse as the number of 
candidates and parties contesting elections increased. With 98 per cent 
of major party votes and 90 per cent of minor party votes completed above 
the line, parties gained almost total control over interparty preferences. 
By  the 2013 Senate election, the ever-increasing number of parties 
contesting Senate elections and the growing complexity of preference 
tickets lodged resulted in nine of the 36 State senators being elected from 
trailing positions on preferences, with several leap-frogging to victory 
from very low first-preference tallies (Green 2018). Group voting tickets 
(GVTs) were therefore increasing the divergence between PR-STV and 
List-PR outcomes.
The 2013 result led to changes that were introduced ahead of the 2016 
double-dissolution election. Party logos were added but the divided 
ballot paper was retained. Group voting tickets were abolished, ending 
the ability of parties to control interparty preferences. Voters were given 
a new option to express preferences for parties by numbering at least six 
boxes above the line, and parties reverted to the pre-1984 situation of 
influencing preferences by handing out how-to-vote recommendations. 
Full preferential voting below the line was ended, with voters only 
needing to express preferences for at least 12 candidates. Generous savings 
provisions were included to prevent a rise in informal votes.
By passing control of interparty preferences to voters and giving voters 
more options to exhaust their preferences, the new system increased the 
importance of first-preference votes and diminished the ability of parties 
to engineer victories after trailing on first preferences. How the system 
would work in practice was masked by the calling of a double-dissolution 
election in 2016, which aided the election of minor parties by lowering 
the quota from 14.3 to 7.7 per cent.
Before examining how the new Senate electoral system worked in 2019, 
it is important to first look at the impact of the allocation of new Senate 
terms after the 2016 election, as well as the votes recorded by States and 
Territories at the 2019 election.
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The consequences of the 2016 double 
dissolution
The 2016 double-dissolution election spilled all 76 Senate seats: 12 per 
State plus the four Territory senators. At the first sitting following the 
election, the rotation of terms was re-established by all State senators 
being allocated to either six-year terms ending in 2022 or three-year 
terms facing re-election in 2019. Terms were allocated on the order of 
election—a decision that resulted in the majority of minor party senators 
being allocated short terms, facing re-election in 2019.
Between 2016 and 2019, more than one-quarter of Senate representation 
changed through retirement or disqualification. Of the 76 senators elected 
in 2016, only 56 served a full three years. There were 20 departures from 
the chamber, including 10 senators disqualified under Section 44 of the 
Constitution—eight for citizenship issues and one each for a criminal 
offence and pecuniary interests (see Chapter 3, this volume). Retirements 
and other casual vacancies were filled by State parliaments appointing 
replacements from the same party. Disqualified candidates were replaced 
through a recount, with more senators disqualified in one term than had 
been disqualified in the previous 115 years.
The recounts caused a number of senators’ terms to be reallocated in 
February 2018. There were also several changes in party affiliation during 
the term. Table 10.2 summarises the party composition of the Senate at 
the 2019 election, breaking the numbers into continuing members and 
three-year and Territory senators facing re-election in 2019.
Table 10.2 Composition of the Senate at the 2019 election
Senate as it finished Coalition Labor Greens Others
Six‑year senators 16 13 3 4
Three‑year senators 13 11 6 6
Territory senators 2 2 0 0
Total 31 26 9 10
Source: Calculated by author based on party representation ahead of the 2019 election .
Twelve crossbench senators faced re-election, including one Greens senator 
in every State. Three crossbenchers faced election in New South Wales, 
two in the other four mainland States and one in Tasmania. It has been 
unusual for half-Senate elections to return more than one crossbencher 
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per State, with only seven of 54 contests between 1990 and 2013 electing 
more than one crossbencher, four of those due to the complex GVT 
preference deals at the 2013 election. The allocation of seats combined 
with the new Senate electoral system decreased the chances of multiple 
minor party senators being elected in any State.
The 2019 result
Table 10.3 summarises the overall change in votes and seat numbers 
produced by the 2019 Senate election. The government had a net gain 
of four seats at the expense of the crossbench, with overall numbers for 
Labor and the Greens unchanged.
Table 10.3 2019 election results
Senate as elected Votes (%) Change Seats won Change New Senate
Coalition 38 .0 +2 .8 19 +4 35
ALP 28 .8 –1 .0 13 0 26
Greens 10 .2 +1 .6 6 0 9
PHoN 5 .4 +1 .1 1 –1 2
UAP 2 .4 +2 .4 0 0 0
CA 0 .2 –3 .1 0 0 2
others 15 .1 –3 .8 1 –3 2
Source: AEC .
The Coalition won three of the six vacancies in the five mainland States, 
two in Tasmania and one each in the two Territories. Compared with 
the outgoing Senate, in the new Senate, the Coalition gained seats 
from the crossbench in New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia. 
The Liberal Party gained a seat from Labor in Queensland and Tasmania, 
though this second gain was cancelled out by the National Party losing its 
seat to Jacqui Lambie (of the Jacqui Lambie Network, or JLN).
Labor’s Senate vote share was a further decline from the already low 
votes recorded in 2013 and 2016. Labor gained two seats, one each from 
the crossbench in New South Wales and South Australia, but lost seats 
to the Coalition in Queensland and Tasmania. Labor’s vote was below 
30  per  cent in New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia, 
falling short of two quotas in the last two States. Labor’s vote was so low in 
Queensland that the party elected only one senator—its surplus beyond 
one quota, trailing the Greens. 
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The Greens retained all six seats and increased their vote, polling 9.9 per 
cent or higher in every State except New South Wales. The Greens did 
not achieve a quota on first preferences in any State, but in every State 
the party’s vote in quotas was high enough to win seats where Labor fell 
significantly short of electing an extra member with its surplus quota.
The PHON increased its vote, finishing third ahead of the Greens in 
Queensland, fourth in the other mainland States and fifth behind the 
JLN in Tasmania. Only Queensland returned a PHON Senator, Malcolm 
Roberts, who won the seat he had been disqualified from in 2017, while 
the party lost its seat in Western Australia. Roberts’s replacement in 
Queensland, Fraser Anning, and Brian Burston in New South Wales both 
defected and contested the 2019 election for other parties.
Support for the Centre Alliance (formerly the Nick Xenophon Team, 
or NXT) collapsed without the high-profile presence of Nick Xenophon’s 
name on the ballot paper. Despite a massive advertising spend 
(see  Chapter  17, this volume), the UAP polled only 2.4 per cent; its 
highest vote was 3.5 per cent in Queensland, where Clive Palmer was the 
party’s leading Senate candidate.
Results by State
New South Wales
Table 10.4 Senate results: New South Wales
Vote by party (%) Senators allocated/elected
Party 2013 2016 2019 2013 2016 2019
LIB/NAT 34 .2 35 .9 38 .6 3 2 3
ALP 31 .6 31 .3 29 .8 2 1 2
Greens 7 .8 7 .4 8 .7 0 1 1
Liberal Democrats 9 .5 3 .1 1 .9 1 1 0
PUP (2013–16)/UAP (2019) 3 .4 0 .1 1 .5 0 1 0
PHoN 1 .2 4 .1 5 .0 0 0 0
others 12 .3 18 .1 14 .5 0 0 0
Notes: The 2016 column shows senators allocated to short terms by a Senate motion in 
February 2018; Senator Burston switched from one Nation to the UAP in June 2018 .
Source: Party totals accumulated by author from AEC results .
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The reallocation of Senate terms resulted in three minor party senators 
facing re-election, two Coalition and only one Labor senator. Despite 
polling a record low of 29.8 per cent (2.09 quotas), Labor was able to 
gain a seat at the expense of the crossbench. 
The Coalition’s vote rose compared with the previous election, polling 
2.70 quotas and electing three senators. Nationals Senator John Williams 
retired and sitting Liberal Jim Molan was demoted to fourth on the 
Coalition ticket. Molan mounted a vigorous campaign encouraging 
Liberal supporters to vote for him below the line and polled a record 
137,325 below-the-line votes (see Chapter 4, this volume). This was 
2.9 per cent of all votes and 7.6 per cent of Coalition votes, but not nearly 
enough to elect him ahead of the three Coalition candidates above him.
The Greens retained their single seat, but the other two crossbenchers 
were defeated. Burston was defeated as a UAP candidate after being 
elected for One Nation in 2016. The Liberal Democrats lost the seat they 
had held for two terms. The name confusion with the Liberal Party that 
had previously advantaged the Liberal Democrats diminished after the 
party drew column R, well to the right of the ‘Liberals and Nationals’. 
The Liberal Democrats had polled more strongly when to the left of the 
Liberal Party on the ballot paper, polling 9.5 per cent from column A in 
2013 and 3.1 per cent from column D in 2016.
On first preferences, the Coalition polled 2.70 quotas, Labor 2.09, the 
Greens 0.61, PHON 0.35 and the other parties combined, 1.26 quotas. 
At the end of the count with two vacancies to fill, the Coalition had 
0.97 quotas, the Greens 0.96 and PHON 0.68, with 0.39 quota of 
votes exhausted. The Coalition and the Greens candidates would have 
reached a  quota had PHON been excluded. Of all minor party and 
Labor preferences distributed, 20.5 per cent flowed to the Coalition, 





Table 10.5 Senate results: Victoria
Vote by party (%) Senators allocated/elected
Party 2013 2016 2019 2013 2016 2019
LIB/NAT 40 .1 33 .1 35 .9 2 2 3
ALP 32 .5 30 .7 31 .1 2 2 2
Greens 10 .8 10 .9 10 .6 1 1 1
AMEP 0 .5 0 .9 0 .0 1 0 0
PHoN 0 .0 1 .8 2 .9 0 0 0
Derryn Hinch’s Justice Party 0 .0 6 .1 2 .8 0 1 0
PUP (2013–16)/UAP (2019) 3 .7 0 .3 2 .5 0 0 0
others 12 .4 16 .2 14 .2 0 0 0
AMEP = Australian Motoring Enthusiasts Party 
Note: The 2016 column shows senators allocated to short terms by a Senate motion 
in February 2018 .
Source: Party totals accumulated by author from AEC results .
Justice Party Senator Derryn Hinch was defeated, with his seat won by 
the Liberal Party. Hinch had benefited from appearing in column A in 
2016, but his vote more than halved after drawing Column I in 2019. 
Labor and the Greens retained their representation with around the 
same vote share as at the previous two elections.
The Coalition polled 2.51 quotas, Labor 2.18, the Greens 0.74, PHON 
and Derryn Hinch 0.20 each and all other parties together polled 
1.17 quotas. After electing the first four senators, by count 355, only five 
parties remained: the Greens on 0.98 quotas, the Coalition on 0.76, Labor 
in fifth place on 0.33, having been passed by Hinch on 0.37, and PHON 
on 0.38. The exclusion of Labor’s surplus elected the Greens’ Janet Rice to 
the fifth vacancy and pushed Hinch ahead of PHON. At the end of the 
count, the third Liberal candidate had reached 0.93 quotas, Hinch held 
0.58 quotas, with 0.49 quotas of votes exhausted.
The Victorian result demonstrated how the new Senate electoral system 
changed the dynamics of preferences. In 2013, the third Liberal candidate, 
Helen Kroger on 0.81 quotas, had been caught and passed by Ricky Muir 
of the Australian Motoring Enthusiasts Party (AMEP), who polled only 
0.05 quotas (Green 2014). The ability of minor parties to use GVTs to 
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direct preferences to Muir allowed him to pass Kroger. Without GVTs 
in 2019, more than 20 per cent of minor party voters directed preferences 
to the Liberal Party and more than 40 per cent of minor party preferences 
were exhausted before choosing between Hinch and the Coalition. 
Despite polling 4.2 per cent lower than in 2013, the Liberal Party in 2019 
was not passed on preferences.
Queensland
Table 10.6 Senate results: Queensland
Vote by party (%) Senators allocated/elected
Party 2013 2016 2019 2013 2016 2019
LNP 41 .4 35 .3 38 .9 3 2 3
ALP 28 .5 26 .3 22 .6 2 2 1
Greens 6 .0 6 .9 9 .9 0 1 1
PUP (2013–16)/UAP (2019) 9 .9 0 .2 3 .5 1 0 0
PHoN 0 .6 9 .2 10 .3 0 0 1
others 13 .6 22 .1 14 .8 0 1 0
Notes: The 2016 column shows senators allocated to short terms by a Senate motion 
in February 2018; the 2016 PHON seat filled by Fraser Anning on recount is shown as 
‘others’ held . 
Source: Party totals accumulated by author from AEC results .
In Queensland, the Liberal National Party (LNP) gained a seat as Labor’s 
vote collapsed to 22.6 per cent, with the party losing a seat and returning 
only one senator. The LNP polled 2.72 quotas, PHON 0.72, the Greens 
0.70, Labor 1.58 and all other parties together 1.28 quotas. To the point 
where only the main four parties remained, 31.9 per cent of minor party 
preferences flowed to PHON, 20.8 per cent to the LNP, 18.9 per cent to 
the Greens and 12.7 per cent to Labor, with 15.7 per cent exhausting.
UAP preferences elected PHON’s Malcolm Roberts, who won the seat 
he had lost in 2017 by disqualification. His surplus elected the third 
LNP candidate, after which the Greens were declared elected without the 
second Labor candidate being excluded.
Anning, who had replaced Roberts in the Senate but never sat with 
PHON, was defeated with 1.3 per cent of the vote for his new Fraser 




Table 10.7 Senate results: Western Australia
Vote by party (%) Senators allocated/elected
Party 2013 2016 2019 2013 2016 2019
LIB 39 .2 38 .5 40 .9 3 2 3
NAT 5 .1 2 .5 1 .4 0 0 0
ALP 26 .6 28 .3 27 .6 1 2 2
Greens 9 .5 10 .5 11 .8 1 1 1
PUP (2013–16)/UAP (2019) 5 .0 0 .4 1 .7 0 0 0
SPRT 0 .2 0 .0 0 .0 1 0 0
PHoN 0 .0 4 .0 5 .9 0 1 0
others 14 .4 15 .8 10 .7 0 0 0
SPRT = Australian Sports Party
Notes: The 2016 column shows senators allocated to short terms by a Senate motion in 
February 2018; the 2013 result is based on original Senate election, not the 2014 re‑election .
Source: Party totals accumulated by author from AEC results .
Defending only two seats, the Liberal Party polled 2.86 quotas and 
gained a third senator at the expense of PHON’s Peter Georgiou, who 
finished fourth with 0.41 quotas. Labor polled 1.93 quotas and elected 
two senators, while the Greens’ Jordon Steele-John was re-elected to the 
short-term vacancy allocated to him after he replaced the disqualified 
Scott Ludlam.
At the original 2013 Senate election—subsequently voided and rerun—
Labor had polled 1.86 quotas, the Greens 0.66 quotas and the Australian 
Sports Party 0.02 quotas. Complex preference flows delivered the final two 
vacancies to the Sports Party and the Greens despite Labor’s significant 
lead on first preferences. Under the Senate’s new electoral system, it was 
impossible for a minor party to corral preferences from other minor 
parties in the same way.
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South Australia
Table 10.8 Senate results: South Australia
Vote by party (%) Senators allocated/elected
Party 2013 2016 2019 2013 2016 2019
LIB 27 .5 32 .6 37 .8 2 3 3
ALP 22 .7 27 .3 30 .4 1 1 2
Greens 7 .1 5 .9 10 .9 1 1 1
NXT/CA 24 .9 21 .8 2 .6 1 0 0
Family First 3 .8 2 .8 0 .0 1 0 0
PHoN 0 .0 3 .0 4 .9 0 0 0
PUP (2013–16)/UAP (2019) 2 .6 0 .1 3 .0 0 0 0
others 11 .4 6 .5 10 .4 0 1 0
Notes: The 2016 column shows senators allocated to short terms by a Senate motion in 
February 2018, and also incorporates changes in party membership .
Source: Party totals accumulated by author from AEC results .
At the 2013 and 2016 elections, the South Australian Senate contest was 
heavily influenced by the success of the NXT. Xenophon’s resignation in 
2017 to contest the South Australian State election saw the party renamed 
the Centre Alliance. Without Xenophon’s name on the ballot paper, the 
Centre Alliance’s vote collapsed and the party was unable to re-elect Skye 
Kakoschke-Moore, who had been disqualified in 2017 and replaced with 
party defector Tim Storer. Storer did not contest the 2019 election.
Family First’s Bob Day had won the final seat at the 2016 election, but 
after his disqualification in 2017, Family First folded into the Australian 
Conservatives, while Day’s replacement, Lucy Gichuhi, eventually joined 
the Liberal Party. She was defeated in 2019 from the unwinnable fourth 
position on the Liberal ticket.
The Liberal Party polled 2.65 quotas, Labor 2.13, the Greens 0.76, 
PHON 0.34 and all other parties 1.12 quotas. Labor’s exclusion elected 
the Greens, the Liberal’s third candidate was elected after the exclusion of 
the Centre Alliance and the UAP, while PHON was left with 0.69 quotas 




Table 10.9 Senate results: Tasmania
Vote by party (%) Senators allocated/elected
Party 2013 2016 2019 2013 2016 2019
LIB 37 .5 32 .5 31 .5 2 1 2
NAT 0 .0 0 .0 1 .1 0 1 0
ALP 32 .8 33 .6 30 .6 2 3 2
Greens 11 .7 11 .2 12 .6 1 1 1
PUP (2013–16)/UAP (2019) 6 .6 0 .7 2 .6 1 0 0
PHoN 0 .0 2 .6 3 .5 0 0 0
JLN 0 .0 8 .3 8 .9 0 0 1
others 11 .4 11 .1 9 .2 0 0 0
Notes: The 2016 column shows senators allocated to short terms by a Senate motion in 
February 2018, and also incorporates changes in party membership .
Source: Party totals accumulated by author from AEC results .
The disqualification of Jacqui Lambie on citizenship grounds rearranged 
Tasmania’s Senate representation. Lambie had been elected to a six-
year position, but the recount following her disqualification elected 
Steve Martin to a three-year vacancy, while a third Liberal was elevated 
to  a  six-year seat. Once elected, Martin declined to resign in Lambie’s 
favour and later joined the National Party. Martin was defeated by Lambie 
at the 2019 election while the Liberal Party gained a seat from Labor, 
replacing the Nationals seat lost by Martin.
Long experience with the Hare-Clark electoral system at Tasmanian State 
elections result in a higher rate of voters venturing to vote for candidates 
below the line. Nationally, 7.3 per cent of ballot papers were below-the-
line votes compared with 27.1 per cent in Tasmania—down slightly from 
28.1 per cent in 2016. The Liberal Party polled 2.20 quotas, Labor 2.14, 
the Greens 0.88, the JLN 0.62, PHON 0.24 and all others 0.92. 
In 2016, Labor’s Lisa Singh was demoted to the normally unwinnable 
sixth position on the Labor ticket, but she polled 6.1 per cent of the 
vote below the line and won re-election ahead of higher-placed Labor 
candidates. In  2019, Singh was demoted to the unwinnable fourth 
position and polled a similar 5.7 per cent, but with the higher quota at 
a half-Senate election, was unable to pass higher-placed Labor candidates.
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Reaction to the electoral changes 
by parties and candidates
Between 1984 and 2013, parties learnt how to use the GVT system to 
their advantage. Over time, more and more minor parties nominated for 
election, secure in their ability to exchange preferences and aggregate their 
votes via GVTs. The rapid increase in ballot paper groups after 2007 was 
a sign of how minor parties were using the GVT system. The new Senate 
system ended guaranteed preference flows and added a disincentive to 
low-polling and like-minded parties competing against each other. 
The decline in groups nominating since 2013 illustrates the impact of the 
new system (Table 10.10).
Table 10.10 Groups contesting Senate election, by State
Year NSW Vic. Qld WA SA Tas. ACT NT Total
2007 25 23 24 21 19 11 8 5 136
2010 32 21 23 22 18 10 4 6 136
2013 44 39 36 27 33 23 13 12 227
2016 41 38 38 28 23 21 10 7 206
2019 35 31 26 23 16 16 7 9 163
Source: AEC nominations .
Some of the decline in groups’ 
numbers was caused by the decline 
in the number of parties contesting 
every State. Previously, minor 
parties might have concentrated on 
one State but nominated candidates 
in other States to increase the pool 
of minor party votes. With the end 
of GVTs, the significant decline in 
groups at the 2019 election was 
due to fewer parties contesting 
every State. Table 10.11 tallies how 
many States parties contested.
Table 10.11 Number of smaller 
parties contesting one or more 
States, 2013 and 2019
Number of smaller parties contesting







Note: Totals do not include Labor, 
the Coalition or the Greens .




Where in 2013 there were 27 minor parties that contested four or more 
States, in 2016 there were only 12. This withdrawal partly explains 
the decline in groups contesting. Where previously small parties were 
encouraged to contest every State to build the pool of minor party votes 
for preference harvesting, the tactic was self-defeating with the abolition 
of GVTs.
Reaction to the electoral changes: 
How the maths worked
The impact of preferences on Senate results can be estimated by 
comparing the number of elected members under Senate PR-STV with 
those that would have been elected under an alternative non-preferential 
system. The best comparison is with List-PR using a highest remainder 
method of allocating final seats. Under this List-PR method, members 
are elected either with filled quotas or with highest remainders—that 
is, leading partial quotas. The difference between an estimated List-PR 
Senate result and the actual PR-STV result is a measure of the impact of 
preferences, shown by the number of senators elected from trailing partial 
quotas. How much a PR-STV result will deviate from a modelled List-PR 
outcome depends on the strength of interparty preference flows.
Writing about the changes to the Senate’s electoral system, Green 
(2018: 200) noted: 
The 2016 electoral changes effectively weighted the system in 
favour of highest remainders, first by weakening interparty 
transfers as the number of ballot papers exhausting preferences 
increased, and second by the abolition of group-voting tickets, 
ending party control over interparty transfers.
The hypothesis that the Senate’s new electoral system weights the 
allocation of final seats in favour of highest remainders can be tested using 
the results of the 2013 and 2019 half-Senate elections. The results of both 
elections are compared with possible outcomes had the election been 
conducted using List-PR with a highest remainder method of allocating 
final seats.
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A summary of the comparisons is provided in Table 10.12. It shows that 
nine senators were elected from trailing partial quotas in 2013, but no 
trailing parties were elected under the new system in 2019. With the 
new electoral system having weaker party control over preferences and 
a greater number of exhausted preferences, it behaves more like List-PR 
than the former Senate system under GVTs. 
Table 10.12 Comparison of PR‑STV and simulated List‑PR results
2013 Senators elected 2019 Senators elected
Filled quotas 21 22
Highest remainder 6 14
Trailing wins 9 0
Note: Excludes the four Territory senators .
Source: Calculations by author . 
More detail on the 14 senators elected from leading partial quotas in 2019 
is shown in Table 10.13. On the left are the partial quotas and parties for 
successful senators, while on the right are the highest polling unelected 
candidates and parties.
Table 10.13 2019 election: Success from partial quotas




NSW 0 .70 LIB 0 .61 GRN 0 .35 PHoN
Vic . 0 .74 GRN 0 .51 LIB 0 .20 PHoN 0 .20 DHJP
Qld 0 .72 LNP 0 .72 PHoN 0 .70 GRN 0 .58 ALP
WA 0 .93 ALP 0 .86 LIB 0 .83 GRN 0 .41 PHoN
SA 0 .76 GRN 0 .65 LIB 0 .34 PHoN
Tas . 0 .88 GRN 0 .62 JLN 0 .24 PHoN
Notes: DHJP refers to Derryn Hinch’s Justice Party and GRN to the Australian Greens . 
Source: AEC election results, calculations by author . 
Of the 15 parties with a partial quota above 0.5 at the start of the count, 
only Labor in Queensland failed to win a seat. That was a contest in 
which four parties started with more than 0.5 partial quotas in a race for 
three seats. In the other five States, the partial quota for the next party in 
order—in each case, PHON—ranged from 0.20 quotas to 0.41 quotas, 
which were all well short of the partial quota of the sixth elected party.
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It was a very different pattern in 2013 when every State except Queensland 
saw candidates elected from trailing partial quotas (shown in Table 10.14 
by underlined text). In Victoria, the ratio of the lowest elected party to 
the highest defeated candidate was 0.04 to 0.81 quotas, and in Western 
Australia, 0.02 to 0.86 quotas.
Table 10.14 2013 election: Success from partial quotas
State Elected party and partial quota Highest unelected parties 
and quotas
NSW 0 .67 LDP 0.39 L/NP 0 .55 GRN
Vic . 0.76 GRN 0.04 AMEP 0 .81 LIB
Qld 0 .90 LNP 0 .69 PUP 0 .42 GRN
WA 0.74 LIB 0.66 GRN 0.02 SPRT 0 .86 ALP 0 .35 PUP 0 .35 NAT
SA 0 .92 LIB 0.50 GRN 0.26 FFP 0 .74 NXT 0 .59 ALP
Tas . 0 .82 GRN 0.46 PUP 0 .63 LIB
Notes: Bold text indicates parties successful from trailing partial quotas; WA result based 
on the original 2013 Senate result, not the 2014 re‑election; LDP refers to the Liberal 
Democratic Party, L/NP to the Liberal–National Party Coalition (NSW) and FFP to the Family 
First Party .
Source: AEC election results, calculations by the author . 
Table 10.15 categorises all successful and unsuccessful parties based on 
their initial partial quota.
Table 10.15 Elected and defeated senators based on partial quotas: 
2013 and 2019 elections
Number of successful and unsuccessful groups
2013 election 2019 election
Partial quota value Successful Unsuccessful Successful Unsuccessful
0 .9 to < 1 .0 (14 .3%) 2 0 1 0
0 .8 to < 0 .9 (12 .9%) 2 2 3 0
0 .7 to < 0 .8 (11 .4%) 2 1 4 0
0 .6 to < 0 .7 (10 .0%) 3 1 5 0
0 .5 to < 0 .6 (8 .6%) 0 2 1 1
0 .4 to < 0 .5 (7 .1%) 2 1 0 1
0 .3 to < 0 .4 (5 .7%) 1 2 0 2
0 .2 to < 0 .3 (4 .3%) 1 8 0 4
0 .1 to < 0 .2 (2 .9%) 0 9 0 27
< 0 .1 (1 .5%) 2 159 0 100
Note: Based on the original 2013 Senate election in Western Australia, not the 2014 
re‑election .
Source: AEC results, calculations by the author . 
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As noted earlier, 14 of the 15 parties that began the 2019 count with 
a partial quota above 0.50 were elected. The 15th, Labor in Queensland, 
was unsuccessful, as was every party that began the count with a partial 
quota under 0.50. This contrasts starkly with the 2013 result under GVTs. 
In 2013, there were six parties that were unsuccessful that started the count 
with more than 0.50 partial quotas. There were six parties successful after 
starting with a partial quota under 0.50 quotas. The most notorious cases 
were Ricky Muir in Victoria (AMEP) and Wayne Dropulich in Western 
Australia (SPRT), who leap-frogged to victory from less than 0.1 quotas.
Conclusion
This analysis confirms that the new Senate system weights the allocation 
of final seats in favour of parties with the highest remainders on first 
preferences. The abolition of GVTs, combined with the ending of full 
preferential voting, has weakened interparty preference flows. The new 
system does not prevent parties trailing on initial partial quotas from 
winning, but it does advantage parties that attract a significant first-
preference vote and disadvantage those that rely primarily on attracting 
further preferences from other parties. 
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THE ELECTION IN THE 
STATES, TERRITORIES 
AND REGIONS
Nick Economou, Zareh Ghazarian, Narelle Miragliotta, 
Will Sanders, Rodney Smith, John Warhurst 
and Paul Williams
In this chapter, we contextualise the regional variation in the 2019 
election results by focusing on some of the local factors that influenced the 
campaign and the outcomes in each of the Australian States and Territories. 
While the States and Territories appear to have some influence on federal 
election outcomes, the reasons for this remain unclear (Martinez i Coma 
and Smith 2018). Investigating the diversity of election campaign issues, 
events and styles across Australia, we examine, where relevant, previous 
State and Territory election results, economic conditions, specific 
policy promises and campaign visits from the major party leaders, and 
analyse notable regional variations within each jurisdiction. A number 
of competitive ‘battleground’ seats are highlighted, which are seen as 
important for the overall outcome of the election, drawing significant 
resources from the major parties and attracting substantial media attention 





Apart from the fact that it provided around one-third of the 151 members 
of the House of Representatives, New South Wales was particularly 
important in 2019 because it contained a large proportion of marginal 
seats. The 2016 federal election left the major parties evenly balanced in 
New South Wales, with Labor holding 24 seats against the Coalition’s 
23 seats. By the 2019 federal election, the Liberal Party had narrowly lost 
the seat of Wentworth to the Independent Kerryn Phelps in a by-election 
caused by Malcolm Turnbull’s resignation from parliament. Based on 
the 2016 results, swings to Labor of 2.5 per cent would take four NSW 
seats from the Coalition (Gilmore, Robertson, Banks and Page). On the 
other hand, if the Coalition managed swings towards it of 2.5 per cent, 
Labor would lose two NSW seats (Lindsay and Macquarie). Finally, 
a 1.1 per cent swing to the Liberals would see them regain Wentworth. 
Thus, New South Wales contained seven of the 23 marginal seats most 
likely to be critical to the 2019 outcome—more than any State except 
Queensland, which had eight.
Contextual factors
Two factors that might be important in explaining the results of the 
election are State economic conditions and State politics. In 2019, neither 
of these suggested that Labor would make significant gains against the 
Coalition in New South Wales.
For 18 months after the July 2016 federal election, the NSW economy 
performed strongly relative to the other States; however, it began to 
show some signs of weakening prior to the 2019 federal election. The 
annual percentage increase in gross State product to July 2018 in New 
South Wales was the lowest of all States and Territories, at 1 per  cent 
(ABS 2018). The economic growth that did occur in New South Wales was 
uneven. The construction sector, driven partly by the NSW Government’s 
heavy investment in public infrastructure projects (NSW  2018), 
contributed very visibly to the State’s economic growth. However, the 
NSW agricultural sector contracted significantly (ABS 2018). To the 
extent that swinging voters judge governments retrospectively on their 
economic performance (Fiorina 1981), rather than voting on probable 
future economic conditions, the economic position of New South Wales 
gave them little cause to punish the federal Coalition.
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The vagaries of election cycles produced the unusual circumstance of 
both  national and NSW Coalition governments attempting to win 
third terms in the first half of 2019. The NSW fixed-term election was 
set for 23 March. Ultimately, the Coalition was returned to government 
in New South Wales with a slim majority, winning 48 of the 93 seats in 
the NSW  Legislative Assembly. It recorded a first-preference legislative 
assembly vote of 41.6 per cent—down 4.1 per cent on the 2015 result. 
Labor barely improved its position, winning 33.3 per cent of the first-
preference votes—down 0.8 per cent from 2015—and a notional 
two-party-preferred swing of 2.3 per cent across the State.
What were the implications of this result for the federal contest? Labor’s 
failure to make large gains at State level suggested the Coalition might 
be able  to hold on to its federal NSW seats. Labor did not achieve 
first-preference or two-party-preferred swings of real magnitude in 
any NSW region except northern Sydney, where the Liberals could be 
expected to retain their seats easily. The NSW win undoubtedly boosted 
Coalition morale, particularly within the Liberal Party. It paved the 
way for the Coalition to make infrastructure commitments during the 
federal campaign that would receive wholehearted support from the newly 
elected State Liberal Premier. Moreover, the Coalition’s NSW campaign 
theme, that Labor would ruin the State’s strong budgetary position, 
suggested the way the Coalition might campaign effectively against Labor 
at the federal poll.
The campaign in New South Wales
As in 2016, in 2019 the major party leaders visited NSW electorates 
for policy announcements more often than they did electorates in the 
other States and Territories (see Table 11.1; and Martinez i Coma and 
Smith 2018: 220). The difference between 2016 and 2019 is that in 
2016 Bill Shorten made as many visits to NSW electorates as did his 
Liberal opponent, Malcolm Turnbull, while in 2019, Shorten was much 
less visible in New South Wales than Scott Morrison. Morrison’s first 
visit of the campaign, on 11 April, was to the marginal Labor seat of 
Lindsay, in Sydney’s west, while Shorten began his campaign in Deakin 
(see  ‘Victoria’, below)—a relatively safe Liberal seat in Melbourne’s 
east. These starting points could simply have been due to home State 
convenience (Morrison being from Sydney and Shorten from Melbourne); 
however, Shorten’s relative lack of attention to New South Wales in 
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2019 appears to have been strategic. Shorten’s last major campaign 
event was a meeting at Blacktown Town Hall in Sydney’s west—a venue 
made iconic by Gough Whitlam’s ‘It’s Time’ campaign speech in 1972 
(Chan 2019). Nonetheless, Table 11.1 shows that Morrison campaigned 
more frequently than Shorten in New South Wales, while Shorten focused 
more of his campaigning on Queensland, where polling suggested Labor 
might pick up more seats (see below). The two leaders gave roughly the 
same amounts of attention to the other States and Territories.
Table 11.1 Leaders’ electorate visits by State and Territory
Morrison Shorten McCormack Total
NSW 23 14 12 49 (37 M + S)
Qld 11 16 7 34 (27 M + S)
Vic . 15 16 4 35 (31 M + S)
WA 10 8 0 18 (18 M + S)
SA 5 5 0 10 (10 M + S)
Tas . 9 7 3 19 (16 M + S)
ACT 0 0 0 0 (0 M + S)
NT 2 2 0 4 (4 M + S)
Totals 75 68 27 170 (143 M + S)
Source: Calculated from Worthington (2019) .
Despite frequent news media commentary to the effect that Western 
Sydney was a key ‘battleground’ in the election, the leaders spent 
relatively  little time there. Morrison made six visits to Western Sydney 
electorates, three of them to Lindsay. Shorten made just two visits to 
Western Sydney electorates (Lindsay and Greenway). Most electorates 
in Western Sydney went unvisited by either leader. Both leaders made 
more visits to inner Sydney electorates, particularly Reid, which each of 
them visited for five events (see Table 11.2).
The only electorates outside Sydney visited by both leaders were the 
marginal seats of Gilmore on the NSW South Coast and Robertson on 
the Central Coast. As might have been expected, National Party Leader 
Michael McCormack focused his attention on coastal and inland rural 
seats, including his own seat of Riverina.
227
11 . THE ELECTIoN IN THE STATES, TERRIToRIES AND REGIoNS
Table 11.2 Leaders’ electorate visits by NSW region







8 6 0 1 2 5
Northern 
Sydney
0 1 0 4 0 5
Southern 
Sydney
2 0 0 2 0 4
Western 
Sydney
6 2 0 8 1 12
Central 
Coast
2 3 0 0 1 2
Hunter/
Illawarra
1 0 0 5 0 6
Coastal 
rural
3 2 5 3 1 6
Inland rural 1 0 7 4 0 7
Total 23 14 12 27 5 47
* Electorates not visited by Labor or Coalition leaders during the campaign .
** Electorates that both Labor and Coalition leaders visited to make announcements and 
campaign .
Source: Calculated from Worthington (2019) .
In 2019, the major parties seemed to do less to target particular regions 
with policy packages than they had in 2016 (Martinez i Coma and Smith 
2018: 221–22). The Liberal Party did package policies for four specific 
regions, including one addressed to Western Sydney.1 Labor did not 
produce policy packages specifically for any NSW regions but included 
State-by-State breakdowns of some of its funding promises—for example, 
on education and infrastructure (ALP 2019a, 2019b). On key policies 
affecting specific regions, such as the development of the Western Sydney 
airport, the major parties’ promises were quite similar (Liberal Party of 
Australia 2019b; ALP 2019b). Most of the parties’ policies were directed 
generally at the national electorate. This was also true of 2016; however, 
in 2019, the parties seemed to expect voters to do more work to find out 
how policies might affect their own areas.
1  The other regional packages covered Tasmania, the Northern Territory and Central Queensland 




The overall results in New South Wales showed little change from either 
the 2016 federal election results or the March 2019 NSW State election. 
In two-party-preferred terms, the Coalition only lost votes to Labor in 
inner and northern Sydney—both areas where the Liberal Party could 
afford to lose votes. In Western Sydney, the Liberal Party gained ground 
in both its average first-preference vote (up 3 per cent) and against Labor 
in two-party-preferred terms (up 2.7 per cent). The 47.1 per cent average 
two-party-preferred Liberal vote in Western Sydney was high enough to 
undermine the still common idea that the diverse region of Western Sydney 
is a ‘Labor heartland’. Outside Sydney, there were relatively few changes in 
votes. Overall, very few seats changed hands in New South Wales. Labor 
won Gilmore from the Liberals with a swing of 3.3 per cent but suffered 
swings against it in all the other marginal NSW seats, including Lindsay, 
which it lost. In both Gilmore and Lindsay, the incumbent MPs did not 
recontest their seats in controversial circumstances. This provides part 
of the explanation for the results in these seats; however, Labor’s general 
failure to make up ground in marginal NSW seats was the larger and more 
important factor at work. 
Victoria
By Nick Economou and Zareh Ghazarian
Since the 1993 federal election, Victoria has been a State in which 
the ALP  has been the party preferred by the majority of voters. 
Given the persistent two-party majorities for Labor and notwithstanding 
the two-party swings that occur between elections, it is rare for anything 
other  than a small number of ultra-marginal seats to change hands 
between the major parties in Victoria. The 2019 contest conforms with 
this dominant pattern. 
Contextual factors
The expectation that the Liberals and Nationals were in some trouble in 
Victoria owed something to the State election held in November 2018. 
This election resulted in a landslide Labor victory in which there were 
significant swings to Labor in previously strong Liberal-voting districts 
in Melbourne’s eastern suburbs and in the southeastern suburban 
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growth corridor. The assumption was that the State election result was 
driven in no small way by voter response to events in federal politics in 
which Malcolm Turnbull had lost the prime ministership as a result of 
manoeuvring by ultra-conservative Liberals such as Michael Sukkar, the 
sitting Member for Deakin. Further, the Liberal members for Chisholm 
and Higgins, Julia Banks and Kelly O’Dwyer, had resigned from the 
Liberal Party citing a culture of male bullying. This, in turn, had flushed 
out Liberal Party State President Michael Kroger, who had to defend 
his party’s reputation at the very time he was also involved in a major 
intraparty battle with the Cormack Foundation in a bid to gain access to 
campaign funds.
The campaign in Victoria
Labor’s interest in the State was inevitable given that Opposition leader 
Bill Shorten held a Victorian seat (the western suburban division of 
Maribyrnong). Shorten was clearly of a mind to replicate the approach 
of his State colleague, Premier Daniel Andrews, as he travelled across 
metropolitan Melbourne promising federal support for a slew of transport 
infrastructure projects, the most ambitious of which was a proposal 
to construct a massive underground rail loop traversing the middle 
suburbs. Not to be outdone, Prime Minister Scott Morrison travelled 
to Corangamite to promise federal support to build a very fast rail 
connection between Geelong and Melbourne. Labor tried to up the ante 
with a promise to pour taxpayer funds into the Australian Football League 
stadium at Kardinia Park, also in Geelong. Back in Melbourne, Morrison 
committed federal funds to the construction of the infamous East–West 
Link—the proposed freeway to be tunnelled under the Greens-voting 
inner suburb of Carlton that the State Labor Government had refused to 
consider building. 
Regional results
At the beginning of the election and at its conclusion, Labor held 21 seats 
in Victoria, the Liberals 12 seats, the Nationals three seats, the Greens 
one and there was one Independent. Save for a few new faces due to take 




Of course, the fact that there was no substantive change to the 2016 result 
was in fact the important outcome in the context of the general election 
result. Predictions of a Labor victory in the national contest were based 
on an assumption of a shift of Liberal seats to Labor occurring in a State 
such as Victoria. The expectation of such an outcome was driven by two 
electoral events preceding the 2019 national vote. First, Victoria was the 
State in which there was strongest support for same-sex marriage, with 
65 per cent of Victorians voting ‘yes’ in the postal survey held in 2017. 
This suggested the State would reject the Coalition at the national level, 
especially as it was led by prominent socially conservative figures who had 
toppled the progressive Turnbull. Second, federal Labor’s hopes of a strong 
performance in Victoria were buoyed by the significant realignment of 
voter support from Liberal to Labor in previously strong Liberal seats in 
the 2018 State election. 
The fact that the expected Labor swing did not eventuate suggests either 
the 2018 State election was a ringing endorsement of the State Labor 
Government and its premier or something happened in between the 
State and federal elections to prevent the expected federal realignment 
occurring. The results from the 2019 federal contest do not give any clear 
insights as to what happened between the two elections other than to show 
that, at least in terms of the primary vote, it was the UAP that received the 
biggest swing, after which Independents and Labor received the next best 
swings. A review of the two-party swings by electoral division does not 
give much insight either, other than to highlight that, while there were 
swings to Labor in some of the Liberal Party’s most marginal seats, they 
were nowhere near enough to result in a transfer of seats. Expectations 
of non–major party success were also unmet and the one incumbent 
Independent had to withstand a 4 per cent swing against her.
The reality of the Victorian result was that it was more akin to a confirming 
election than a government-changing election in that the result in 2019 
was almost the same as it had been in 2016, notwithstanding all that 
had happened in the national political debate over that three-year cycle. 
The swing to Labor in Victoria in 2019 was negligible and certainly 
not of sufficient dimensions to result in a transfer of seats. All the other 
predictions of non–major party success by Greens and/or Independents 
also proved to be wrong. In accounting for the Victorian result, it is 
worth remembering that the 2019 outcome—in which Labor won the 
Statewide two-party vote but few, if any, seats changed hands—follows 
a longstanding pattern in Australian electoral politics. 
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Queensland
By Paul Williams
The unexpected result of the 2019 federal election campaign in 
Queensland, in defiance of reputable public opinion polls, marks it out as 
one of historical significance. News media narratives once again framed 
Queensland as a key battleground State but no published poll correctly 
forecast Labor’s 26.7 per cent primary vote—the federal party’s worst 
result in Queensland since 1901 and equivalent to the decimation of 
Anna Bligh’s Labor Government in 2012.
The 2019 election supported the ‘Queensland is different’ thesis 
(Murphy 1978; McQueen 1979; Charlton 1983; Williams 2009, 2011). 
As a ‘frontier’ State—where agriculture, pastoralism and especially 
mining make up the core of economic activity and forge a political 
culture far removed from the ‘Sydney–Melbourne–Canberra triangle’—
regional Queensland shares characteristics with regional Tasmania, 
Western Australia, the Northern Territory and parts of New South Wales 
(for  example, the seat of Hunter). But Queensland ultimately remains 
different given its status as Australia’s most decentralised State, where more 
voters live outside the capital city than within it. Queensland comprises six 
regions, each exercising distinct electoral behaviours: Brisbane, Brisbane 
fringe, Gold Coast, Sunshine Coast, eastern provincial and western rural 
(Williams 2018b). Understanding this diversity, and how minor populist 
parties (and parts of the LNP) exploit those differences, is therefore 
essential to unpacking Queensland’s role in the 2019 federal election.
Queensland voters—especially regional voters who have long bristled 
at post-material environmentalist and human rights policy agendas 
supplanting economic priorities—were primed for a conservative 
backlash long before the 2019 campaign began. From issues that much of 
regional Queensland found antithetical or irrelevant—of which anger at 
strict controls on tree-clearing and lower than average support for same-
sex marriage are obvious manifestations—to major party leadership that 
failed to resonate with regional Australia, the 45th Parliament proved 
fertile ground for new conservative and populist leadership to take root in 
Queensland. More specifically, the seeds of the LNP’s Queensland surge 
were sown overwhelmingly by two factors: Scott Morrison’s accessible, 
pragmatic and occasionally populist leadership style, which contrasted 
strongly with Bill Shorten’s apparently aloof and mistrusted persona; 
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and material economic concerns—of which the Adani coalmine and 
its promise of regional employment were merely one element—that 
saw voters reject both environmental concerns and Labor’s arguably 
complicated and poorly defended tax policy in favour of what appeared 
to be the Coalition’s pledge to keep taxes lower.
Contextual factors
At the 2017 State election, a relatively popular State Labor Government 
under Annastacia Palaszczuk increased its seat share. The LNP, by contrast, 
suffered a 7.6 per cent primary swing and won just 33.7 per cent of the 
primary vote (Williams 2018a). However, the Queensland economy 
throughout the 45th Parliament continued to suffer a post-mining slump 
that saw State unemployment hover around 6 per cent—higher than the 
national average—with regional unemployment around twice that, and 
youth unemployment in seats such as Herbert approaching 20 per cent 
(QGSO 2019; Brown 2019). Moreover, the collapse of Clive Palmer’s 
Queensland Nickel in 2016—with $70 million long owed to workers in 
and around Townsville—made the mining downturn particularly piquant 
for north Queensland. Add the fact that wage growth had barely kept 
pace with inflation during a ‘per capita recession’ (Commins 2019) and 
regional Queensland promised a perfect storm for a regional blue-collar 
backlash against a federal Coalition that spruiked a buoyant national 
economy but delivered little household prosperity. 
Despite the Adani coalmine anecdotally playing a pivotal role in Labor’s 
defeat in regional Queensland, voter salience regarding this thorny 
issue did not initially appear high. Opinion polls during the 2017 State 
campaign indicated, for example, that just 17 per cent of voters rated the 
issue as important (Marszalek 2017; Williams 2018a). And when voters 
did show interest, public opinion appeared to be turning against the mine. 
Indeed, Palaszczuk enjoyed a mid-campaign fillip when she pledged to 
veto any federal public money being allocated to Adani for infrastructure. 
By early 2019, a YouGov-Galaxy poll found 51 per cent of Queenslanders 
supported coalmining generally, but just 37 per cent endorsed the Adani 
project specifically (Killoran 2019). In that sense, the Adani issue appeared 
to be totemic: while only a minority of Queenslanders were passionate 
about the Adani project specifically—which was not unexpected given 
publicised threats to groundwater, the Great Barrier Reef and the black-
throated finch—regional voters saw the project as a lifeline to community 
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revival. The fact Queenslanders rated material economic interests more 
highly than the environment—the reverse of the Australian average—
is evidenced in Table 11.3.






Note: Per cent of respondents who identified these issues as most important to them in 
the 2019 election .
Source: Hanrahan (2019) .
Notwithstanding these data, Adani’s polarising effect clearly shaped voting 
intentions in all 30 Queensland seats (and in many outside Queensland), 
with Adani enjoying its strongest salience in the five seats closest to 
the mine’s site in the Galilee Basin: Capricornia (the mine’s location), 
Herbert, Dawson, Flynn and Maranoa. In Flynn—held by the LNP by 
just 1 percentage point—a YouGov-Galaxy poll found 55 per cent of 
voters (including one-third of Labor voters) rated the Adani mine as ‘vital’ 
for the future of central Queensland (Viellaris 2019). 
The campaign in Queensland
Scott Morrison spent one-third of his campaign in Queensland—mostly 
in the regions—which was more than any other State except New South 
Wales. On successive tours, the Prime Minister pledged road infrastructure 
and repeated his mantra that Labor’s $387 billion tax plan—including a 
so-called retirement tax and allegations of ‘death duties’—would cripple 
Australia (Hewett 2019). Consequently, a YouGov-Galaxy poll found 
59 per cent of all Queensland voters, and 27 per cent of Labor voters, 
preferred the Coalition’s tax plan, compared with just 26 per cent of 
all Queensland voters who supported Labor’s (Killoran and Smethurst 
2019). In total, Morrison—including in a late blitz during the campaign’s 
final week—visited the seats of Herbert, Flynn and Brisbane three times, 
Capricornia twice and Forde, Petrie, Longman and Leichhardt once each. 
Aware of Queensland’s capacity to make or break his campaign, Shorten also 
focused heavily on Queensland, and launched his Queensland campaign in 
Brisbane on 5 May. Curiously, the Opposition leader waited until the final 
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week to visit Labor’s most marginal seat of Herbert. Nonetheless, Shorten 
continued to campaign on his ability to deliver fairness while governing with 
unity and stability, but poorly defended policies on tax and Adani plagued 
him. While supporting mining generally, for example, Shorten refused 
to sign a Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union 
(CFMMEU) pledge to guarantee the Adani project and he maintained his 
right to review any Queensland Government approval (McKay 2019). 
The Greens’ campaign produced an unintended effect on regional 
Queenslanders contemplating a Labor vote. The ‘Stop Adani’ convoy—
which travelled for 18 days under the tutelage of former Greens leader 
Bob Brown from Tasmania to Brisbane and then to Clermont, the heart 
of the Adani site, before moving to Canberra—raised the ire of regional 
Queenslanders in the five ‘Adani’ seats. Vilified as southern ‘blow-ins’, 
the Greens-led convoy galvanised local resentment toward ‘outsiders’, 
allowed a vacillating Labor Party to be conflated with Greens policies 
and ultimately fuelled Morrison’s pleas for locals to reject a progressive 
policy agenda. Once again, even those in regional Queensland ambivalent 
about the mine would have seen Adani’s approval as a totemic rejection 
of ‘outsider’ interference. 
Regional results
While acknowledging the limitations of applying regional analysis to 
geographically large federal electorates that inevitably overlap criterion 
borders, Table 11.4 reveals Labor lost disproportionate support across the 
Brisbane fringe and in provincial towns along the eastern seaboard—each 
long considered blue-collar Labor heartlands (Williams 2018a, 2018b). 
Labor can take some comfort from the fact its losses were more moderate 
across Brisbane’s middle-class suburbs. While swings against Labor were 
moderate also on the Gold and Sunshine coasts and in rural Queensland, 
the fact these moved from already low Labor bases provided the party no 
succour. The LNP, conversely, hardly improved its position in suburban 
Brisbane or rural Queensland, it declined in its Gold Coast heartland 
and made only modest gains in the Brisbane fringe. None of these results 
allows the LNP to rest on its laurels. Dramatically improved results, at 
Labor’s expense, for PHON in all regions (especially the Brisbane fringe 
but not western rural) and for the UAP in all regions except Brisbane city, 
delivered gains to the LNP via preferences. Interestingly, PHON and the 
UAP performed better in Sunshine Coast seats than in Gold Coast seats.
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Table 11.4 Queensland primary vote and swing, by region, 2019 federal 
election (per cent)




















































































Note: Divisions are Brisbane (Brisbane, Bonner, Griffith, Lilley, Moreton, Ryan); Brisbane 
fringe (Blair, Bowman, Dickson, Forde, Longman, oxley, Petrie, Rankin); Gold Coast 
(Fadden, McPherson, Moncrieff); Sunshine Coast (Fairfax, Fisher); eastern provincial 
(Capricornia, Dawson, Flynn, Herbert, Hinkler, Leichhardt, Wide Bay); western rural (Groom, 
Kennedy, Maranoa, Wright) . 
Source: Author’s calculations from AEC (2019a) . 
Table 11.5 Comparing ‘Adani’ seat and Queensland results, primary vote 
and swing, 2019 federal election (per cent)













































Note: The five ‘Adani’ seats are Capricornia, Herbert, Dawson, Flynn and Maranoa. 
Source: Author’s calculations from AEC (2019a) . 
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Table 11.5 indicates that while the five Adani seats produced primary 
swings to the LNP only slightly larger than the Queensland mean, those 
same seats saw huge two-party-preferred swings—via populist right 
preferences—almost three times the Queensland average. The table also 
reveals a significant spike in PHON support—again, largely from an 
increased field—and levels of UAP support higher than the Queensland 
average. Overall, these data, including the modest increase in the Greens’ 
vote, support the claim that Adani was a highly salient, indeed polarising, 
issue in central Queensland. 
Western Australia
By Narelle Miragliotta
Western Australia was one of three key battleground States in 2019. 
This  time around, Labor had grounds to believe that the State, which 
had long eluded the party, might finally deliver for it. At the 2016 federal 
election, Labor had enjoyed a modest but notable improvement in its 
primary vote (an increase of 3.7 per cent), signifying that a possible 
correction was occurring. And, at the March 2017 State election, the State 
Labor Party, led by Mark McGowan, achieved a swing of 9.1 per cent in 
its primary vote, claiming government. 
Labor entered this contest with hopes of retaining its five existing 
electorates  and also securing five additional seats: Hasluck (held by 
Ken Wyatt, then Minister for Senior Australians and Aged Care and 
Minister for Indigenous Health), Swan, Stirling (in which the incumbent, 
Michael Keane, resigned), Pearce (held by Attorney-General, Christian 
Porter) and Canning. Of these seats, $500,000 was spent on the 
campaign to win the inner metropolitan seat of Swan (Scarr 2019b). 
Labor’s candidate, Hannah Beazley, was considered a strong prospect to 
secure the seat formerly held by her father, Kim Beazley, between 1980 
and 1996. 
The campaign in Western Australia
The importance of Western Australia to a Labor victory was reflected in 
the increased campaign visits Bill Shorten made to the State (12 per cent, 
up from 9 per cent in 2016), the promise to hold a historic summit 
of business and unions in Western Australia if elected (Lewis 2019: 9) 
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and a $105 million pledge towards defence industry infrastructure for 
West Australian shipyards. Labor also sought to leverage the popularity 
of the State Labor Premier and the strong economic credentials of the 
State government, which, against expectations, delivered a $553 million 
surplus in its May Budget (Hondros et al. 2019). 
While the underlying conditions for Labor in the State were encouraging, 
the Liberals were in full defensive mode. Scott Morrison visited Western 
Australia regularly throughout the campaign and was quick to flatter West 
Australian voters with his declaration that he would live in the west if he 
did not already call New South Wales home (Scarr 2019a). The Morrison 
Government was also able to take credit for increasing Western Australia’s 
share of the goods and services tax (GST) and placing a floor under 
future GST allocations—long a sore point for the State (Laschon 2018). 
Moreover, the Liberals came to the State bearing various infrastructure 
projects totalling $1.4 billion, including a $349 million upgrade to the 
Tonkin Highway that would benefit voters in four of the party’s marginal 
electorates, including Labor’s most marginal seat of Cowan (Blaxendale 
and Varga 2019: 6).
There were also indications that some of Labor’s policies might frustrate 
its much-hoped-for recovery. Polling of voters conducted in four marginal 
seats for the Liberals by MediaReach suggested that voters in these 
electorates believed Labor’s proposed changes to negative gearing would 
likely cause property prices to fall or stagnate, and also do little to improve 
young people’s access to the property market (Scarr and Hennessy 2019).
Regional results
It became apparent on election night that Labor’s confidence of 
a  resurgence in the State was misplaced. The gains achieved by Labor 
in 2016 almost evaporated in 2019. While the swing against the party’s 
two-party-preferred vote was slim (0.9 per cent), its primary vote suffered 
a larger, 2.7 per cent swing against it, falling to 29.8 per cent—the second 
worst State-level performance for Labor. 
Although federal Labor retained its five existing West Australian seats, the 
outcome suggests the malaise runs deep. The last time Labor attained seat 
parity with the Liberals in the State was in 1998 and the last time it held 
a plurality of West Australian electorates was in 1990. As Table 11.6 shows, 
the strongest swings recorded against Labor were in outer metropolitan 
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electorates, followed by rural seats. Between them, these electorates 
constitute 10 of Western Australia’s 16 seats. And while the average size 
of the swing against Labor in the inner metropolitan electorates was less 
severe, it comes off an already low base. In the inner metropolitan seats 
where the Greens averaged 14.3 per cent of the primary vote, the minor 
party entrenched its status as Labor’s curse and saviour. 






Liberal average first-preference vote 45 .03 41 .47 46 .27
Liberal average first-preference swing –3 .25 –2 .08 1 .65
Labor average first-preference vote 30 .19 33 .00 21 .30
Labor average first-preference swing –0 .28 –5 .81 –2 .02
Greens average first-preference vote 14 .32 10 .05 9 .79
Greens average first-preference swing –0 .34 –1 .40 –1 .00
Other average first-preference vote 10 .12 15 .46 22 .55
Other average first-preference swing 4 .13 8 .36 1 .28
Source: Author’s calculation from AEC (2019b) .
South Australia
By Narelle Miragliotta
One journalist lamented during the campaign that ‘the arithmetic’ did 
not favour South Australia in 2019 (Wills 2019b: 44). This assessment is 
difficult to disagree with entirely. South Australia has only ever returned 
a comparatively small number of federal lower house seats but, following 
the 2017–18 redistribution, its share of seats contracted further, from 
11  to 10 (see further, Chapter 9, this volume). In the final analysis, 
only one seat was identified as vulnerable following the redistribution, 
the seat of Boothby, held by the Liberal incumbent, Nicolle Flint, on 
a margin of 2.7 per cent. Flint gained notoriety over her decision to sign 
the petition that led to the unseating of Malcolm Turnbull. This brought 
Flint unwanted  attention, especially from GetUp!, which designated 
her one of the six ‘hard right wreckers’ that it campaigned against 
(Gailberger 2019a: 10). 
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But with only one seat truly competitive, the federal leaders did not 
spend significant time campaigning in the State. Over the course of the 
campaign, the two leaders visited South Australia five times apiece; in 
comparison, they made 16 stops in total to Tasmania (see Table 11.1). This 
did not mean, however, that either party ignored the State or Boothby, 
where the combined major party pre-election spending commitments 
for the marginal seat totalled $400 million (Wills 2019a: 6). Similarly, 
the Liberals—seeking to strengthen their prospects in Sturt, vacated by 
Christopher Pyne—committed $100 million in funding for three road 
projects in that electorate (Blaxendale and Varga 2019: 6). Labor sought 
to distinguish its party by, among other things, pledging to commission 
an independent study into the potential impact of an oil spill in the Great 
Australian Bight (Gailberger 2019b: 6). 
Further reducing the urgency for the major parties was the absence of 
the NXT and, more particularly, its leader and founder, Nick Xenophon. 
Although the NXT was rebadged as the Centre Alliance when Xenophon 
quit politics in 2018, the new party, in his absence, was a more muted 
force, fielding only three lower house and two Senate candidates.






Liberal average first-preference vote 38 .80 34 .63 48 .72
Liberal average first-preference swing 5 .21 4 .68 7 .29
Labor average first-preference vote 40 .95 44 .64 19 .16
Labor average first-preference swing 4 .03 6 .40 0 .63
Greens average first-preference vote 11 .70 9 .22 6 .90
Greens average first-preference swing 4 .27 3 .45 2 .08
Other average first-preference vote 8 .48 25 .20 11 .43
Other average first-preference swing –12 .54 –15 .35 –10 .36
Source: Author’s calculation from AEC (2019b) .
The demise of the NXT, and the limited appeal of its successor, the 
Centre Alliance—despite holding on to the seat of Mayo, represented 
by Rebekha Sharkie—proved advantageous for the major parties. South 
Australia was the only jurisdiction where Labor (3.8 per cent) and the 
Liberals (5.7 per cent) both increased their Statewide share of the primary 
vote (see Table 11.7). And, while neither restored fully its pre-2016 first-





Tasmania accounts for only five of the 151 seats in the House of 
Representatives, but it is very rare for national election campaigns not to 
focus on at least two of these seats. This reflects the reality that the two 
perennial battleground seats of Bass and Braddon, which cover the 
northeast and northwest of the State, are always marginal and consistently 
hold out the hope to the major party in Opposition that they can be won. 
With the published national opinion polls fuelling expectations of 
a government-changing election, and given the recent by-election result 
in Braddon, Labor might have been confident of holding all four of 
its Tasmanian seats. Whatever Liberal Party strategists thought of the 
opinion polls, the government’s strategy was clear enough: defence of 
government would require winning at least Braddon from Labor and 
possibly taking Bass as well. As it turned out, the Liberal strategy in 
Tasmania was successful. Labor was defeated in both Braddon and Bass. 
Tasmania was a significant failure for the Labor campaign while the effort 
put into campaigning in the north by Prime Minister Scott Morrison was 
rewarded with gains that allowed the government to increase its overall 
House of Representatives majority. 
Contextual factors
In March 2018, a State election was held in which the incumbent Liberal 
Government was re-elected despite some expectations that Premier Will 
Hodgman (now retired) might struggle to win a lower house majority. 
Confusingly, having obtained a swing towards it and having increased 
its total seat share, Labor also appeared to have performed creditably in 
this contest. The problem with this, however, was that Labor gains had 
occurred at the expense of the Greens rather than the Liberals, and—
arguably of greater significance—there was a serious differential in Labor’s 
performance in the northern divisions compared with those in the south.
The campaign in Tasmania
By the halfway point of the campaign, monitoring by the Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) of the campaign visits conducted 
by Morrison and Bill Shorten noted how often Morrison had 
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visited Tasmania and that Braddon was one of the most oft-visited 
seats in the Prime Minister’s  campaign travels (Doran et al. 2019). 
The  Advocate—the  newspaper published in Burnie and read across the 
Braddon electorate—was even more enlightening on how the major 
party campaigns  were  going. The paper noted (presumably with some 
disapproval) that not only had the Opposition leader been to the southern 
Tasmanian seats more often than to the north, he had also promised 
money for southern indulgences of which northerners disapproved, such 
as a commitment of more federal funding for the Hobart-based Museum 
of Old and New Art (MONA). And, if that was not bad enough, Shorten 
also promised to support Tasmania having a team in the Australian Football 
League (Bailey and Jarvie 2019). In so doing, he aligned himself (perhaps 
inadvertently) with those who were advocating that the Tasmanian team 
be based in Hobart—a cardinal error for a leader whose primary objective 
should have been to curry favour with interests in Launceston, Burnie 
and Devonport. 
Regional results
The Statewide result was a curious mix of contrary swings, the only 
consistency of which lay in the sharp distinction in voting behaviour 
between  the Tasmanian north (Bass and Braddon) and the south 
(Franklin  and Clark). The north–south divide was also evident in 
the sprawling division of Lyons, where booths in centres in the north 
(Deloraine, Longford and Prospect) were won on the two-party-preferred 
vote by the (disendorsed) Liberal, while the two-party majority for Labor 
tended to get stronger the closer booths were to Hobart. Labor secured 
a large share of the Statewide two-party-preferred vote (55.9 per cent, down 
by 1.4 percentage points) but could win only two (that is, 40 per cent) of 
the five seats.
The regional swings give a better account of what happened. The two-party-
preferred swing to the Liberals in Bass was 5.8 per cent and in Braddon, 
4.8 per cent. On the other hand, the swing in Franklin was 1.5 per cent 
to Labor, making this one of the safest Labor divisions in the country, 
and in Lyons, the two-party-preferred swing of 1.3 per cent also went to 
Labor. Clark, meanwhile, firmed for the Independent Andrew Wilkie, with 
a  swing of 4.3 per cent. The significance of these regional variations lay 
in the transfer of seats. With swings towards them, incumbents in Clark 
(Wilkie), Franklin and Lyons (both Labor seats) were re-elected. Bass and 
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Braddon, however, changed, with the Liberal candidates, Brigit Archer and 
Gavin Pearce, winning their respective seats from Labor incumbents. This 
was precisely the outcome the Liberals’ national strategy had been geared 
to achieve and, as such, the importance of the Tasmanian result lay in its 
contribution to the return of the Morrison Government with a majority. 
It is difficult to interpret the deeper meaning of the Tasmanian contribution 
to the 2019 election. At one level, the result conforms to a longstanding 
pattern in which Labor wins the Statewide two-party vote but does 
not win all, or many, of the five available seats. Denison/Clark appears 
to be the preserve of Wilkie, and Tasmania’s most notoriously volatile 
electorates, Bass and Braddon, defied the Statewide result by being won 
by the Liberal Party, as they have been known to do in the past. Tasmania’s 
regionalism was particularly noticeable in this election. The south of the 
State continued to be the electoral base for the social-democratic parties, 
including Labor and the Greens. On this occasion, the north of the State 
swung to the Liberals and, in the case of the northwest coast, embraced 
the populism of a candidate such as Jacqui Lambie.
The Australian Capital Territory
By John Warhurst
There were two distinctive aspects to the ACT campaigns. The first were 
local ACT issues. These included the funding of national institutions, 
including the National Gallery of Australia, National Library of Australia, 
National Museum and the Australian War Memorial. In the case of the 
first three and others, the issue was too little government funding, while 
in the case of the War Memorial, it was criticism of the overly generous 
$500 million funding of an expansion plan developed by its Director-
General, Dr Brendan Nelson, a former Liberal Opposition leader 
(Zhou 2019).
Funding of the Australian Public Service and other public service matters 
are always an issue in the Australian Capital Territory, and this was so 
again. Labor campaigned on a better deal for the public service, including 
reducing spending on private consultants. Late in the campaign—
controversially, after most pre-poll voting had finished—the government 
announced cuts of $1.5 billion over four years to the public service to 
fund its election campaign spending promises (Whyte 2019a).
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The second unique aspect was the energetic campaign against 
conservative Liberal Senator Zed Seselja (Warhurst 2019). He has long 
been a  controversial figure in the Australian Capital Territory among 
the factionalised Liberal Party and within the Canberra community. 
He opposed same-sex marriage during the postal survey and abstained 
from voting on the legislation during 2017. He was also one of the 
leading young guns supporting Peter Dutton’s campaign against Malcolm 
Turnbull in 2018—both matters way out of character for left-leaning, 
socially progressive Canberra.
While the two major party senators are almost impossible to shift in 
Canberra—despite repeated efforts by the Democrats and the Greens, 
among others—this time the campaign was vociferous. Both the Greens 
candidate, Penny Kyburz, and Independent Anthony Pesec campaigned 
hard and they were joined by Unions ACT and Get Up!. Unions ACT ran 
an allegedly $100,000 Dump Zed campaign (www.dumpzed.org.au [site 
discontinued]), including leaflets and a polling place presence. Its leaflet 
linked Seselja, Dutton and Tony Abbott. As voters queued to vote, they 
were handed empty scratchie cards with the messages ‘Under Zed you will 
get Zilch’ and ‘Put Zed last. That’s where he puts you’. Get Up! distributed 
how-to-vote cards urging: ‘Vote for Climate Change. This time Don’t 
Vote Liberal.’ They urged a vote for Kyburz and Pesec because they offered 
‘very strong support for climate action’. By contrast, Katy Gallagher for 
Labor was rated a more muted ‘Moderate Support for Climate Change’ 
(though the how-to-vote card scarcely distinguished between the three 
candidates). For his part, Seselja relished the challenge and did not hide 
behind the Liberal brand. His campaign was personalised as ‘Your local 
candidate for the Senate’, using his distinctive brand name ‘Zed’ on the 
T-shirts of his many young volunteers.
Regional results
Labor won all three seats easily, but these seats are now more distinguishable 
in their voting patterns. Labor held its two-party-preferred position in 
the House of Representatives, despite suffering small negative swings 
in  the  southern seat of Bean, where the Independent environmentalist 
Jamie Christie polled 8.9 per cent and the Greens polled 13.7 per cent 
(more than 22 per cent in total), and in the northern seat of Fenner. In the 
central seat of Canberra, new Labor MP Alicia Payne won a two-party-
preferred swing of 4 per cent and Tim Hollo (Greens) earned a swing of 
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4.6 per cent up to 23.7 per cent, making it one of the nation’s most Green 
electorates. In the Senate, Labor and the Liberals split the two seats, but 
there was a tiny swing against Seselja and a swing towards both the Greens 
(3.5 per cent, up to 19.4 per cent) and Independent Pesec (5 per cent). 
This means the anti-Zed campaign was ultimately ineffective, and he won 
close to a quota in his own right. According to Seselja, that showed that 
the ‘personalised’ campaign against him did not work. In reality, he was 
also protected by the two-seat system, as was always going to be the case.
Canberra remains a ‘Labor town’ with a strong green tinge (Whyte 2019b). 
That is also the case at the Territory level. Zed Seselja floats in a sea of 
red. To some, including former public service commissioner John Lloyd 
of the Institute of Public Affairs, this pattern is a worrying anomaly 
with possible implications for the connection between the Australian 
Public Service and the wider community (Dingwall 2019). The largely 
conservative ideological character of the ACT Liberals is something of an 
enigma; moderation might be suggested by the demographics if greater 
electoral success is desired. Any change in ACT representation in future 
elections remains highly unlikely.
The Northern Territory
By Will Sanders
At the 2016 federal election, support for the Country Liberals was at 
a historic low and the two-term Country Liberal Member of the House of 
Representatives for the Darwin-based seat of Solomon, Natasha Griggs, 
lost her seat comprehensively with just 34.5 per cent of first-preference 
votes and 44 per cent of the two-candidate-preferred count. This probably 
reflected the disarray of the Country Liberal Government in the Northern 
Territory Legislative Assembly, which had suffered both a change of chief 
minister and several defections since its election in August 2012 (Smee 
and Walsh 2016). A month after Griggs’s loss, the Country Liberals under 
Adam Giles lost the August 2016 Legislative Assembly election to Labor 
under Michael Gunner in a similarly comprehensive fashion. 
During the 2019 election campaign, the Northern Territory achieved 
prominence in the national media just once, when Prime Minister Scott 
Morrison and Opposition leader Bill Shorten both visited, on Tuesday, 
23 April. As well as supporting the Country Liberals’ two aspiring women 
candidates for the House of Representatives and a new woman Senate 
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candidate, Morrison criticised the Gunner Territory Labor Government, 
which by the end of 2018 was suffering defections over management of 
its large debt and Budget deficit. Morrison called Gunner’s government 
the ‘worst in the country’ and argued that ‘if you can’t manage money, 
you can’t run a country’. The not-so-hidden implication was that poor 
money management was a problem for Labor, which also extended to 
Shorten and his federal team. Shorten’s task during his Territory visit 
was the more staid one of supporting two incumbent members of the 
House of Representatives and a senator seeking re-election. His rhetoric 
was about ‘Territorians looking to the future’ and ‘taking opportunities’, 
as ‘Territorians do’. 
When Labor retained its two Northern Territory House of Representatives 
seats in the 2019 election, this was interpreted by the party faithful in 
the Territory as a vote of confidence in the Gunner Government and as 
evidence that Morrison’s criticisms of it had misfired (Gibson 2019). While 
this probably overinterprets the result, the 2016 story above suggests that 
legislative assembly elections and Commonwealth parliamentary elections 
in the Territory can interact. 
From a larger geographic perspective in 2019, the obvious question is: 
why was the Northern Territory strong for Labor when Queensland to 
the east and Western Australia to west were so much more problematic? 
The political economies of these outlying regions based on resource 
extraction industries may seem rather similar, but there is something 
different occurring in the Territory electorally compared with Queensland 
and Western Australia. One difference is that the Territory, with its 
much smaller capital city in the north rather than the south, has a larger 
proportion of public administrators and other white-collar professionals 
building careers in the jurisdiction but ultimately destined to leave. 
Gerritsen (2010: 32–33) has called this ‘the politics of the expatriates’ and 
notes as a corollary that the ‘real Territorians’ are the Aboriginal people 
for whom the Northern Territory is a long-term home. This points to 
a second big difference from Queensland and Western Australia: the 
Indigenous proportion of the population in the Northern Territory. 
With more than 40 per cent of its population identifying as Aboriginal 
and/or Torres Strait Islander in the 2016 census, the Northern 
Territory’s second outback seat of Lingiari stands out as the one House 
of Representatives division in which Indigenous Australians are a high 
enough proportion of the population to have significant electoral power. 
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The Country Liberals’ 2019 pre-selection in Lingiari of prominent 
young Warlpiri woman and Alice Springs town councillor Jacinta Price 
suggested an attempt to attract Aboriginal votes. While her primary vote 
was 5 per cent higher than her predecessor’s in 2016, the Labor vote for 
the incumbent, Warren Snowdon, was also up 5 per cent. Whereas in 
2016 there had been nine candidates in Lingiari (including one prominent 
Yolngu Independent, who attracted 4.3 per cent of votes), in 2019, there 
were just six candidates to share the primary vote. While Price was the 
prominent Indigenous candidate in 2019, her vote was strongest in 
the regional towns and weaker in the discrete Aboriginal communities. 
Snowdon, by contrast, won these discrete communities serviced by 
remote-area mobile polling even more convincingly than in past elections 
when he had also faced high-profile Aboriginal candidates.
Snowdon’s seven-term tenure in Lingiari suggests that the Aboriginality 
of candidates has made little difference to recent Commonwealth 
parliamentary elections in the Northern Territory. No doubt, in this one 
House of Representatives division in which there is such a significant 
Aboriginal presence, Labor will think hard about an Aboriginal 
replacement candidate for Snowdon. But in the meantime, Aboriginal 
voters have not moved in large numbers to support Aboriginal candidates, 
whether as Independents, for the Country Liberals, for general minor 
parties or, as in 2013, for Australia’s First Nations Political Party. 
Since 2010, the AEC has invested significantly in Indigenous electoral 
participation. In 2019, the AEC produced a table (Table 11.8) as part of its 
work on enrolment. In the 151 divisions of the House of Representatives 
grouped in Table 11.8, the two outlying divisions with an ‘enrolment 
rate’ compared with the ‘estimated enrolment eligible population’ in 
the range 75–80 per cent are Lingiari and Durack, in the Kimberley 
region of Western Australia. These are also the two divisions with the 
highest proportions of Indigenous people in their populations. Turnout 
against enrolment is also a problem in Lingiari, which is the one House 
of Representatives division in the far-right column of Table 11.9—two 
categories lower in turnout than any other. Increased enrolment among 
Aboriginal people in Lingiari could, ironically, decrease turnout further, 
unless the AEC can also improve Indigenous participation in remote-area 
mobile polling.
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Table 11.8 Enrolment in 151 House of Representatives divisions 











No . of HoR divisions 54 52 41 1 1 2
Source: Australian Electoral Commission, enrolment statistics .
Table 11.9 Votes cast against enrolment in 151 House of 











No of HoR divisions 1 126 21 2 0 1
Source: Australian Electoral Commission, 2019 Australian federal election results .
Aboriginal electoral power in remote areas of the Northern Territory 
is real, by virtue of population proportions, and probably explains the 
different results in the Territory in 2019 compared with remote areas of 
Queensland and Western Australia. However, enrolment and turnout 
figures suggest that such Aboriginal electoral power may still have 
considerable untapped potential.
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Shaun Ratcliff, Jill Sheppard and Juliet Pietsch
On Saturday, 18 May 2019, the incumbent Liberal–National Coalition 
parties surprised most observers by winning a majority of seats in 
the House of Representatives. Although the win was narrow—the 
conservative parties won 77 seats in the 151-seat chamber—this gave 
them a majority in the lower house of the national parliament. Using 
new data from the Cooperative Australian Election Survey, this chapter 
addresses and empirically evaluates some of the narratives about voting 
behaviour that emerged out of this shock election result, including claims 
about economic interest, age and ethnicity.
Following this unexpected outcome, one of the narratives that developed 
around the result was that Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s suburban 
ordinariness provided him and the Coalition parties he led with an 
advantage over the parties of the left. The left-of-centre Labor Party had, in 
some accounts, been portrayed as representing inner-city elites, allowing 
the Liberal–National Coalition parties to win the support of struggling 
workers employed in manufacturing and retail (see Wright et al. 2019). 
This included claims that the Labor Party’s negative gearing policies—and 
other plans to tax ‘aspirational voters’—actually hurt the very voters they 
were meant to help.
Related to this, the major parties’ strategies in 2019 appeared designed 
to segment the electorate by age: Labor’s housing affordability policy 
potentially disadvantaged older voters to the benefit of the young, while 
the Coalition defended the rights of older voters to enjoy the benefits 
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of superannuation and property-related tax minimisation policies. 
On  the  surface, these strategies appear sound. Older voters make up 
a large (and generally Coalition-voting) segment of the electorate.
Another narrative was that the ‘ethnic’ vote helped the Coalition win 
the election, stopping Labor ‘in its tracks’ (Jakubowicz and Ho 2019). 
In  particular, it was asserted that the Australian Marriage Law Postal 
Survey run by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) in September 
2017 activated the socially conservative politics of certain groups of voters, 
especially within the Chinese community, with ‘ethno-religious prejudices 
around sexuality and gay culture’ having ‘a devastating impact on the 
ALP vote where they were activated’ (Jakubowicz and Ho 2019). During 
this opinion survey regarding the legalisation of same-sex marriage, the 
Labor Party largely supported the ‘yes’ case. Conversely, the Coalition 
was more ambivalent, with some high-profile supporters in its ranks and 
a large number of opponents. When the parliament subsequently voted 
to change the Marriage Act, almost all Labor parliamentarians voted in 
support, while several high-profile Coalition members voted against or 
abstained. It has been argued that this process helped the Coalition lock 
in the support of socially conservative ethnic groups.
We test these ideas in this chapter. Did the Coalition win working-
class voters, or ‘battlers’, and is there evidence that the Labor Party’s tax 
policies (in this instance, negative gearing) helped drive these shifts? Was 
this also associated with a large age-related electoral cleavage? Is there 
evidence of an ‘ethnic vote’ and was this associated with opposition to 
same-sex marriage?
We examine these questions using the Cooperative Australian Election 
Survey (Ratcliff and Jackman 2019). This comprised a sample of 10,316 
respondents stratified by age, gender and State collected through the 
YouGov online panel between 18 April and 12 May 2019. These data were 
weighted by age, gender, education, language spoken at home and State.
Using these data, we find that older, higher-income voters who owned 
their own homes continued to support the Coalition at higher rates, 
whereas lower-income renters and younger voters supported Labor. 
Support for negative gearing was more concentrated and opposition 
diffuse. This suggests that Labor’s policies on housing affordability and 
taxation may have been an electoral weakness, rather than a strength. 
However, this was not for the reasons claimed in the popular narrative. 
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There is also very little evidence for the assertion that ethnic minorities 
favoured the Coalition, that they thought the rights of same-sex couples 
had gone too far or that their attitudes towards this issue drove them 
towards the Coalition in greater numbers.
Vote by age
Very rarely in Australian electoral politics has either major party made 
explicit appeals to voters based on their generation or age cohort. 
This changed in 2019. Both the Labor Party and the Coalition engaged 
in strategies that incorporated policies that overtly appealed to voters 
belonging to different age or generational groups. This may not have been 
intentional (other groups may have been the targets), but regardless, the 
outcome was the same.
The Labor Party’s dual-pronged housing affordability policy—comprising 
a commitment to reducing franking credit dividends for some self-funded 
retirees and a cut to negative gearing offsets for property investors—
would have disadvantaged (wealthier) older voters and benefitted younger 
(less  affluent) individuals (Kehoe 2019). Negative gearing essentially 
allows the unrestricted use of tax losses from investment properties to be 
offset as tax deductions from most other sources of income. Conversely, 
the Coalition defended the rights of older (income- and asset-rich) voters 
to enjoy the benefits of existing tax minimisation policies available through 
superannuation and property investment (Millane 2019).
On paper, these clashing approaches were sound. Older voters have 
traditionally supported the Coalition in greater numbers. As the 
population ages, this group increasingly makes up much of its electoral 
base. The parties of the left (particularly the Greens) have performed 
better among younger voters for decades, with Labor doing better with 
those aged under 65 than over and appearing content to lose the support 
of some older voters in 2019. Labor’s shadow treasurer Chris Bowen told 
voters that ‘if you don’t like our policies, don’t vote for us’ (Kehoe and 
Cranston 2019).
Labor may have been willing to adopt this strategy due to the perception 
that it had a (potentially temporary) electoral advantage from a surge in 
the enrolment of young people during the 2017 marriage law postal survey 
(Betigeri 2019). However, this narrative may not be entirely accurate. 
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It may be intuitive that young Australians were energised by an issue 
particularly salient to them and would enrol and vote. Indeed, enrolment 
among young Australians (aged 18 to 25) increased from 73 per cent in 
2011 to 85 per cent in 2018, reversing a previous decline (AEC 2019). 
However, it is more likely that increased enrolments prior to the 2019 
election were due to the AEC’s policy of direct enrolment (ANAO 2016). 
In 2019, approximately two-thirds of all electoral enrolment in Australia 
occurred through direct updates of the roll by the AEC.
While this difference may seem technical in nature, it is substantively 
important. Previously unenrolled voters who were mobilised to enrol so 
they could have a say in the marriage law postal survey have, by definition, 
at least a minor interest in one contemporary policy issue. Previously 
unenrolled voters added to the electoral roll do not necessarily have any 
passing interest in politics and there is no reason for us to assume that 
they would turn out to vote, given they did not actively enrol themselves. 
In that sense, stories of ‘declining youth turnout’ are better characterised 
as the continuation of an existing trend rather than any new phenomenon. 
In other words, similar raw numbers of Australians are voting, but the 
pool of enrolled voters is growing (through direct enrolments).
Individual behaviour in 2019: Same old, same old
If anything, the parties’ segmentation of the electorate by age or 
generational cohort in 2019 reinforced existing patterns. Many young 
voters abstained, and those who voted tended to support Labor and the 
Greens. Despite pre-election narratives suggesting young voters would 
play a disproportionately important role in the outcome, they were unable 
to remove the Coalition Government.
As a baseline, we can reasonably assume that these intergenerational 
patterns have become a relatively fundamental feature of contemporary 
Australian politics. Based on both the Australian Election Study and now 
the Cooperative Australian Election Survey data, there are clear trends 
and cross-sectional data. As can be seen in Figure 12.1, a clear pattern 
concerning age and partisan choice remained at the 2019 election. Young 
voters preferred Labor over the Coalition, with the Greens only a small 
way behind the major centre-right parties.
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Figure 12.1 First‑preference vote intention for the House 
of Representatives, by age
Source: Ratcliff and Jackman (2019).
Moreover, young voters were the most likely to not enrol or abstain from 
voting, either risking a fine for non-attendance or avoiding enrolment in 
the first place (as shown in Figure 12.2).1
Figure 12.2 Non‑voting for the House of Representatives, by age
Note: Non‑voting denotes adult Australian citizens who either have not enrolled to vote 
or did not intend to cast a valid vote . 
Source: Ratcliff and Jackman (2019).
1  Of course, since being enrolled in an online survey panel and being willing to complete a survey 
about politics are likely correlated with the act of enrolling and voting, there are limitations to what 
we can learn from these data about the act of abstaining.
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The framing of particularly salient issues in the 2019 campaign—tax 
policies, housing affordability and wage and wealth inequality—may 
have been designed to appeal to younger voters, driving them towards the 
Labor Party and away from the Coalition (and perhaps the Greens). This 
does not appear to have gone according to plan.
The expectation that Labor’s housing policy—which included reducing 
the tax breaks available to landlords and therefore their incentive to bid 
real estate prices higher—would appeal to younger votes may have been 
reasonable. Younger voters are less likely to own their own home and 
more likely to rent than older voters. However, although these younger 
voters were less likely to agree that landlords should be able to use losses 
from rental properties as a deduction on income tax through negative 
gearing (Figure 12.3), they were not more likely to disagree. Rather, they 
were more likely to not hold an opinion on this issue.
Figure 12.3 Support for the use of negative gearing for investment 
properties, by age
Note: The question asked was: ‘Please say whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or 
strongly disagree with each of these statements . Landlords should be able to use losses 
from rental properties as a deduction on income tax (through negative gearing) .’ 
Source: Ratcliff and Jackman (2019).
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Figure 12.4 First‑preference vote intention for the House 
of Representatives, by support of the use of negative gearing 
for investment properties and age
Source: Ratcliff and Jackman (2019).
As a result, this issue did not necessarily drive these voters towards the 
Labor Party. As Figure 12.4 highlights, the relationship between attitudes 
towards negative gearing and voting intention was strongest for voters 
aged between 50 and 69. Younger voters, aged between 18 and 29, were 
much less likely to vote based on their attitudes towards negative gearing. 
Although we cannot prove the direction of causality, this may suggest that 
opposition to negative gearing was diffuse and Labor’s policy on this issue 
did little to benefit the party during the campaign.
Economic voting in 2019
Our finding that attitudes towards negative gearing had only a limited 
association with voting intentions among the young may suggest that the 
explanation of the result adopted by some in the media—that traditional 
voting patterns based on economic cleavages have broken down—has 
some validity. These claims are similar to the ‘death of class’ thesis, in 
which it was asserted that (now irrelevant) economic cleavages were 
a part of specific historical processes linked to the Industrial Revolution 
(Clark et al. 1993; Pakulski and Waters 1997). As the major political issues 
of the Industrial Revolution were resolved, ideologies and issues related 
to economic class became less important. According to these arguments, 
demand for significant (economic) policy difference disappeared. Instead, 
class consciousness and economic cleavages have been replaced with social 
and post-materialist politics (see also Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997, 2008).
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Many of these claims, however, are based on confusion between aggregate 
movements in voting choice and the behaviour of individuals (see, for 
instance, Atkins 2019; Crowe 2019; Wright et al. 2019). These writers 
find that electorates with lower than average incomes, lower levels of 
education and greater numbers of renters moved towards the Coalition. 
Besides linking (often small) swings with overall levels of support, they are 
also guilty of ecological fallacies.
Although the type of occupation an individual has can play an important 
role in their economic interests and political preferences, this is not 
necessarily the only (or even most important) driver of politicised economic 
cleavages. A meaningful analysis of economic interests (or economic class) 
is driven not by the colour of a voter’s collar alone, but also by their access 
to resources and their relationship with capital (a simplification of the 
arguments put forward by Braverman 1974; Wright 2000: 25).
Using this more nuanced understanding of economic interests combined 
with our data, we undertake a deeper analysis of economic voting at the 
2019 election. We start by operationalising this concept of economic 
interests through the examination of voting intention as a function of 
proximity to capital and access to resources. For this exercise, we consider 
a voter who owns their own business or a private trust as being closer to 
the interests of capital and a voter with a higher household income as 
having greater resources. The results indicate that the commentary on the 
Coalition’s status as the party of the battler has been mistaken.
While the Coalition received some of its highest support from those 
earning $208,000 or more who own a business or a trust (approximately 
60 per cent of the voters who gave the Liberal–National parties their first 
preference in 2019), the picture was very different among those who could 
be better described as working class (see Figure 12.5). Associated with, 
but not necessarily caused by, Labor’s policy on housing affordability and 
taxation, the Coalition also did well among high-income homeowners, 
while Labor did better with low-income renters (see Figure 12.6). 
Although, as with age, Labor’s advantage with lower-income renters and 
workers was smaller than the Coalition’s lead among higher-income 
and capital-owning voters.
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Figure 12.5 Party support by business or trust ownership and 
household income
Source: Ratcliff and Jackman (2019).
Figure 12.6 First‑preference vote intention for the House of 
Representatives, by home ownership and household income
Source: Ratcliff and Jackman (2019).
Of course, some blue-collar workers voted for the Coalition. However, 
if we adopt a meaningful definition of the working class—voters who work 
in blue-collar jobs or sales and services, with lower to middle incomes and 
who are employees—we find they did not actually provide the Coalition 
with significant support. Approximately 25 per cent of those with average 
to lower earnings (with household incomes below $78,000 per annum) 
supported the Liberal and National parties with their first-preference votes. 
Conversely, about half of those with the lowest incomes (less than $26,000 
per annum) voted Labor. The self-employed in blue-collar and sales and 
service occupations, with incomes above $208,000 per annum, were the 
ones who overwhelmingly voted for the Coalition. Contrary to many of 
MoRRISoN'S MIRACLE
262
the claims made since the election, higher-income voters were the ones who 
swung away from Labor, defecting to the Coalition in greater numbers than 
those with lower household incomes (see Figures 12.7 and 12.8).
As we might expect, based on self-interest, voters who owned their own 
homes (including those with a mortgage) and those with high household 
incomes were more likely to support the use of negative gearing by 
landlords (Figure 12.9). These voters were also much more likely to vote 
for the Coalition (Figure 12.10). However, as discussed above, support 
for negative gearing was more concentrated, while opposition was diffuse. 
While those who benefited were more likely to support the Coalition, 
those who would not benefit—namely, lower-income voters who did not 
own their own homes—were more likely to not hold an opinion. As with 
younger voters, their partisan choice appears to have been less associated 
with their attitudes towards negative gearing. The only high-income 
group that voted strongly for Labor was that of high-income voters who 
opposed the use of negative gearing for investment properties.
Figure 12.7 First‑preference defections from Labor for the House 
of Representatives, by household income
Source: Ratcliff and Jackman (2019).
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Figure 12.8 First‑preference defections from the Coalition for the 
House of Representatives, by household income
Source: Ratcliff and Jackman (2019).
Figure 12.9 Support for the use of negative gearing for investment 
properties, by home ownership and household income
Note: The question asked was: ‘Please say whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or 
strongly disagree with each of these statements . Landlords should be able to use losses 
from rental properties as a deduction on income tax (through negative gearing) .’ 
Source: Ratcliff and Jackman (2019).
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Figure 12.10 Vote intention by support for the use of negative gearing 
for investment properties and household income
Source: Ratcliff and Jackman (2019).
Vote by ancestry
A final narrative surrounding the election result asserted that the Coalition 
won with the support of the ‘ethnic’ vote. Specifically, one claim was that 
the same-sex marriage plebiscite activated the socially conservative politics 
of certain groups of voters, especially those from the Chinese community 
(Jakubowicz and Ho 2019). Is there any evidence that Chinese voters are 
more conservative on gay rights? Or that the Chinese vote swung away 
from the Labor Party and influenced the election outcome?
Changing patterns in and attitudes towards 
immigration
Interest in the possible political influence of the ethnic vote is not 
new. It attracted a great deal of scholarly attention in the 1980s, 
when multiculturalism was at its peak. During this period, it was well 
established that the Labor Party had the edge over the Coalition among 
Australia’s ethnic population (Pietsch 2018), although there was variation 
across different groups (Pietsch 2017b). This was particularly the case for 
Australia’s new migrant populations from Asia.2 Part of the interest in the 
2  In part due to the Hawke Labor Government’s actions following the Tiananmen Square 
massacre in 1989, when it extended temporary permits for Chinese Nationals in Australia and 
granted permanent visas to 42,000 Chinese temporary visitors (see Pietsch 2018).
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ethnic vote is due to the changing nature of immigration to Australia. 
During the later years of the 20th century, it became more multicultural, 
temporary and skills-based, focused on workers and students.3
These changes in the nature of the immigration system ignited a public 
debate on population pressures, housing and job security during the 
2019 NSW State election, which was held only months before the federal 
election. This issue became highly salient during the State campaign, with 
a video released showing NSW Labor Party Leader Michael Daley saying: 
‘Our children will flee [Sydney] and who will they be replaced with … 
they are being replaced by young people from typically Asia with PhDs’ 
(Pietsch 2019). Federal Labor immediately went into damage control, 
concerned about the upcoming federal election and a number of marginal 
seats with high populations of Asian voters. Revealing the high degree of 
sensitivity in some of Labor’s key migrant-heavy seats about perceptions 
of racism, Daley later offered his resignation so as not to hurt the federal 
election campaign. 
The 2019 election and the Chinese vote
During the federal election campaign, there was a great deal of concern 
about how both of the major parties were being perceived among Asian 
migrants in key marginal seats. This was particularly evident in the middle-
suburban Melbourne seat of Chisholm, where it was claimed that East 
Asian voters made up more than 30 per cent of the population and would 
be decisive in the outcome for that electorate. In particular, it was pointed 
out that approximately 20 per cent of Chisholm residents spoke Chinese 
(Pietsch 2017a). Both the major parties recruited Chinese candidates to 
3  In the 1950s, almost half of all new migrants arriving in Australia came from the United 
Kingdom. This declined to 18 per cent by 2016. Over the same period, immigration from the People’s 
Republic of China shifted from a very small proportion of arrivals to Australia to one of the largest 
(Simon-Davies 2018). By 2016, 3.2 per cent of adults in Australia (including just over 1.6 per cent 
of citizens) were born in China, and more than 5.7 per cent had Chinese ancestry (including more 
than 3.6 per cent of citizens) (ABS 2016). In 2017, only 32.5 per cent of the total visas allocated 
were for permanent residency (Simon-Davies 2018) and many of these applications for permanent 
visas came from former international students. In recent years, the government reformed the visa 
system to narrow the list of occupations eligible for permanent visas, adjusted the points test used to 
evaluate applications, with a stronger emphasis on higher education and English-language ability, and 
made changes to temporary migration, restricting the type of occupations for which temporary visa 
applicants could apply (Boucher and Davidson 2019).
MoRRISoN'S MIRACLE
266
appeal to the ‘ethnic’ voter. The candidate for the Labor Party was Jennifer 
Yang from Taiwan and the Liberal Party candidate was Gladys Liu from 
Hong Kong.
At first glance, the claims that the ethnic vote (particularly the Chinese 
population) swung to the Coalition and helped it to hold marginal 
seats, such as Chisholm, seems reasonable. Liberal candidate Gladys Liu 
narrowly won the seat with an active campaign against the Safe Schools 
program, which was introduced into Victorian schools by the State 
Government4 to address the issue of bullying of lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender, queer and intersex (LGBTQI) students. According to Liu: 
The Chinese believe same-sex [marriage] is against normal practice 
[and] … Chinese people come to Australia because they want 
good … things for the next generation, not to be destroyed—
they use the word destroyed—[by] same-sex, transgender, inter-
gender. All this rubbish. To them, they are just ridiculous rubbish. 
(Burton-Bradley 2019)
Comments made by Liu in 2016 also surfaced during the campaign, 
in which she described LGBTQI issues as ‘ridiculous rubbish’ 
(Burton-Bradley 2019).
There was also concern that the Liberal campaign displayed Chinese-
language signs at polling booths with the appearance of official AEC 
notices, telling voters that the ‘correct’ way to vote was to put a number 1 
next to the Liberal candidate. These signs were the subject of a High Court 
challenge (see Chapter 3, this volume). A similar campaign was observed 
on WeChat, a Chinese-language social media platform, providing 
how-to-vote instructions that recommended support for Liu (see Karp 
2019). There was some concern that this signage would take advantage 
of language (and other) barriers and divert Chinese-speaking Australians 
towards the Coalition (Pietsch 2018).
Testing these claims
Combined, these claims assert that the Coalition benefited from the 
Chinese  vote, which was more socially conservative than the rest of 
the  electorate, open to manipulation due to language barriers and 
strategically located in marginal electorates (including Chisholm). 
We question these assertions.
4  Initially, with some federal funding.
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Some of these election narratives regarded the Chinese vote as critical 
in key  seats such as Chisholm in Melbourne and Barton in Sydney 
(Jakubowicz  and Ho 2019). While the Chinese vote is large in these 
electorates and a few others, it makes up a smaller proportion of the 
electorate than many of these claims suggest. Most observers mistake 
the  total Chinese population for the citizen population. While more 
than one-quarter of Chisholm’s adult population is ethnically Chinese 
(self-identifying as having Chinese ancestry), most are not Australian 
citizens and could not vote in the federal election. Similarly, while nearly 
one-quarter of Chisholm residents aged over 18 reported speaking 
a Chinese language at home, most of these Chinese speakers were not 
Australian citizens. Overall, 14 per cent of Chisholm’s adult citizens had 
Chinese ancestry and just over 11 per cent spoke a Chinese language at 
home (ABS 2016). This makes the Chinese component somewhat less 
dominant in these areas than is sometimes asserted. Additionally, regardless 
of the size of the Chinese vote in Chisholm and similar electorates, there 
is little evidence Chinese social conservatism (if it exists) was decisive in 
any way. The first-preference and two-party-preferred swings against the 
Coalition were actually larger in Chisholm than the Victorian average, 
suggesting that any appeal to Chinese social conservatism or tricks 
designed to take advantage of language barriers provided little benefit to 
the Liberal candidate.
There are also doubts about whether Chinese Australians are actually 
more socially conservative than other voters, and whether they shifted 
to the Coalition in 2019. We test this by examining voting intention 
by respondents’ ancestry and attitudes towards same-sex marriage 
(Figures 12.11 and 12.12). We find that, generally speaking, there is little 
difference in the attitudes towards same-sex rights by ancestry and that 
Chinese voters (in our sample, at least) are actually less likely than other 
voters to say same-sex rights have gone too far.
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Figure 12.11 First‑preference vote intention for the House 
of Representatives, by ancestry
Note: Points are scaled by the number of weighted respondents identifying with each 
ancestry category . Respondents were able to select two ancestry categories . 
Source: Data from Ratcliff and Jackman (2019).
Figure 12.12 Belief that rights for same‑sex couples have gone too far, 
by ancestry
Notes: The question asked was: ‘The statements below indicate some of the changes that 
have been happening in Australia over the years . For each one, please say whether you 
think the change has gone too far, not gone far enough, or is it about right . The rights of 
same‑sex couples .’ Points are scaled by the number of weighted respondents identifying 
with each ancestry category . Respondents were able to select two ancestry categories . 
Source: Ratcliff and Jackman (2019).
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We also examined the rate of defection of voters with Chinese ancestry 
and other voters from the Labor Party and Coalition between 2016 and 
2019. Shown in Figures 12.13 and 12.14, these indicate that Chinese 
Australians did not shift their party support from the Labor Party to the 
Coalition at a greater rate than other voters. The Coalition may have been 
slightly more successful holding on to Chinese-ancestry voters, but not 
to the extent that it would likely have made a major difference to the 
election result.
Figure 12.13 First‑preference defections from Labor for the House 
of Representatives, by Chinese ancestry
Source: Ratcliff and Jackman (2019).
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Figure 12.14 First‑preference defections from the Coalition for the 
House of Representatives, by Chinese ancestry
Source: Ratcliff and Jackman (2019).
Discussion and conclusion
The 2019 Australian election was framed around significant policy 
differences, with real winners and losers. As a result, narratives developed 
around the (generally unexpected) outcome. It was claimed the centre-left 
Labor Party had become the party of the elites and its negative gearing 
policies had reduced its support among the very voters they were meant 
to help, who instead voted for the Liberal–National Coalition. It was 
also asserted that the ‘ethnic’ vote helped the Coalition win the election, 
with the 2017 same-sex marriage postal survey activating the socially 
conservative politics of certain groups of voters, and in particular the 
Chinese community.
We find there is little evidence to support these narratives.
271
12 . VoTER BEHAVIoUR
Chinese Australians do not appear to have favoured or swung towards the 
Coalition. There is little evidence that they thought the rights of same-sex 
couples had gone too far or that attitudes about this issue drove voters 
towards the parties of the centre-right. We also find that the traditional 
economic cleavages remain intact. However, we also find an equally 
powerful counternarrative to these—one that is supported by the data. 
Labor made the most explicit pitch to younger, generally lower-income 
renters—or at least, against older, more affluent voters—of any major 
party in recent Australian history. It was also expected to win. It did not.
One possible reason is that support for negative gearing is more 
concentrated, particularly among those likely to benefit from it: the older, 
the affluent and those who own real estate. Conversely, opposition is 
limited and diffuse. Those less likely to benefit are generally more likely 
to not hold an opinion than oppose the policy. Arguably, this limited any 
electoral benefits Labor may have been able to obtain from its policy in 
this space.
As the electorate continues to age, the strategy adopted by Labor will 
probably struggle to attract sufficient numbers of voters in a sufficient 
number of electorates to win a majority in the House of Representatives. 
This is not to say that the Labor Party is incapable of forming government 
in Australia, either now or in the future. However, it may suggest that 
the dividends earned by electoral strategies that explicitly target younger 
voters over older ones may decline over time. Moreover, the most salient 
issues among the population generally—economic management, health, 
education and the environment—increasingly involve intergenerational 
trade-offs. An issue such as climate change may be viewed as a form of 
zero-sum calculation for many voters. For every younger person whose 
future welfare may be enhanced by actions to reduce the potential effects 
of climate change, the return from an older voter’s superannuation 
may be jeopardised. The policy reality of this calculation is largely 
irrelevant. Perceptions are potentially more important. Current and 
future governments in Australia face the challenge of convincing older 
generations that they will not be bearing the costs of long-term policies 
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The Australian Labor Party was widely predicted to win the 2019 federal 
election, and against these expectations it fell short. This chapter offers an 
outline of some of the decisive factors in Labor’s campaign that shaped 
its unexpected loss. Immediately following the election defeat, there was 
a plethora of commentary that sought to offer explanations for Labor’s 
poor electoral performance. Post election, Labor’s own review confirmed 
many of the common explanations for the defeat (ALP 2019). This 
chapter seeks to distil this wider commentary and make some evaluative 
judgements about the range of factors posited for the poor result. As the 
editors argue in the opening chapter of this volume, the result can be 
seen as ‘overdetermined’, with a plethora of possible factors to account 
for the result.
The chapter is organised in the following way. First, the analytical 
approach of the chapter is briefly outlined—a comparative ‘hybrid’ 
approach. Second, Labor’s result is located in the wider debates about 
the crisis of European social democracy. Third, the chapter gives a brief 
description of the key features of Labor’s campaign. Fourth—and the core 




Ideas, institutions and individuals
In the study of labour and social-democratic politics, a range of analytical 
approaches is available (see Randall 2003). The hybrid approach 
adopted  here follows the work of British political scientist Tim Bale 
(for  example, Bale 2010). The chapter examines the performance of 
Labor through three key themes: individuals, ideas and institutions. 
In  brief, the theme of ‘individuals’ examines issues of agency, the role 
of key actors and, crucially, a focus on leadership factors. The theme of 
ideas explores the impact of the role of ideology and related policy issues 
in explaining Labor’s defeat. The institutional theme explores the wider 
structural factors that contributed to Labor’s defeat, and this includes 
Labor’s campaign, but also wider factors such as the turbulence in the 
Australian party system. Overall, these three themes are interconnected 
and interdependent. Agents and actors offer ideas and policies, which are 
shaped by the institutional and structural context. 
The crisis of social democracy
Before focusing on Labor’s campaign, it is useful to contextualise 
Labor’s defeat in the wider crisis of social democracy (Bailey et al. 2016; 
Keating and McCrone 2013; Manwaring and Kennedy 2018). While 
the Australian 2019 election result was a surprise, against the backdrop 
of the wider decline of the electoral fortunes of the family of social-
democratic and labour parties, it is probably less surprising. Much like 
its European counterparts, Labor’s structural vote, if gauged by its first 
preferences, appears to be in decline (see Figure 13.1). In 1983, Labor 
won nearly 50 per cent of the primary vote; in 2019, it was down to 
33 per cent. Labor has not won an election outright since Kevin Rudd’s 
2007 win. It is notable that Labor’s past three election results are among 
the lowest first-preference tallies it has received since the 1980s. The ALP’s 
2010 national review outlined and acknowledged many of the features 
of the structural decline of the party, especially declining union density, 
declining party membership and a decline in supporters’ identification 
with the party (Manwaring 2011). 
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Figure 13.1 ALP first preferences, 1980–2019
source: compiled by author.
A comparative perspective only reaffirms this ongoing structural problem. 
In Figure 13.2, Labor’s vote share is compared with a range of key sister 
centre-left parties, and this suggests a much wider issue for Labor than 
just the specific problems that shaped its 2019 performance. Ultimately, 
the centre-left parties face a wider structural change in the family of 
party systems and an erosion of their support base. They are struggling 
to win elections. In 2019, the main traditional centre-left parties were 
out of office in a range of countries, including the United Kingdom, 
France, Germany and Italy. While there are clear outliers and positive 
cases (Portugal, Denmark and New Zealand, for example), there remain 
ongoing debates about how the centre-left might revitalise its mission 
(Keating and McCrone 2013). The result of the 2019 Australian election, 
with Labor’s electoral woes, can offer insights into the wider debates about 
the crisis of social democracy.
Carol Johnson, in her insightful chapter on ideology in this volume, 
argues  that Labor pursued a relatively traditional social-democratic 
strategy. While agreeing with this judgement, I would emphasise that 
Australian Labor in 2019 offered a ‘technocratic’ form of social democracy. 
By technocratic, following Rundle (2019), we can suggest that Labor’s 
agenda, while egalitarian, was focused more on specific policy fixes, 
mechanisms and instruments than on offering a coherent vision of a more 
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egalitarian Australia.1 Labor’s technocratic approach seemed to distance 
itself from the everyday concerns of the wider public. Despite the breadth 
of Labor’s policy agenda—and like many of its European sister parties—
it is facing similar structural problems in galvanising its support base. 
Figure 13.2 Centre-left parties’ share of the vote
source: Manifesto Project Dataset (version 2019b): doi.org/10.25522/manifesto.mpds.2019b.
Labor’s campaign
Labor’s campaign had four key features: it was the result of a long-term 
strategy, it was policy rich, it reflected positional differences and it strongly 
emphasised distributional outcomes.
Labor’s campaign was a two-election campaign and, ultimately, its roots, 
key messages and policy approaches were entrenched from the 2013 
election loss and Bill Shorten’s time as leader. At the 2016 election, Labor’s 
campaign strategy was policy-rich and made a virtue of a relatively strong 
1  In this chapter, the term ‘technocratic’ social democracy is used to broadly describe Labor’s 
agenda. It is technocratic in two main senses. First, following Rundle (2019), Labor’s primary concern 
was focused on specific policy fixes (for example, the franking credit tax concessions) to fill a diffuse, 
ill-defined ‘vision’ of social democracy. In contrast, a more coherent form of social democracy has, 
arguably, a clearer definition of its core mission, and its policy approaches stem from this. Second, it 
was technocratic in that Labor was either unwilling or unable to redeploy more ‘traditional’ policy 
instruments (such as a more expansive welfare state) and, as a result, it had to rely on and find more 
specific indirect tax policy instruments. 
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front bench. As Stephen Mills outlines in his chapter in this volume, Labor 
offered a ‘challenger’ campaign in 2019 and again sought to make a virtue 
of the strong, unified front bench. Labor’s policy focus was a deliberate 
attempt to remove attention from Shorten’s leadership limitations and 
public unpopularity. In 2016, Labor set out its ‘100 popular policies’. The 
foundations for the 2019 campaign were laid from 2013. Given the better 
than expected results at the 2016 election, this was seen as a solid strategy. 
Labor offered a ‘big target’ strategy, in that it sought to win office by 
giving salience to key policy issues that showed clear positional space 
between itself and the Coalition. Moreover, as detailed in Figure 13.3, 
Labor set out many more policies (69 listed) than the Coalition (42).2 
Across the range of 22 issues covered in Figure 13.3, it is striking that in 
only three areas (business, small to medium enterprises and defence) did 
the Coalition have ‘more’ prominent policies than Labor. Labor’s was an 
ambitious, wide-ranging policy agenda, which, judging by the election 
result, was perceived as too ambitious, unworkable or reckless.
Figure 13.3 Key policy offerings of major parties, 2019 federal election
source: Donegan and Jeyaratnam (2019).
2  Data taken from The Conversation’s overview of key policy issues for each of the two main parties 
(Donegan and Jeyaratnam 2019). Note this is not a comprehensive overview of all the major parties’ 




Labor’s key campaign slogan was its message of a ‘Fair go for Australia’. 
As a slogan, it lacked flair or innovation, but it did largely reflect the 
distributional impact of Labor’s agenda. In trying to understand the impact 
of election campaign effects, we can distinguish between the impact of 
valency and positional types of election issues (Brady and Johnston 2006: 
8). Valency issues reflect shared ends but parties offering different routes 
to the same ends. Positional issues are those for which parties offer quite 
different policy choices for voters. There is some evidence that, unlike 
countries such as the United Kingdom (Brexit aside), in Australian election 
campaigns valency issues have not been a striking feature (see McAllister 
et al. 2015). Labor’s 2016 and 2019 campaigns strongly reflect a campaign 
shaped by a strong focus on policy positional differences. 
While Labor has often campaigned on the theme of equality or fairness, 
what was markedly different in its 2019 ‘fair go’ campaign was a much 
stronger focus on tackling economic inequality by targeting high-income 
earners and big business—the ‘big end of town’. Yet, rather than seek 
to reduce economic and social inequality through ‘traditional’ social-
democratic ‘tax and spend’ approaches (such as a more expansive 
welfare  state), it used more ‘technocratic’ measures, especially through 
hitherto rather little-known tax concessions. There were three main 
themes to Labor’s tax policy campaign, centring on income tax, housing 
and tax concessions:
• Tax relief for low and middle-income earners (Labor pledged to match 
the Coalition’s tax relief rebate of $1,080 for those earning less than 
$48,000 and offered tax relief worth up to $350 for low-income 
workers earning up to $37,000).
• Abolition of negative gearing for investors buying existing houses from 
January 2020 and halving of capital gains tax discount for investment 
properties.
• Ending of cash rebates for excess franking credits, preventing self-
funded retirees receiving tax refunds (creating an estimated revenue 
of $10.7 billion over four years).
Labor’s strategy was clear. First, the tax cuts for low to medium-income 
earners were to neutralise criticism that Labor was anti–tax cuts, and to 
highlight the Coalition’s far more regressive, and long-term, staged tax 
plan. Second, the focus on tax concessions framed them as an outdated 
‘gift’ for high-income earners and the revenue created would enable Labor 
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to underwrite its ambitious spending plans. This technocratic approach 
meant that Labor could avoid having to reform more traditional taxation 
mechanisms such as income tax or social insurance increases or reheating 
the debates about the GST. Third, the appeal to reform housing tax 
concessions was part of a bid to tackle housing affordability and access 
issues. Labor sought to temper anxiety about its ambitious tax reforms 
by promising a larger surplus than that promised by the Coalition 
(Chan 2019). 
The second part of Labor’s campaign was a series of ambitious spending 
pledges, which included:
• $2.3 billion Medicare cancer plan and $2.4 billion dental-care plan 
for older people
• additional $3.3 billion to public schools over three years 
• commitment to introduce a ‘living wage’, pegged to the national 
minimum wage 
• new $5 billion fund to modernise electricity transmission infrastructure
• reverse penalty rate cuts for retail and hospitality workers
• pay increase for childcare workers. 
Overall, Labor’s campaign was pitched around core themes of significant 
tax changes to increase government revenue, linked to a clear redistributive 
agenda, across a range of areas.
To some extent, this was an uneventful campaign for Labor, in that there 
were relatively few gaffes, unexpected events or specific missteps that 
proved decisive. As Brady and Johnston (2006) note, election campaigns 
are not limited to the usual short four–five-week campaign prior to the 
election date (see also Chapter 2, this volume). Labor’s campaign in 2019 
needs to be understood as part of a two-election strategy, with the core 
of its policy agenda built into the foundations of the run-up to the 2016 
campaign. Labor hoped it could reassure voters about its ambitious, 
policy-rich agenda by releasing many of the key flagship proposals early. 
A key event in Labor’s 2019 campaign was the 2018 ALP national 
conference. Here, as explored below, a number of key damaging policy 
issues, especially immigration, were ‘neutralised’ in a bid to demonstrate 
electoral capacity (Norman and Belot 2018). 
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The short campaign reflected key tensions in Labor’s strategy. On the one 
hand, it wanted to appeal with an ambitious, wideranging policy agenda, 
yet on the other, it was forced to be defensive and temper its ambition 
by downplaying any potential negative economic impacts. The overall 
claim made here about Labor’s campaign is that, arguably, very few specific 
events had decisive electoral effects on the results; rather, a wider range of 
factors might better explain the election result and, crucially, Labor’s loss. 
Individuals
In this section, we consider the key factor of agency and, specifically, 
the role of leadership factors that proved decisive in the election loss. 
A  prevailing narrative both throughout and after the election result 
was that Labor’s campaign was held back by having Shorten as leader 
(Cameron and McAllister 2019; Murphy 2019; Powell 2019). The Liberal 
campaign was negative and its ‘Bill we can’t afford’ slogan neatly captured 
specific anxieties about Labor and Shorten’s ability to govern or secure 
wider electoral support. Yet, polling data and AES data on leadership 
might suggest that, while this was a factor, it was only one of a number. 
First, despite claims about Morrison’s more ‘presidential’ campaign, the 
impact of personalisation and individual leadership on electoral outcomes 
seems mixed. Intriguingly, despite the high churn of Australians prime 
ministers over recent years, since 2004, AES data suggest there has been 
a steady decline in voters citing the party leader as a key consideration in 
their voting decision (Cameron and McAllister 2016: 24). At the 2004 
election, ‘party leader’ was cited by 19 per cent of those polled, but by 
only 9 per cent at the 2016 election. Yet, there is no doubt that Shorten 
was never able to cut through and achieve much in the way of widespread 
popularity and it is noteworthy that he was more unpopular than Tony 
Abbott in 2013 (Cameron and McAllister 2019). Labor’s effort to counter 
this was by presenting a strong front bench, although, as Stephen Mills 
notes (in Chapter 23, this volume), this had at best a limited impact. 
Late in the campaign, in what was clearly crass overreach, Sydney’s Daily 
Telegraph launched a scathing attack on Shorten for what it claimed was 
his misrepresentation of his background and his upbringing by his mother. 
An emotional Shorten hit back at the media and, among the political 
commentariat, this appeared to help soften his image and ‘humanise’ him. 
However, this incident arguably had no impact on improving his public 
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image, as Shorten was consistently deemed an unpopular leader in the 
polls (Martin 2019). In terms of public persona, Shorten certainly fell 
well short of veteran party leader and legend Bob Hawke, who passed 
away at the end of the campaign, but also striking is the difference with 
Jacinda Ardern in New Zealand, where leadership effects clearly played 
a part in turning around the electoral fortunes of New Zealand Labour. 
We can note other individuals and actors involved in shaping Labor’s 
campaign, although their overall impact was seemingly negligible. One 
key moment in the campaign was at Labor’s official launch, which saw 
together for the first time Hawke, Paul Keating and, critically, Kevin 
Rudd and Julia Gillard. It was a specific effort to show party unity and 
to contrast with the more recent leadership instability that characterised 
Morrison’s rise to power. In sum, we can note that Shorten’s lack of appeal 
may have helped fuel misgivings among some about a potential Labor 
government. Yet, in and of itself, it offers just a partial explanation.
Ideas
Labor’s loss is arguably rooted in the tensions, dilemmas and limitations 
posed by its ideational and policy agenda. A useful framework with which 
to understand the dilemmas and trade-offs in political and policy ideas 
is provided by Jenny Stewart’s (2009) work on policy values. Stewart 
distinguishes between different types of values, two of the main types 
of which are ‘outcome’ and ‘design’ values (Stewart 2009: 27–28). 
Outcome values reflect the desired end point and design values reflect the 
institutional choices made to implement these values. Stewart’s key insight 
is that values often entail ‘shadow’ values that are sometimes ‘sacrificed’ 
(in her example, ‘greenness’ can come at the expense of economic growth) 
(Stewart 2009: 27). For the purposes of this chapter, the central point is 
that it was not just the breadth of Labor’s ideological and policy agenda, 
but also the inherent value conflicts and trade-offs, that ultimately 
hampered its electoral performance. Here we can identify four key policy 
and ideational trade-offs in Labor’s agenda: 
1. vision versus policy specificity
2. outputs versus outcomes (tax versus spend)
3. environmental issues versus economic growth
4. inequality versus efficiency.
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As outlined above, Labor offered one of the most policy-rich agendas in 
its recent electoral history. It offered a broad canvas, with key flagship 
issues in areas including environmental and climate policy, health, energy 
and tax policy. One upshot was that Labor was unable to sufficiently 
control the discussion of its policy agenda—an insight shared by 
a number of contributors to this volume and indeed by the ALP in its 
post-election review (ALP 2019). Initially, Shorten’s focus was on the 
election as a ‘referendum on wages’, but during the short campaign it 
quickly moved on to other issues—for example, threatening that it would 
be the ‘climate change election’ (Aly 2019; Robinson 2019). The ‘fair 
go’ proved an inadequate organising theme to give coherence to the new 
agenda. As political scientist Stuart Ball (2005) notes, to win government, 
an Opposition needs a ‘new agenda’; and, while Labor clearly had this, 
it proved insufficiently coherent. In sum, diversity came at the expense 
of focus.
One criticism levelled at Labor was that it lacked an overarching, 
credible narrative or ‘vision’ (Rundle 2019). Labor was forced to spend 
a  significant part of the campaign explaining its policy agenda, rather 
than outlining its future aspirations for the country. Perhaps a telling 
moment in the campaign that captured Labor’s dilemma was during the 
second televised leaders’ debate when Morrison was happy to concede 
time to Shorten with the quip, ‘Bill has more taxes to explain’. Touché. 
One insightful comparison has been made with Ed Miliband’s ill-fated 
election campaign in 2015 in the United Kingdom (Chiu 2019). Miliband 
was often hamstrung by launching numerous policies and then losing 
valuable political capital by having to explain them (Bale 2015). Labor 
had some similar struggles. On announcing the pay increase for childcare 
workers—a seemingly popular policy—Labor was forced to explain why 
this sector was singled out for special treatment. Tellingly, the Liberals were 
not penalised for having no such plans. Likewise, in one clear moment of 
electoral jitters, Labor quickly decided to adopt the Coalition’s housing 
policy to offer a guarantee for first-time homebuyers. In brief, Labor’s 
focus on policy detail, with numerous policy and spending offerings, 
came at the cost of explaining its core mission. 
A second, ultimately damaging, policy trade-off that Labor did not 
manage to resolve was the balance between policy outputs and outcomes. 
The difficulty here is to have clear linkages between the mechanisms and 
instruments that will be employed in government and the tangible public 
goods that will be delivered as a result. The net effect was that Labor had 
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to devote disproportionate time to explaining its tax policy (outputs) at 
the expense of describing the potential benefits of the changes (outcomes). 
In  a revealing interview after the election result, Labor Deputy Leader 
Tanya Plibersek acknowledged this as a factor, especially with what she 
saw as a  credible infrastructure plan for Queensland (ABC 2019). The 
upshot is that Labor appeared to suffer electorally from having a weak 
link between its key policy mechanisms (especially the fears raised about 
its tax agenda) and the speed, tangibility and credibility of the eventual 
outcomes. 
This fed into a further policy trade-off between the environment/
climate policy and economic growth. It seemed a shrewd tactical move 
by Labor to coopt the Coalition’s National Energy Guarantee (NEG), 
buttressed with a strong commitment to a renewable energy target of 
50 per cent by 2030. Adopting the NEG was a way to neutralise previous 
damaging debates about introducing a carbon pricing mechanism. Yet, 
Labor lacked credibility here, in part because of its ambivalence over the 
Adani coalmine, which became something of a lightning rod for wider 
uncertainty about Labor’s ability to balance environmental and economic 
concerns (Aly 2019). 
Finally, we can note a policy dilemma that proved damaging to Labor’s 
campaign: the trade-off between equality and efficiency. This was 
compounded by Labor not explaining its flagship policies clearly enough. 
For example, Labor’s tax policy was targeted at the ‘top end of town’. The 
eventual election result suggested that—most strikingly in Queensland—
it was unclear who was meant by the ‘top end of town’. Here, Labor 
was seemingly prioritising reducing economic inequality rather than 
stimulating economic and employment growth (and market efficiency). 
This focus on tackling (in)equality over efficiency was most keenly felt 
by relatively well-paid workers in the resources sector who feared job 
insecurity from both the end of the mining boom and the debates about 
the future of energy in the country. Likewise, Labor’s ‘franking’ credits 
policy was convincingly relabelled a ‘retiree’ tax, in part because it was not 
fully clear which groups might be adversely affected. It was another policy 
that required further explanation. The more fundamental problem with 
the franking credits policy was that Labor was perceived to be targeting the 
most affluent groups at the expense of offering a nuanced policy agenda 
that enabled broader economic growth and market efficiency. It is worth 
contrasting the ALP’s approach to tackling inequality with that of New 
Labour in the United Kingdom. New Labour targeted its rhetoric and 
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policy at uplifting the most economically vulnerable groups rather than 
having direct confrontation with the wealthiest groups. In contrast, the 
ALP explicitly targeted a suite of policies at ‘the top end of town’, which 
gave license to the scare campaign that it would introduce a ‘death tax’. 
Overall, we might make some tentative evaluations of Labor’s policy and 
ideological agenda. Following Brady and Johnston (2006: 8), we can 
differentiate between two key areas of effective campaigning: persuasion 
and priming. In terms of persuasion, Labor was damaged by the scare 
campaign about its tax plans. It is striking that not only the Liberals, 
but also the UAP, the Centre Alliance and others explicitly targeted 
Labor on its supposed ‘retiree tax’. The election result suggests Labor 
could not satisfactorily resolve a number of the policy trade-offs outlined 
above. As a result, Labor was not persuasive enough on its policy agenda. 
Second, Brady and Johnston (2006: 8) note the role of priming, in which 
‘campaigns can shape public opinion by making certain issues salient to 
voters’. Labor had problems with priming the public on its policy agenda. 
The breadth of its agenda meant it proved difficult to sufficiently hold key 
swing voters on its core campaign issues—for example, wage stagnation.
It is worth noting that, while Labor lost, against expectations, it lost only 
narrowly. The close and unexpected result can obscure the significant 
amount of work Labor undertook to build its ideational and policy 
agenda. Critically, at its 2018 national conference, it had neutralised the 
issue of immigration—much to the chagrin of refugee advocacy groups. 
This might not have had any negative impact for Labor, but it certainly 
gave them no positive uplift. Similarly, the vexed issue of increasing the 
Newstart allowance was ‘parked’ by Labor by its promise of a review. 
It was striking, too, that seemingly controversial social policies, such 
as the progressive and well overdue policy announcement about access 
to abortion services, did not have any significant public backlash. 
Interestingly, this issue reflects Labor’s ongoing shift to expand its concept 
of equality (Johnson, Chapter 5, this volume). 
In sum, Labor’s ability to persuade and prime on its ideological 
commitments and policy was curtailed, due in part to some of the difficult 
policy trade-offs interwoven in its agenda. Labor did not lose the battle 
of ideas, not least because the Coalition offered so few in reply; rather it 
was punished due to some of the policy tensions inherent in its offerings. 
However, none of these was fully apparent until the polling booths closed. 
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Institutions
Institutional factors encompass both the role of key institutions in shaping 
electoral outcomes and what is more accurately described as structural 
factors, such as the changing shape of Australia’s party system. Institutional 
and structural factors clearly had an impact on Labor’s performance. 
The Labor machine seemingly ran a campaign beset by various 
difficulties (Williams 2019). Immediately after the election, a number 
of anonymous Labor sources pointed out that Noah Carroll, who led 
Labor’s campaign, had made some strategic mistakes. A key finding 
from Labor’s own post-election review was the party’s failure to establish 
a  formal campaign committee (ALP 2019: 9). Moreover, the decision 
to base the campaign headquarters in Western Sydney proved a mistake 
(Uhlmann 2019). Labor’s internal polling also, apparently, was far from 
accurate (indeed, much like the national polls), which may have created 
inaccurate feedback loops for campaign headquarters. Labor’s polling may 
have underestimated Shorten’s unpopularity. While Labor raised funds 
and mobilised volunteers and the like, its strategic message failed to cut 
through in the right marginal seats. Again, much of this may have been 
apparent only after the poor result for Labor.
A second institutional factor that some critics pointed to was the role of 
Chris Bowen as shadow treasurer. Much was made of his quip that ‘people 
can always choose to not vote for us’ in his defence of the franking credits 
policy. However, according to some anonymous Labor sources, it was his 
institutional role as treasurer that may have proved damaging. Arguably, 
a key role as (shadow) treasurer is to have the thankless task of saying 
‘no’ to shadow Cabinet colleagues in their ambitious spending claims. In 
part, the argument is that Bowen was insufficiently resilient in reining in 
Labor’s spending pledges. This, of course, remains speculative, and the 
impact is hard to measure. 
We might also note other institutional factors, perhaps including the 
lacklustre campaign run by the ACTU (see Chapter 20, this volume; 
also Karp 2019). At certain elections, union campaigns have helped 
Labor—notably, the WorkChoices campaign of 2007, but also at the 
State level, with union mobilisation assisting Daniel Andrews in Victoria, 
for example. The ACTU’s ‘Change the rules’ campaign, while worthy in 
aiming at systemic change, was seen as misconceived and, crucially, lacking 
public cut-through. Labor may not have been hindered by the campaign, 
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but it seemed to have no positive impact on the result. We might also add 
here that the impact of factional stability within the party, with the ALP 
clearly learning the lessons of the Rudd–Gillard years, was neutral, rather 
than positive. 
Finally, we can note other institutional factors—not least the issue of 
campaign spending. Labor’s campaign can only be seen in the wider 
context of the campaigns of other parties, and especially their different 
funding levels. Critically, Clive Palmer’s UAP spent significantly 
more than Labor, with an estimated $55 million outspending of Labor’s 
$13–15 million (Koslowski 2019). The negative UAP advertisements had 
little direct electoral benefit to Palmer’s party, but they helped bolster the 
Liberals in an effective scare campaign. These institutional factors link 
with Shorten’s post-election critique of the ‘vested interests’ that Labor 
faces. Indeed, Labor has always faced systemic pressures within a capitalist 
market economy (for example, Johnson 2019).
Finally, we can point to wider structural changes, especially in Australia’s 
party system, having a clear impact—less as an explanatory factor to 
describe Labor’s loss in 2019, and more in placing tougher structural 
constraints on Labor’s ability to manoeuvre. Two related factors play out 
here. First, as noted elsewhere, Australia’s party system is shifting and, 
again, we see record numbers of voters turning away from the major 
parties. The rise of the minor parties and the role of Independents are 
significant for the major parties, but this also means that elections are now 
far more seat-by-seat in focus, and Labor cannot rely on the same residual 
support. If we link this to the wider issue of the crisis of social democracy, 
this raises key issues for Labor and its future relations with the Greens, and 
the extent to which it must countenance future regular coalition-building 
(see Holloway et al. 2018). Labor appears to be in structural decline and 
this is linked to declining union density and declining party membership. 
Conclusion
Against expectation, polling and wider predictions, Labor lost the 2019 
election. A plethora of articles in the immediate aftermath, many insightful, 
provides clues as to what proved decisive in Labor’s loss. The approach 
outlined here emphasises the range of institutional, ideational and 
individual factors that shaped the loss. The combination of an unpopular 
leader, an effective scare campaign targeting the policy tensions in Labor’s 
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ambitious agenda, linked to some wider institutional problems, meant 
that, while the overall result was close, Labor fell far short of its hopes. The 
Australian Labor Party is, then, another case of the ongoing travails of the 
centre-left, although compared with its Dutch, German, French or even 
UK counterparts, it has a firmer base on which to rebuild. 
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The Liberal Party entered the 2019 election campaign in a similar position 
to 2016. Its previous three years in office had been characterised by 
internal instability, ideological conflicts, policy stagnation and, ultimately, 
a change in leadership, with Scott Morrison replacing Malcom Turnbull as 
prime minister. Such instability normally suggests a government heading 
to electoral defeat and this was reflected in polling that consistently 
showed Labor leading the two-party-preferred vote, albeit by a relatively 
small margin. As a result, many political commentators were surprised on 
election night when the Coalition was returned to office, with the Prime 
Minister himself declaring he had ‘always believed in miracles’. 
This chapter analyses the Liberal campaign in 2019 and explores its 
broader implications for the Liberal Party’s ideological and organisational 
direction. After a brief summary of voting patterns, the first section 
analyses the key features of the party’s campaign strategy, comparing 
it with the 2016 campaign. It argues that, although both campaigns 
were light on policy detail, the 2019 campaign was more negative in its 
orientation, made greater use of online campaigning and was more in 
keeping with traditional Liberal campaign themes. The second section 
focuses on party organisation. It argues that there was a significant shift 
in the lead-up to the campaign as sitting Liberal MPs publicly criticised 
the underrepresentation of women within the party and called for the 
introduction of quotas. It seems unlikely, however, that major reform will 
occur in this area in the foreseeable future given the hostility to quotas and 
feminism within powerful sections of the party. This section also examines 
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disputes over the preselection process in New South Wales in the lead-
up to the 2019 campaign, arguing that it illustrates how difficult it is 
to democratise internal party processes. The third section of the chapter 
focuses on party ideology. Although some thought the Liberals would lose 
safe seats to moderate Independents in 2019, this occurred only in the 
seat of Warringah. Instead, the likely effect of the election was to reinforce 
the conservative ascendancy within the Liberal Party. 
The 2019 campaign
Although the election result was widely described as a disaster for Labor, 
in terms of seat share, the overall picture throughout the country was one 
of relative stability. The Liberals gained four seats and the LNP gained 
two. Three of the Liberal gains and the two LNP gains were from Labor. 
The Liberals also won a seat previously held by an Independent. It was 
a similar story in terms of the Liberal Party’s primary vote. According to 
the AEC, the party’s share of the primary vote declined by around 2 per 
cent in Victoria and Western Australia, while there was a small increase 
of around 0.5 per cent in Queensland. The largest gain was in South 
Australia, where the Liberals achieved a 5.5 per cent increase as a result 
of the 16.9 per cent decline in the Centre Alliance vote. As discussed 
elsewhere in this volume, the capacity of the Liberals to retain and win 
marginal seats in Queensland and Tasmania was crucial to the outcome of 
the election, and it is likely this was partly a result of a significant increase 
in support for right-wing populist parties. 
One of the major similarities between the 2016 and 2019 Liberal 
campaigns was the absence of major policy announcements. Turnbull’s 
2016 campaign focused strongly on corporate tax cuts that were set out in 
the 2016 federal Budget, and it featured few other major policies (Barry 
2018: 278). Similarly, tax cuts announced in the 2019 federal Budget—
handed down shortly before Morrison called the election—were key to 
the Morrison campaign. However, the 2019 Budget focused on income 
tax cuts, including a cash rebate of $1,080–$1,215 for workers earning 
$50,000–$90,000, targeting a group that received little from the 2016 
Budget (Murphy 2019a). It also entailed a medium-term flattening of the 
income tax system, so those with yearly incomes of $45,000–$200,000 
will pay a marginal tax rate of 30 per cent from 2024 (Karp 2019a), and 
$100 billion of infrastructure spending over the next 10 years, focusing 
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particularly on transport (Chan 2019). The large corporate tax cuts the 
government had previously supported were put aside (see Chapter 5, 
this volume). 
One of the major internal criticisms of the 2016 Liberal campaign was 
that it was not negative enough (see Barry 2018: 280). In contrast, attacks 
on the trustworthiness of Opposition leader Bill Shorten and Labor’s 
record on economic management were central to the 2019 campaign, and 
a major focus of Liberal campaign advertising. Labor’s relatively detailed 
set of policy announcements, particularly its policies on negative gearing 
and dividend imputation, were particular targets for criticism. Multiple 
advertisements used the slogan ‘Labor: It’s the Bill Australia can’t afford’ 
(Liberal Party of Australia 2019a, 2019b), while others described Shorten 
as ‘the greatest risk to Australia’s economy in a generation’ (Liberal Party 
of Australia 2019b). Mills (Chapter 23, this volume) suggests that aspects 
of the Liberal campaign in fact went beyond a merely negative campaign 
and became, instead, a scare campaign using misleading language such 
as ‘retiree tax’. Liberal advertising also falsely claimed that Labor was 
planning to reintroduce a ‘death tax’—a claim that was widely shared 
through social media (Murphy et al. 2019). 
Another major difference between the 2016 and 2019 elections was the 
Liberal Party’s capacity to engage in more effective online campaigning. 
One of the major criticisms of the 2016 campaign was that the party was 
lagging well behind Labor in this area (for example, Meers 2016; Barry 
2018). However, this changed in 2019, with the Liberals running a more 
organised and sophisticated social media campaign. Reports suggest there 
were significantly higher levels of engagement with the Liberal Party’s 
Facebook page and Scott Morrison’s Instagram account than with Labor’s 
Facebook page and Shorten’s Instagram account (Bourke 2019). The videos 
posted on the Liberal Facebook site also received a much higher number 
of views than Labor’s. There were 17,630,800 views of Liberal Facebook 
videos, while Labor Facebook videos were viewed only 5,940,500 times 
(Carson and Zion, Chapter 22, this volume; Knaus 2019). 
The rise of online campaigning also led to concerns about the integrity 
of  the  campaign. The Liberal Party benefited from Facebook posts that 
falsely  claimed Labor was planning to introduce an inheritance tax, 
although  the posts were unauthorised and the Liberals denied they were 
responsible for them (Wroe 2019). Similarly, Liberal supporters used 
WeChat to target campaign messages at the Chinese community, spreading 
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false information about Labor policies, with claims that Labor would 
increase the intake of refugees to 320,000 in 10 years and that ‘this group of 
refugees will surpass Australia’s entire Chinese immigrant population, and 
there will be more in the coming years and taxpayers will have to pay for it’ 
(Zong, cited in Karp 2019b). Another message falsely claimed that Labor 
would extend the Safe Schools program to all schools around Australia 
and that the aim of  the program was ‘to teach students same sex sexual 
intercourse’ and ‘that the following vocabulary cannot be used: dad, mum, 
older brother, younger brother, older sister, younger sister, uncle, aunt, boy, 
girl, pregnant, and other gendered words’ (Tomazin and Zhuang 2019). 
Although there is no indication the Liberal Party was officially involved 
in this campaign, the Liberal candidate (and now Member) for Chisholm, 
Gladys Liu, ran a similar campaign against Safe Schools on WeChat in 2016 
when she chaired the Victorian Liberal Party’s communities engagement 
committee (Hendrie 2016; Zhuang and Tomazin 2019). 
Another notable feature of the 2019 campaign was the emergence 
of Advance Australia, a conservative response to left-wing activist 
organisation GetUp!. According to its website, Advance Australia ‘is not 
a political party or aligned to any political organisation’, but it is led by 
Gerard Benedet, who was previously a Liberal staffer (Seo 2019). Two 
of the four major campaign issues listed on its website were targeted 
at Labor policies (on dividend imputation and emissions reduction). 
Its two other areas of focus were also issues that were major concerns 
of the Liberal Party’s conservative wing—preventing Australia Day 
being shifted from 26 January and changing Section 18C of the Racial 
Discrimination Act—while four of the five MPs it targeted for support 
during the 2019 campaign were conservative Liberals (Koslowski 
2019). The emergence of this organisation is potentially significant 
because one of the Liberal Party’s longstanding concerns—repeated in 
the aftermath of the 2016 campaign—was its weak capacity for on-the-
ground campaigning (Brett  2003; Barry 2018), and the emergence of 
Advance Australia potentially helps address this deficit. Although the 
organisation was ultimately unsuccessful in one of its chief aims—to help 
Tony Abbott retain his seat of Warringah (Koslowski 2019)—Advance 
Australia reportedly attracted 32,000 members in its first six months and 
$1.2 million in donations (Seo 2019). Its website also lists a number of 
wealthy backers on its advisory council, including Maurice Newman and 
Sam Kennard, so it is not impossible that it could become a significant 
campaign presence in the future. However, it is too early to reach any firm 
conclusions about what, if any, impact it will have in the long term.
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Although the Liberal campaign in 2019 departed in significant ways from 
its 2016 campaign, it is also important to note that some of the key themes 
were in keeping with a much longer Liberal tradition. In her work on 
the Liberal Party, Judith Brett (1992, 2003) has identified a continuous 
strand running through the rhetoric of the party and its prewar non-
Labor predecessors. The rhetorical strategy is to identify the Labor Party 
with class war and sectional interests, while positioning the Liberal Party 
as the party that is about the national interest and/or the interests of 
hardworking ‘mainstream’ Australia. Brett has argued that, in the postwar 
period, the foremost Liberal exponents of this approach were Robert 
Menzies, with his emphasis on the ‘Forgotten People’, and more recently, 
John Howard, who was ‘able to adapt the language and thinking carried in 
his party’s political traditions to the circumstances of his political present’ 
(Brett 2003: 184). 
Although Morrison did not exhibit Menzies’s or Howard’s creative use of 
language, he did draw on themes that were in line with this longstanding 
Liberal tradition. In fact, the speech he gave at the Liberal Party campaign 
launch had striking similarities with the kind of language Menzies, 
Howard and others had used. Morrison emphasised that the Liberal Party 
stood for aspiration and the ‘promise of Australia’ in contrast to Labor’s 
‘politics of envy’. His speech was filled with references to the importance 
of the family, the home and hard work, framed around Morrison’s own 
family and experiences:
Mum is a woman of great and practical faith, quietly and patiently 
loving us, always. Life is about what you contribute, not what you 
accumulate. That’s what mum and dad have taught me. It’s about 
serving others, because in life, it’s people that matter.
My family story is not uncommon in our country. Australians 
quietly going about their lives with simple, decent, honest 
aspirations. Get an education. Get a job. Start a business. Take 
responsibility for yourself, support others. Work hard. Deal with 
whatever challenges come your way. Meet someone amazing. 
I  did, there she is, Jenny. Create a life and a family together. 
Work even harder to support them and give them the choices and 
hopefully, an even better life than the one that you have. Save for 
your retirement and your future. Strive, wherever possible, to be 




There are parallels here with Menzies’s ‘Forgotten People’ speech. 
Alongside the emphasis on the family (and, by implication, the home), 
there is a  clear emphasis on moral values, reflecting the longstanding 
Liberal belief that ‘the middle-class … is not just an economic class but 
a moral category whose members are defined by their political values, 
social attitudes and moral qualities as much as by their social and 
economic position’ (Brett 1992: 41). This is reflected in the emphasis on 
contributing and not accumulating, saving for the future (cf. Brett 1992: 
59–60) and leaving a better life for one’s children. It is also a (presumably 
deliberate) attempt to distance the Liberals from Turnbull’s emphasis 
on Australia as ‘a nation that is agile, that is innovative, that is creative’ 
(Turnbull and Bishop 2015), which has connotations of entrepreneurial 
activity and constant change in a digital economy. 
In his victory speech on election night, Morrison emphasised that his 
election win was for the ‘quiet Australians’. Although this was probably an 
attempt to draw a line between his prime ministership and the perceived 
rancour and leadership instability that had characterised Australian 
politics since 2007 (Murphy 2019b), there was an obvious similarity 
to Menzies’s phrase ‘the Forgotten People’. Thus, the 2019 campaign 
represented a return to some longstanding themes of Liberal campaigns in 
Australia, which was perhaps a reflection of Labor’s renewed engagement 
with traditional issues of class and material inequality.
Party organisation and the 2019 election
The 2019 election also drew attention to a number of organisational issues 
confronting the Liberal Party. In particular, one of the marked features of 
the lead-up to the 2019 campaign was greater public discussion of the 
underrepresentation of women in the party. This issue had attracted some 
attention in the 2016 campaign because the number of women Liberal 
MPs was the lowest it had been since 1993 (Norman 2018a; see also Barry 
2018: 285). However, at that time, few sitting federal MPs were prepared 
to comment publicly on the issue. In the lead-up to the 2019 election, this 
changed, with Liberal senators Jane Hume and Linda Reynolds and MPs 
Melissa Price and Julia Banks publicly drawing attention to the problem 
(Norman 2018a). 
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The push for change gained further impetus following the leadership 
spill that resulted in Turnbull being replaced as prime minister. Many 
political commentators thought Morrison was less qualified for the job 
than foreign minister Julie Bishop, who was an experienced and popular 
politician, and they drew links between this and the Liberal Party’s 
underrepresentation of women. Moreover, a number of women within 
the Liberal Party, including Senator Lucy Gichuhi and Julia Banks, 
publicly alleged that supporters of leadership candidate Peter Dutton 
had engaged in forms of bullying and intimidation during the leadership 
dispute (Yaxley 2018). Minister for Women Kelly O’Dwyer supported 
these claims, commenting that ‘it is clear to me that people were subjected 
to threats and intimidation and bullying’ (Norman 2018b). 
One of the Liberal Party’s leading internal critics, Julia Banks, the Member 
for Chisholm, decided to quit the Liberals following the leadership change 
and sit as an Independent. In her speech to the parliament announcing 
this decision, Banks stated:
Equal representation of men and women in this parliament is an 
urgent imperative which will create a culture change. There’s the 
blinkered rejection of quotas and support of the merit myth, but 
this is more than a numbers game. Across both major parties, the 
level of regard and respect for women in politics is years behind 
the business world. There is also a clear need for an independent 
whistleblower system, as found in many workplaces, to enable 
reporting of misconduct of those in power without fear of reprisal 
or retribution. Often when good women call out or are subjected 
to bad behaviour, the reprisals, backlash and commentary portray 
them as the bad ones: the liar, the troublemaker, the emotionally 
unstable or weak, or someone who should be silenced. (Banks, in 
Commonwealth Parliament of Australia 2018)
In this way, Banks drew attention to the effect of the culture and behaviour 
within the parliament on female underrepresentation, while calling for the 
introduction of quotas to bring about more equal representation. Liberal 
frontbencher Sussan Ley also suggested this was a reform that should be 
considered (Murphy 2018). This is particularly notable as Ley became 
Minister for the Environment following the election, which means that, 
for the first time in recent memory, there is a sitting federal Liberal 
frontbencher who has seriously raised the prospect of introducing quotas. 
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There is substantial evidence that quotas are an effective way of 
addressing a gender imbalance in the representation of MPs (Baird and 
Bold 2019). However, the idea of affirmative action underlying quotas 
sits uneasily with Liberal Party ideology, as affirmative action reflects 
an acknowledgement that structural inequalities have played a role in 
generating the underrepresentation of women. Acknowledging this fact 
sits uneasily with both neoliberalism, with its emphasis on individuals 
competing in an unfettered free market, and conservatism, which is 
hostile to feminism and opposed to forms of intervention that challenge 
existing hierarchies. It is perhaps unsurprising that other parties on the 
right around the world tend to have a problem with the representation 
of women. For example, after the May 2019 elections for the European 
Parliament, all parties on the left and centre-left had at least 40 per cent 
female representation (Politico 2019). In contrast, most parties on the right 
and centre-right had female representation rates of less than 30 per cent 
(the exception was the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy group, 
which had 40.48 per cent). Given the broader ideological context, and 
the fact Morrison has explicitly rejected calls for quotas (SBS 2018), it 
is hard to imagine any significant action on this issue occurring in the 
next three years. Nonetheless, recent events suggest influential women 
within the Liberal Party are becoming increasingly concerned about 
underrepresentation and are prepared to publicly call for reform.
Another ongoing organisational issue for the Liberal Party relates to 
preselection. Over the past 10 years, the party has faced criticism, 
particularly in its NSW division, for a lack of democracy in the preselection 
process (Staley 2008: 23; Reith 2011: 23; Barry 2018: 161, 163–64). 
In the wake of the 2016 election, there was a strong push to adopt 
proper membership plebiscites for preselections in the NSW division, 
as recommended by a 2014 review led by former prime minister John 
Howard (Nicholls 2014). This culminated in the ‘Warringah motion’, 
which proposed the adoption of a ‘one-vote, one-member approach’ to 
membership involvement in preselections (McNally 2018). This motion 
was initiated by the Warringah branch of the party and backed by former 
prime minister and member for Warringah Tony Abbott (Chan 2017). The 
motion was passed with the support of 61 per cent of delegates attending 
the NSW Liberal Futures convention, which was a special convention 
held in 2017 to discuss preselection reforms (Knaus and Chan 2017). 
However, it was subsequently rejected at the annual general meeting 
of the NSW division in 2018, which instead endorsed the ‘Bennelong 
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motion’, which was a ‘watered-down’ alternative that gave party members 
the ability to preselect candidates while leaving ‘around 10 per cent of the 
preselection vote’ with the party hierarchy (McNally 2018). 
This shows how difficult it is to achieve internal party organisational 
reform, particularly if the reforms in question involve a ‘democratising’ of 
internal party processes. The problem is that it is difficult to achieve reform 
without winning agreement from those wielding power within the party 
under the existing structures. Because existing powerbrokers generally 
benefit from preserving the status quo, they are likely to be reluctant 
to embrace reform (see Coghlan and Denton 2012; Gauja 2012, 2017; 
Miragliotta 2013; Barry 2015, 2018). This is partly reflected in the fate of 
the Warringah motion, which was largely being pushed by the party’s right 
faction (which was likely to increase its power if preselection processes were 
democratised) and opposed by the moderate and centre-right factions, 
which currently wield most power within the NSW division (Nicholls 
2017).1 Nonetheless, the reform that occurred—even in its watered-down 
form—still had some significance, even if did not go as far as advocates 
of the Warringah motion desired. In the wake of the Bennelong motion 
being passed, Abbott, for example, stated: ‘The Liberal Party is still too 
much of an insiders’ club, but it’s much less of an insiders’ club than 
it was’ (cited in McNally 2018). Ultimately, the reform contributed to 
the defeat of Senator Jim Molan at the 2019 election. Molan, who was 
actually a supporter of party democratisation, ended up being preselected 
for the unwinnable fourth position on the Coalition’s NSW Senate ticket 
(Hunter and Loussikian 2018). 
A final twist in the recent history of Liberal Party preselection reform in 
New South Wales was Scott Morrison’s intervention to convince the State 
executive to cancel preselection votes in four seats so the sitting members 
were automatically re-endorsed (see Gauja and Taflaga, Chapter 4, this 
volume; Tillett 2018). The primary aim was to save conservative MP 
Craig Kelly, who was reportedly in danger of being dumped as the Liberal 
candidate for Hughes. Morrison’s intervention was clearly against the 
spirit of party democratisation and it further illustrates how difficult it is 
to achieve meaningful reform. Even when watered-down measures such 
1  As is often the case with internal party debates over organisational reform, there were other 
issues at play. In particular, the push for reform became entangled in the acrimony associated with the 
leadership dispute between Tony Abbott and Malcolm Turnbull (Chan 2017), while there were also 
concerns over potential branch-stacking (Nicholls 2017).
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as the Bennelong motion are adopted, there will always be a temptation 
for State executive intervention to cancel preselections or overturn 
decisions made at the local level, particularly when the authority of the 
parliamentary leader is at stake. 
Party ideology
The 2019 election result also has important implications for the ideological 
direction of the Liberal Party and its place in the party system. The major 
points of disagreement within the Liberals are not over economic policy, 
where there is support for a broadly neoliberal approach, but over social 
and environmental issues.2 When Turnbull took the party leadership from 
Abbott in the lead-up to the 2016 campaign, some believed this would 
mean a change in the ideological direction of the party as Turnbull had 
more progressive views on social and environmental issues than Abbott 
and many other Liberal MPs. However, from the outset of his prime 
ministership, Turnbull was constrained by internal forces within the 
Coalition. To win the leadership and become prime minister, he made 
agreements with conservative Liberal MPs and the Nationals to retain 
Abbott’s proposed plebiscite on same-sex marriage, rather than have a vote 
on the issue in parliament (Hartcher 2019b). Ultimately, the catalyst for 
the end of his prime ministership was climate change policy, which also 
ended his time as Opposition leader in 2009. Turnbull’s energy policy, 
the NEG, aimed to bring about a 26 per cent cut in carbon emissions by 
2030 (Knaus 2018). Although a majority of the party room supported 
the policy, Abbott and a number of other conservative MPs threatened 
to cross the floor on the Bill. As a result, Turnbull dropped the reduction 
target from the NEG; however, this was not enough to save him from 
being deposed as prime minister following a leadership challenge led by 
conservative MPs. 
2  There is not space in this chapter for a detailed account of what is meant by the terms 
‘conservative’ and ‘progressive’. However, in brief, a conservative in this context refers to an MP 
who wants to preserve cultural traditions (or, more accurately, their perception of a particular set 
of cultural traditions) against the demands of those who are pushing for ‘progressive’ reforms. 
The  ‘progressives’ are generally aiming for social reforms that improve the status of disadvantaged 
and oppressed minorities and environmental reforms aimed at reducing carbon emissions and 
promoting environmental sustainability. In recent times, core issues of division within the Liberal 
Party (and beyond) have occurred over issues such as marriage equality, the Racial Discrimination Act 
and climate change, which have pitted conservative MPs against ‘moderate’ MPs who are somewhat 
more progressive on social and environmental issues. 
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The constraints Turnbull faced as Liberal leader and the fact he was 
replaced with the more ideologically conservative Morrison clearly 
illustrated the ascendancy of conservative forces within the Liberal Party 
on social and environmental issues. In light of this, some commentators 
(for example, Hartcher 2019a) thought this might give Independent 
candidates more of a chance to win some blue-ribbon Liberal seats where 
voters were economically conservative but more progressive on social 
and environmental issues. The Wentworth by-election, triggered by 
Turnbull’s resignation from parliament, reinforced this belief, with former 
Australian Medical Association president Kerryn Phelps winning the safe 
Liberal seat as an Independent, running on a campaign that emphasised 
the importance of action on climate change. With a number of high-
profile socially progressive but economically conservative Independents 
running in similar seats around the country—including Zali Steggall 
in Warringah, Oliver Yates in Kooyong and ex-Liberal MP Julia Banks in 
Flinders—and the loss of Indi to Cathy McGowan in 2013 and Mayo to 
NXT candidate Rebekha Sharkie in 2016 (Hartcher 2019a), it seemed 
possible that the Liberal Party was facing the defection of more moderate 
voters who were alienated by the conservative direction of the party, 
particularly on environmental issues.3 
The election did not, however, ultimately result in an influx of progressive 
Independents in safe Liberal seats. Steggall won the seat of Warringah from 
Abbott, who experienced a 12.64 per cent decline in his first-preference 
vote, and there were significant results in the formerly safe Liberal seats 
of Indi (where Independent candidate Helen Haines replaced the retiring 
McGowan) and Mayo (where Sharkie was returned, now for the Centre 
Alliance). However, sizeable swings in other seats did not result in victory 
for progressive Independent candidates. For example, an 8.24 per cent 
decline in the Liberals’ first-preference vote in Kooyong did not result 
in victory for Yates, while Phelps was defeated by Dave Sharma in 
Wentworth, despite a 14.82 per cent fall in the Liberal first-preference 
vote (compared with the 2016 election). Overall, the results of the 2019 
election do not demonstrate an imminent threat to the Liberal Party from 
progressive Independents in blue-ribbon seats. However, the rise of high-
profile challengers, the fall in the Liberal first-preference vote in some of 
3  Although she was not as strongly supportive of action on climate change as some of the other 
Independents, Louise Stewart in Curtin could possibly be added to this list, as could the Greens 
candidate in Kooyong, Julian Burnside—a high-profile barrister and campaigner for a more 
humanitarian approach to refugee policy.
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these seats, the loss of Warringah and the likelihood that climate change 
will become an increasingly salient issue in future campaigns do suggest 
there is potential for change in the near future. 
Because the Liberals went to the 2019 election with relatively few 
major policy commitments, it is unclear what their policy agenda for 
the next three years will be beyond the income tax cuts and transport 
spending announced in the 2019 Budget. However, there are a number 
of reasons to think the party is likely to move further to the right. 
Having deposed the Liberal Party’s most high-profile moderate, Malcolm 
Turnbull, as party leader and won an unexpected election victory under 
Morrison, conservative forces within the Liberal Party are likely to have 
been emboldened to pursue a conservative agenda. Adding to this is the 
retirement of other high-profile moderates such as Julie Bishop, Julia 
Banks and Kelly O’Dwyer. Combined with the importance of PHON 
and UAP preferences in deciding the election in key marginal seats, 
it seems likely that conservative forces will be in the ascendant.
Early indications seem to bear this out. There had been be a renewed push 
by some within the Liberal Party to amend Section 18C of the Racial 
Discrimination Act to remove the reference to speech that offends. This was 
one of the major issues on the agenda during the Abbott Government’s 
first term, and it was also part of the election manifesto of the IPA that 
was sent to Coalition MPs in the lead-up to the 2019 election (Bennett, 
Chapter 21, this volume; Crowe 2019). On the issue of climate change, the 
collapse of the NEG left Australia in an unstable position on energy policy. 
Given this uncertainty has attracted the ire of business groups—which 
are one of the core Liberal constituencies—the Morrison Government is 
likely to face pressure to act on this issue. However, balanced against this 
is the political strength of the fossil fuel industry, opposition to major 
cuts in carbon emissions from conservative Liberal MPs, the fact climate 
change policy played a key role in the demise of three of Australia’s past 
four prime ministers and Morrison’s past support for coal. 
Conclusion
Despite the internal instability and policy stagnation of its second term 
in office, the Coalition Government was returned for a third term on 
the back of a highly negative small-target strategy that made Labor’s tax 
policies and leadership the main focus. The Liberal Party significantly 
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improved its digital campaigning in 2019, but its attacks on Labor 
drew on longstanding themes in its own campaign history. Although 
there were some signs that 2019 might mark a shift in attitudes on the 
underrepresentation of women within the party and the start of a process 
of ideological fragmentation, ultimately, no significant change occurred in 
either direction. Considering the authority Prime Minister Scott Morrison 
is likely to wield within the party on the back of an election victory that 
was perceived to be a ‘miracle’, the ideological and organisational status 
quo seems likely to persist for at least another three years.
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THE NATIONAL PARTY 
OF AUSTRALIA
Geoff Cockfield
By early 2019, the Nationals looked set to lose ground in the forthcoming 
election. There were the usual problems of shrinking rurality in electorates 
along the eastern mainland coast and impending competition from minor 
parties, Independents and, in some regions, the Liberals. The Coalition was 
lagging in the opinion polls and the Nationals had struggled to articulate 
positions for—and in some cases develop substantial policies on—some 
key rural issues such as water allocations, mining developments, migration 
and the state of the dairy industry. More unusually, the federal Nationals 
were also in the mainstream news with three federal parliamentary 
members subject to scrutiny and ridicule for their personal behaviour, an 
unplanned leadership change, talk of further leadership challenges and 
pre-election criticisms of Coalition policy by Nationals’ candidates.
Yet, in the national election, the Nationals held all their House of 
Representatives seats and even increased their hold on the most marginal 
seats. The aim of this chapter is to try to explain this, considering the focuses 
of the campaign, strategies around preferences and policy issues and what 
the party represented to rural and regional voters. In summary, the Nationals 
were able to restore some internal stability prior to the election, concentrate 
resources and messaging on the seats they held and do advantageous 
preference deals. The result demonstrated that the Nationals, and perhaps 
the Coalition more generally, can have a degree of dysfunction and a limited 
policy agenda and still attract sufficient votes to be in government, provided 




The Nationals contested 29 House of Representatives seats—close to the 
same number as in 2016. Through the Queensland Liberal National Party 
(LNP), there were seven ‘Nationals’1 candidates running in winnable 
seats, with six of those successful. The Victorian party also concentrated 
its efforts, contesting only four seats (for three wins). The Nationals did 
not run candidates in the Labor-held seats of McEwen (peri-urban), 
Ballarat and Bendigo (based on regional cities), as they had in 2016.2 
In New South Wales for this election, the State party was slightly more 
aggressive and competed with the Liberals for the regional seats of 
Gilmore and Eden-Monaro. The Nationals had not contested Gilmore 
for 40 years and the party has never held Eden-Monaro. The South 
Australian Nationals, a party that was revived in the 1960s after being 
extinguished through a merger in 1932, made a rare foray into the federal 
sphere, contesting the seat of Barker. The Tasmanian National Party 
returned to the federal arena for the first time since 1996. The State party 
was re-established in 2018, with candidates selected for three seats (Bass, 
Braddon and Lyons) and two others for the Senate for the 2019 election. 
In Western Australia, following concerted but unsuccessful attempts to 
re-establish a presence in the federal parliament in 2013 and 2016, the 
State Nationals scaled back their efforts in 2019, contesting only three 
seats (Durack, O’Connor and Pearce), covering the wheat belt and the 
northern and western remote areas. 
As in recent elections, in 2019, the most common background of 
candidates was in small–medium regional businesses, with 25 of the 
39  candidates  (10  for the Senate) in this category. There were two 
candidates who could be considered primarily commercial farmers, 
with only Mark Coulton (Parkes) making it into parliament, though 
many more candidates had rural backgrounds and interests, including 
agricultural landholding. Both Nationals Leader Michael McCormack 
and Deputy Leader Bridget McKenzie are somewhat typical of the modern 
1  LNP candidates, like those from the Country Liberal Party (CLP), affiliate with one or the other 
of the federal Coalition parties after an election, though intending allegiances are usually signalled 
during the campaign. 
2  Under Coalition agreements in Victoria and New South Wales, either party may contest any seat 
where there is no sitting member recontesting. In reality, such contests are restricted to regional and 
rural electorates.
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Nationals, having lived and worked in regional areas but being one or two 
generations removed from the farm. Despite this, or perhaps because of it, 
they are both great supporters of farming people and communities.
Less than 20 per cent of the candidates for lower house seats were women, 
with only two contesting winnable seats (Capricornia and Mallee). 
Michelle Landry increased her margin in Capricornia, while Anne Webster 
became the new member for Mallee. Webster was preselected for Mallee 
after the previous member, the married Andrew Broad, stepped aside after 
personal exchanges with a woman on an international ‘dating’ website 
made the news in early 2019 (Wroe and Crowe 2018). The  Nationals 
continued to use Senate preselections to address their historical gender 
imbalance. In 2019, six of their 10 Senate candidates were women, with 
Susan McDonald from Queensland, Perin Davey from New South Wales 
and Sam McMahon from the Northern Territory elected, so that four of 
the Nationals’ five post-election senators were women. Davey’s campaign 
was somewhat disrupted by attempts to encourage below-the-line voting 
to elevate the chances of the fourth listed Liberal, Jim Molan. Had the 
Molan support campaign succeeded, the Nationals would have been 
without a senator in New South Wales, even though that State party is 
strongly coalitionist. After the election there were a record seven women 
in the 21-member federal party room. The Nationals continued with 
a woman Deputy Leader, Bridget McKenzie, who had followed from 
former NSW Senator Fiona Nash in that role.
The Nationals were at risk of losing support among rural and regional 
women because of the Broad story, former leader Barnaby Joyce’s 
marital breakdown and relationship with a staffer (Livingston 2018) 
and a complaint of inappropriate behaviour against Joyce (Chan 2018). 
Joyce’s  situation led to him vacating the party’s leadership in early 
2018. Efforts to preselect more women were probably influenced by 
the need to clean up their image, but the Nationals may also have been 
recognising  the importance of women in regional small business, farm 




Policies and the campaign
The Nationals entered the 2019 election trying to balance a number 
of politically difficult issues and some of these were addressed through 
campaign policy statements (see Table 15.1 for a summary of positions). 
First, while mining developments offer the prospect of regional jobs, there 
are many rural people opposed to them generally or in the particular. 
Despite some previous vacillation, the National Party ended the 2019 
election campaign as a strong supporter of mining. There were two aspects 
to this: the Nationals held and continued to hold after the election the 
resources portfolio, under Senator Matt Canavan (from Queensland), 
which has a strong development focus; and, second, for many regional 
areas, especially in Queensland, mining investment is one of the few 
industries that offers the prospect of additional jobs. Nationals members 
in central Queensland seats (Capricornia, Herbert, Flynn and Dawson) 
made a proposed coalmining development by Indian company Adani 
and the related jobs a central issue (Murphy 2019a). Local campaign 
advertising highlighted Queensland Labor’s and federal Labor’s 
vacillations on support for the development, while candidates even 
welcomed the confrontations that came from a pre-election anti-Adani 
protest roadshow led by former Greens leader Bob Brown (Koziol 2019). 
These candidates and other members of the Queensland LNP staked out 
a more general pro-coal position, with some even implying just before 
the election that they would split from the Coalition unless the Cabinet 
committed to support and even fund a new coal-fired power station in 
north Queensland. Scott Morrison adroitly defused this with a promise 
to ‘evaluate’ the case (Coorey 2019). 
Table 15.1 Summary of issues, Nationals campaign positions 
and Coalition policy positions
Issue Nationals position Coalition position
Adani (Carmichael) 
coalmine proposal










Basin (MDB) water 
allocations
Prioritise agriculture in allocations
Establish a national water grid
Extend regional 
development 
funding in MDB 
regions
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Issue Nationals position Coalition position
Dairy industry Mandatory code of conduct for processors
Market information provision
Energy-efficiency grants
Grants for farmer cooperatives
Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) dairy specialist 
More money for ACCC agriculture unit
Same as Nationals 
Migrant labour Enable working visas for those 
in agriculture
Regional migrant visas
overall reduction in migration
Same as Nationals
Small business Lower taxes for small and medium‑sized 
enterprises 





Vegan farm protests Increase penalties for property trespass




# It was not clear whether or not all Nationals supported this .
* No detail, just general undertakings .
Source: Foley (2019); The Nationals (2019a, 2019b) .
Second, the Murray–Darling Basin (MDB) Plan, which includes limiting 
water extractions, was also in the news, with allegations of fraudulent 
activities around government programs and reports of mass fish deaths 
(Davies 2019; Hamilton-Smith 2018). The Nationals wanted water 
policies that recognised ‘the continued importance of agriculture’ and 
included the building of more dams and the establishment of a national 
water grid under a statutory authority (The Nationals 2019a), which would 
be a major institutional change in Australia’s federal system. In response 
to the fish deaths—and perhaps with the threat of the Shooters, Fishers 
and Farmers Party (SFFP) in mind3—there were a number of promises to 
support recreational fishing (The Nationals 2019a). On the other hand, 
the Nationals stayed well away from any flirtation with changes to gun 
laws in the wake of the mass shootings in Christchurch, New Zealand. 
Prior to the massacre, some Coalition State governments and individual 
members, including the Deputy Leader, Bridget McKenzie, had engaged 
with gun lobbyists and were pushing for the ‘easing’ of some legislative 
restrictions on certain types of guns (Patel 2016). 
3  The SFFP won two seats from the Nationals in the NSW State election earlier in 2019. 
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Third, the Nationals have long struggled with what to do for farmers since 
the deregulation of commodity marketing support systems. The dairy 
industry was an election issue for the Nationals in 2016 and continuing 
low prices and drought made it evident that there had been little real 
policy change or impact since. For the 2019 election, the Nationals again 
supported a mandatory code of conduct—aimed largely at processors—
and a range of other measures trying to influence prices in a market 
context (Table 15.1) (The Nationals 2019a). 
A fourth policy dilemma for the Nationals is migration. They are generally 
nationalist and socially conservative but migrants and temporary workers 
are an increasingly important source of labour for agricultural industries 
and a potential source of more people in rural areas otherwise experiencing 
depopulation. For this election, the party supported ‘multiculturalism’, 
though with an emphasis on ‘integration’ and a proposal to encourage 
migrants to move to regional areas, but with the proviso that the focus 
would ‘remain firmly on attracting skilled migrants’ (The Nationals 
2019b, emphasis added). 
There were also some fundamental issues for the Nationals in the areas 
of small business and agriculture. There were general policy aspirations 
in support of small business (Table 15.1), but the centrepiece, and 
perhaps major Coalition policy, was tax cuts. For agriculture, there 
would be continued drought relief and promises about the benefits of 
forthcoming trade agreements. As with the Adani protests, a series of 
protests by vegan activists presented the Nationals with an opportunity 
to bolster their anti-post-materialist credentials, which played well in the 
regions. The animal welfare activism ‘threat’ would be addressed through 
increasing legal penalties (Table 15.1). 
The overall approach for the campaign was for sitting members to focus 
on local concerns and agrarian and small business rhetoric and issues, 
supported by fearmongering about Labor and the Greens. Party Leader 
Michael McCormack spent much of his time in his electorate of Riverina, 
with two to three visits to central Queensland seats and one or two to Lyons 
and Braddon in Tasmania (Doran et al. 2019). He did not visit Western 
Australia, South Australia or the NSW north coast seat of Richmond, 
which was held by Labor but was a former Nationals stronghold. Scott 
Morrison was also active in visiting central Queensland—somewhat in 
contrast to the 2016 election, when Malcolm Turnbull’s regional visits 
were limited and nearly always taken in tandem with Barnaby Joyce. 
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Joyce kept a low national profile during the campaign, focusing on his 
electorate of New England and the revived threat of Independent Tony 
Windsor. This suggests, with the exception of the Tasmanian visits, that 
the focus was overwhelmingly on the winnable seats.
Results
The Nationals held all their House of Representatives seats and retained 
five senators (AEC 2019). As usual, the proportion of seats exceeded 
the proportion of votes (Figure 15.1), reflecting the geographical 
concentration  of support and the focus of campaigning on a limited 
number of electorates. The proportion of House of Representatives 
seats declined very slightly due to an additional seat (making 151) 
in the parliament since the previous election. The Senate result was 
a closer reflection of overall support, with the Nationals ending up with 
6.5 per cent of senators—less than the proportion for the Greens. 
Figure 15.1 Country/National Party share of primary votes and seats 
for the House of Representatives at national elections
Note: LNP votes are divided between the Liberals and Nationals based on expected party 
alignment in Canberra, to analyse historical trends .
Sources: Adapted from UWA (various years); AEC (2019) .
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The Nationals increased both their primary and their two-party-preferred 
(TPP) vote in nine of the 16 seats they won (AEC 2019). They increased 
just the primary vote in two seats and just the TPP margins in another two. 
In line with the overall Queensland result for the Coalition (discussed in 
Chapter 11, this volume), the Nationals substantially increased the TPP 
gaps in the previously marginal central Queensland seats of Capricornia, 
Dawson and Flynn. Most surprising was the result for Dawson, given 
that sitting member, George Christensen, was yet another National in the 
media spotlight—in his case for spending substantial periods, including 
parliamentary business periods, over the previous four years in the 
Philippines (Wroe 2019). 
The Nationals finished the election with no seats with margins of less than 
6.5 per cent, with Anne Webster having the narrowest margin, though 
should she choose to run again, she will not have competition from the 
Liberals and should increase this with a ‘sophomore surge’ (first-term 
incumbency bonus). In New South Wales, the SFFP had little impact 
on the Nationals’ final outcomes, since, of the western NSW seats, the 
SFFP only contested Calare, for less than 18 per cent of the vote, and 
in that seat the Nationals increased their TPP vote. Indeed, the flurry of 
activity of the minor parties, including PHON and the UAP, may have 
worked in favour of the Nationals. The Coalition arranged a preference 
deal with the UAP while the Nationals—differing from most of the 
Liberal preference deals—elevated PHON above Labor. McCormack, in 
an unusual burst of honesty on preferences, said the party needed to do 
what it took to win, though he also argued that PHON was closer to 
the Nationals on values and policies than were Labor or, especially, the 
Greens (Murphy 2019a). This rapprochement with PHON carried some 
risk given that, during the previous term of government, there had been 
attempts by ‘alt-right’ groups to infiltrate the NSW Nationals, which led 
to some hasty expulsions (McGowan 2018). 
The results did, however, reaffirm that the federal Nationals are confined 
to the eastern grain, sugar and dairy zones, with parts of the sugar 
and dairy zones slipping from their grasp over time with peri-urban 
development. Outside the seats the Nationals already held, attempts at 
expansion were very unsuccessful. In New South Wales the Nationals 
received less than 13 per cent of the primary vote in Gilmore and less than 
7 per cent in Eden-Monaro, leaving the Liberal Party with significant 
rural representation in southern New South Wales. In Indi, the Nationals’ 
vote decreased significantly to 9.5 per cent, suggesting that if Independent 
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Helen Haines, successor to Cathy McGowan, is defeated at a future 
election, Indi will most likely return to the Liberals. Similarly, the Liberals 
are the dominant party in rural and remote South Australia, Tasmania 
and Western Australia. In Western Australia, the Nationals lost ground 
from the previous election in the three electorates they contested. For the 
Senate, the WA Nationals’ vote share declined, with a quota well below 
that of PHON and below that for the Help End Marijuana Prohibition 
(HEMP) Party, as was also the case with the Tasmanian Nationals. 
For the Tasmanian electorates of Bass and Braddon, neither Nationals 
candidate received more than 3 per cent of the primary vote. In Lyons, 
Deanna Hutchinson won almost 16 per cent of the votes, but this was the 
electorate  in which the Liberal candidate was disendorsed just before 
the election. In Barker (SA), Miles Hannemann won only 2.5 per cent 
of the vote. Thus, the ‘revived’ parties made little impression. 
The results suggest that the only realistic intermediate prospect for 
expansion of the Nationals’ footprint is Kennedy in Queensland. For the 
2019 election, however, Bob Katter increased both his primary and his 
TPP votes, so regaining this seat for the Nationals looks set to hinge on the 
health and inclinations of the sitting member and perhaps the intentions 
of his son, Robbie Katter, who is a member of the Queensland Parliament. 
While three NSW coastal/rural seats all swung further to the Nationals, to 
the north in Richmond, the Nationals’ primary vote decreased slightly and 
Labor’s Justine Elliot slightly increased her margin, suggesting this seat is 
no longer in the Nationals’ heartland (for an explanation of demographic 
change in this region, see Cockfield 2009). 
Cabinet, Coalition and policy directions
Once again, the Liberal Party needed the Nationals to form government. 
There have been only three elections since 1922 in which the Liberals 
(or their predecessor parties) could have governed alone (for a full review, 
see Botterill and Cockfield 2015). Despite the pre-election dissension 
from some Queensland parliamentarians (Clarke 2019), the Coalition 
parties had a reasonably harmonious campaign. The two leaders worked 
well together, and Scott Morrison was quite popular in regional areas. 
Post election, all indications are that the Nationals will settle into 
a  collaborative approach under McCormack. There were at least two 
threats to a collaborative Coalition. First, Joyce remained in the party 
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room and, prior to the election, indicated his interest in a return to the 
leadership (Crowe 2019). His style—in contrast to recent leaders such as 
John Anderson, Tim Fischer, Mark Vaile and probably McCormack—
was to be more combative and openly independent within the Coalition. 
Second, and related to Joyce’s leadership ambitions, the Queensland 
Nationals MPs may be emboldened to engage in further bouts of 
‘independence’, with, for example, some wanting to start debates about 
enabling nuclear power in Australia (Murphy 2019b), which could be 
politically risky for the Coalition. This may be part of a more general 
problem for the Coalition, with an assertive Queensland LNP developing 
its own agendas, rather than just feeding into the two Coalition parties 
at the federal level. While the LNP has not yet proved a successful party 
in terms of longevity in office at the State level, it is the dominant party 
in Queensland federally, holding more than two-thirds of Queensland’s 
House of Representatives seats after the 2019 election. 
Against that, Morrison is likely to have considerable authority within 
the joint party room, given his central role in the Coalition campaign, 
and McCormack is likely to favour quiet negotiation over flourishes of 
independence. Furthermore, the case for Joyce’s return to the leadership 
may have been diminished by the election result. Joyce was not given 
a post-election ministerial position and did not even retain his role as 
drought envoy; and other possible leadership contenders, such as David 
Littleproud (Maranoa), who did become Deputy Leader when McKenzie 
stepped down in early 2020, were waiting in the wings, so a resurrection 
might not be a simple matter. 
The Nationals have one less member of Cabinet, though they gained an 
additional outer ministry. Trade—so often in the past a portfolio of the 
Country (then National) Party—remains with the Liberals, however, the 
Nationals have water resources, as part of an omnibus portfolio, as well 
as infrastructure, which is a key area of concern for regional politics. 
Decentralisation remained a named part of MP for Gippsland Darren 
Chester’s outer-ministry portfolio that also includes regional services 
and local government. Decentralisation was introduced to a portfolio in 
Morrison’s first ministry and it remains to be seen whether this is more 
than just a symbolic naming. Efforts at decentralisation have previously 
been most associated with Labor governments (1945–49 and 1972–75). 
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Explaining the result
Despite the internal ructions, unfavourable media related to personal 
behaviour and no great policy initiatives in the previous two terms of 
government, the Nationals were able to hold their ground. The Nationals 
and the Coalition more generally were able to establish a reasonable level 
of discipline just before the campaign proper, the preference deals seemed 
to work and competition from minor parties, such as the SFFP, was 
more limited than expected, probably partly due to resource constraints. 
Morrison was popular in the bush, especially after taking decisive action 
on recovery after severe floods in northern Queensland early in 2019, and 
he followed this up by making drought a priority immediately after he 
assumed the prime ministership (PM&C 2018; Karp 2019). There was 
pork-barrelling around infrastructure and facilities in target electorates, 
but this may not have been decisive, given that, in the three most marginal 
seats of central Queensland, Labor’s spending promises far exceeded those 
of the Nationals (Irvine and Wright 2019). 
Perhaps this election suggests more about some general tendencies in 
national elections in Australia. The Coalition parties can win elections 
despite some degree of disunity, adverse perceptions of leadership, no 
great policy reforms and a thin policy agenda. Fearmongering about 
Labor and ‘progressive’ politics can work and may work especially well in 
regional areas. From a survey of attitudes and values, weighted to regional 
areas and conducted in 2016 by the author and others, there is evidence of 
the generally assumed social conservatism in the bush. Using some survey 
items adapted from the work of Shalom Schwartz (Schwartz et al. 2010, 
2014), we examined the values of some 1,400 Australians, with 66 per cent 
of those recruited from regional areas. Factor reductions were used to 
identify related survey items, which were turned into scales about ‘security 
and patriotism’ and ‘equality and freedom’—each constructed from three 
seven-point scale questions. We also asked a series of questions about 
attitudes towards climate change and these were converted to a scale from 
four seven-point scale questions. As expected, these constructed factors 
significantly correlated to voting intention at that time, prior to the 2016 
election. Intending Liberal and Nationals voters had the highest scores on 
‘security and patriotism’ and the lowest scores for ‘equality and freedom’ 
and ‘concern about climate change’.
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For this chapter, I re-examined the data by dividing the respondents 
by electorate types: ‘eastern rural’ electorates, which included all the 
Nationals’ electorates plus some adjacent ones held by the Liberal Party; 
‘other regional’ electorates; and ‘metropolitan’ electorates. The average 
of ratings for ‘security and patriotism’ from respondents in the eastern 
rural electorates was higher than those from other areas, while that for 
‘equality and freedom’ was lower. The differences in ratings were not great 
(see Figure 15.2), but they were statistically significant (p values of 0.023 
and 0.05, respectively). While there were no significant differences for 
‘concern about climate change’ by electorate type, there was a difference 
by State, with Queensland respondents having the lowest average rating. 
The key point from this is that the background narratives of the Coalition 
in recent years about nationalism, national security and the threat of 
Labor’s ‘equality’ agenda may play particularly well in the Nationals’ 
heartland. In addition, concerns about the climate change impacts of 
additional coalmines might be somewhat smaller in Queensland than 
in other areas. 
Figure 15.2 Ratings for the factors of ‘security and patriotism’ 
and ‘equality and freedom’
Source: 2016 survey by Linda Courtenay Botterill, Helen Berry and Geoff Cockfield.
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Conclusion
The Nationals saved more than the furniture in the 2019 election, 
preserving the house they had steadily rebuilt since 2007 (see Figure 15.1). 
They remain a significant party in that they are usually needed for 
the non-Labor parties to form government and they continue to 
hold important portfolios in Cabinet. They are able to project values 
related to social conservatism, nationalism and community, despite 
members not always living up to those purported values. Anti-Labor 
sentiment—a  foundational  element of the Country Party—has now 
broadened to encompass the Greens and, most recently, animal welfare 
activism, so that mobilising against this supposed threat axis is now 
entrenched in popular discourse and campaigning. 
The election result, along with a historical tendency to leadership stability, 
may keep McCormack in place. On the other hand, there may be further 
agitation, with Joyce remaining ambitious and some of the Queenslanders 
feeling both entitled and important. They would, however, do well to 
think about what strategies have worked for the Country Party/Nationals 
and that is stable coalitions. Efforts at independence, as in Western 
Australia, have not really worked in even the medium term, nor has direct 
competition with the Liberals. And, once a State party is extinguished, 
it can be hard to revive, though there were mergers and demergers in 
Queensland prior to the LNP that did not cripple the State Country 
Party/Nationals. The Nationals are, however, unlikely to be able to deliver 
substantial benefits to the agricultural sector and rural communities given 
the constraints of coalition, market deregulation, drought, population 
movement to major towns and cities and the general difficulties of running 
small businesses. That may not, however, matter so much provided the 
Nationals are seen as representing agriculture, small business and some 
notion of the community values of the ‘real’ Australia. 
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In May 2019, green parties were surging across Europe in the elections for 
the European Parliament, reaching their highest vote and representational 
levels of all time. In contrast, the Australian Greens saw some gains in 
the vote in the Senate, but only as a partial recovery towards the levels 
of support they enjoyed in 2010. Climate change, described by former 
prime minister Kevin Rudd as ‘the greatest moral, economic and social 
challenge of our time’, was expected to be a key focus for the election. 
Yet this did not occur; so, what happened?
First, it must be acknowledged that the Australian Greens (the Greens) 
did have a better election result than in 2016. The 2019 election brought 
a renewed focus on the environment, a reduced number of parties on the 
Senate ballot paper and an opportunity to focus on rebuilding the party’s 
vote and image. The Greens retained their Senate seats in all six States, 
significantly increasing their vote in South Australia and Queensland. 
This chapter will explore why the election did not in fact become the 
climate change election, including some of the dynamics at play within 




The Greens fielded candidates in all 151 House of Representatives seats 
and 35 in the Senate contest. Two of the House of Representatives 
candidates (in Lalor and Parkes) resigned over social media posts. Across 
all candidates, the Greens came close to gender parity (50.5 per cent 
men), and also fielded the only ‘sex unspecified’ candidate of the election.
In the Senate, the Greens nominated six candidates in New South Wales, 
Victoria, Queensland and Western Australia, four in South Australia, three 
in Tasmania and two each in the Northern Territory and the Australian 
Capital Territory. At this election, the party was also defending six of 
the nine Senate seats won in 2016. The senators standing for the Greens 
were not, however, the same team that had been successful in 2016. Two 
key replacements, one due to Section 44(i) of the Constitution and one 
to retirement, saw Jordon Steele-John replace Scott Ludlam in Western 
Australia and Mehreen Faruqi replace Lee Rhiannon in New South 
Wales. Disability advocate Steele-John took the seat previously held by 
the popular Ludlam after Ludlam discovered post election that he was in 
fact a New Zealand citizen, and Rhiannon lost her preselection to Faruqi 
in what some saw as a changing of the guard in New South Wales (for 
a fuller discussion of Section 44 issues, see Hobbs et al. 2018). Larissa 
Waters in Queensland had also fallen foul of Section 44 post election, 
with her seat initially taken by former Australian Democrat Senator 
Andrew Bartlett, but Bartlett resigned early to allow Waters to retake her 
seat, having renounced her previously unknown Canadian citizenship. 
All six defending senators had won three-year half-terms in 2016, so now 
had the opportunity to win full six-year terms.
In the House of Representatives, Adam Bandt recontested his seat of 
Melbourne, local firefighter Jim Casey challenged Anthony Albanese 
again in Grayndler, while Bartlett took on Liberal MP Trevor Evans in 
Brisbane. These would be the target seats in Victoria, New South Wales 
and Queensland, respectively. The Greens in Victoria also had hopes for 
three further seats: Cooper (formerly Batman), Macnamara (Melbourne 
Ports) and Wills. The party had come close to taking Batman in the 2016 
election, though had faded slightly at the by-election in 2018. With a new 
candidate in Cooper, former Greens Senate candidate David Risstrom, 
the party might have been forgiven for thinking its chances were indeed 
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good in that seat. Equally, the former MP for Melbourne Ports, Michael 
Danby, retired at the election, leaving an open seat, and the Greens, with 
2016 candidate Steph Hodgins-May recontesting, might have fancied 
their chances.
Results
The results show an overall increase in the Greens’ Senate vote of just over 
1.5 per cent, but the House of Representatives staying fairly stable. When 
we examine the State-by-State results, we can see the results overall are 
buoyed by increases in Queensland and South Australia. This is repeated 
in the House of Representatives. One point to note is that the South 
Australian result is most likely due to the disappearance from the ballot 
paper of Nick Xenophon and his NXT ticket, which had polled more 
than 21 per cent in 2016.
Table 16.1 Preliminary Australian Greens results
Senate House of Representatives
State Primary Change Primary Change
NSW 8 .73 1 .32 8 .71 –0 .24
Vic . 10 .62 –0 .25 11 .89 –1 .24
Qld 9 .94 3 .12 10 .32 1 .49
WA 11 .81 1 .48 11 .62 –0 .44
SA 10 .91 5 .03 9 .61 3 .40
Tas . 12 .57 1 .41 10 .12 –0 .10
ACT 17 .71 1 .61 16 .85 1 .76
NT 10 .24 –0 .54 10 .15 1 .06
National 10.20 1.58 10.40 0.17
Source: AEC (2019) .
As can be seen from Figure 16.1, there was steady growth in votes for 
the Australian Greens from 1998 to 2010 and the resumption of a slight 
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Figure 16.1 House and Senate results for the Australian Greens, 
1993–2019
Source: AEC (2019) .
We can compare these with results from recent European Parliament 
elections in which Greens polled particularly strongly: Germany, 
20.5 per cent; Belgium, 15.2 per cent; France, 13.5 per cent; Denmark, 
13.2 per cent; the United Kingdom, 11.8 per cent; Sweden, 11.5 per cent; 
Ireland, 11.4 per cent; and the Netherlands, 10.9 per cent. Of the major 
Western European nations, it was only in Italy that Greens failed. For 
green parties in the European Parliament, this meant increasing their 
numbers by almost 50 per cent, from 55 to 74 (European Parliament 
2019). In  Germany—the new powerhouse of green politics—the 
Greens appear to be close to replacing the Social Democrats as the main 
Opposition party. The Australian Greens therefore sit towards the lower 
end of success when seen in comparison with their European cousins, 
even while they can claim to be one of the first green parties in the world 
(Crowley 1996: 532). 
What is clear from the results, however, is that the Greens’ Senate vote in 
the three largest States is now lagging behind that in all other States and the 
Australian Capital Territory. The situation in the House of Representatives 
is a little more complicated, but the overall impression is that the vote 
increase the Greens experienced in 2016 (from the low of 2013) has eased. 
Yet it is also obvious that the explanation is more complicated than that. 
A closer look at the seats where the Greens polled more than 20 per cent 
(Table 16.2), which includes those that are current and future potential 
target seats for the party, shows some interesting developments.
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Table 16.2 Divisional Australian Greens results
Seat Vote +/–
Melbourne 49 .30 4 .70
Wills 26 .62 –4 .29
Macnamara 24 .24 0 .08
Griffith 23 .65 6 .67
Canberra 23 .31 4 .59
Grayndler 22 .55 0 .31
Brisbane 22 .37 2 .94
Higgins 22 .47 –1 .72
Kooyong 21 .24 2 .65
Cooper 21 .14 –15 .53
Ryan 20 .35 1 .59
Richmond 20 .32 –0 .12
Source: AEC (2019) .
One point to note is that, with exception of Richmond, these are all inner 
urban seats. The trend of Greens doing particularly well in inner urban 
seats has been documented before (Jackson 2018) but is demonstrated 
again here. However, it might also be noted that, apart from the seat of 
Melbourne, the Victorian Greens did not have a successful election. Falls 
in Wills (–4.3 per cent), Higgins (–1.8 per cent) and, most dramatically, 
in Cooper (–15.5 per cent), with a status quo result for Macnamara 
(0.1 per cent), suggest a stagnation of Greens support in Victoria. The 
result in Kooyong, where high-profile barrister Julian Burnside took on 
Treasurer Josh Frydenberg—although heralded as a potential boilover—
yielded a small primary swing of 2.6 per cent, and a TPP result of 
44.3:55.7 (a larger, 7.1 per cent swing). In Melbourne, the increase in the 
primary vote was 4.7 per cent, though only a 2.8 per cent swing on TPP, 
with sitting MP Adam Bandt returned easily after the ALP candidate, 
Luke Creasey, withdrew partway through the campaign after injudicious 
social media comments by him came to light (Doran and Sweeney 2019). 
While good overall results in Melbourne and Kooyong were recorded, this 
was also less than might have been expected.
The problematic results in Victoria mirror in some way the problems the 
party faced in the 2018 Victorian State election, in which the Greens 
were expected to win new seats while retaining their upper house seats. 
However, a bruising (and ultimately unsuccessful) Batman by-election 
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in March 2018, with claims of undermining of the Greens candidate 
by disgruntled party members and local councillors, left a pall over the 
campaign. This overshadowed the win for the Greens in the Northcote 
by-election the previous November. The end result of the election was 
very mixed, with the Greens retaining two of their previously held seats 
(Melbourne and Prahran), winning the seat of Brunswick, but losing 
Northcote to the ALP. The upper house vote was down only slightly but, 
combined with a preference cartel between minor parties put together by 
Glenn Druery, the Greens lost four of their five seats (VEC 2018). 
In a similar fashion, the NSW branch of the party emerged from a bitter, 
divisive and damaging previous year, yet recorded a solid rise in their 
Senate vote, even as the vote for the House of Representatives stagnated. 
The NSW State election in March, just two months before the federal 
election, meant keeping the party campaigning through two major 
elections in the first five months of the year, which it managed in relatively 
good order.
A year earlier, in May 2018, the ‘Eastern Bloc’ faction of the party had won 
the key preselections for the State’s upper house (Visentin 2018). This was 
followed by Rhiannon’s departure from the Senate in August 2018 after 
being defeated by Faruqi. The year was rounded out with the ouster from 
the party of State MP Jeremy Buckingham, prompting bitter attacks from 
both within and outside the party, but with the national party refusing 
to get involved. The beginning of 2019 started with a challenge in the 
courts to the existing State preselections, but once this was dismissed, 
the party successfully returned all its sitting MPs up for election, with 
their three State lower house MPs increasing their margins. Buckingham 
ran as an Independent but polled only 0.26 per cent, compared with his 
former party’s 9.73 per cent (NSW Electoral Commission 2019). Finally, 
MLC Justin Field—not up for election until 2022 and a factional ally of 
Buckingham’s—resigned from the party in April 2019, just before the 
federal election was called. However, for the first time in a number of 
years, the Greens were able to enter an election reasonably unified, with 
a popular candidate. The campaign period was therefore one of bringing 
the success and unity of the State campaign into the federal arena, 
with Faruqi’s election perhaps signalling a change for the better for the 
NSW party.
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A different story again can be seen in the Queensland branch of the party, 
with an increase in votes across the inner urban seats of Brisbane: Griffith, 
Ryan, Moreton and Lilley. This followed on from successful 2017 State 
and 2016 Brisbane City Council elections, in which the Greens won 
their first assembly seat in their own right and their first Brisbane City 
councillor—both in single-member districts. The campaign was boosted 
by the return of Larissa Waters. The Queensland party therefore presented 
a unified campaign. However, one element not effectively dealt with was 
Bob Brown’s ‘Stop Adani caravan’, which appeared to galvanise anti-
Greens sentiment in some quarters (SBS 2019b). This would indicate 
that the Greens have not found an appropriate role for their high-profile 
former leader.
South Australia saw the most dramatic shift in Greens fortunes, although 
this is also easily ascribable to the lack of the NXT ticket on the ballot. 
At the same time, the Greens’ increase of 4.9 per cent was second only 
to the Liberal Party in terms of recovery of vote, suggesting that NXT 
voters in South Australia are now at least partly identifying the Greens’ 
Sarah Hanson-Young as a fair replacement for their aspirations. While 
not recovering to its 2010 level, the House of Representatives vote for the 
Greens of 9.61 per cent remains the second-best result in nearly 30 years 
of the Greens contesting South Australian seats, and a substantial recovery 
from the 2016 result.
In the other States and Territories, the rises were generally more muted. 
While the Australian Capital Territory, Tasmania and Western Australia 
all recorded rises of around 1.5 per cent, this was really more of a status-
quo result, and certainly in the case of Western Australia, it did not return 
the party to the 15.6 per cent heights of the 2014 Senate by-election. 
In the House of Representatives, the results were again muted, with 
no opportunities to advance in the inner urban seats of Perth, Canberra 
or Denison.
Campaign focus
If we are to believe the political rhetoric leading up to polling day, this 
was the ‘climate change election’—as had been claimed for the elections 
in 2007 and 2010 (Grube 2014). Certainly, this was the point made by 
a series of polls and commentary in the lead-up to the election, with 
electors suggesting climate change was a significant issue (Hanrahan 2019; 
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Kassam 2019; SBS 2019a; Wade 2019a, 2019b). But was this borne out 
by the election media of the Greens themselves? Greens Leader Richard 
Di Natale’s ‘Leader’s Address’ to the National Press Club on 1 May 
highlighted that climate change, along with a series of other issues, would 
be important for the Greens campaign, but was clearly not the sole focus 
(Di Natale 2019). The Greens might therefore be expected to focus their 
media specifically on climate change. As we can see from Table 16.3, 
however, a different picture emerges—of many different issues covered 
by multiple voices.
Table 16.3 Australian Greens’ media releases, 2019 campaign
Candidate Media releases Topic
Di Natale 7 Employment (1), Bob Hawke (1), health (1), 
democracy (1), environment (1), foreign affairs (1), 
Budget (1)
Bandt 9 Industrial relations (2), environment (6), 
employment (1), science and technology (1), 
election campaign (1)
Siewert 22 Employment (2), social security (5), mental health 
(4), environment (2), election campaign (1), 
Indigenous affairs (7), housing (1)
Hanson‑Young 12 Environment (8), energy (1), Budget (1), 
communications (1), election campaign (1)
Whish‑Wilson 8 Energy (3), environment (3), Budget (2)
Rice 17 Transport (2), environment (6), agriculture (2), 
LGBTQI issues (2), Budget (3), foreign affairs (2)
McKim 2 Environment (1), election campaign (1)
Waters 8 Environment (2), democracy (1), infrastructure (1), 
energy (2), election campaign (2)
Steele‑John 6 Environment (2), disability (2), election campaign (2)
Faruqi 8 Animal welfare (1), housing (1), child care (2), 
environment (1), education (1), election campaign (2)
Source: Media releases as listed on Greens’ webpage, from 1 April 2019 to 18 May 2019: 
greensmps.org.au/terms/article-type/media-release .
This needs to be considered in the context of a campaign that appeared 
to be driven by a particular agenda on the Coalition side—that of the 
paramount leader (Morrison) battling it out with the challenger (Shorten). 
The ALP’s election material tended to emphasise the group nature of 
the ALP front bench, but Morrison’s relentlessly personalised campaign 
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meant that Shorten was the key focus. In the context of a presidential-
style campaign, the State-based and MP-focused campaign of the Greens 
struggled to cut through.
Taken together, we might consider Norris’s (2000, 2004) concept of the 
‘premodern’, ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ campaigns. The constituency 
turn for which the ALP had been lauded in Victoria (Mills 2014) 
remained a core part of the Greens’ campaign, especially as they struggled 
to match the funding to run the kind of successful television advertising 
associated with ‘modern’ campaigning. The form of meta-campaigning 
associated with the postmodern campaign—using the party’s social media 
access as the principal avenue for influencing voters—might then be seen 
as the key to a new form of Greens campaigning. Indeed, Hanson-Young, 
with 157,000 Twitter followers (more than Di Natale’s 127,000), might 
be seen as pursuing the archetypal campaign, with some 120 tweets on 
a variety of issues during the campaign. Yet this form of campaigning 
can also be viewed as primarily supporting a more localised campaign 
structure in South Australia (particularly in relation to local issues such 
as the Murray–Darling river system).
When we follow this through and examine the number of followers 
and  posts on Facebook for the various MPs, we find a shift in focus. 
For instance, more than half of Hanson-Young’s posts on her Facebook 
page (for which she has 134,000 followers) covered environmental issues 
(44  of  83). The majority of these posts focused on three particular 
issues: the Murray–Darling river system, the Great Australian Bight and 
climate change. Certainly, in terms of the Greens’ more outwardly facing 
campaign, the focus was much more on the environment than on the 
general set of issues that Hanson-Young normally has carriage of and 
is known for. The other thing platforms such as Facebook offer is the 
potential for at least some interaction. Although the site did not record 
a  large number of conversations between Hanson-Young and others, 
it did have videos, commentary from volunteers and endorsements from 
high-profile individuals (Hanson-Young highlighted two, from columnist 
and commentator Jane Caro and former Australian cricketer Jason 
Gillespie.) As to whether this works, the simple fact of having 134,000 
followers suggests some level of penetration. By way of comparison, 
Hanson-Young featured in only 14 stories in the main South Australian 
daily, the Adelaide Advertiser, with climate change and the Great 
Australian Bight featuring in seven of those.
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Table 16.4 Social media followers of Greens candidates
MPs Twitter Facebook Instagram
Di Natale 125,000 112,000 17,000
Bandt 179,000 125,000 7,000
Siewert 13,000 21,000 1,000
Hanson‑Young 157,000 134,000 7,000
Whish‑Wilson 17,000 26,000 2,000
Rice 11,000 26,000 2,000
McKim 17,000 38,000 2,000
Waters 64,000 80,000 15,000
Steele‑John 10,000 34,000 6,000
Faruqi 21,000 60,000 5,000
Sources: Twitter, Facebook and Instagram .
While the numbers contained in Table 16.4 are just ‘viewing figures’, they 
give some idea of the apparent social media preferences of each of the 
MPs. Hanson-Young is a significant performer on Facebook and Twitter 
but much less so on Instagram. In at least some respects, this fits with 
activity shifts and preferences noted in how campaigns use social media 
(Kreiss et al. 2018). Instagram is clearly favoured, at least to some degree, 
by Di Natale and Waters, while Bandt is a heavy user of Twitter. By way of 
comparison, former Greens Senator Scott Ludlam, much noted for both 
his tech-savviness and his following, still retains 117,000 Twitter followers 
and tweets regularly on issues of democracy, climate change and energy.
Campaign structure
As with previous Greens campaigns, the core campaign structures 
were housed within the State branches. The national office, apart from 
providing extensive research elements, left the running of the individual 
State campaigns to the State branches (see Kefford 2018). That there 
were six senators up for election meant there were parallel structures 
operating (a State-based structure as well as the national parliamentarians 
and national campaign coordinator). This election was the second 
without the necessity of preference negotiations around the group voting 
ticket (GVT), but it remained important to ensure consistency and the 
distribution of how-to-vote material. The negotiations themselves were 
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then directed to supporting particular candidates and parties, with the 
result that 82  per  cent of Greens preferences favoured the ALP over 
the Coalition (see Raue, Chapter 9, this volume).
This structuring also meant that the bulk of funding for the campaign 
was held at the State level. Whether this lack of centralisation worked for 
or against the party should be the subject of further investigation, as it 
would appear that, although the individual States still contribute funding 
to the national body, this is primarily for the maintenance of the national 
organisation, as opposed to actual campaigning. National campaigning 
itself still reflects only an equivalent proportion of party funding to the 
NSW or Victorian campaign budgets. For the more populous States such 
as New South Wales and Victoria, regular staffing (in New South Wales, 
approximately10 full-time and part-time staff) is supplemented with four 
to five campaign-specific staff. In less populous States such as Western 
Australia, regular staffing numbers double in size.
Conclusion
The Greens would be fairly pleased with the result, given the major 
party posturing. Morrison’s focus on Shorten set up a presidential-style 
campaign—a recurring feature of Australian elections—that did not allow 
the Greens the freedom they might otherwise have enjoyed. The  party 
had struggled somewhat with internal issues over the year preceding the 
election, with resolution being reached only in New South Wales. The lack 
of resolution clearly dogged the party in Victoria, even as New South 
Wales seemed to emerge more united, if somewhat battered. The results 
do, unfortunately, have the capacity to reignite tensions both within and 
between the State parties. Certainly, both the NSW and the Victorian 
branches will have troubling fulfilling national funding priorities given 
their loss of State MPs. Even while returning their sitting senators and 
State MPs, for the Victorian and NSW parties, the loss of five and two State 
MPs, respectively, with only a marginal increase in the federal vote means a 
possible period of financial belt-tightening.
The shift in the vote in Queensland, however, would have to be seen as 
a high point for the party. The Queensland Greens—once constantly beset 
by internal division—are now winning seats at all levels of government. 
The resurgence of the South Australian party, coupled with steady results 
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elsewhere, places the party in a moderately good position going forward. 
This would appear to indicate that the Greens are not in any immediate 
danger of following the path of the Australian Democrats.
With a wait until August 2020 for the Northern Territory election (followed 
in October by both the Australian Capital Territory and Queensland), the 
party will have an opportunity to consolidate, build more robust internal 
processes and rebuild membership and funding.
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The 2019 federal election is noteworthy for many reasons. One of 
the defining stories should be that the ALP and the Liberal–National 
Coalition have been unable to draw voters back from the minor parties 
and Independents. Put simply, the long-term trend is away from the 
major parties. In this election, there was a small nationwide increase in the 
vote for minor parties and Independents in the House of Representatives, 
while in the Senate there was a modest decline. The State-level results are 
more varied. The Coalition lost ground in some places and maintained 
its vote in others. The ALP vote, in contrast, was demolished in Tasmania 
and in Queensland. Almost one in three Queenslanders and Tasmanians 
decided to support a party or candidate in the House other than the ALP 
or the Coalition. Across the entire country, this was around one in four 
(see Figure 17.1). In the Senate, Queensland and Tasmania again had 
the largest non–major party vote. These results are dissected in greater 
detail in other chapters in this volume, but they suggest that supply-side 
opportunities remain for parties and candidates expressing anti–major 
party sentiments. Put simply, the political environment remains fertile 
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Figure 17.1 First‑preference votes for minor parties and Independents
Source: Compiled with data kindly provided by Antony Green and from Australian 
Electoral Commission (2016 and 2019) .
In terms of seat composition, the minor parties have remained unchanged 
in the House, with Katter’s Australian Party (KAP), the Australian Greens 
(discussed in Chapter 16, this volume) and Centre Alliance (formerly the 
NXT) holding on to their respective seats. However, it is in the Senate 
where things have changed dramatically.1 The government is presented 
with a streamlined Senate crossbench compared with what it faced after 
the 2016 election. In total, the Senate crossbench will consist of 15 
representatives from the minor parties: nine Greens, two from the Centre 
Alliance, two from Pauline Hanson’s One Nation (PHON), one from 
the Australian Conservatives and one from the Jacqui Lambie Network 
(JLN). In contrast, after the 2016 election, the crossbench was 20-strong. 
Beyond the results, and a discussion of how important minor party 
preference flows were to the outcome (see Raue, Chapter 9, this volume), 
there were two critical stories about the minor parties that emerged 
from the 2019 election that will be the focus of this chapter. First, while 
there has been much discussion of the way the major parties and the 
Greens have used social media for the past decade or more (Gibson and 
McAllister  2011), this is the first election in which there has been 
a significant expansion in social media usage by the other minor parties. 
1  The number and type of minor parties in the Senate are further complicated by the Section 
44 disqualifications; some senators who were elected as a result of disqualifications subsequently 
switched parties or created their own (discussed in Chapter 3, this volume). 
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At a time when the traditional media landscape is fragmenting, this allows 
these parties to bypass the talking heads and deliver their messages directly 
to voters. Second, the re-emergence of Clive Palmer on the national 
political scene is an important part of the story—most of all for what it 
says about power and influence in Australian politics. Palmer reportedly 
spent over $60 million and, while he failed to win a seat and ended up 
with a meagre share of first preferences, at the very least, he contributed to 
the framing of the election in the minds of voters. These issues are worthy 
of further examination and are unpacked below. 
The minor parties embrace digital
For a decade or more, there has been increased interest in how various 
political actors are embracing the digital age (Chen 2013, 2015). Many 
analyses have suggested that the use of digital media by the non-Greens 
minor parties has been at a basic level, with rudimentary candidate pages 
that were lacking in how they engaged their audience (Chen 2012; 
Kefford 2018). The 2019 contest was different. What this election showed 
is that the minor parties are, albeit slowly, increasing the sophistication 
and scale of their social media and digital campaigns.2 When the social 
media and digital advertising of the KAP, JLN, PHON, United Australia 
Party (UAP), Centre Alliance, the Australian Conservatives and Fraser 
Anning’s Conservative National Party (CNP) are analysed, we see evidence 
of significant investment in the digital space. 
Unsurprisingly, Facebook remains the dominant mode for minor parties 
to interact with voters and the minor parties appear to have been well served 
by their social media accounts before and during the election campaign. 
As Esposito (2019) demonstrated, the Facebook pages for Fraser Anning 
(CNP), Pauline Hanson (PHON) and Malcolm Roberts (PHON) 
featured ‘in the top five performers for the year when it comes to total 
interactions on the platform’.3 The reach of and voter engagement with 
the social media accounts of key minor party actors were also significant 
during the campaign. As Table 17.1 demonstrates, engagement with the 
2  For a larger discussion of social media use, see Bruns and Moon (2018). McSwiney (2019) also 
noted that right-wing minor parties in 2019 were primarily using social media for issue framing.
3  Palmer (discussed more in the section below) had an unusual digital journey after the previous 
election. His online presence after the 2016 election started to resemble and be influenced by the alt-
right (Caccamo 2018), but, as the election drew closer, these influences seemed to diminish and he 
ran an orthodox digital campaign with social media at the centre.
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social media accounts of key minor parties during the official campaign 
period (11 April–18 May) was comparable with that of the major parties.4 
Pauline Hanson’s Facebook page had the most interactions, and this is 
perhaps unsurprising given it has one of the highest number of followers 
of any of Australia’s political pages. With seven of these posts receiving 
over 10,000 interactions, and with more than 250,000 followers on the 
platform, it is likely that each of these posts was viewed by hundreds 
of thousands of voters. In total, Hanson had 11 of the top 20 posts by 
engagement numbers and all of the top seven. The UAP, JLN and Anning’s 
pages had the remaining posts in the top 20. 
Table 17.1 Top 20 minor party campaign posts on Facebook by number 
of interactions
Date Interactions Party/candidate and link Content




30 April 24,936 PHoN: www .facebook .
com/PaulineHansonAu/
posts/986838414853804
Internal PHoN problems 
and response
1 May 23,705 PHoN: www .facebook .
com/PaulineHansonAu/
posts/987248828146096
Internal PHoN problems 
and response








29 April 17381 PHoN: www .facebook .
com/PaulineHansonAu/
posts/985985544939091
Policy: $15–20 billion on 
dam‑building in north 
Queensland
16 May 14,360 PHoN: www .facebook .
com/PaulineHansonAu/
posts/996513533886292
Attack on mainstream 
media 
4  These data come from Crowdtangle’s Google Chrome plugin, which provides data on the 
social media engagement of various pages. Interactions here are the combined number of reactions, 
comments and shares of the post. As a point of comparison, the most interactions a post from the 
main ALP page received during the campaign was around 35,000 and the main Liberal Party page 
was approximately 37,000. These figures are current for 31 May 2019. 
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Date Interactions Party/candidate and link Content




Lambie joke and photos 
12 May 11,581 Anning: www .facebook .
com/senatorfraseranning/
posts/707083586374005
Racism/visas for white 
South African farmers








9 May 9,670 Anning: www .facebook .
com/senatorfraseranning/
posts/705012946581069
Racism/ban on Muslim 
immigration
13 May 9,509 UAP: www.facebook.com/
CliveFrederickPalmer/
posts/2440482705971252
Anti‑Labor, claim of deals 
with China
28 April 9,149 Anning: www .facebook .
com/senatorfraseranning/
posts/699190917163272
Racism/support for white 
South Africans





30 April 8,688 PHoN: www .facebook .
com/PaulineHansonAu/
posts/986642288206750
Internal PHoN problems 
and response
17 April 8,659 Anning: www .facebook .
com/senatorfraseranning/
posts/692901687792195
Racism/claim that ‘fake 
refugees’ are entering 
country 








7 May 6,931 PHoN: www .facebook .
com/PaulineHansonAu/
posts/991111161093196
Results in NSW election
Note: The Facebook pages of Hanson, Lambie, UAP, Palmer, Anning, the Australian 
Conservatives, Brian Burston, KAP and the Centre Alliance were all analysed as part of this 
analysis of social media engagement .
Source: Crowdtangle (see Footnote 6) . 
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In terms of targeting, there is evidence to suggest that the minor parties 
have started to embrace targeting across various platforms and search 
engines. On Facebook, evidence of the UAP and PHON using targeted 
ads during the campaign was identified via the Facebook ad library, as well 
as through searches of some of the party pages and examination of the ads 
they were running. Some of the targeting was, however, more than a little 
unusual. For example, one PHON Senate candidate for New South 
Wales had targeted ‘people over the age of 18 who lived in Victoria’, while 
another targeted ad on Facebook, from the UAP, targeted ‘people aged 
16 to 38 who live in Australia’.5 There were also a number of reports of 
UAP advertising spreading across other areas of digital media, including 
YouTube and mobile game apps, as well as in Google search results 
(Bogle 2019; Vitorovich 2019). This is all evidence of the trajectory of 
minor party campaigning, which is increasingly heading online. 
The increased use of social media by the minor parties to connect with 
voters during the election campaign is unsurprising, but it does present 
challenges. This is changing the nature of electoral politics and how issues 
are framed in the minds of voters. Given that increasing numbers of 
voters are accessing their political information solely from social media, 
Facebook and other platforms provide opportunities for minor parties to 
reach vast numbers of voters in an affordable way. The danger, however, 
is that parties willing to produce misinformation or provocative content 
seem to do better on the platform and, as a result of the network effects 
of social media, this information can spread rapidly across the political 
landscape. This problem is likely to only get worse. 
The return of Clive
Clive Palmer’s return to the federal political arena was significant, not 
because he won a swag of Senate seats and a seat in the House—as he did 
in 2013 with his Palmer United Party (PUP) (Kefford and McDonnell 
2016, 2018)—but because of what his 2019 campaign says about power 
in Australia. An extremely wealthy individual, Palmer has a résumé 
that, among many other things, includes the rapid disintegration of his 
previous party as a result of incompetence and infighting, not paying the 
5  These descriptions are taken from Facebook’s advertising information, which provides limited 
details on the targeting strategy used.
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workers of his Queensland Nickel refinery an estimated $7 million in lost 
wages and benefits (Ferrier 2019) and being an absentee parliamentarian 
when he was the member for Fairfax between 2013 and 2016 
(Evershed 2014). He spent a reported $60 million6 on a campaign that 
contributed to how the election was framed in the minds of at least some 
voters and delivered significant preferences to the government, hurting 
the ALP along the way.7
Given the UAP’s eventual nationwide vote was 3.4 per cent in the House 
and 2.3 per cent in the Senate, voters might be wondering what exactly 
the point of all this was. Perhaps we will never know. But Palmer’s return 
to  the federal political arena raises a variety of questions about our 
democracy, including how we want elections to be funded, whether we 
think wealthy individuals should be able to pour this amount of money 
in and whether we care if the messaging from our parties and candidates 
for office is completely detached from anything resembling truth or facts. 
Ultimately, Palmer has burnt through another set of candidates  and 
$60  million dollars with an amateurish, self-interested campaign, 
and maybe he does not care, but perhaps we should. 
The campaign the UAP ran received significant media coverage from 
the outset. First, in April and May 2018, billboards started to emerge 
across the country with Palmer’s image and the slogan ‘Make Australia 
great’. Then, in January 2019, Palmer began advertising through the mass 
media. Television advertisements—which were accused of infringing the 
copyright of a song from the band Twisted Sister—generated plenty of 
media attention for Palmer and were ‘broadcast on the Seven, Nine and 
Ten networks between 50 and 167 times in the first week of January 
alone’ (Whitbourn 2019).8 Around this time, hundreds of thousands of 
text messages were sent out from the UAP claiming that, ‘when elected, 
United Australia Party will ban unsolicited text messages which Labor & 
Liberal have allowed’. The text message also contained a link to the UAP’s 
6  See Chapter 3 (this volume) for more on the advertising spend.
7  It should be noted, however, that in no seat in the House did this change the outcome, so 
the UAP’s preferences had no direct effect on who won government. But as Raue (Chapter 9, this 
volume) demonstrates, around 65 per cent of UAP preferences flowed to the Coalition. 
8  One version of the ad focused on the National Broadband Network, stating that $55 billion 
had been spent on it and it still did not work (Swanston 2019). Another started off with an image of 
disgraced former Labor Senator Sam Dastyari, with the headline: ‘Labor Senator’s expenses paid by 
the Chinese Government.’ This was followed by ‘No more foreign control’ (Whitbourn 2019). 
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website. Again, this generated substantial media coverage for the party. 
But what modest gains the party may have made via increasing its name 
recognition were surely undone by the ill will generated by the tactic. 
Plate 17.1 Copy of UAP text message sent to voters
Source: Brent Davidson, Twitter account, 16 January 2019 .
The contrast with PUP’s 2013 campaign was stark. In 2013, when Palmer 
and his PUP tasted success, they had a set of policies that were generous 
to everyone and were designed to harvest a protest vote (Kefford and 
McDonnell 2016), but their messaging was largely an attack on both 
major parties with their slogan ‘Not the Liberal way or the Labor way, 
but the right way’ being emblematic of this (Kefford and McDonnell 
2016). In 2019, with at least double the amount of funds injected into the 
campaign, Palmer and the UAP released, word for word, the same national 
policies as 2013, with one change: there was no need to ‘dump the 
carbon tax’ as that had already been achieved (UAP 2019h).9 Moreover, 
as opposed to 2013, when the campaign messaging was filled largely with 
generic, anti–major party rhetoric, in 2019, the messaging from the UAP 
was completely detached from reality, primarily targeted the ALP and was 
filled with what can only be described as lies.10 
One media release and message spread across social media was titled: 
‘Labor and China’s Communist government conspiring against Australia’ 
(UAP 2019e). Another said: ‘Bill Shorten will hit us with another trillion 
9  To describe the policies of PUP and the UAP as lacking in detail would be a very generous 
assessment. Instead, they published four policies on their website and then a range of policies were 
floated at points throughout the election campaign. An example of this was a post that said the party 
would ‘increase the age pension by $150 per week’ (UAP 2019g). Another was that they would reduce 
power costs by 50 per cent, once elected (UAP 2019b). 
10  To be clear, there were numerous videos, posts and media releases that attacked the major parties 
together, but there was no advertising that attacked the LNP or Morrison in the way that some of the 
UAP’s advertising did the ALP. 
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dollars of taxes and costs’ (UAP 2019c). A third claimed that Labor’s 
negative gearing policy would allow ‘foreign companies to claim tax 
deductions that Australians will not be able to’ (UAP 2019a). Beyond 
the anti-Labor messaging, Palmer’s economic nationalism was exemplified 
by ads that asked: ‘Did you know that a Chinese communist controlled 
company owns an airport in the Pilbara? Now another Chinese owned 
company has bought another airport near Perth for just $1’ (UAP 2019d). 
This video has, thus far, been viewed 1.4 million times on Facebook. 
Another of the UAP’s fabrications was that the major parties would not 
deliver a tax cut until 2024 (UAP 2019f ); this was spread across social 
media widely and promoted via paid advertising. Over and over, the 
messaging from Palmer and the UAP was not just loose with the truth, 
it had absolutely no connection with it. 
This is all evidence of Palmer’s malignant influence in Australian politics. 
While it could be argued that in 2013 he sought to damage the major 
parties and have his business interests advanced, his campaign resonated 
because of increasing dissatisfaction with the major parties and Australian 
democracy. He was subsequently able to have some input on policy as 
a result of the numbers he held in a finely balanced Senate. The 2019 
campaign was something altogether different. Palmer and his UAP 
actively spread misinformation and falsehoods across the political 
landscape, which may sow further seeds of discontent in the Australian 
body politic.11 Internationally, Palmer’s gigantic personal investment 
and complete domination of his party are not unparalleled (Kefford and 
McDonnell 2018), but it is worth considering whether any plutocrat has 
spent this much money and ended up with as little in return. Perhaps we 
are fortunate that this is the case. 
Conclusion
The 2019 federal election has provided more evidence of the challenges 
Australian democracy confronts. It is becoming increasingly difficult for 
the major parties to build a coalition of voters large enough for them 
to govern across a country where the interests and preferences of the 
States and regions are increasingly contradictory. So, while the crossbench 
11  The scholarship on negative advertising and attack ads has long suggested that negative 
advertising can weaken political efficacy. See Ansolabehere et al. (1994). 
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in the Senate has shrunk, the nationwide vote for minor parties and 
Independents in the Senate has decreased slightly and there are certainly 
challenges for each of the minor parties, the reality is that voters are not 
returning to the major parties in any significant way. Voters continue to 
spray their first preferences across a wide range of minor parties, depending 
on the State or Territory in which they live and whether they live in the 
major metropolitan areas or in the regions. There is an opportunity for 
a fourth force to emerge in Australian federal politics, especially on the 
right, but thus far none of the party entrepreneurs has had the resources 
or knowhow to pull this off. 
The challenges of institutionalising, outlined in the 2016 election book 
(Kefford 2018), remain for the minor parties. Indeed, we have seen some 
of these challenges come to fruition. Since the previous election, Nick 
Xenophon departed the parliament, the NXT became the Centre Alliance 
and, notwithstanding Rebekha Sharkie holding on to the seat of Mayo, 
their vote in the Senate has collapsed. While Katter remains very popular 
in his stronghold of Kennedy, his party has made little headway at the 
federal level beyond this seat. Katter, who has held the seat for 26 years, 
is 74 years old and the question must be asked, how much longer can 
he continue? The JLN and PHON probably have reason to be most 
optimistic. Lambie has been returned to the Senate for six years and, given 
the state of play in Tasmania, there is a significant opportunity for her 
to be a long-term senator for the State. PHON has overcome crisis after 
crisis and still managed to increase its Senate vote in Queensland. With 
two senators, the party is, again, in a critical position given the finely 
balanced numbers in that chamber, but whether the party can remain 
united given all the evidence to the contrary remains to be seen. 
Australia’s minor parties remain critical in many ways. They are 
vehicles through which frustration at the major parties and the political 
establishment is channelled. They represent interests that the major 
parties are perceived to overlook. They often determine what policy passes 
through the Senate, securing deals along the way for their home States or 
favoured issues. While there is significant fragmentation on the right—
far more than on the left—and these parties appear to be fighting for 
the same electoral space, the situation is more complex. These parties are 
pulling voters away, not just from the Coalition, but also from the ALP, 
suggesting the drivers of de-alignment are multidimensional. The major 
parties are therefore caught in a bind. They are losing their share of first 
preferences to minor parties, hence, their need to compete with them. But 
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they also require preferences from these parties—thus, they often need 
to find ways to cooperate. Australia’s institutional architecture, therefore, 
continues to produce pressure points that challenge the major parties and 
provide opportunities for the minor parties. 
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Jennifer Curtin and Jill Sheppard
The impact of Independents on the fortunes of Liberal–National Coalition 
governments is often overshadowed by a focus on the minor parties’ 
presence and power in the Senate. This ignores the fact that Independents 
have been a fixture in the lower house since 1996 and, at various times 
over this period, either Labor or the Coalition have needed their support 
to govern. Most recently, this was the case for newly anointed Prime 
Minister Scott Morrison. Following the election of Independent Kerryn 
Phelps to Malcolm Turnbull’s former seat of Wentworth in October 
2018, Morrison’s government no longer held a majority. In November 
that year, on the day after Phelps was sworn in, Liberal MP Julia Banks 
quit the Liberal Party to sit as an Independent. Although both Phelps 
and Banks stated their preference to see the government run its full term, 
these Independents and others proved themselves thorns in the Coalition’s 
side. In November 2018, Cathy McGowan introduced a Bill to establish 
a national integrity commission with wideranging powers to address 
perceived corruption and, in December, Phelps introduced the Medevac 
Bill, the aim of which was to bring asylum seekers detained offshore to 
Australia for medical treatment. Meanwhile, Banks’s presence  on the 
crossbench was a constant reminder of the allegedly toxic culture of 
the Liberal Party.
These incumbent Independents, and other aspiring Independent 
candidates, were a highly visible part of the 2019 campaign landscape for 
a number of reasons. First, alongside the traditional local constituency 
battles for votes, nationally, a number of Independents banded together 
MoRRISoN'S MIRACLE
358
to champion issues of government integrity, the politics of water and 
climate change.1 Second, there was a small but noisily expressed public 
disillusionment with the Liberal Party—in part as a response to the 
nature of Turnbull’s dismissal, but also in reaction to allegations of sexism 
and cronyism and resistance to addressing issues of climate change and 
coalmining. Thus, in addition to seeing Independents in the Coalition’s 
rural and regional heartlands, the possibility of Independent representation 
extended to the leafy Liberal suburbs of the major cities. Finally, the 2019 
election was to be the year of Independent women. It remains rare to see 
women elected as Independents in Australia, yet in 2019, the percentage 
of Independent women candidates increased significantly (up from 
12.9 per cent in 2016 to 23.2 per cent). This chapter examines each of 
these dimensions of the Independents’ campaigns and then reviews the 
results and implications for the future of Independents. For, although 
history was made when Independent candidate Helen Haines replaced 
Cathy McGowan as the member for Indi, it is not yet evident that the 
winning strategies employed in rural and provincial electorates will 
translate into ongoing success for urban liberal Independents. 
The campaigns: A focus on both local 
and national
Independents have proved critical to government stability in recent years 
and their increasing presence can be credited to a combination of factors: 
a preferential electoral system, single-member districts, the presence of 
compulsory voting and general disenchantment with the major political 
parties, particularly among those who live in safe rural and regional seats. 
Although the election of growing numbers of Independents is not unique 
to Australia, elsewhere Independents tend to succeed in systems with 
open party lists and low electoral thresholds (Brancatti 2008).
Nonetheless, international and Australian scholarship points to one 
common feature associated with successful Independents: the need to 
be a ‘local notable’. This normally requires candidates to be known for 
1  Peter Andren was also known for his progressive stance on asylum seekers and parliamentary 
integrity as the MP for Calare, and Independents have worked together before—for example, in setting 
up the Independent Candidate’s Advisory Network (to encourage others to stand as Independents). 
However, Andren, Tony Windsor and others chose not to form a ‘group’ to advance substantive policy 
issues (Costar and Curtin 2004: 21–23).
359
18 . THE INDEPENDENTS
something before standing as an Independent—as local councillors or 
mayors, sports stars or media personalities (Costar and Curtin 2004). 
However, the election of McGowan in the Victorian seat of Indi in the 
2013 federal election represented something both traditional and new. 
Her win was traditional in the sense that it reinforced a three-decades-
long, low-level trend whereby a geographical concentration of voters 
eschewed major party loyalties in favour of local candidates. 
This has been particularly evident in rural and regional electorates when the 
Coalition is in government. Alongside this, were several new dimensions. 
McGowan’s campaign approach, which harnessed communities of support 
around the electorate, promoted both visibility and voice for the voters 
of Indi. Her base was far more diverse and inclusive than the discontent 
tapped 20 years earlier by Pauline Hanson’s One Nation. McGowan spoke 
to young and old from across the political spectrum, many of whom had 
eschewed tribal party politics and were searching for a different kind of 
local representative (Curtin and Costar 2015; Curtin 2018). 
Another particular feature of the 2019 election was that Independent 
candidates were better resourced and ostensibly cooperated more 
closely than in previous years (Grattan and Seaborn 2019). Whereas 
successful Independents in recent decades have had experience either as 
party-endorsed legislators or within party institutions, the current cohort 
of Independent candidates and MPs is markedly different. Instead, they 
are attracting support from less partisan sources. Two specific but related 
circumstances appear to have led to this phenomenon: the first is the 
decline in support for and trust in the major political parties, which has 
led directly to community-based organisational support for candidates 
such as Haines; and the second is frustration among many voters over the 
dearth of progressive climate change policies among those same parties 
(see, for example, Kassam 2019).
The first form of support, with Voices for Indi as the exemplar, has 
been covered widely (Curtin and Costar 2015; Grattan and Seaborn 
2019; Hendriks 2017). The second is less well understood. A broad 
coalition of climate change activists—including tech entrepreneur Mike 
Cannon-Brookes, Australian billionaire’s son Simon Holmes à Court 
and former prime minister Malcolm Turnbull’s son, Alex—privately 
funded environmentally progressive Independents. Some of these funds 
were channelled through Climate 200 Pty Ltd, an organisation that was 
registered  in April 2019 and which donated $40,000 to Julia Banks, 
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$35,000 to Helen Haines, $37,000 to Rob Oakeshott, $47,500 to 
Kerryn Phelps, $145,000 to Oliver Yates and $50,000 to Independent 
Senate candidate Anthony Pesec (AEC 2019a). By contrast, Zali Steggall’s 
campaign was funded by a range of wealthy individuals and was claimed 
to be the most well-resourced of any Independent campaign in Australian 
history, with a $1.1 million war chest (Chambers and Caisley 2019; 
Maley 2019). This kind of organisation among Independent candidates—
based both locally on shared concerns and nationally on specific issue 
domains—is certainly unprecedented in Australian politics.
Once elected, the ‘creative’ deliberative approach McGowan practised 
with the support of Voices for Indi gave her constituents an opportunity 
to participate in the practice of representation, demystifying federal 
politics in the process and creating ‘respectful, authentic, skilled citizen 
politicians’ (Haines 2019a; Hendriks 2017). Then, in November 2018, 
Voices for Indi invited around 550 registered campaign volunteers to 
a January 2019 meeting in the town of Benalla to determine a ‘succession 
process’ in advance of McGowan’s anticipated retirement prior to the 
2019 election (Chan 2018b). Although unprecedented, this approach was 
deemed necessary for a number of reasons: to ‘Keep Indi Independent’, 
to continue to build on McGowan’s legacy of ‘doing politics differently’ 
and to ensure the campaign infrastructure created to support McGowan 
remained intact (Koslowski 2019a). 
A meeting of around 200 volunteers endorsed Haines as the preferred 
candidate in mid-January and she began establishing her credentials 
as a worthy successor to McGowan. She spoke of the importance of 
valuing inclusion, diversity, listening and ‘recognising the power within 
communities’ by building on ‘our little movement started in 2013, and 
what Cathy McGowan championed in office’, to ‘pass it on to the next 
community representative who will come after’ (Haines 2019a).
Haines’s policy positions were informed by conversations with citizens and 
her own experience in public health. She took an openly pro-choice stance 
on euthanasia and abortion and supported more funding for health care, 
education, aged care, the ABC and sharing regional grants across Australia, 
rather than privileging Coalition-held seats (Haines  2019b; Somerville 
and Johnson 2019). Haines opposed the Adani coalmine—differentiating 
herself from both the Liberal and the National candidates—and was 
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a strong advocate for clean energy and climate change mitigation. In so 
doing, she invoked the progressive tendencies of some farmers who also 
recognised the need for new policies on energy and water (Haines 2019b).
Voices for Indi provided dynamic and coherent support for the new 
candidate, marshalling the well-known ‘orange army’ of 1,600–1,700 
volunteers (spread across Indi’s numerous small rural towns and the City 
of Wodonga). In the end, this amounted to roughly one volunteer for every 
20 first-preference votes Haines received. Given the 21-day pre-polling 
period, this level of ‘humanpower’ proved critical (Koslowski 2019c). 
The ground campaign once again had a ‘traditional’ pre-cartel party feel, 
with face-to-face conversations, handmade paraphernalia sold at school 
fetes and music festivals and the requisite colour-coordinated bumper 
stickers and T-shirts. Haines also used ubiquitous new platforms—in 
particular, Facebook and Twitter. However, these only supplemented her 
highly visible presence around the electorate—often accompanied by the 
still-popular McGowan, thus helping voters to see that a transition from 
one Independent to another was both simple and natural. This double 
act was also apparent online, with McGowan’s 20,000-plus followers on 
Twitter regularly reminded of her support for Haines. Their campaign 
activities were sufficiently successful to attract the attention of Advance 
Australia (Martin 2019). 
The Voices for Indi movement proved contagious in 2019, with 
a community group called Voices of Warringah (VOW) created to support 
an alternative candidate to Tony Abbott, who local activists argued had 
refused to engage with liberals on issues such as climate change and 
same-sex marriage. These Warringah-based activists formed a committee 
and interviewed candidates, eventually selecting former Olympian Zali 
Steggall. ‘Kitchen table conversations’, pioneered in Indi, were hosted, 
social media accounts activated and volunteers mobilised. 
GetUp! was also prominent in the campaign to oust Abbott, as were at least 
four other grassroots groups (Davies 2019). Dowse (2019a) recalls there 
being more than 700 people present at a GetUp! meeting in December 
2018, well in advance of Steggall confirming her candidacy. The collective 
raison d’être of these activists was to unseat Abbott and get climate change 
on to the Liberals’ policy agenda. In a sense, these two issues amounted 
to a single-issue campaign for Steggall; moderate Liberals were angry at 
Abbott’s determined denial that renewable energy and climate mitigation 
strategies were necessary let alone desirable (Dowse 2019a). This was 
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probably most visible at the Vote Tony Out rally, which attracted an 
estimated 1,000 protesters and featured former State-level Independent 
MPs, both of whom endorsed Steggall (Dowse 2019b).
Steggall’s campaign also attracted considerable attention from conservative 
campaigning organisation Advance Australia (see Chapter 21, this 
volume). Advance Australia released a crude video (later removed) and 
large billboards linking Steggall to Labor Leader Bill Shorten. These 
were strategically located on at least one of several main roads through 
the  electorate (and on roaming trucks). Meanwhile, Steggall incurred 
the wrath of shock jocks on radio station 2GB and talkback listeners 
who argued her supporters were playing the worst kind of dirty politics 
by linking Abbott and then-convicted Catholic Cardinal George Pell 
on posters. 
Steggall took lessons on campaigning as an Independent from both 
McGowan and Phelps. Similar to Haines, who was surrounded by 
orange in Indi, and Phelps by supporters in purple, Warringah was 
awash with volunteers wearing aqua-coloured T-shirts. It was estimated 
that Steggall  had marshalled over 1,000 supporters on the ground 
(Dowse  2019a), along  with a well-positioned office up the road from 
Abbott’s, a  strong social  media presence and an experienced team of 
fundraisers and tacticians. 
Steggall also shared with Phelps and Banks the expertise of Damien 
Hodgkinson, whose experience in community campaigning helped win 
Phelps the by-election in Wentworth.2 Hodgkinson’s company, DEM 
Asia, was reported to be working with eight Independent candidates in 
setting up campaign infrastructure on the ground, including donor and 
volunteer databases and advertising, and administering postal vote ballot 
systems (Middleton 2019). The candidates maintained this was not an 
Independents’ alliance, but rather a means by which to counterbalance 
the significant resources and knowledge available to the major party 
candidates (Tingle 2019). It was alleged that the Liberals were sufficiently 
concerned by Steggall’s prospects that the party was spending as much as 
$2 million in the electorate. In Wentworth, voters were also targeted with 
an onslaught of Liberal-funded mail-outs and robocalls in the final week 
of the campaign (Witt 2019).
2  Hodgkinson was assisted by Anthony Reed and communications specialist Darrin Barnett, 
a former media adviser to Julia Gillard (Middleton 2019).
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There were differences, however, between the campaigns of Steggall 
and Phelps, on the one hand, and Haines on the other. Steggall and 
Phelps were running against high-profile Liberal candidates in blue-
ribbon urban electorates and their target demographic was disaffected 
moderate liberals concerned with the Liberal Party’s position on climate 
change. While refugees and some local issues were raised, the campaign 
messaging concentrated primarily on climate and did not engage in the 
anti-establishment narrative often associated with non-party candidates. 
The Sydney Morning Herald’s SmartVote tool indicated that Haines, 
Yates, Steggall and Phelps all held more progressive stances than both 
the Liberals and Labor on environmental protection and law and order 
(including the treatment of asylum seekers). However, Steggall and Phelps 
differed in that they were closer to the Liberals on the economy and were 
openly opposed to Labor’s tax package (Koslowski 2019b).
But 2019 also looked different to previous elections in two other ways. 
First, a number of Independents expanded their messaging in an effort 
to force a collective focus on national issues beyond the obvious one 
of climate change. The focus on national issues was driven in part by 
a newer breed of Independents—what some have termed the ‘sensible 
centre’—made up of progressive urban Liberals (Denniss 2018). Fifteen 
Independent candidates ran a video across social media platforms that 
asked voters to ‘rethink the role of Independents’, from being political 
disruptors (thereby distancing themselves from some of the minor parties) 
to being a ‘force for constructive debate’ (Tingle 2019).
Prior to this, 12 Independent candidates had jointly called for immediate 
action on the allegations of misuse of public funds relating to the 2017 
purchase of water rights by the federal government from Eastern Australia 
Irrigation, which was dubbed ‘Watergate’. The signatories demanded 
the government adopt a comprehensive national integrity commission 
(Crowe 2019). These initiatives followed the parliamentary work of 
Independent MPs—notably, McGowan and Phelps—who successfully 
leveraged the balance of power held by the Independents and minor 
parties to push for change to the medical evacuation regime for asylum 
seekers on Manus Island and Nauru and to highlight the need for a federal 
integrity commission to address political corruption. Phelps noted that, 
during the campaign, the Independents would look to ‘cooperate and 
share resources’ and take a stand on issues of national importance, but 
reassured voters that this would not undermine their autonomy or their 
freedom to disagree with one another (Tingle 2019).
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The second distinct feature of 2019 was the gender factor. In October 
2018, Phelps had issued a call to arms to other women Independents to 
run for public office (Davies 2018). By March 2019, a number of high-
profile women had put themselves forward as Independent candidates, 
including Louise Stewart in Julie Bishop’s former seat of Curtin, Western 
Australia; Steggall; Alice Thompson in the seat of MacKellar; and Banks in 
the seat of Flinders. Media outlets around the country were documenting 
the ‘rise of impressive female independent candidates’ (Karvelas 2019). 
The emergence of strong female independents who were economically 
conservative but radical on issues such as climate change was seen as 
a challenge to the Coalition. These women ‘invaders’ were said to be a 
consequence of the Coalition being internally split on environmental 
policy as well as the resistance of both the Liberal Party and the Nationals 
to selecting, promoting and fostering a culture inclusive of women 
(Clark 2019; Kenny 2019). Voters were reminded that Steggall, Phelps 
and Banks were economically conservative, socially progressive women 
who would normally fit easily within a centre-right party, but who had 
chosen to run as outsiders (Karvelas 2019). The fallout from the Liberal 
leadership battle, and its impact on Julie Bishop, remained a constant 
undercurrent as a result. 
Three Sydney-based women lawyers had established ‘WomenVote’ in 
advance of the federal election and—like the now 40-year-old strategy of 
the Women’s Electoral Lobby—scored parties on five policies of importance 
to women. They also used a bright-pink bus to travel to key electorates to 
canvass women voters’ views and ask questions of candidates. They began 
their campaign in Wentworth and then travelled to Warringah, highlighting 
that women Independents were standing up for women (Smith 2019). 
Other women’s groups also profiled women Independents. Women’s Agenda 
provided a range of information about the candidates on its website, while 
‘Connecting Women’ organised a panel discussion on gender equality in the 
electorate of Warringah (Dowse 2019b). 
Women were also involved in organisation on the ground; four of the five 
VOW executive members were women and its secretary, Kathryn Ridge, 
had run as an Independent at the 2017 NSW by-election after former 
premier Mike Baird retired (Chan 2018a). Images of Phelps’s purple-clad 
volunteers regularly featured groups of women, and photos of McGowan 
and Haines campaigning together were an implicit reminder that for 
too long Independent politics had been dominated by men. Haines 
said politics and the people of Indi needed intelligent rural women as 
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representatives (Priestley 2019). It is difficult to assess the impact of 
women who helped run the campaigns of the women Independents, but 
in the case of Indi, Wentworth and Warringah, we do know that all three 
were explicitly committed to positive rather than negative narratives. The 
day after the election, a collage displayed in Warringah included the words 
‘Love Wins’ (Dowse 2019c).
The results
In 2019, fewer Independent candidates stood for the House of 
Representatives  than in 2016 (95 compared with 108), but the number 
elected increased by one, to three.3 The share of the vote Independents 
received increased to 3.37 per cent (up from 2.8 per cent), although this 
figure masks a wide variation across States. Independents in South Australia, 
Western Australia and Queensland attracted less than 1.5  per  cent 
compared with between 3.5 and 5 per cent in New South Wales, Victoria, 
the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory, and 13 per cent 
in Tasmania (the last boosted by Andrew Wilkie’s success). 
Two incumbent Independents ran in 2019: Andrew Wilkie in the 
renamed and redistributed Tasmanian seat of Clark and Phelps in 
Wentworth. As indicated in Table 18.1, Wilkie extended his already tight 
hold on the sparsely populated seat to the south of Hobart, winning 
sufficient primary votes to be elected outright and increasing his overall 
margin to 72 per cent. In a sense, Clark is different to the ‘usual’ regional 
Independent seat in that the contest was between Wilkie and Labor, rather 
than a Coalition party candidate. 
Phelps, however, was unsuccessful. Second-time Liberal candidate Dave 
Sharma won Wentworth despite Phelps increasing her primary vote by 
3 per cent. Commentators argued that the anger over Turnbull’s demise 
had dissipated, which, in combination with the polls predicting a Labor 
win and the scare campaign equating voting Independent with support 
for Labor, undermined Phelps’s chances. 
3  The drop in the number of Independent candidates may have been a result of the doubling of the 
deposit required of candidates (see Chapter 3, this volume). Reforms to the Senate electoral system 
in 2016 also reduced the chances of Independents’ success. Nonetheless, 57 Independents nominated 
for Senate election. Of these, Anthony Pesec was the highest-profile candidate. A climate change 
and renewable energy activist, he campaigned as a progressive alternative to ACT incumbent Liberal 
Zed Seselja. Pesec received 12,604 votes—just less than 5 per cent of the vote (but almost 80,000 
votes short of being elected).
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Table 18.1 Results for selected Independents, 2016 and 2019








44 .07 50 .05 6 .02 67 .78 72 .12 4 .35
Rob oakeshott 
(Cowper, NSW)
26 .29 24 .49 –1 .80 45 .44 43 .21 –2 .23
Kevin Mack 
(Farrar, NSW)
20 .49 39 .06
Zali Steggall 
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32 .43 2 .53 51 .12 48 .69 –2 .43
Alice Thompson 
(MacKellar, NSW))










32 .35 –2 .41 54 .83 51 .39 –3 .44
oliver Yates 
(Kooyong, Vic .)




7 .75 Placed 
4th
Sources: Compiled by the authors from AEC (2019b); and Curtin (2018) .
Wilkie was joined by two new Independents, Haines and Steggall, 
representing two quite different seats (urban and rural), and both making 
history: Steggall because the seat of Warringah had always been held by 
the Liberal Party and Haines because, for the first time federally, one 
Independent succeeded another. Haines’s campaign, like McGowan’s in 
2016, was challenging in that she was subject to a three-cornered contest, 
meaning an exchange of preferences between the Liberals and Nationals. 
It took 25 days to declare the result, with Haines unable to retain 
McGowan’s level of support. The seat of Indi is now one of Australia’s 
most marginal electorates. Steggall, on the other hand, received a healthy 
43 per cent primary vote, which translated into a fairly safe margin of 
7 per cent.
367
18 . THE INDEPENDENTS
Of the remaining high-profile candidates, only Rob Oakeshott came close 
to the 25 per cent primary vote considered the required minimum to 
have a chance of winning. The Liberal Party’s Sussan Ley held her seat of 
Farrer on primary votes (50.7 per cent), although Kevin Mack secured 
39 per cent of the two-party preferred—a swing against Ley of 7 per cent. 
Oliver Yates was prolific on social media but failed to reach double figures 
in Kooyong. He was seeking to unseat Treasurer Josh Frydenberg but the 
presence of a high-profile Greens candidate, Julian Burnside, complicated 
the choice for voters concerned about the environment (Burnside won 
16 per cent of the primary vote). Julia Banks and Alice Thompson both 
received more than 12 per cent but failed to draw sufficient votes away 
from either the Liberal or the Labor candidates. 
The cases of Indi, Clark and Warringah reinforce the argument that 
Independents will often succeed when voters believe political parties 
have failed to address both local and national interests. These successes 
are also a reminder that compulsory preferential voting in single-member 
districts aids the cause of Independents, because disillusioned constituents 
are compelled to vote and Labor and the Coalition are more likely to 
direct preferences to Independents than to each other. Thus, when an 
Independent candidate wins 25 per cent of the primary vote, they have 
a strong chance of garnering sufficient preferences to reach the required 
50 per cent plus one. In most cases, this makes the seat ‘marginal’ 
(the contemporary exception is Wilkie). 
In the case of rural and regional electorates, this marginal status can 
result in additional government largesse when the Coalition is in power, 
reinforcing the power of Independents. However, the example of Phelps 
suggests the same does not apply to the new urban liberal Independent. 
For, despite emulating the Indi model, Phelps, Banks, Yates, Steggall and 
others like them may be perceived as single-issue (climate change) protest 
candidates, attracting those only momentarily disaffected with their 
natural party of choice. Whether Steggall can marshal a permanent base 




Australian Electoral Commission (AEC). 2019a. AEC Transparency Register. 
Canberra: AEC. transparency.aec.gov.au/.
Australian Electoral Commission (AEC). 2019b. 2019 Federal Election. Canberra: 
AEC. www.aec.gov.au/Elections/Federal_Elections/2019/index.htm.
Brancatti, Dawn. 2008. ‘Winning Alone: The Electoral Fate of Independent 
Candidates Worldwide’. Journal of Politics 70(3): 648–62. doi.org/10.1017/
S0022381608080675.
Chambers, Geoff and Olivia Caisley. 2019. ‘Federal election independent 
candidates backed by Climate 200 funding vehicle’. The Australian, 5 November. 
www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/federal-election-independent-
candidates-backed-by-climate-200-funding-vehicle/news-story/ 1a4c 635f0 bee 
627b2a8f97f007491090.
Chan, Gabrielle. 2018a. ‘Tony Abbott faces campaign using tactics that defeated 
Mirabella in Indi’. The Guardian, 6 October. www.theguardian.com/australia-
news/2018/oct/06/tony-abbott-faces-campaign-using-tactics-that-defeated-
mirabella-in-indi.
Chan, Gabrielle. 2018b. ‘Cathy McGowan succession process launched by Indi 
community group’. The Guardian, 30 November. www.theguardian.com/
australia-news/2018/nov/30/cathy-mcgowan-succession-process-launched-by-
indi-community-group.
Clark, Andrew. 2019. ‘Independent invaders could decide election’. Australian 
Financial Review, 3 May. www.afr.com/news/politics/national/blue-ribbon-
battles-independent-invaders-could-decide-election-20190503-p51jp5. 
Costar, Brian and Jennifer Curtin. 2004. Rebels with a Cause: Independents 
in Australian Politics. Sydney: UNSW Press.
Crowe, David. 2019. ‘The “price of power”: Key independents list their conditions 
for support in next parliament’. Sydney Morning Herald, 1 May. www.smh.
com.au/federal-election-2019/the-price-of-power-key-independents-list-
their-conditions-for-support-in-next-parliament-20190430-p51iqe.html.
Curtin, Jennifer. 2018. ‘Independents return and the “almost” hung parliament’. 
In Double Disillusion: The 2016 Australian Federal Election, edited by Anika 
Gauja, Peter Chen, Jennifer Curtin and Juliet Pietsch, 359–80. Canberra: 
ANU Press. doi.org/10.22459/DD.04.2018.16.
369
18 . THE INDEPENDENTS
Curtin, Jennifer and Brian Costar. 2015. ‘The contest for rural representation: 
The celebrated contest over Indi and the fate of independents’. In Abbott’s 
Gambit: The 2013 Australian Federal Election, edited by Carol Johnson and 
John Wanna, with Hsu-Ann Lee, 275–91. Canberra: ANU Press. doi.org/ 
10.22459/ AG.01.2015.16. 
Davies, Anne. 2018. ‘Kerryn Phelps and her purple army shake up politics-as-
usual in Wentworth stunner’. The Guardian, 20 October. www.theguardian.
com/australia-news/2018/oct/20/kerryn-phelps-and-her-purple-army-shake-
up-politics-as-usual-in-wentworth-stunner.
Davies, Anne. 2019. ‘“And this is Mosman!”: Genteel Warringah rocked by election 
rancour’. The Guardian, 16 May. www.theguardian.com/australia-news/ 2019/
may/16/genteel-warringah-rocked-election-rancour-abbott-steggall.
Denniss, Richard. 2018. ‘Progressive ideas are becoming the new “sensible centre” 
of Australian politics’. The Guardian, 28 November. www.theguardian.
com/comment isfree/2018/nov/28/progressive-ideas-are-becoming-the-new-
sensible-centre-of-australian-politics.
Dowse, Sara. 2019a. ‘Warringah rises up’. Inside Story, 24 April. insidestory.org.au/ 
warringah-rises-up/.
Dowse, Sara. 2019b. ‘Something’s afoot in Warringah’. Inside Story, 7 May. 
insidestory.org.au/somethings-afoot-in-warringah/.
Dowse, Sara. 2019c. ‘Warringah’s win’. Inside Story, 20 May. insidestory.org.au/
warringahs-win/.
Grattan, Michelle and Jane Seaborn. 2019. ‘The Independents: The cases of 
Warringah and Wentworth’. In From Turnbull to Morrison: Understanding 
the Trust Divide, edited by Mark Evans, Michelle Grattan and Brendan 
McCaffrie, 281–94. Melbourne: Melbourne University Publishing. 
Haines, Helen. 2019a. Helen Haines’ Bio. Wangaratta, Vic.: Voices for Indi. voices 
forindi.com/candidate-identification-process/more-about-helen-haines/.
Haines, Helen. 2019b. Helen Haines launches campaign for Indi. 7 April. www.helen 
haines.org/campaign_launch [page discontinued].
Hendriks, Carolyn M. 2017. ‘Citizen-Led Democratic Reform: Innovations in 




Karvelas, Patricia. 2019. ‘Women are pushing to the front of the queue in 2019 
Australian politics’. ABC News, 30 January. www.abc.net.au/news/ 2019-
01-30/zali-steggall-tony-abbott-kelly-odwyer-australian-politics-women/ 
10761552.
Kassam, Natasha. 2019. Lowy Institute Poll 2019. Sydney: Lowy Institute. 
www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/lowy-institute-poll-2019.
Kenny, Mark. 2019. ‘Liberals lose yet another high-profile woman, yet still no 
action on gender’. The Conversation, 21 January. theconversation.com/liberals-
lose-yet-another-high-profile-woman-yet-still-no-action-on-gender-110158.
Koslowski, Max. 2019a. ‘Cathy McGowan, trailblazing independent MP, to quit 
politics at the election’. Sydney Morning Herald, 14 January. www.smh.com.au/
politics/federal/cathy-mcgowan-trailblazing-independent-mp-to-quit-politics-
at-the-election-20190114-p50r6v.html.
Koslowski, Max. 2019b. ‘Are independents really from the “sensible centre”? 
Smartvote Australia asked 50 of them’. Sydney Morning Herald, 7 May. www.
smh.com.au/federal-election-2019/are-independents-really-from-the-sensible-
centre-smartvote-australia-asked-50-of-them-20190507-p51kr2.html.
Koslowski, Max. 2019c. ‘“A school fete on steroids”: How the first ever 
independent handover triumphed’. Sydney Morning Herald, 20 May. www.
smh.com.au/federal-election-2019/a-school-fete-on-steroids-how-the-first-
ever-independent-handover-triumphed-20190520-p51p6y.html.
Maley, Jacqueline. 2019. ‘Steggall’s campaign was powered by a $1.1 million 
donations war chest’. Sydney Morning Herald, 4 November. www.smh.com.au/
politics/federal/steggall-s-campaign-was-powered-by-a-1-1-million-donations-
war-chest-20191101-p536nh.html.
Martin, Lisa. 2019. ‘Independent’s day? The orange army and its battle for Indi’. 
The Guardian, 23 April. www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2019/apr/23/
independents-day-the-orange-army-and-its-battle-for-indi.
Middleton, Karen. 2019. ‘The campaigner behind Phelps, Banks and Steggall’. 
The Saturday Paper, No. 242, 2–8 March. www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au/
news/politics/2019/03/02/the-campaigner-behind-phelps-banks-and-steggall/ 
15514452007567.
Priestley, Angela. 2019. ‘“I have strength in my hands”: Midwife Helen Haines 




18 . THE INDEPENDENTS
Smith, Alexandra. 2019. ‘Wentworth candidates board the big pink bus’. Sydney 
Morning Herald, 1 May. www.smh.com.au/federal-election-2019/wentworth-
candidates-board-the-big-pink-bus-20190501-p51j2q.html.
Somerville, Erin and Sian Johnson. 2019. ‘Independent MP accuses federal 
government of politicising regional grants’. ABC News, 6 March. www.abc.
net.au/news/2019-03-06/mcgowan-lodges-official-complaint-over-grant-
announcements/ 10876004.
Tingle, Laura. 2019. ‘Federal election 2019: Independents band together to take 
on political parties’. ABC News, 7 May. www.abc.net.au/news/2019-05-07/
independents-advert-takes-on-political-parties-laura-tingle/11084804.
Witt, Merrill. 2019. ‘Independents’ success offers silver lining’. CityHub, 







For the first time in many federal elections, business did not play a major 
or prominent role in the 2019 campaign. Business groups had been 
comparatively active in many previous federal elections, in 2004, 2007, 
2013 and 2016, asserting their values and priorities while combatting 
government policies they resented—notably, the mining rental resource 
tax in May 2010. In 2010, business remained on the sidelines, seemingly 
perplexed over the sudden ‘leadership coup’ against Kevin Rudd, while 
generally positive towards the fiscal stimulus that Labor had engineered to 
combat the Global Financial Crisis. 
In 2019—again, following much leadership turmoil, this time in the 
Coalition Government—business once more largely opted to leave 
the election result up to the voters and not run a vigorous campaign to 
influence the outcome. Somewhat paradoxically, the Opposition Labor 
leadership later blamed big business and sections of the corporate media 
for their election loss.
Nevertheless, business did try to change the tenor of debate away from 
short-term and local considerations to longer-term positive and proactive 
agendas. Mostly, business stressed the need for stability and certainty in 
governance, a clear sense of direction and confidence-building for the 
economy. It repeatedly called for further economic and structural reform, 
fewer impediments to business and for the next government to push 
ahead with much needed reforms including on climate change. Business 




For the last few elections, it has been a race to the bottom to take 
things off the agenda and limit options and choices … a blame 
game and an anti-business agenda and anti-growth agenda are 
not going to solve the issues that Australia confronts. (Quoted in 
Uren 2019) 
Perhaps what was less expected was that business stressed the need for 
cooperation for better outcomes overall and implicitly criticised the 
heightening of the politics of envy in the ‘class war’ against the ‘top end 
of town’.
Business also wanted a clear winner, not a hung parliament, giving the 
next government a clear mandate (see Garvey and Gluyas 2019). A less 
rabble-like Senate was also preferred, with many executives hoping 
for a smaller crossbench of ‘maverick’ senators. Sections of business 
had generally been pleased with the Coalition’s Budget for 2019–20 
(which promised a surplus of $7 billion and economic growth rates of 
2.75 per cent, later reduced to 2.5 per cent), which was delivered in the 
final sitting days of parliament and on the eve of the election being called, 
but they were sceptical about whether such an economic plan on its own 
could turn things around.
‘Meek and mild’ so ‘business hardly 
played a role’
Business groups and senior CEOs widely expected a Labor victory, 
especially after more than 50 consecutive Newspolls showed Labor holding 
a commanding lead in the two-party-preferred vote. The National Retail 
Association (2019), for instance, informed its members to expect a Labor 
win because ‘Labor has led in every major opinion poll for the past two 
and a half years and is still the favourite’. In many ways, business lapsed 
into a fatalistic ‘groupthink’ and became resigned to the polls and the fact 
that a change of government was imminent. It also appeared to believe 
what the polls were saying, and it is worth recalling that a Newspoll in 
mid-March 2019 had the Labor Party ahead by a margin of 54–46 per 
cent—an eight-point lead eight weeks out from the election. In such 
circumstances, business apparently adopted a series of tactical strategies: 
battening down while awaiting Labor’s victory, not antagonising Labor 
in the lead-up to the campaign proper and not running advertisements 
attacking Labor or boosting the Coalition. Many CEOs also began 
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overtly currying favour with Labor leaders, hoping to prosper or retain 
influence under their rule. Interestingly (and as discussed in Chapter 11, 
this volume), the re-election of a Liberal–National Government in New 
South Wales under Gladys Berejiklian was not seen by either business 
or the media as a harbinger of better prospects for the Coalition, even 
though its regional focus certainly was a fillip to Scott Morrison.
Business commentators reported that ‘big business was bracing for Bill 
Shorten and bracing for more class war’ (Fullerton 2019), and that it 
may regret not having a fuller strategy or may revert to behind-the-scenes 
lobbying (Uren 2019). Conservative columnists such as Chris Kenny 
(2019) noted once the election was over:
Big business hardly played a role. In fact, many on the Coalition 
side have long been frustrated about the way corporate Australia 
had become meek and mild on major economic debates, seemingly 
to align itself with a prospective Labor government in Canberra. 
Columnists in the business pages of News Corp newspapers claimed: 
‘Some people close to PM [Prime Minister] Scott Morrison had 
grumbled  …  about the business lobby’s poor contribution during 
the campaign’ (Glasgow and Lacy 2019d). Glasgow and Lacy (2019c) 
reported: 
It is the view of many in Team Morrison that the BCA was missing 
in action during the election campaign … [and] the BCA’s board 
… like most of corporate Australia had been bracing for life in Bill 
Shorten’s Australia. 
At one political panel event held for business in the final week of the 
campaign, only one businessman, Alastair Kinloch from AMP Limited 
(Glasgow and Lacy 2019b: 17), said he felt the tide had turned and 
that the Coalition could scrape back in; the other people present were 
apparently incredulous. 
As a former economist with the Australian Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry (ACCI), Greg Evans (2019), wrote in the aftermath of 
the election:
Today the business sector is not a policy influencer and is mostly 
missing in action. A centrepiece of the government’s third term 
agenda is to deliver income tax cuts to middle Australia, yet 
business provided no impetus for this. There was always a strong 
economic case to return bracket creep to individuals, especially 
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when other factors were weighing on wages growth. Surprisingly, 
this was overlooked by industry. Instead, business had a one-
dimensional tax approach and, after failing to secure company 
tax reductions, had nothing left to say … the business voice was 
virtually silent. It did not contribute a reform agenda or highlight 
and oppose those policies detrimental to its interests and to 
the economy.
It must be said that many business commentators were uniformly 
hostile to Labor’s proposed policies, but not many actively endorsed the 
Coalition, perhaps seeing it as the least-worst alternative. These included 
Robert Gottliebsen, Terry McCrann, Chris Kenny, Allan Wood, Don 
Stammer, Matthew Cranston and Michael Stutchbury. The Australian’s 
David Uren and the Australian Financial Review’s Phillip Coorey, Jennifer 
Hewett and Adele Ferguson were notable exceptions to this apparent 
hostility. Moreover, many conservative economic columnists regularly 
attacked Labor’s tax plans, including Henry Ergas, Jonathan Pincus, 
Tony Shepherd, Judith Sloane, Niki Savva, Adam Creighton and Nick 
Cater. Many of these journalists and commentators had close personal 
connections to the Coalition or larger business associations.
The semi-retired financial journalist (and Sky News commentator) Alan 
Wood wrote a rabid weekly column in The Weekend Australian throughout 
the lead-up to the election, predicting the ‘end of Australia’ if Labor won. 
In an article entitled ‘Labor lays out 165 steps to economic destruction’, 
Wood (2019) ventured:
Before the campaign started, I noted that Bill Shorten and Chris 
Bowen had made it official and public: they had formalised a 
two-stage strategy to destroy Australia. That was far too gentle; 
back then we were yet to know the half of it. If you want to be 
afraid, really afraid, go to the Labor Party’s policies website. All 
the promises are listed, one by one, and linked to the semi-specific 
policy detail. As of Friday night, one week out from the election, 
they added to 165. Just let that number sink in. I doubt that we’ve 
ever seen anything remotely, remotely, approaching that sort of 
promised utterly pervasive government intrusion into our lives 
both in broad societal but very directly in individual terms. 
He then went on to castigate as many of Labor’s policies as he could 
squeeze into his 1,200-word column, before ending with: ‘A Shorten–
Bowen government won’t just change the country, it will destroy it.’
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Thus, many sectors of business remained relatively silent; business was, 
in effect, ‘sitting out’ the election. It was also reticent to be seen as a very 
active  player because Bill Shorten was making the ‘big end of town’ 
and ‘fat-cat employers’ a major part of his campaign rhetoric. Shorten’s 
comment about business leaders being sent to the ‘naughty corner’ if he 
won may have further discouraged some business leaders from speaking 
out on issues about which they normally would have in the course 
of events.
Others called for a more collaborative approach—for instance, the CEO 
of the Property Council of Australia (PCA), Stephen Conry, said:
There are too many instances where political leaders or ministers 
respond to industry groups by saying ‘but of course you’d say that, 
because it’s relevant to your industry’. We need more industry 
groups or industry associations collaborating to argue why both 
sides of politics should get together [on] issues such as tax reform 
… business wanted overall tax reform, but this would need 
bipartisan support. (Quoted in Condon 2019)
This begs the question: should business have played a more significant role? 
Certainly, some leading Coalition ministers thought so, and were later 
critical of the benign role adopted across the sector (Frydenberg 2019). 
Other commentators argued that ‘business failed to explain their views’ in 
the months leading up to and during the campaign (M. Kenny 2019). But 
business generally took the view that to take on a more strident profile in 
the campaign would prove counterproductive, and might only encourage 
more radical oppositional groups such as the ACTU and GetUp! to spend 
even more than they were already investing in a Labor win (reputedly 
$3.2  million by the ACTU and $4.7 million by GetUp!), in addition 
to the millions coming from individual unions such as the Australian 
Education Union and the National Tertiary Education Union, which 
were spending $1.6 million to support school education and universities 
(see also Scott, Chapter 20, this volume). In addition, the consistency of 
the opinion polls predicting a comfortable Labor victory possibly also 
silenced the larger business associations, although some smaller sectional 
associations were more vociferous.
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There was much media speculation that the Coalition would see its 
election funding from business sources dry up, but in the event, funding 
seemed to materialise, although the Coalition allocated these funds very 
prudently towards sandbagging the seats it needed to hold, while targeting 
a small number of Labor seats as vulnerable in Queensland and Tasmania. 
This funding stream may have been motivated by the desire to ensure 
that the Coalition would remain a viable political force in the event it was 
consigned to Opposition. 
Business association advocacy
Business associations speaking for their members largely focused and 
spoke out on problems or issues close to their constituencies’ interests. 
Most associations did not address issues across a wide canvas, in 
contrast with the pattern in recent decades. Some groups produced 
an  explicit policy priorities statement of variable length—for example, 
the Australian Industry Group (Ai Group) produced a seven-page list, 
while the National Farmers’ Federation (NFF) produced a glossy eight-
page agenda (NFF 2018; see also NFF 2019)—but many simply put 
forward industry-specific or sectoral policies through news releases. The 
most prominent issues were policies to stimulate economic and regional 
growth; policies on energy and carbon emissions reduction; pro-coal and 
anti-coal sentiments, especially over the emblematic Adani coalmine in 
Queensland; and issues such as the severe drought and water restrictions 
in rural Australia, banking reform and credit availability and increased 
funding for cultural industries. Interestingly, many firms talked of 
Aboriginal engagement, constitutional reconciliation and ‘working 
together’ to seek meaningful change and reducing gaps—for example, 
the accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers’ (2019) ‘Parity’ campaign 
to end ‘disparity’. Table 19.1 collates the election priorities for Australia’s 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Business collectively was racked by worry about the nation’s economic 
future, slackening economic growth and global trade wars. It generally 
thought no major party had an appetite for dealing with the difficult policy 
issues facing Australia—and it was accusing most politicians of ‘kicking 
the can down the road’. Almost all businesses strongly supported Budget 
repair measures and pleaded for lower taxation for both companies and 
individuals. Some issues on which one might have expected business to 
find a voice were relatively overlooked or ignored, including a crackdown 
on multinational tax avoidance, lower interest rates and a looming interest 
rate cut by the Reserve Bank of Australia, immigration levels, asylum 
seeker issues and the ‘Medevac’ Bill allowing the relocation of offshore 
detainees whose medical conditions were thought significant by doctors 
(discussed in Simms, Chapter 2, this volume). Business in general did not 
seek to inflame the proposed Indian-owned Adani coalmining project, 
which was contentiously granted federal environmental approval on the 
eve of the caretaker period, but still awaited State government approvals 
(see Williams, Chapter 11, this volume).
Big business and the BCA were quoted as ‘sounding the alarm that yet 
another election will pass without any serious commitment to economic 
reform’ while warning about ‘the rise of an anti-business agenda’ 
(Uren 2019). The BCA’s Westacott argued that ‘the idea that we can go for 
another 10 to 15 years without [a] major economic downturn is fanciful 
and naive’ (Uren 2019). The BCA highlighted the political shortcomings 
of the present adversarial approach to politics and the lack of progress on 
tax reform and developing a sustainable energy policy. The association’s 
priorities were growth policies, increased productivity, increased real wage 
growth in alignment with productivity and no return to the industry-
based award determinations sought by the ACTU (see Scott, Chapter 20, 
this volume). Like many business groups, the BCA urged consistent 
action against climate change while calling for removal of the moratorium 
on coal seam gas production in eastern Australia. This relaxation was 
also advocated by the Minerals Council of Australia (MCA), which 
also endorsed nuclear power as a way of guaranteeing reliable energy at 
competitive prices. The miners supported continued coal production but 
were largely quiet on Adani until after the election and insisted on greater 
measures to reduce emissions.
The Ai Group, representing Australian manufacturers, stressed the 
importance of lifting the levels of skills, training and education in 
the  workforce and ‘urged all parties to support’ these opportunities, 
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including greater investment in the science, technology, engineering, 
mathematics and medicine (STEMM) capabilities of the workforce. The 
Ai Group stressed the need for prosperity and growth along with social 
cohesion, and it called on the next government to reopen debate on the 
tax reform agenda and re-examine many of the proposals put forward in 
the comprehensive but not influential Australia’s Future Tax System report, 
known as the Henry Review (Henry et al. 2009). It also argued that 
climate change and energy policies had to be durable and well integrated 
to safeguard Australia’s economic future.
The NFF and AgForce Queensland were (along with bankers and doctors) 
the most self-interested in their concerns. They called for a ‘national 
agricultural strategy’ and an ‘agricultural workforce strategy’, better 
trade access and bilateral agreements and government delivery of greater 
international competitiveness for the sector. They called for reduced 
taxes, support for farming families, including agricultural starter loans, 
and increased temporary migrant intakes. Water management was a huge 
concern, especially with large parts of the continent in drought. The NFF 
(2019) did not support ‘pausing’ the Murray–Darling Basin Plan (as some 
high-profile Independent candidates were advocating) but called for 
greater attention to the ‘devastating effects on rural communities from the 
removal of consumptive water’. It also advocated that, if Labor’s proposed 
Federal Environmental Protection Authority (FEPA) were established, 
water should not be included in its remit, and it was ‘not convinced that the 
inclusion of the compliance arm of the Murray–Darling Basin Authority 
(MDBA) should be part of a new FEPA’. As in previous elections, the NFF 
and AgForce had an extensive set of environmental demands, including 
rewards for emission offsets, carbon farming, drought management, 
dedicated government funds to support environmental sustainability 
involving land management and the exclusion of farming from restrictive 
environmental policies, including restrictions on land clearing. Like other 
business groups, they advocated a national energy policy.
The ACCI and Small Business Association of Australia advocated tax relief, 
opposed what they and the Coalition termed Labor’s ‘retiree taxes’ and 
supported greater flexibility for small businesses, better workplace relations 
and reduced energy costs. The National Retail Association also advocated 
tax cuts and lower interest rates, opposed restoring penalty rates and called 
for a stronger economic growth agenda from government. The Insurance 
Council of Australia prioritised national infrastructure and business 
efficiency, regional growth and for government to renew the tax reform 
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agenda. The Australian Medical Association (AMA), the Royal Australian 
College of General Practitioners (RACGP) and the Pharmaceutical Guild 
of Australia (PGA) wanted an extra $1 billion spent on Medicare payments 
to doctors and greater investment across the health sector and community 
pharmacies, and took out full-page advertisements stressing health as a core 
issue for government. These health lobbyists insisted on more resources going 
to their sector but did not publicly endorse one side of politics over another. 
The AMA also urged better care for asylum seekers and refugees, while the 
RACGP urged greater attention to primary care in health funding. RACGP 
advertisements that portrayed sick people complaining ‘I can’t afford to see 
a doctor’ were rejected publicly by other groups of doctors, who claimed the 
advertisements were misleading.
A few associations were more political in their messages and seemed to 
endorse Chris Bowen’s off-the-cuff remark to retirees that ‘if you don’t like 
our policies, don’t vote for us’ (paraphrased) (Chapman 2019). Master 
Builders Australia (MBA) targeted 10 ‘building seats’ where levels of 
housing construction were highest, claiming house prices would fall and 
rents rise under Labor, and ran press and TV advertisements opposing 
Labor’s taxation policies. The Self-Managed Superannuation Funds 
Association warned Labor that 1 million self-managed superannuation 
funds in Australia were not happy with what they called Chris Bowen’s 
retiree taxes and, along with other retirement income bodies, it claimed 
the entire debate was ‘misleading’. The Australian Banking Association 
opposed further reforms imposed on the banking sector and especially 
resented proposed levies on the major banks (a $640 million levy over 
four years by Labor and a $554 million budgetary measure from the 
Coalition funded by an industry levy) and attacked the proposed changes 
to franking credits, negative gearing and capital gains. The various housing 
associations—for example, the Real Estate Institute of Australia (REIA), 
the MBA and the Housing Industry Association (HIA)—strongly opposed 
any increased financial burdens on the fragile housing market, warning of 
declining rental availability and increased rents, but also put in a demand 
for reduced stamp duties, despite this being a State government matter. 
The PCA endorsed estimates that Labor’s property taxes would cost the 
housing and real estate sector $32.4 billion over 10  years (Kelly  and 
Roddan 2019).
Interestingly, increases to the Newstart and youth allowances were 
advocated by two associations (the BCA and the MCA), but not, as might 
have been expected, the National Retail Association.
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A few CEOs spoke out
Mining tycoon Clive Palmer played the most activist role in the campaign 
as a leading business identity and through his party, the UAP (see Kefford, 
Chapter 17, this volume). Other CEOs were vocal only episodically 
about issues of concern to them in the months leading up to the 
election, and most eschewed making comments that could be construed 
as partisan. The most salient issues about which they spoke personally 
were energy reliability, climate change, emissions reduction, economic 
growth prospects, the importance of investment certainty, tax cuts and 
Budget repair.
With the heavy emphasis on the rival tax plans offered by the major 
parties, some business leaders debated the relative virtues of tax cuts versus 
interest rate stimulus. The Commonwealth Bank’s CEO, Matt Comyn, 
came down firmly on the side of tax cuts, claiming they ‘were the best to 
stimulate the economy, and stimulate speedily, better than further cuts 
to interest rates’ (Moullakis 2019). Business generally favoured the tax cut 
proposals of both major parties but believed the Coalition’s policies were 
preferable and more reform oriented. Occasionally, suggestions to increase 
the GST or broaden its base were made, although builders opposed the 
cumulative effects of the GST in the housing and building sectors. 
Perhaps having a ‘bob each way’, business leaders did try to make overtures 
to a potential incoming Labor government, attending political events and 
holding lavish parties as fundraising ventures and occasions to meet and 
greet. More than 500 well-wishers and party-goers attended Shorten’s 
post–Budget Reply celebration at the National Convention Centre 
Canberra, which featured influential CEOs, business association leaders 
and ‘half-billionaires’, including business tycoon Marcus Blackmore 
and many other celebrity guests (Glasgow and Lacy 2019a). A host of 
private business functions were also designed to court the politicians who 
business collectively thought would be running the country. Visy boss 
Anthony Pratt held two of the most lavish parties, first for Morrison (at 
$10,000 per head) and then for Shorten and his team, on 27 March in 
his Melbourne mansion, Raheem. Presumably expecting a Labor win, 
Pratt also attended Labor’s election night party (which soon turned into a 
wake), as did Ian Silk, CEO of AustralianSuper. 
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The tax pushback from financial advisers
Although the real estate and building associations routinely opposed 
Labor’s policies cutting concessionary payments to landlords and retirees, 
a prominent group of media-savvy financial advisers was very animated in 
their hostility to Labor’s so-called retiree taxes. These advisers, with access 
to regular media as well as the more specialist digital investor newsletters 
and advisory platforms, included Robert Gottliebsen, Terry McCrann, 
Don Stammer, Tony Shepherd and Chris Kenny. A particularly public 
stoush took place between Labor’s shadow treasurer Chris Bowen and 
columnist Gottliebsen over the latter’s relentless criticisms of Labor’s 
tax proposals (which he called unfair, inequitable, unreasonable, non-
consultative, retrospective, and so on) and the former’s aggrieved 
resentment of the persistent attacks. Labor proposed ending the cash 
reimbursement of company taxes paid on behalf of individuals under 
the dividend imputation scheme (franking credits) to individuals and 
other associates who were not required to pay income tax. Gottliebsen 
forensically attacked Labor’s franking credits policy and warned of its 
likely impact on many retirees and small businesses, who he claimed 
were ‘white hot’ over the proposals. He also claimed presciently as early 
as February 2019 that the issue could result in the Coalition winning the 
campaign (Gottliebsen 2019).
The Financial Planning Association, which represented 14,000 financial 
advisers, also campaigned against Labor’s proposed changes. Many 
observers suggested the campaign waged by financial advisers on 
complicated topics that were relatively abstruse to most voters was one of 
the reasons for a shift in voting preferences, labelling it an intergenerational 
struggle over ‘tax versus benefits’ between cashed-up baby boomers and 
millennials wanting instantaneous gratification. Some financial journalists 
argued that Labor’s proposed industrial relations policies (the resumption 
of penalty rates, industrial-based bargaining, government wage subsidies, 
more union rights at work) would disproportionally affect companies 
with substantial employee expense ratios (Kirby 2019).
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Substantive campaign issues 
affecting business
Other issues of concern to business that emerged during the campaign 
were the slowing rate of economic growth and what further structural 
reforms were necessary to stimulate growth. This debate had many 
dimensions. There were divisions within the electorate over whether to 
maintain the status quo or push for more structural reform to deliver 
international competitiveness. A further salient issue was the extent to 
which Labor’s redistributive policies were desirable versus the smaller-
government pitch adopted by the Coalition, with business largely 
favouring the latter. Towards the end of the campaign, Morrison began 
warning that now was not the right time to elect Labor and that he 
wanted ‘this election to be a choice about aspiration and continuing to 
support aspiration or surrender aspiration to government in the form 
of higher taxation and bigger spending’ (Benson 2019). He had earlier 
stressed to business leaders that ‘the Australian economy will be weaker 
under Labor’ (Remeikis 2019). He subsequently argued that elections 
were usually fought over about 2 per cent of the federal Budget, while 
this one was being fought over a substantial 6 per cent of budget outlays. 
While sections of the business community highlighted poor wages growth 
and a lack of consumer spending as problems for the domestic economy, 
others saw the big versus smaller government debate as the hip-pocket 
politics of envy pitting Australians against each other. 
Three other divisive issues percolated throughout the campaign: the Adani 
coalmine, and climate change reform linked to energy and water.
Passionate rifts over the controversial Adani Carmichael coalmine in the 
Galilee Basin in Queensland saw it become the most talked about economic 
and environmental policy of the election (see Simms, Chapter  2, and 
Economou et al., Chapter 11, this volume). Media reports cited much 
reputational damage to the Queensland mining sector, especially coal, 
with surveys claiming voters believed miners were motivated only by ‘self-
interest, power and influence’ (Long 2019). Attitudes to the Adani mine 
reflected the fractured values across the Australian federation, with southern 
States largely opposed and the northern mining States supportive of the 
project. The issue also highlighted regional opportunities—contrasting 
rural areas with limited or declining job prospects with the bigger cities 
where employment growth was more certain. Adani also placed Labor on 
MoRRISoN'S MIRACLE
392
the horns of a dilemma: facing a choice between losing environmental 
(and young) votes in the cities and losing working-class regional voters—
and consequently the party placed a moratorium on its MPs speaking out 
on the mine (Owens 2019). However, the Adani proposal also became an 
emblematic cause célèbre, and the various hold-ups to its final approval 
guaranteed that it remained the most controversial mining project in the 
country. While Adani had been working through the approvals process 
for nearly nine years, other mining projects were approved close to the 
election and yet others, such as Palmer’s Waratah coal project, were quietly 
awaiting developmental approval.
Adani was also linked to broader climate change issues and the 
preparedness of governments to take coordinated and coherent action. 
Business was strongly in favour of environmental action to reduce 
emissions, not least to provide clarity for future investment decisions. It 
should also be noted that many larger businesses were already preparing to 
report on their climate change mitigation actions under the requirements 
of Australian Accounting Standards Board financial reporting. Such 
businesses were therefore accepting of the need to undertake emissions 
reform and frustrated by the lack of decision-making from the political 
class. The lack of direction in sustainable energy policy was also an issue, 
with disappointment at the failure of government to guarantee energy 
supplies and wield ‘big stick’ penalties against power companies.
Finally, the nationwide drought and resulting water shortages were 
a massive problem affecting four states (New South Wales, Victoria, 
Queensland and South Australia). Many farmers faced close to zero water 
allocations and many country towns were on drastic water restrictions. 
The effectiveness and value for money of the Murray–Darling Basin Plan 
with its $13 billion price tag and associated water buybacks were widely 
disputed. Much more obvious were the impacts of severe water restrictions 
on towns, farms, families, livestock and crops. Those affected by the plan 
were more resigned than hopeful but were critical that further amendments 
were policy on the run (as with Labor’s water policy announced on 6 May, 
which was opposed by the NSW division of the NFF).
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The wash‑up: ‘There is a God!’—
Collective reactions from business
On the first Monday after polling day, business writer Ticky Fullerton 
(2019) wrote that the collective reaction of business to the unexpected 
election result was: ‘There is a God after all.’ The sigh of relief among 
investors on the same day was manifested in a $33 billion rebound in the 
stock market. Adani received fast-tracked approvals from the Queensland 
Government for the remaining groundwater issues within three weeks 
of the election. The media reported heightened business and consumer 
confidence, first homebuyers re-entering the housing market, retirees 
resuming their lust for ocean cruising and spectacular increases in small 
business loans. The MBA (2019) also reported a ‘post-election bounce 
in housing’. However, there were signs of economic malaise, with the 
Reserve Bank of Australia confirming in early June that economic growth 
had fallen to just 1.8 per cent (down from the 3 per cent predicted in 
December and 2.75 per cent in the April Budget), causing the bank to 
cut interest rates by 0.25 per cent on 2 June. There was much nervousness 
about a looming international trade war and increased tariff barrier 
protectionism.
Many business leaders acknowledged that the Coalition had campaigned 
virtually alone (especially Scott Morrison, who conducted an almost solo 
campaign effort), certainly without much business involvement. On the 
other hand, they also believed they had not been prepared for or consulted 
on Labor’s ambitious array of policies, which Labor’s frontbenchers had 
largely disseminated to interested constituencies rather than consulting 
with them. 
The Treasurer and Deputy Liberal Leader, Josh Frydenberg, addressed 
a BCA dinner event post election and singled out its CEO Westacott, 
claiming she was ‘a rare voice of business not to vacate the field’ 
(Glasgow and Lacy 2019d). But he later admitted that Alan Joyce, CEO 
of Qantas, had been courageous for ‘taking a stand on the front page 
of his masthead … against Labor’s industrial relations policy’. A cartoon 
depicting this Frydenberg event showed business leaders receiving their 
nametags and a begging bowl before entering the venue to take their seats. 
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Bill Shorten, in his first address to the reassembled ALP Caucus on 
30  May,  blamed ‘powerful vested interests’, ‘corporate Leviathans’ and 
a ‘financial behemoth’ (Palmer) for Labor’s loss, as well as sections of the 
corporate media (principally, News Limited) who he claimed abhorred 
Labor. Anthony Albanese, Shorten’s successor as Labor leader, announced 
Labor would be reviewing all the policies it took to the election and quickly 
downplayed the ‘class warfare’ rhetoric of his predecessor. He promised 
Labor would be ‘pro-business’ under his leadership and, in his initial 
critique of the Shorten-led campaign, he said the party’s policy proposals 
had ‘alienated small business-people’ (Bramston 2019).
The 2019 federal election results confounded almost everyone. Labor 
ardently believed it would be the next government and the election was but 
a final coronation. The Coalition probably believed it would spend time in 
Opposition—attested by the large number of Coalition politicians opting 
to retire prior to the election. The Greens thought they would be in some 
form of coalition with Labor in a power-sharing arrangement or holding 
the balance of power in the Senate. Palmer and Pauline Hanson thought 
they would be the future kingmakers in any government formation. The 
union movement thought—wrongly—it would orchestrate leaders and 
groups who were expecting a change of government. However, business 
may come to regret not advocating for a more comprehensive policy 
agenda or may revert to exerting behind-the-scenes influence to shape 
policy directions.
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Participation by peak trade union bodies and their affiliates in the 2019 
federal election continued a tradition established in 2007 of major public 
political campaigns by unions. In that election, the ACTU campaigned 
against the Howard Government’s unpopular ‘WorkChoices’ industrial 
relations laws, which had come into operation in 2006. WorkChoices 
reduced the employment conditions of millions of workers. The ACTU’s 
campaign against the laws helped elect the Labor Party led by Kevin 
Rudd to government from Opposition, and the Rudd Government then 
repealed significant parts of those laws.
At the next election, in 2010, unions played a prominent defensive 
campaign role that helped to protect the Gillard Labor Government. 
Australian union peak councils have since given priority to spearheading 
campaign efforts that seek changes of government from the Liberal–
National Coalition to Labor. 
Some of these campaigns have had strikingly positive effects, such as in 
the 2014 Victorian State election. In that campaign, the human faces 
of ambulance paramedics and firefighters were successfully presented 
to win support from voters for specific, long-delayed wage rises 




In the 2016 federal election, when Labor nearly dislodged Malcolm 
Turnbull following Tony Abbott’s overthrow as prime minister in 
2015, unions were again widely credited for a professional and effective 
grassroots campaign. That campaign highlighted the need for improved 
wages of lower-income workers in the outer suburbs and regions. It also 
urged better provision of public health and education. 
Australians’ views on union and 
business power
By 2007, the proportion of Australians regarding unions as having too 
much power had dropped to little more than one-third—down from more 
than two-thirds in the early 1990s when the first steps towards enterprise 
bargaining were taken. After 1993, the proportion of Australians thinking 
big business had too much power rose above the proportion regarding 
unions as having too much power for the first time in the past half-
century (1969–2019), according to the AES and its predecessor surveys. 
The proportion of Australians who think big business has too much power 
has stayed above the proportion who think trade unions have too much 
power ever since those lines crossed after 1993 (Cameron and McAllister 
2016: 84).
Australian unions’ efforts to rectify this unfair, long-term imbalance 
against working people included playing a prominent role in the string 
of by-election campaigns held during the 45th parliament, in 2017 
and 2018. Most of those by-elections resulted from disqualification of 
parliamentarians ruled technically ineligible for election under Section 
44(i) of the Australian Constitution (see Chapters 2 and 3, this volume). 
Although none of the by-elections prompted by disqualification resulted 
in a change of seats from one party to another, one notable change of 
individual personnel occurred when former ACTU president Ged 
Kearney, a former nurse, entered the House of Representatives for Labor 
after the Batman by-election on 17 March 2018. She comfortably defeated 
the challenge from the Greens, whose vote had steadily risen in that seat 
in the six previous electoral contests. Kearney reversed the trend against 
the ALP in Batman because of her contrast with the two preceding male 
Labor MPs, who were preoccupied with factions and machinery or were 
out of step with some widespread socially progressive views held in that 
electorate in Melbourne’s northern suburbs.
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Examples of union campaign themes 
in 2019
The Australian Nursing and Midwifery Federation (ANMF) ran 
advertisements on YouTube in the 2019 national election campaign 
dramatically presenting the plight of Ruby, one of many patients in aged 
care facilities suffering from the lack of a legally sanctioned minimum 
nurse/carer to resident ratio. The ANMF, a union representing members 
in a feminised industry, argued that ‘our parents and grandparents deserve 
the quality of care that they once gave to us but across Australia people 
like Ruby are suffering because of chronic understaffing’. It declared that 
it was time to act to ensure ‘our loved ones … have at least a minimum 
number of nurses and carers on every shift’. The campaign asked voters 
to enter their postcode on a website to identify their local politician and 
thus enable a letter to be sent by the union to those MPs who were not 
supporting better staff-to-patient ratios in aged care facilities.
The Australian Education Union’s ‘Fair Funding Now’ campaign, 
meanwhile, featured advertising on social media and a fleet of 10 branded 
vans travelling across Australia to engage with school staff and parents 
in local communities. That campaign highlighted the much bigger 
commitments to government school funding given by Labor and the 
Greens than by the Coalition parties. 
The union covering cleaners in the Australian Capital Territory, United 
Voice, maintained a high profile following a strike by its members 
employed in the Commonwealth Parliament House in the previous term 
through its campaign to achieve a pay rise for the workers who ‘clean 
the people’s house’ but who had received no wage increase for five years 
(United Voice 2018). 
‘Change the rules’
The ACTU, in its own television and radio advertisements in the lead-
up to the election, featured different individual workers from different 
industries and age groups speaking about the difficulties of long hours and 
job insecurity. Those advertisements then declared: ‘This is not Australia. 
Change the Government to Change the Rules.’
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A more general ‘Change the Rules’ campaign had been launched by 
the ACTU soon after the election of Sally McManus as its secretary 
(McManus  2017), financed by its now well-established levy on 
ACTU-affiliated unions for campaigning purposes. 
That campaign—to alter the laws set by politicians for employment 
relationships—had multiple objectives, including to make corporations 
and wealthy individuals pay a higher share of tax, to give working people 
more power and to overcome job insecurity associated with a highly 
casualised workforce. As part of this—and following the scandals revealed 
by the banking royal commission and the subsequent Hayne report—
an emboldened ACTU embarked on a confident national 2019 election 
campaign in 16 targeted seats, as part of which it also conducted opinion 
polls (see Chapter 8, this volume). 
Table 20.1 ACTU targeted seats
State Seat Party holding seat 
prior to election
Margin by which seat 
held prior to election (%)
NSW Banks LIB 1 .44
Gilmore LIB 0 .73
Reid LIB 4 .69
Robertson LIB 1 .14
Vic . Corangamite ALP* 0 .03
Dunkley ALP* 1 .03
Qld Capricornia LNP 0 .63
Flynn LNP 1 .04
Forde LNP 0 .63
Herbert ALP 0 .02
Leichhardt LNP 3 .95
Petrie LNP 1 .65
WA Pearce LIB 3 .63
Swan LIB 3 .59
SA Boothby LIB 2 .71
Tas . Bass ALP 5 .42
* Notionally after redistribution
Source: Karp (2019a) .
The results, however, fell well short of those ambitions.
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Union overreach in Victoria
Expectations were especially raised in Victoria after the November 2018 
landslide re-election of the Andrews State Labor Government, which 
was widely seen as a reward for that government’s proven positive first-
term performance in building big public infrastructure and other policy 
initiatives. There was also a perceived hostility in that progressive State 
towards the dumping as prime minister of the comparatively small-l liberal 
Malcolm Turnbull by the forces behind arch-conservative Peter Dutton, 
which resulted in Scott Morrison’s elevation to the prime ministership 
in August 2018. 
The Victorian Trades Hall Council was, however, unable at the federal 
election to achieve its own ambitious aims to win further seats (beyond 
the ACTU’s own targeted seats) held by the Liberal Party with high 
margins between 6 and 13 per cent. These included the outer southern 
Melbourne electorate of Flinders and the eastern Melbourne suburban 
electorates of Deakin, Menzies, Higgins and Kooyong. 
Table 20.2 Victorian unions’ additional targeted seats






Source: Hannan (2019) .
While many of the voters in the very affluent seats of Higgins and 
Kooyong are small-l liberal voters with socially progressive views on issues 
such as climate change and refugees, they are, above all, economic or 
market liberals who are not likely to respond positively to trade unions. 
The average swing to the Labor Party in those five seats was just over 
3 per cent and the Liberal Party’s hold on all of them was not seriously 
threatened.1
1  All references to swings and seat margins in this chapter are in two-party-preferred terms and all 
data on results are from the AEC website.
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The Victorian unions also failed to achieve a Labor win in the less 
affluent seat of Chisholm in Melbourne’s mid-eastern suburbs (which it 
had held from 1998 to 2016), despite a swing to the ALP there of more 
than 2 per cent. Nor did the ALP win the outer south-eastern suburban 
Melbourne seat of La Trobe (which it had held from 2010 to 2013); 
indeed, there was a swing against it there of more than 1 per cent. There 
were swings of between 1 and 2 per cent to the ALP in Dunkley and 
Corangamite, but these electorates had already been rendered notionally 
Labor by redistributions. They made up two of only three targeted seats 
in which the ACTU succeeded Australia-wide. Labor does now hold 
21 of the 38 federal seats in Victoria but that is likely to be close to the 
maximum it can expect to win.
Outcomes in the ACTU’s targeted 
seats nationally
The only other ACTU-targeted seat nationally that Labor won was 
Gilmore in New South Wales. There was a swing to Labor of more than 
3 per cent in Gilmore but this was due to the imposition of a controversial 
Liberal Party candidate, which divided the established local Coalition 
politicians. Nevertheless, the ALP holds 24 of the 47 federal electorates 
in New South Wales (and gained a 1.5 per cent swing towards it in the 
ACTU-targeted seat of Reid in that State). 
The ALP also holds all three seats in the Australian Capital Territory 
and both seats in the Northern Territory. The ACTU campaign lost 
two electorates that it was aiming for Labor to retain: Bass in Tasmania 
(with a swing of nearly 6 per cent against Labor) and Herbert in north 
Queensland (with a swing against Labor of more than 8 per cent). 
The ALP’s problems in winning a national majority include the fact that 
it holds only two of the five seats in Tasmania, only five of the 10 seats 
in South Australia (despite a 1.3 per cent swing towards Labor in the 
ACTU-targeted seat of Boothby) and only five of 16 in Western Australia 
(where the only positive for the ACTU at the 2019 election was a swing of 
nearly 1 per cent to Labor in the targeted seat of Swan). The ALP’s biggest 
problem, however, is that it holds only six of the 30 seats in Queensland. 
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Jobs versus the environment 
in Queensland
The ACTU campaign failed to gain any of the five seats it was seeking 
to win for Labor in Queensland. The worst trend was in the central 
Queensland seat of Capricornia, where there was a swing of nearly 
12  per  cent against the ALP in an electorate the party had held from 
1998 to 2013. The result was not much better in Flynn, a seat closer to 
Brisbane, where the swing against Labor was nearly 8 per cent. In Forde, 
south of Brisbane, the swing against Labor was also nearly 8 per cent, 
and in Brisbane’s outer northern suburbs, the seat of Petrie (which Labor 
held from 2007 to 2013) swung against Labor by nearly 7 per cent. Forde 
and Flynn, and the seat of Leichhardt in far north Queensland, which 
was also unsuccessfully targeted by the ACTU, had all been held by Labor 
from 2007 to 2010.
How Queensland differed from the rest of Australia in 2019 was the 
salience of the issue of jobs versus the environment, particularly in 
the five seats closest to the proposed Adani coalmine (see Chapter 11, 
this volume). This exposed the need for more effective material economic 
policies, from both Labor and unions, which connected with workers, 
families and communities threatened by the phasing out of coal and other 
declining industries and for a ‘just transition’ into tangible, adequate and 
secure new employment in renewable energy or elsewhere, including 
through substantial investment in quality skills retraining. 
Skills and jobs, including the potential for many new jobs such as through 
further investments in major solar power expansion, needed to be a much 
bigger Labor policy focus. The plight of workers in central and north 
Queensland who were feeling insecure about their future employment 
proved to be a disastrous blind spot for Labor.
Different unions, and different divisions within unions, had put forward 
conflicting policies on the proposed Adani coalmine, to be located in the 
electorate of Capricornia. Some in the unions—like some in the ALP—
signalled opposition to the mine in line with environment-minded 
voters in inner Melbourne and Sydney. Others did not rule out support 
for the mine in accordance, for example, with the position held by the 
Queensland mining division of the CFMMEU. 
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This equivocation caused serious losses of votes from Labor in coalmining 
communities in Queensland and beyond (for example, the Hunter 
electorate in New South Wales), and there were also large swings against 
Labor in regional communities worried about job losses more generally 
(including in the Tasmanian seats of Bass and Braddon). Parallels can be 
drawn in this respect with Labor’s seat losses in Tasmania in the 2004 
‘forestry’ election (see Simms and Warhurst 2005).
Labor’s loss of working‑class voters
One initial interpretation of aggregate data advanced by the Grattan 
Institute was that Labor lost votes particularly among people on low 
incomes with less formal education and who were further from the centre 
of capital cities (Chivers 2019). The Australian National University’s Ben 
Phillips, meanwhile, found from Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 
census and AEC data that a particularly strong driver of the two-party-
preferred swing to the Coalition at the electorate level was the share of 
blue-collar workers—an overall correlation of 61 per cent, which was even 
stronger for Queensland (Phillips 2019).
This, however, is at odds with the interpretation of comprehensive 
survey data, which emphasises the extent of support still given to Labor 
compared with the Coalition by voters who work in blue-collar, sales 
or services jobs, have lower to middle incomes and who are employees 
(see Chapter 12, this volume). It would be helpful to have such survey data 
disaggregated by geographic region in sufficiently large numbers to better 
compare the extent of Labor’s loss of working-class voters in Queensland 
(or in particular regions of Queensland, as discussed in Chapter 11, this 
volume) with the trends in other States. 
It is unlikely that the proportion of unionists voting Labor as their first 
preference in 2019 rose to as high as the 63 per cent who voted Labor 
in 2007. The actions by the Coalition Government then had weakened 
the working conditions of millions of voters, which was a central policy 
reason for the election of the Labor Party led by Rudd from Opposition 
to office.
Some media commentators have asserted that working-class people turned 
away from Labor in 2019 because those workers had suddenly been 
transformed into capitalists. The voting trend was more likely because 
many workers were very worried about the risk of job losses.
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Insecurity about employment may, ironically, have made many working 
people in Australia at the 2019 election more likely to stay with the 
incumbent government (despite its own turnover of leaders) rather than 
risk the set of miscellaneous but substantial policy changes put forward by 
Labor, for fear that those might bring further economic uncertainty. This 
is doubly ironic given that Labor in 2019 had specific policies to move 
workers currently categorised as ‘casual’ into more secure permanent 
work. That policy, however, did not assure those workers who feared total 
losses of their jobs in particular industries and regions.
Attempts to make the election 
a ‘referendum on wages’
The election was characterised by Shorten and other Labor frontbenchers 
from March 2019 as a ‘referendum on wages’, following widespread 
concern about the longstanding trend of wage stagnation in Australia. 
Labor promised to gradually increase the minimum wage to turn it into 
a ‘living wage’. The ALP also indicated that it would allow a long-time 
objective of unions for a return to ‘pattern bargaining’, or multi-employer 
bargaining, to replace the reduction of bargaining to the individual 
enterprise level since the early 1990s, which had so weakened union 
power and real wages. 
Pattern bargaining would only be allowed though for employees in low-
wage sectors such as early childhood education and care. This was certainly 
an appropriate sector on which to focus given that its highly feminised 
workforce makes it representative of the continuing, serious problem of 
gender wage inequality in Australia. However, the ALP’s announcement 
of how it would achieve higher wages for early childhood education and 
care workers was not made until late in the election campaign and it 
involved large spending, with very complex details. These needed clearer 
design and more detailed explanation.
Labor also promised to amend legislation to reinstate the full penalty wage 
rates previously paid on Sundays and public holidays to approximately 
700,000 workers in fast food, retail and hospitality outlets, pharmacies, 
clubs and restaurants. These wage rates were in the process of a phased 
reduction as a result of a Fair Work Commission decision in February 2017. 
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The ALP further committed to impose bigger punishments on perpetrators 
of wage theft, ensure labour hire workers received the same pay as those 
directly employed, make sure workers in the so-called gig economy 
were properly paid and toughen measures against sham contracting. 
The Coalition parties, by contrast, avoided these topics and successfully 
steered debate on to other issues.
The credibility problem for unions 
and Labor 
Previous Labor governments had established and implemented the very 
rules that unions and Labor in 2019 said needed to be changed. This created 
a credibility problem. The Hawke and Keating governments introduced 
enterprise bargaining, and the Rudd and Gillard governments did not fully 
roll back the Howard Government’s WorkChoices policies. Bill Kelty, who 
was the ACTU’s secretary when enterprise bargaining and steep union 
membership decline started in Australia, made campaign appearances in 
2019. His proclamation at the beginning of an advertisement broadcast 
by the ALP that ‘Shorten is essentially a disciple of Hawke and Keating’ 
did not help Labor overcome that historical credibility problem. 
Shorten’s well-known previous role as national secretary of the AWU 
partly helped, but also partly hindered, his campaign in the 2019 federal 
election. Prominent, potent and lingering criticisms had been made 
that, as a union official, he was prepared to compromise the interests of 
workers in favour of employers (Schneiders et al. 2015). Further, he was 
portrayed as being, in major personality respects, a ‘shape-shifter’ who 
tried to simultaneously adopt ‘contradictory stances’, to put on different 
masks in an attempt to be all things to all people, which raised serious 
questions about what he actually stood for (Millar and Schneiders 2015). 
These traits likely contributed to his consistently poor public opinion poll 
ratings on the attribute of trustworthiness.
Rupert Murdoch’s The Australian newspaper reported on 24 April that 
Shorten had told a coal export terminal worker on Queensland’s central 
coast, in response to that worker’s request, that he would consider reducing 
taxes for workers earning $250,000 or more a year (Brown and Lewis 
2019). But very few individuals in those kinds of occupations receive 
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income anything like that. The only occupations in Australia that average 
above $250,000 taxable annual income are in fact surgeons, anaesthetists, 
internal medicine specialists and financial dealers (ATO 2019).
Yet Shorten failed to do what Barack Obama had in reply to a strikingly 
similar challenge from a worker to his plans to tax higher income earners 
during his successful 2008 US presidential election campaign. Obama 
rhetorically and confidently asked a large outdoor crowd in a New 
Hampshire apple orchard: ‘How many plumbers do you know that are 
making a quarter-million dollars a year?’ 
Sky News Australia then showed on 9 May how Shorten suffered an 
awkward encounter at a freight company north of Brisbane (Sky News 
2019) when two male fluoro-vested workers refused to shake his hand 
because they did not like him. That media outlet, also Murdoch-owned, 
might have portrayed those two individual workers as not liking the Labor 
leader because they were on high incomes and felt his tax policies were 
an enemy to their aspirations; however, the workers may not have liked 
Shorten for reasons other than having individual ambitions to become 
low-taxed, very high-income workers—perhaps because they thought he 
had been a weak union official or because they felt he did not care enough 
about Queensland jobs.
Unions after the 2019 election
Unions are collective agents to realise opportunities for working people 
to get ahead from a foundation of secure employment and decent 
wages. Unions and Labor need to be clearly and consistently on the 
same wavelength as most workers in expressing those central priorities. 
Employment and income security are the most important ingredients 
in forming the common ground between different left-of-centre 
constituencies. Economic policies that promote this security in people’s 
lives build scope for the pursuit of more compassionate, outward-looking 
social and environmental policies.
Following the 2019 election result, unions need to make more widely 
a persuasive case about the details of exactly which rules they want to 
change, how such changes can be implemented and the specific short-




There will now be further discussion among unions of the relative 
priorities of grassroots workplace organising vis-a-vis electoral/political 
campaigns using media including advertising, to resolve tensions 
between these priorities. Unions spent $6.5 million on advertisements 
in the 2019 election and $25 million had been spent on the ‘Change the 
Rules’ campaign overall up to the aftermath of the election (Karp 2019a, 
2019b). This was similar to the amount spent by unions in preceding 
federal elections and confirmed the advantage for Labor over non-Labor 
parties of having a strong union base in terms of both people and money. 
However, the financial resources the unions could muster in 2019 were 
dwarfed by the unprecedented big-spending advertising intervention in 
the election by Clive Palmer’s corporations (as discussed in Chapters 17 
and 19, this volume).
Nearly three-quarters of voters still think big business has too much power, 
whereas less than half think unions do, according to the latest available 
data (Cameron and McAllister 2016: 84). The gap between the two views 
is the highest it has been since 2007, and those data pre-date the scandals 
uncovered by the banking royal commission. These sentiments suggest 
there is still a successful electoral basis for more precisely focused, credible 
campaigning by unions—for more popular and better resonating policies 
aimed more accurately at the needs of their core constituencies—than was 
mounted in 2019. 
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THIRD PARTIES AND 
THINK TANKS
Ebony Bennett
Though few seats changed hands, the 2019 federal election produced an 
unexpected result, shocking the Coalition and Labor and the numerous 
third-party organisations, think tanks, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), charities and activist groups that engaged in the electoral debate.
Third-party organisations and think tanks play important roles in 
federal elections. While there are numerous organisations that engage 
with federal election campaigns, this chapter will discuss the scope 
and effectiveness of the electoral campaigning activities of progressive 
organisation GetUp! and its conservative counterpart, Advance Australia, 
in their target electorates—including phone banking, doorknocking, 
paid advertising and generating free media and fundraising. It will also 
examine the activities of three think tanks in shaping the public policy 
debate: the Canberra-based think tank The Australia Institute, and the 
Melbourne-based Grattan Institute and Institute of Public Affairs (IPA). 
GetUp! and Captain GetUp
On election night, Antony Green (2019) tweeted: ‘Politics is often about 
expectations. Tonight’s seat numbers are almost exactly the same as in 
2016. Then it was worse than expected, this time it is better. And doesn’t 
that change the speeches.’
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Similarly, in 2016, GetUp! was widely credited as a formidable campaigning 
outfit with the power to topple sitting Liberal MPs from office, raising 
expectations for its 2019 electoral performance that failed to materialise. 
Though GetUp! was certainly not the only organisation campaigning in 
seats such as Bass and Dickson in 2016, it was GetUp! that was largely 
credited with (or blamed for) Andrew Nikolic losing the seat of Bass and 
the 5.2 per cent swing against Peter Dutton in the Queensland seat of 
Dickson, and it was therefore seen as a force in the swing against the 
incumbent Coalition Government. 
GetUp! is now well established as a large and influential organisation 
in Australian politics, sitting alongside Australia’s major established 
political parties in terms of its membership, organising capacity and 
ability to mobilise people to action. GetUp! (2019a) describes itself as 
an independent movement with more than a million members, ‘working 
to build a progressive Australia and bring participation back into our 
democracy’. GetUp! is unique in Australian politics and it is very effective 
at irritating the conservative side of politics. It advocates for progressive 
issues its members care about such as climate change, saving the Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), housing affordability and health care. 
Its campaigning efforts this election did not meet expectations.
In 2019, GetUp! kept the same election strategy as in 2016, targeting 
conservative politicians it dubbed ‘hard-right blockers’ to disrupt their 
influence in politics. Though the GetUp! campaign was a presence in 
29 seats, most of its campaigning focused on MPs labelled by GetUp! 
members as ‘hard-right Liberal–National Party blockers’ in the seats of 
Warringah, Flinders, Boothby, Pearce, Menzies, Dickson and Kooyong, 
who had wrecked progressive policies and stifled public debate on 
climate change, refugees, multiculturalism, economics and democratic 
participation.
GetUp! shortlisted its targeted seats by surveying its members, inviting 
them in January to nominate the ‘hard-right MPs they want booted from 
Parliament’, and subsequently announced Dutton and Tony Abbott 
as the ‘country’s most loathed politicians’ (GetUp! 2019b). In March 
2019, GetUp! (2019c) announced Greg Hunt as its next electoral target 
(though Hunt is not commonly understood to belong to the Coalition’s 
hard right), citing his role as ‘the numbers man for Peter Dutton’s failed 
leadership coup’ and his ‘terrible record on climate change’. GetUp! then 
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expanded its targeted seats from five to seven and aimed to double its 
volunteers from the 2016 election (3,736). National director Paul Oosting 
acknowledged it was the organisation’s most ambitious approach to date 
and that GetUp! had set itself a huge task. He was correct.
While GetUp! employed standard election tactics in terms of organising 
and advertising, with a reported election advertising spend of $4 million, 
its strategy of targeting hard-right blockers was different to most third-
party campaigns, which focus primarily on marginal seats or on specific 
issue-based campaigns. Seats such as Kooyong and Menzies were 
considered safe, even blue-ribbon, Liberal seats, but were part of a tranche 
of Victorian Liberal seats that were possibly ‘up for grabs’ following Labor’s 
strong victory at the recent State election. That calculation proved to be 
overly ambitious, but GetUp! was not alone in making it.












Total voter contacts 748,354
(183,222)
Source: Supplied by GetUp! to the author .
Table 21.2 2019 election outcomes in seats targeted by GetUp!
Target electorate Outcome
Dickson (Qld) 2 .9% swing to LNP; LNP re‑elected with 54 .6% of TPP
Warringah (NSW) 18 .3% swing against LNP; IND defeats LIB with 57 .2% of TPP
Flinders (Vic .) 1 .4% swing to ALP; LIB re‑elected with 55 .6% of TPP
Menzies (Vic .) 0 .3% swing to ALP; LIB re‑elected with 57 .5% of TPP
Kooyong (Vic .) 7 .1% swing against LNP; LIB re‑elected with 55 .7% of TPP
Pearce (WA) 3 .9% swing to LNP; LIB re‑elected with 57 .5% of TPP
Boothby (SA) 1 .3% swing to ALP; LIB re‑elected with 51 .4% of TPP
Source: AEC (2019) .
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While Tony Abbott lost his blue-ribbon seat of Warringah to Independent 
Zali Steggall, no other hard-right blocker targeted by GetUp! lost their 
seat, leaving former Nationals leader and Member for New England, 
Barnaby Joyce (in Sky News Australia 2019), to boast on election night: 
‘Went for the sucker trap again didn’t you? Put all your resources into 
a seat you weren’t going to win, so you burned up all your resources in 
other seats you could have.’
Oosting acknowledged GetUp! had not achieved what it set out to do, 
but said its strategy was formed and expectations set in the context of 
a predicted nationwide swing against the government that also failed to 
materialise. Oosting later denied claims from targeted Liberal candidates 
Nicolle Flint and Kevin Andrews that they were harassed and slandered 
by GetUp! (Ferguson 2019).
GetUp! had radically ramped up its phone-banking capacity compared 
with the 2016 federal election, while its doorknocking efforts appear to 
have been concentrated in Warringah. However, evidence suggests the 
ability of tactics such as doorknocking, phone-banking and advertising 
mail-outs to persuade voters to switch their vote during general elections 
is limited (Kalla and Broockman 2018).
The tactics employed in the campaign led to questions about whether 
targeting blockers gave incumbents an ‘underdog’ status and accusations 
that the campaign had alienated voters. Benedict Coyne, the Greens 
candidate for Dickson, told The Guardian: 
At the risk of generalising, there is a sense that Dutton was able to 
play the victim card, you know, ‘GetUp! and all these outsiders are 
coming here to do this to me’, and that certainly speaks to his base 
to come and defend him whether it’s true or not. (McGowan 2019)
Dutton’s margin in Dickson shrank from 6.7 to 1.6 per cent in 2016; in 
2019, there was a 2.9 per cent swing towards him. GetUp! has credited its 
volunteers with limiting the swing in Dickson to 2.9 per cent (compared 
with the 4.3 per cent swing to the Coalition across Queensland in 2019). 
Third-party campaigns can have persuasive effects when particular 
candidates take unusually unpopular positions or positions in conflict 
with the values of their electorates and where third-party campaigns 
make a special effort to identify persuadable voters (Hersh and Schaffner 
2013). Abbott, although a long-term incumbent member, had positions 
on climate policy that were out of step with those of his electorate. While 
415
21 . THIRD PARTIES AND THINK TANKS
Dutton was the architect of controversial policies as home affairs minister, 
perhaps his positions were not so far out of step with his electorate of 
Dickson as those of Abbott with his electorate of Warringah. A clear 
difference between the successful Warringah campaign and the other seats 
targeted by GetUp! was the presence of a high-profile and well-respected 
Independent candidate in Zali Steggall, in addition to a  high-profile 
blocker in Abbott, who was out of touch with his electorate.
Tactics that worked well for GetUp! in 2016 backfired in 2019, although 
arguably their most prominent mistake occurred in the electorate in which 
they had their only success. A satirical television ad depicting Abbott as 
an apathetic surf lifesaver letting someone drown was universally judged 
a  mistake and was withdrawn by GetUp!. A conversation guide for 
volunteers phone-banking in Treasurer and Deputy Liberal Leader Josh 
Frydenberg’s seat of Kooyong incorrectly instructed them to say that 
‘Josh Frydenberg was part of the coup that removed Malcolm Turnbull 
as Prime Minister’. Oosting then made several other errors, including 
incorrectly describing the Treasurer as the deputy prime minister and 
then the finance minister, when defending the guide and GetUp! in 
a live interview on Jon Faine’s ABC Mornings program (Faine 2019). The 
interview was described by some in the media as a ‘car crash’ (Koziol 2019). 
The electoral outcomes in GetUp!’s target seats show the limits of its 
approach; enthusiastic volunteers and money alone are not enough to shift 
safe seats. International experience suggests GetUp! could have a more 
meaningful, persuasive impact if it focused its efforts on issue-based 
campaigns. Third-party campaigns have had success using doorknocking 
to increase turnout, but Australia’s compulsory voting makes this 
intervention unnecessary (John and Brannan 2008). 
GetUp!’s perceived electoral success in 2016 also provoked a substantial 
backlash. A complaint from Liberal MP Ben Morton sparked an AEC 
investigation into whether or not GetUp! should be considered an 
associated entity of a political party. The complaint—one of a number 
made after the 2016 federal election—was perceived primarily as an 
attempt to depict GetUp! as a creature of the Labor Party and the Greens, 
undermining its reputation for independence. The AEC ultimately 
concluded for the third time that GetUp! was not an associated entity 
and ruled that the fact an organisation advocates an agenda on one side of 
the political spectrum does not mean it is ‘operating’ for the benefit of all 
registered parties on that side of the spectrum (AAP 2019).
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Following several failed attempts to start a ‘conservative GetUp!’ as 
a counterweight, Advance Australia was launched in November 2018 to 
little public fanfare, but with the backing of high-profile businessmen, 
including storage company director Sam Kennard and former ABC 
chairman Maurice Newman. Its national director is Gerard Benedet, 
former chief of staff to former Queensland LNP treasurer Tim Nicholls. 
It had extraordinary early success; while it reported 27,500 members 
and raised $395,000 in donations in March (Koslowski 2019), by the 
next month, it reported 32,000 members and $1.7 million in donations 
for the election (Van Extel 2019)—about half of GetUp!’s election 
advertising spend. 
Advance Australia targeted many of the same electorates as GetUp!, 
though there is less information available on its target seats, campaign 
activities or the engagement of its 32,000 members in efforts such as 
doorknocking and phone-banking. 
Advance Australia’s campaigning was prominent in Warringah, but it 
also campaigned against Greens candidate Julian Burnside in Kooyong, 
Centre Alliance’s Rebekha Sharkie in Mayo and Independents Helen 
Haines in Indi and Julia Banks in Flinders (see Chapter 18, this volume). 
Looking at Advance Australia’s campaign targets, one could argue it was 
about as successful as its progressive counterpart, GetUp!—which is to 
say, not very. Neither Burnside nor Banks was elected, but Abbott’s loss 
in Warringah was the most prominent scalp of the campaign. Sharkie was 
comfortably re-elected in Mayo, while Haines was elected as successor 
to popular Independent Cathy McGowan in Indi. It is not clear how 
Advance Australia spent the $2 million it raised, whether the money 
was raised primarily from large donors or whether it followed GetUp!’s 
example of raising millions of dollars from thousands of small donors. 
If Advance Australia has a broad base of small donors from which its 
donations came, it would be the most successful attempt to date to create 
a ‘conservative GetUp!’.
Perhaps the most interesting character to come out of the 2019 election 
was that of ‘Captain GetUp’. Benedet said the role of the mascot was 
to give people ‘the facts about the left-wing activists who support “fake” 
independents’ (SBS 2019). 
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The caped crusader was Advance Australia’s most visible contribution to 
the campaign, but his role in exposing the ‘political correctness’ of his 
rival was limited. The caped crusader was widely ridiculed upon his debut 
and was arguably more effective at promoting GetUp! than undermining 
it. Captain GetUp also caused problems for the Abbott campaign in 
Warringah when the person inside the costume was filmed inappropriately 
gyrating against a poster of Steggall (SBS 2019). 
Captain GetUp is still active on Twitter, but only time will tell whether 
Advance Australia is able to provide the conservative side of politics 
with the membership, volunteers, fundraising and organising capacity, 
and issue-based campaigning to rival that which GetUp! provides for 
progressive politics. GetUp! will certainly be examining how best to 
deploy its considerable resources and the enthusiasm of its members for 
greater impact in the future. 
Think tanks
Think tanks such as The Australia Institute, the Grattan Institute and the 
IPA play an influential role in elections by generating ideas that shape 
the public policy debate and help to popularise certain ideas and policy 
proposals, and by releasing research reports, engaging with the media, 
briefing policymakers and engaging with the public via conferences and 
other events (Stone 1996).  
Rather than attempt to define exactly what constitutes a think tank, 
Stone identifies shared characteristics that distinguish them from other 
groups: organisational independence, self-determination of research 
agendas, a strong policy focus, a degree of expertise and a concentration 
on influencing public debate (James 1998).
The Australia Institute describes itself as ‘one of the country’s most 
influential public policy think tanks, conducting research that contributes 
to a more just, sustainable and peaceful society’; the Grattan Institute 
describes itself as ‘a non-partisan think tank providing independent, 
rigorous and practical solutions to some of the country’s most pressing 
problems’; while the IPA describes itself as an ‘independent, non-profit 
public policy think tank, dedicated to preserving and strengthening 
the foundations of economic and political freedom’. Each think tank 
describes itself as independent, though the media often describes 
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The Australia Institute as ‘progressive’, the IPA as ‘conservative’ and the 
Grattan Institute as ‘centrist’. None of them is affiliated with a political 
party, unlike the Menzies Research Centre (Liberal Party), the Chifley 
Research Centre (ALP), the Page Research Centre (the Nationals) or the 
Green Institute (Australian Greens), each of which is funded in part by 
a Commonwealth grant-in-aid. These affiliated groups are not examined 
in this chapter. Other, unaffiliated think tanks such as the Melbourne-
based Per Capita were also modelling the impact on families of the 
competing tax policies on offer in the election but cannot be examined in 
the confines of this chapter.
While many other organisations seek to influence the public policy 
debate—including charities and NGOs, trade unions and environmental 
groups—Abelson (2002: 57–63) asserts that think tanks possess unique 
attributes that afford them greater opportunity to influence public policy, 
including their expertise and close ties to policymakers, and calls for 
a ‘holistic’ approach to assessing their effectiveness that acknowledges that 
think tanks ‘possess different resources, which, not surprisingly, affect the 
nature and extent of activities they undertake’ and that each will differ 
in which stage of the policy cycle it prioritises on any given issue: issue 
articulation, policy formulation and/or policy implementation. 
As this book examines the federal election, this chapter will necessarily 
focus on the effectiveness of the think tanks in issue articulation or 
‘agenda-setting’ and policy formation, not policy implementation. 
According to Kingdon, ‘think tanks may often be unable to influence the 
final choice made by policymakers, but they can do much to set—and 
perhaps expand—the limits of respectable debate’ (Steelman 2003: 164).
During the 2019 election, The Australia Institute’s most effective, but 
perhaps least visible, contribution to the public policy debate was to shift 
the economic debate to focus more on revenue. Over the past decade, 
The Australia Institute has published dozens of research reports on the 
importance of Australia having a strong revenue base, closing tax loopholes 
such as negative gearing and the capital gains tax discount, addressing 
the rising cost to the Budget of superannuation tax concessions and the 
cost of dividend imputation and franking credit refunds. The overarching 
purpose of this body of work is to shift the public debate beyond simplistic 
arguments about debt and deficit towards a more inclusive discussion 
about the kind of Australia we want to see and how it will be funded. 
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The Australia Institute was successful in seeing some of its ideas taken up 
as policy by Labor and other parties and candidates in both the 2016 and 
the 2019 elections, including achieving cross-party support to establish 
an independent anticorruption commission, as well as Labor’s policy 
to abolish franking credit refunds for people who pay no tax. This was 
effectively labelled by the Coalition as ‘Labor’s tax on retirees’ and made 
a centrepiece of the scare campaign against Labor. 
In terms of agenda-setting, arguably the institute was most effective on 
the issue of a federal independent commission against corruption. Over 
several years, The Australia Institute released a series of research reports 
that established the need for a federal anticorruption commission to fill 
the gaps in Australia’s integrity system. It also commissioned polling that 
showed such a body would attract support from a majority of voters 
across the political spectrum (Aulby 2017). The Australia Institute 
established a  National Integrity Committee, comprising former judges 
such as the Hon. Anthony Whealy QC and renowned corruption 
fighters such as David Ipp QC to design a blueprint for implementation 
(National  Integrity Committee 2017). In January 2018, in a speech to 
the  National Press Club, Opposition leader Bill Shorten announced 
that Labor would establish such a commission if it were elected and, 
by December that year, the government announced it would establish a 
Commonwealth integrity commission, taking the issue from one rejected 
by both major parties to a bipartisan issue within just a few years. While 
Labor’s policy stayed close to the blueprint set out by the National 
Integrity Committee at The Australia Institute, the Coalition’s model was 
weaker in several respects (National Integrity Committee 2019).
On the issue of dividend imputation and franking credits—which became 
central to the 2019 federal election campaign—a majority of Australians 
have little understanding or are unaware of what franking credits are or 
how they work (Essential Research 2018a, 2018b).
The Australia Institute’s research set out the case for abolishing the cashing 
out of franking credits for those who pay no tax and during the campaign 
it attempted to explain Australia’s system of dividend imputation and 
franking credits and to bust economic myths as they appeared in the 
media and on social media. As a research body with no advertising budget 
or organising capacity, the institute’s efforts were no match for the scare 
campaign in terms of reach or effectiveness. 
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The Australia Institute’s chief economist, Richard Denniss, compared the 
success of the ‘retiree tax’ scare campaign with Labor’s efforts to promote 
its policy to eliminate out-of-pocket costs for cancer care:
As one of the architects of the idea that ended up becoming 
Labor’s biggest revenue measure—the $11 billion plan (over four 
years) to abolish tax refunds to people who pay no tax—I can 
honestly say that I never expected it to wind up at the centre 
of  a  national election campaign. Not because I think it’s a bad 
idea—and not because I think political parties should hide their 
plans the way Abbott hid his plans to slash spending back in 
2013—but because I can say with confidence that almost no one 
knows what an imputation credit is, and everyone knows what 
cancer is. (Denniss 2019: 27)
The Australia Institute’s most visible contribution to the public policy 
debate in terms of media coverage was its distributional analysis of 
the Morrison Government’s planned income tax cuts package, which 
conservatively estimated that at least $77 billion of the benefits of tax cuts 
would go to people earning more than $180,000 per year (Grudnoff 2019). 
The $77 billion figure was first put to Minister for Finance Mathias 
Cormann by David Speers on Sky News in the first week of the campaign 
(Sky News Australia 2019). Cormann rejected the figure but provided 
no official figures. Several different journalists put the figure repeatedly 
to different ministers during the course of the election campaign, but 
no government figures were forthcoming. Labor leapt on the refusal of 
ministers to answer the question and used the $77 billion as part of its 
opposition to the tax cuts package throughout the campaign. 
Senator Cormann promised in the first week of the campaign that the 
government would provide its own distributional analysis, but none was 
forthcoming. These kinds of distributional analyses of income tax cuts are 
relatively straightforward and form a standard part of the way the federal 
Budget measures are critiqued each year; it was the dismissive attitude of 
the government, as well as its refusal to provide its own Treasury numbers, 
that was unexpected during this campaign.
The Australia Institute also sponsored an open letter in Melbourne’s Age 
newspaper on 16 May, signed by 62 climate scientists and other prominent 
Australians, urging the 46th Parliament to make climate change a top 
priority (The Australia Institute 2019). Prominent signatories included 
Nobel Prize winners Professor Peter Doherty and Dr Sue Wareham, 
421
21 . THIRD PARTIES AND THINK TANKS
former Australian of the Year Professor Fiona Stanley, former Australian 
chief scientist Professor Penny Sackett and many of Australia’s leading 
scientists from disciplines including climate change, health, economics, 
energy and finance. Other research areas covered by The Australia Institute 
in the lead-up to and during the election campaign period included 
water buybacks in the Murray–Darling Basin Plan and the impacts of 
climate change.
The IPA’s main election contribution was the manifesto 20 Policies to Fix 
Australia that it sent to MPs (Roskam and Wild 2019). The manifesto 
suggested withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, implementation of 
a flat income tax, legalising nuclear power, abolishing the Renewable 
Energy Target, ending all subsidies to wind, solar and hydroelectricity 
generators and privatising the ABC. Many of these were long-term policy 
objectives the IPA has promoted over several terms of parliament. The IPA 
characterises the Coalition’s repeal of the carbon price in 2014 as one its 
greatest achievements and a ‘victory for mainstream Australians over the 
political class’ (Barro 2019a).
While relatively few of the IPA’s issues gained traction during the 2019 
federal election campaign—perhaps in part because the Coalition’s 
campaign focused so narrowly on tax cuts—it played an influential role 
within the Liberal Party in the lead-up to the election and is likely to gain 
prominence post election during the 46th Parliament. 
In previous years, several of the IPA’s election demands found favour 
within the Coalition but met with strong opposition from the public 
when it came to the policy implementation stage. For example, former 
prime minister Tony Abbott backed several IPA proposals when he was 
in Opposition, including its call to scrap Section 18C of the Racial 
Discrimination Act (Crowe 2019)—an issue that remains in the IPA’s 
2019 manifesto. However, moves to repeal Section 18C were ultimately 
abandoned by the Abbott Government following a huge community 
backlash (Griffiths 2014). 
In the lead-up to the 2019 federal election, the IPA proved effective at 
persuading the Liberal Party to adopt its policy of privatising the ABC. 
This policy found favour with the Young Liberals, which then put forward 
a motion to the Liberal Party’s federal council calling for the Turnbull 
Government to privatise the ABC except for regional services (Norman 
2018). The vote was backed by a large majority, including at least four 
of the party’s top federal officials and at least one federal Liberal MP, 
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according to footage obtained by the Sydney Morning Herald (Crowe 2019). 
Communications minister Mitch Fifield was the only Liberal who spoke 
against the motion, despite having made six complaints about the ABC in 
as many months in his role as minister. 
This demonstrates the IPA’s effectiveness at both agenda-setting—
successfully catapulting the issue of privatising the ABC on to the national 
election campaign agenda—and influencing the policy formulation of the 
Liberal Party. Ultimately, this policy found little favour in the electorate, 
as happened with the policy to abolish the cashing out of franking 
credits. Importantly, despite finding enthusiastic supporters among party 
members, several ministers went into ‘damage control’ when news of the 
vote broke and was met with a strong community backlash. Fearing it 
would give Labor ammunition to run another ‘Mediscare’-style campaign, 
Treasurer Josh Frydenberg assured voters that the ABC ‘is not going to be 
sold and it can never be sold’ (Remeikis 2019). 
In September 2018, the Coalition Government announced it would 
not be replacing the Renewable Energy Target, which expires in 2020, 
effectively fulfilling one the IPA’s key policies (Sydney Morning Herald 
2018). Following the federal election, the IPA’s call to legalise nuclear 
power in Australia has been taken up by the Morrison Government. 
Energy minister Angus Taylor requested a parliamentary inquiry into the 
use of nuclear energy in Australia, though he said Australia’s moratorium 
on nuclear energy would remain in place (Macmillan 2019). There is no 
doubt other parts of the IPA’s manifesto, such as removing red tape, have 
also re-entered the national debate post election. 
The Grattan Institute released a research report in March 2019 advocating 
for the introduction of a universal Medicare-style dental health scheme. 
The report showed that ‘about 2 million Australians who required dental 
care in the past year either didn’t get it or delayed getting it because of the 
cost—and the poor and disadvantaged are most likely to miss out on care’ 
(Duckett et al. 2019: 3).
Little more than a month later, and just a few weeks out from the federal 
election, Labor announced it would introduce dental subsidies for nearly 
3 million pensioners (Barro 2019b). The Grattan Institute’s CEO, John 
Daley, said its scheme was ‘clearly the basis for the recent ALP election 
promise to go down this path’, but added that ‘policy reform always has 
many parents’.
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The Grattan Institute also joined The Australia Institute in publishing 
research during the campaign on the income tax cuts package. The Grattan 
Institute’s research estimated, based on the government’s own Budget 
forecasts, that spending cuts of $40 billion by 2030 would be required 
to meet the government’s promises. The research received widespread 
coverage but was dismissed by the Prime Minister as ‘absolute complete 
rubbish’ (Hutchens 2019). This is despite the institute working closely 
with the government to implement education funding reforms just a few 
years previously, showing that influence over policy implementation on 
one issue does not necessarily translate to effective advocacy or influence 
on other policy fronts. 
Conclusion
The 2019 federal election result upended widespread expectations as well 
as conventional wisdom. Some have argued that the result was a rejection 
of Labor’s progressive policy platform and that low and middle income-
earners abandoned Labor, but as explored in Chapter 12 of this volume, 
there is little evidence to support these narratives, with economic cleavages 
remaining largely intact. 
While third-party organisations such as GetUp! and Advance Australia are 
unlikely to change their political bent in response to election results, their 
tactics, target seats and the resources they devote to election campaigning 
are more likely to change. 
It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of think tanks, as they tend 
to measure success ‘by how much influence they have in shaping public 
opinion and the policy preferences and choices of leaders’ (Abelson 
2002: 88–89), which is hard to capture via simple metrics such as media 
mentions. It is even more difficult to unpick the particular influence of 
think tanks given other groups such as unions and NGOs seek to have 
similar influence—sometimes on the same issues. Overall, it is also 
worth considering how the political climate ‘can enhance or diminish the 
profile of some think tanks’ (Abelson 2002: 125–26), waxing and waning 




However, there is no doubt think tanks did help shape and influence the 
political debate during the 2019 federal election, whether by helping 
certain issues gain national prominence (agenda-setting) or by persuading 
political parties to adopt their policies (policy formulation).
The Coalition’s unexpected election win left the Morrison Government 
with a relatively light policy agenda for the new parliament (Murphy 
2019), which think tanks will now seek to fill, shape and direct with their 
own policy agendas.
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In accounting for the 2019 federal election result, Opposition leader Bill 
Shorten extended the blame for his loss beyond his political opponents 
to the media. He told his party room that powerful vested interests had 
campaigned against Labor through sections of the media itself and had 
got what they wanted. Like recent fallen Australian political leaders before 
him—including Tony Abbott, Malcolm Turnbull and Julia Gillard—
Shorten felt the media, among others, played a part in his political 
downfall: ‘Obviously, we were up against corporate leviathans, a financial 
behemoth, spending unprecedented hundreds of millions of dollars 
advertising, telling lies, spreading fear’ (Osborne 2019). No names were 
mentioned, but likely in Shorten’s crosshairs were Rupert Murdoch’s daily 
metropolitan newspapers and pay television station Sky News Australia, 
which repeatedly ran negative stories, panel discussions and headlines 
describing Shorten as ‘The great divider’ (Rolfe 2019). But Shorten might 
also have been referring to a number of radio presenters with whom he 
declined to do interviews during the campaign, including 3AW’s Neil 
Mitchell in Melbourne and 2GB’s Alan Jones in Sydney, both of whom 
described Shorten as ‘toxic’ to voters (Osborne 2019). Both are right-
of-centre commentators employed by Macquarie Media, in which Nine 
Entertainment Co. has a dominant share. Nine’s newly acquired financial 
daily, the Australian Financial Review, also urged voters to stay with the 
Coalition in its election-eve editorial.
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But how much do Australia’s traditional media—comprising newspapers, 
radio and television—influence an election outcome through their 
political coverage? It is a vexed question, particularly in the internet 
age, when media audiences are fragmented across traditional and digital 
platforms. It is further complicated by a backdrop of economic decline for 
traditional media outlets with limited resources and shrinking newsrooms. 
Since the previous election, changes to cross-media ownership laws in 
2017 resulted in further consolidation of Australian media. The reforms 
enabled television network Nine to take over the Fairfax mastheads 
and end Fairfax’s 177-year name association with the Australian media 
industry. During the campaign, another round of redundancies also saw 
Perth’s only daily newspaper, the West Australian, shed 30 journalism 
jobs. Funding cuts to the national broadcaster, the ABC, since the 2016 
election have also seen job losses across the network. News Corp also shed 
55 jobs shortly after the election (Watkins and Dyer 2019).
Yet, notwithstanding this turbulence and transition for the established 
media, party leaders still perceive mainstream media power as a key factor 
in their political fortunes. Complicating this is a climate of public distrust 
towards the media, with Australians increasingly concerned about ‘fake 
news’ (62 per cent compared with the global average of 55 per cent) and 
falling levels of trust in the news media (Fisher et al. 2019: 16–17). 
Measuring media effects on voter behaviour is notoriously difficult. 
Researchers have found many factors can influence voters’ responses to 
campaign coverage—such as voters’ level of political engagement, with 
the ‘least engaged’ more susceptible to political messaging (Albaek et al. 
2014); the importance of the issue (Wlezien 2005); the use of negativity 
in messaging (Carson et al. 2020); and the type of media platform on 
which the story is conveyed, with television generally considered the 
most powerful (Lau and Rovner 2009). Given these complexities, this 
chapter leaves aside attempts to gauge audience perceptions and media 
effects. Rather, our aim is to assess traditional media’s election coverage 
outputs, focusing first on front-page newspaper stories—the issues editors 
prioritise over others—then the political content available on radio and 
television during the 2019 campaign and, last, a brief word about the 
campaign on social media. 
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How the press reported the 
2019 election campaign
Traditional media remains a worthy area of study. While more and 
more Australians are migrating to the digital sphere to get their news, 
the majority of Australians (57 per cent) still use offline sources as their 
main source of news (Fisher et al. 2019: 13). We examine newspaper 
and broadcast media because they remain Australia’s largest collective 
employer of journalists and produce more original news stories than 
alternative sources. As such, they have the capacity to set the news agenda 
for other media (intermedia effects), including online and social media 
(Sikanku 2011). For example, Australia’s traditional media outlets occupy 
seven of the top 10 ‘most read’ Australian digital news sites each month 
(Pash 2019). Collectively, Australia’s press duopoly of Nine and News 
Corp have about 32 million monthly views. Adding in the ABC’s websites, 
this figure swells to 40 million, meaning that ‘traditional’ media’s online 
audiences account for more than two-thirds (69 per cent) of the views of 
the top 10 digital news sites each month (Pash 2019).1 
To assess how Australia’s 12 major daily newspapers covered the election, 
we collected front pages from Monday to Saturday editions during the 
37-day campaign.2 The population was 377 front pages, accounting 
for absences during Easter and Anzac Day when some outlets did not 
publish. Front pages and their election stories were the units of analysis 
because they provide a sense of indicative coverage, rather than complete 
coverage of the campaign. They offer a snapshot of the stories that editors 
believe are of high news value, thus earning a place on the premium page 
of their newspaper, which is designed to attract readers’ attention. These 
stories are replicated online. Thus, tracking page-one stories provides 
an overview of the election issues that were highlighted to the public 
during the campaign and were given attention over other topics. Each 
front page was given a binary code for the presence or absence of election 
coverage. If present, an election article was coded for its primary topic and 
sentiment. If there were more than one election story, the dominant story 
was selected. Sentiment was judged in terms of being negative, positive 
1  The top 10 news sites were (from one to 10): news.com.au, nine.com.au, ABC News websites, 
smh.com.au, Daily Mail Australia, Yahoo!, The Guardian, Fairfax Digital Regional Network, The Age 
[Melbourne] and the Daily Telegraph [Sydney].
2  We exclude Sunday papers as not all mastheads in the study produced a Sunday edition. 
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or neutral overall for the political party that featured most prominently 
in the story.3 The same methodology was used in 2016, thus providing 
similar data for cautious comparisons. 
First—and as found in 2016—federal election campaigns are newsworthy 
events in Australia. Election stories featured on 69 per cent of eligible 
front pages (compared with 50 per cent in 2016, which was a longer, 
eight-week campaign). This finding is consistent with international 
studies of election coverage (Deacon and Wring 2015: 313). However, 
there are considerable differences in the frequency of front-page coverage 
between mastheads and capital cities (see Figure 22.1). While many of the 
same stories were shared across masthead groups, this occurred across both 
major newspaper groups but was particularly evident with Nine’s papers. 
A total of 24 of 32 front pages of The Age (Melbourne) and the Sydney 
Morning Herald carried the same election story, often using identical 
headlines.4 In a nation that has highly concentrated ownership of its press 
compared with other democracies, this is problematic. Convergence of 
news stories across the masthead group is a way of adapting to limited 
resources following journalist redundancies, but it can limit story diversity 
and give more weight to some election issues than others. Compared with 
2016, story convergence had more than doubled in 2019. In 2016, the 
carriage of the same stories on the front pages of the Sydney Morning 
Herald and The Age occurred 11 times (Carson and McNair 2019: 434).
Figure 22.1 shows that Australia’s two national newspapers, The Australian 
and the Australian Financial Review, along with the capital-city dailies of 
Melbourne, Sydney and Perth—The Age, the Sydney Morning Herald and 
the West Australian, respectively—featured election news on their front 
pages most days. This was not the case with Darwin’s irreverent NT News 
or even, somewhat surprisingly, the daily paper of the nation’s capital, 
The Canberra Times. 
3  A random selection of 10 per cent of the story population was recoded by an independent 
researcher, Dr Andrew Gibbons of the University of Texas, Austin. The intercoder reliability was 
80 per cent. 
4  The dates for which the same or very similar stories were published on the front pages of 
The Age [Melbourne] and the Sydney Morning Herald were: 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 22, 24, 25, 28, 29 and 
30 April; 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15 and 17 May and polling day, 18 May.
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Figure 22.1 2019 election coverage in daily metropolitan 
Australian newspapers
Notes: No . = 258 election front‑page stories; missing data = 12 stories or 2 .9% per cent; 
newspaper owners are in parentheses, ‘N’ = News Corp, ‘9’ = Nine Entertainment Co . and 
‘7’ = Seven West Media .
Source: Authors .
We also find that the amount of front-page election coverage increased 
across the five-and-a-half-week campaign. This is not surprising because 
the start of the official campaign was interrupted by the Easter holiday 
and major media stories such as racehorse Winx winning her last race, 
the Sri Lankan bombings, the arrival of a British royal baby and France’s 
devastating Notre-Dame Cathedral fire. Also, early voting opened on 
29 April, the start of week four of the campaign, suggesting that party 
messaging intensified to attract maximum media attention to reach 
voters before casting their ballot sometime during the final weeks 
(see Figure 22.2). 
Tone of coverage
About one-third of election stories were neutral in tone (100 stories, 
or 38 per cent). However, of the stories that were not neutral in 
their overall message, more were negative (81 stories) than positive 
(72 stories)—a feature consistent with US studies (Patterson 2016). Many 
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more front-page stories focused on the ALP (115 stories) than on the 
Coalition (38 stories), which might be because Labor was expected to 
win, although stories about the ALP tended to be negative (66 stories) 
rather than positive (49 stories) overall (see Figure 22.2). 
If we simply compare the negative and the positive stories about the two 
major parties, the disproportionate front-page coverage given to Labor 
and its leader, Bill Shorten, becomes clearer. Figure 22.3 compares the 
negative coverage of the major parties from 2016 with that for 2019 as 
a percentage of the number of front pages assessed for each campaign.5 
In percentage terms, hostility towards Labor was almost unchanged from 
2016 to 2019 (18 per cent compared with 17 per cent). In fact, the ALP 
had proportionally more positive page-one stories in 2019 than in 2016’s 
press coverage (13 per cent compared with 3 per cent), when the party 
achieved a better electoral result. 
The stories focused on Labor covered wideranging issues; however, 
overwhelmingly, the negative coverage focused on the costs of Labor’s 
policies and tax increases that would follow if elected. Other prominent 
negative stories for Labor targeted the leadership of Shorten, the party’s 
unclear position on the proposed Adani coalmine in Queensland and its 
plan to scrap franking credits for self-funded retirees who did not pay 
tax. More negative headlines about Labor came from the Murdoch stable 
of newspapers than from Nine, with the exception of Nine’s Australian 
Financial Review. Conversely, the negative headlines directed at the 
Coalition came predominantly from the Nine stable of newspapers. 
However, overall there were fewer negative front pages about the Coalition 
and, in the case of the first week, there were no negative front-page stories. 
The page-one topics that were negative for the Coalition concentrated 
on inadequate costings or details in its policies on climate change, roads, 
housing and unemployment, and on being behind in the polls.
The positive stories for both major parties were fewer. For Labor, these 
included positive responses to policies addressing hospital funding, 
child care, violence against women, lifting wages for the low paid and 
Labor’s lead in the polls. Positive Labor policy stories were more common 
in the Nine mastheads than in the Murdoch-owned papers and were 
often syndicated.
5  As 2016 was a longer campaign, the figure is expressed as a proportion of the front pages assessed 
to make the two election years comparable. 
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Figure 22.2 Comparing sentiment of stories about parties 
and their leaders
Notes: No . = 258 front pages with election stories; no . = 107 non‑election front pages 
(not shown here) .
Source: Authors .
Figure 22.3 Comparing the proportions of stories in the 2016 and 2019 
election campaigns that were not neutral in sentiment





Stories paying tribute to the legacy of former prime minister Bob Hawke, 
who died days before the final ballot, also increased the proportion of 
positive Labor stories. These results contradict a perception that coverage 
of the Labor Party was more often negative, at least in quantitative 
terms, in the press during the 2019 election campaign than during the 
previous election. 
The press and issue agenda‑setting
Turning further attention to the issues that made it to the front pages of 
Australia’s daily newspapers, topics varied from State to State, yet stories 
most frequently placed on page one covered policies about taxation, the 
economy, housing, interest rates and concerns over Labor’s proposed tax 
increases and expenditure if elected to office (see Figure 22.4). These 
economically focused policy areas are often associated more favourably 
with the Coalition than with Labor—something known as ‘issue 
ownership’ (Konstantinidis 2008). Less common on page one were topics 
of which Labor typically has issue ownership, such as health, education 
and workers’ pay and conditions. From this perspective, the selection of 
issues by editors that made front-page headlines collectively fitted the 








































































































































































































































Figure 22.4 Story topics most commonly featured on the front pages 
of the daily press during the 2019 election campaign
Notes: No . = 39; orange denotes process stories; blue denotes policy‑focused topics .
Source: Authors . 
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The data show that stories about tax and concerns about Labor’s 
spending dominated the front-page coverage in weeks one and two of 
the campaign, setting up an election narrative. Jobs and penalty rates—
issues promoted by Labor—were among the top issues of week three, but 
this media attention was divided by Clive Palmer’s big advertising spend 
and his role as a possible preference-deal kingmaker. Further, the role of 
former Nationals leader Barnaby Joyce in signing off on a multimillion-
dollar sum of taxpayers’ funds as part of a water buyback scheme—
dubbed ‘Watergate’—also made headlines in the Nine papers and was 
the subject of a long and much commented on interview with Joyce on 
the ABC Radio program RN Drive on 22 April, in which he denied any 
wrongdoing in the decision.
The top three election topics that dominated week four’s coverage were the 
first leaders’ debate, in Western Australia, which was televised on Channel 
Seven (12 front-page stories); the environment, including the future of 
Queensland’s controversial Adani coalmine (10 stories); and a number 
of stories about candidates from both major parties withdrawing after 
unsavoury content was discovered on their social media sites or caches 
(four stories). Week five reverted to issues about the economy and related 
concerns about housing affordability and interest rates. Negative headlines 
about Labor’s plan to scrap franking credits for Australians who did not 
pay tax, such as self-funded retirees, also featured. The economy again 
dominated the campaign’s final week until Hawke’s death overwhelmed 
the coverage.
Television coverage
While television remains an important source of news, the number of 
Australians relying on it for election news has declined steadily over 
time, from 63 per cent in 1969 to 25 per cent in 2016 (Cameron and 
McAllister 2016: 8). But analysing the reach of any particular medium is 
complicated by the fact that content is no longer necessarily confined to 
specific platforms; a little-watched interview segment from a TV program 
might develop a much larger audience via social media or radio and online 




These factors notwithstanding, television coverage of the campaign 
followed a broadly familiar pattern, culminating in election night 
broadcasts. However, there were some noteworthy features, one of 
which was the more prominent role played by the free-to-air commercial 
Network 10 and its coverage of political events through its news–current 
affairs panel program The Project. 
Ahead of the announcement of the 18 May election date, the program 
broadcast an extended and uninterrupted interview in which co-host 
Waleed Aly challenged Prime Minister Scott Morrison about whether the 
Liberal Party had a problem with Islamophobia, and pressed him to address 
a news report from 2011 that said while he was shadow immigration 
minister, he urged a 2010 Shadow Cabinet meeting ‘to capitalise on the 
electorate’s growing concerns about “Muslim immigration”, “Muslims 
in Australia” and the “inability” of Muslim migrants to integrate’ 
(Remeikis 2019). 
The 35-minute interview materialised after Morrison threatened to sue 
Aly following comments the latter made in a broadcast editorial about 
the mass murder of 50 Muslim worshippers in Christchurch that also 
referenced the aforementioned 2011 news report. Both that editorial and 
the subsequent interview with Morrison reflected a more agenda-setting 
role for the Network 10 program; as Australian TV veteran and Network 
10 consultant on news and current affairs Peter Meakin commented, the 
interview indicated that the show was more than ‘a court jester sniggering 
on the sidelines’ (Watkins 2019). 
Despite lower ratings in recent years, the program’s particular significance 
within the news media ecology is that its viewers are predominantly 
in the 18–49-years age bracket, while its competition on Nine, Seven 
and the ABC have ageing demographics, with many viewers aged over 
60. Moreover, its reach is exponentially extended through social media; 
Aly’s emotional and personal editorial in response to the shootings in 
Christchurch drew 427,000 viewers on TV, but on social media it was 
seen almost 14 million times via the show’s Twitter and Facebook pages 
alone (Watkins and Dyer 2019).
The Project also led the television coverage of the ‘Watergate’ affair 
referenced earlier, featuring reports by independent journalist Michael 
West and the show’s own Hamish McDonald. Yet while described in 
a program tweet on 5 May as a story ‘that just won’t go away: the murky, 
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taxpayer-funded water buyback that’s raised a lot of questions’, it failed 
to sustain significant traction across the lifespan of the campaign, as the 
press analysis showed.
As always, TV provided a platform throughout the campaign for 
contenders to attempt to move beyond standard talking points—though, 
not surprisingly, these were also amplified ad nauseum—and to land 
‘gotcha’ punches against a number of hapless candidates, most notably, 
One Nation’s Steve Dickson, who resigned in disgrace after A Current 
Affair aired footage filmed by Al Jazeera of the Senate candidate ‘making 
derogatory comments and groping a woman in undercover footage filmed 
in a Washington DC strip club’ (Hunter and Crockford 2019).
Meanwhile, one of the most prominent fixtures on the small screen 
throughout the contest, beginning well before the campaign itself, was 
UAP founder, Clive Palmer, who eschewed interviews for a saturated 
advertising blitz, which included as many as 150,000 television ads 
(McCutcheon 2019). This tactic failed to win him a single seat, but may 
have helped thwart Labor’s ambitions, especially in Queensland. 
‘Sky News Australia’
With much focus during the campaign on the election coverage of News 
Corp papers, the performance of the Murdoch-owned Sky News Australia 
was scrutinised elsewhere in the media, and criticised by Labor leaders 
past and present, especially its ‘after dark’ line-up, which features mostly 
right-wing hosts, including Peta Credlin, Andrew Bolt, Chris Kenny, 
Alan  Jones and Paul Murray. Described by some as a ‘Foxification’ of 
the pay-TV channel, the line-up has produced an increase in ratings 
(Lallo  2019). And, while available only as a pay channel in most 
metropolitan areas, some Sky News programming was for the first time 
during an election campaign available on free-to-air TV in regional areas 
through the WIN network in Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, 
South Australia and Western Australia, and Statewide across Tasmania 
and the Australian Capital Territory. Of the markets where TV ratings 
are available, the nightly reach during the election campaign was just over 
60,000 nationally, with the largest monitored audiences in New South 
Wales and Queensland, and more than half of that total audience was 
aged over 65 (see Figure 22.5).
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Figure 22.5 Ratings figures for Sky News content on free‑to‑air 
television during the 2019 election campaign
Note: South Australia and some smaller regional markets were not monitored by Regional 
Tam and are thus not included in the graph . 
Source: Authors, using Regional Tam ratings figures of average evening reach from 21 April 
to 18 May 2019 . 
Analysis conducted by The New Daily website of Sky’s programming over 
three consecutive nights found that anti-Labor commentary was seven 
times more likely to appear on the news service than negative rhetoric 
about the Coalition. PHON received more than twice as many positive 
comments as negative, 26 to 11, on Sky, while the Greens received not 
one positive comment and 28 negative comments (Stapleton 2019).
So contentious was the coverage that it became the subject of an on-air 
exchange on Sky itself between Murray and morning host Kieran Gilbert, 
during which Gilbert said to Murray in response to an apparent swipe 
from the latter: ‘You’re not a big fan of Bill Shorten’s. He could have 
orchestrated the second coming and you probably wouldn’t have been too 
positive about it. So that’s the starting point isn’t it?’ (Meade 2019). 
The possible impact of Sky News’s evening coverage on the election 
outcome needs to be seen in the context of the station’s relatively small, 
albeit growing, share of the overall television audience; with repeat and 
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catch-up viewers factored in, the weekly reach of Paul Murray Live averages 
275,000 viewers, with The Bolt Report nearing 240,000 and Credlin on 
almost 200,000 (Lallo 2019). 
Whatever the possible influence of Sky News, it is important to distinguish 
between viewership of the station content itself and the audiences 
that some  of its presenters command through other media formats. 
For  instance,  Bolt’s blog, published via News Corp daily newspaper 
sites (outside the paywall), is billed as the nation’s most read political 
blog, while Alan Jones’s 2GB radio breakfast program—which has 
a 17.6 per cent share of the Sydney radio audience—is also syndicated 
to Brisbane’s 4BC (Kelly 2019). Jones, whose political influence has long 
been debated (Salter 2006; McKenzie-Murray 2018), was highly critical 
of Labor throughout the campaign and predicted a Coalition victory. And, 
following the election, in reference to the refusal of Shorten to appear 
on his program, Jones commented that ‘no-one’s ever won an election 
boycotting this program’ (Jones 2019).
ABC coverage
ABC TV’s campaign coverage included standard programming on its 
main station and more extensive interviews on its News 24 channel, many 
of which were conducted between 4 pm and 6 pm by Patricia Karvelas and 
replayed during her subsequent 6 pm RN Drive program on ABC Radio 
National. The network’s News Breakfast, 7 pm news and current affairs 
program, 7.30, featured a steady mix of daily commentary, interviews 
with politicians and profiles of swing seats, with particular focus on the 
normally safe seat of Warringah, which former prime minister Tony 
Abbott  lost to Independent and former Olympian Zali Steggall. Even 
the weekly current affairs program Four Corners, which did not broadcast 
election stories during the campaign, featured a special entitled ‘Abbott’s 
End’, which was broadcast two days after the poll and chronicled the 
successful campaign that saw him ousted from the seat he had held 
for 25 years.
Interviews with politicians and election analysis also featured on the 
weekly Sunday morning program, Insiders, and on the Monday night 
panel program, Q&A. Over the course of the campaign, Q&A included 
an episode focused on Queensland, featuring five political candidates, two 
standard episodes that included a mix of politicians and other panellists 
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and a program on which the sole guest was Bill Shorten. Scott Morrison 
declined an invitation to appear as the sole guest on the program 
(McMahon 2019).
Throughout the campaign, the ABC positioned its inhouse psephologist 
Antony Green as its trump card, featuring him extensively in promotions 
of its election coverage in acknowledgement of his growing stature over 
a three-decade career. The national broadcaster also provided ongoing 
public opinion findings from its own Vote Compass survey,6 which were 
a common talking point across its network.
Satirical takes on the election campaign were provided by The Weekly 
with Charlie Pickering and in interstitial sketches from comedians Mark 
Humphreys and Sammy J. A notable absence from the network’s campaign 
programming in 2019 was the comedy team known as ‘The Chaser’, whose 
two-decade relationship with the ABC had included regular election-
year programs that were successful in terms of both ratings and awards. 
The team revealed in late 2018 that the ABC would not be funding them 
(Moran and Cooper 2018). Also absent from the national broadcaster was 
the human interest interview-format program Kitchen Cabinet, presented 
by Annabel Crabb, which provided a different kind of engagement with 
many leading politicians during the 2016 election campaign. 
The ABC was briefly an issue in its own right ahead of the 2019 campaign 
when Prime Minister Morrison eschewed convention by directly 
appointing Ita Buttrose as new ABC Chair, despite her not having been 
on the shortlist for the position (Jeffrey and Staff 2019). The appointment 
of Buttrose followed a period of instability in the corporation following 
the sacking of former managing director Michelle Guthrie in September 
2018, and the subsequent resignation of ABC chair Justin Milne in the 
wake of allegations of political interference (Meade 2018). Commenting 
ahead of official confirmation that Buttrose would take up the role, Shorten 
said that while Buttrose was competent, qualified and ‘very respected’, 
the then mooted appointment amounted to ‘more political interference’ 
(Koslowski 2019). However, this controversy proved short-lived.
6  Andrea Carson is on the academic advisory panel of Vote Compass.
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Election debates
Televised debates between leaders have been a staple of Australian 
campaigns but have arguably become less important over time. Just 
21 per cent of Australians reported watching a debate in 2016—down 
from 71 per cent in 1993 (Cameron and McAllister 2016: 9). Over 
time, the debates have also come to be seen as an increasingly unreliable 
predictor of electoral success, with leaders either dodging them or setting 
conditions on where and when they are held (Carson 2019).
This held true in 2019. While in general (but by no means unanimous) 
terms Shorten was seen as the better performer across the three debates, 
neither leader delivered a decisive blow in any of the encounters. The first 
debate, broadcast on multiple channels of the Seven network, attracted 
less than 1 million viewers across metropolitan and regional areas—a far 
cry from the 3.4 million–strong audience that watched the 2010 
campaign leaders’ debate between Julia Gilliard and Tony Abbott, which 
was screened on the three free-to-air networks and the ABC (Craig 2012: 
112).The second of the 2019 debates, which screened on Sky, attracted 
fewer than 100,000 viewers—less than 40 per cent of the audience for 
each of two rugby league matches screened on the pay-TV network on 
the same night (Dyer 2019)—but produced one of the more memorable 
exchanges between the two leaders, when Shorten described Morrison as 
‘a classic space invader’ after the Prime Minister appeared to physically 
close in on him on the stage.
The final debate, hosted by the National Press Club and broadcast on ABC 
TV and Sky in prime time, garnered a respectable 882,000 viewers—but 
was eclipsed by Seven’s reality program House Rules (975,000 viewers) 
(Rigby and Kelly 2019).
Election night coverage
For the first time, all networks covered election night to some extent, 
though in the case of SBS, coverage commenced after 10 pm, by which 
time it was already evident that the Coalition was likely to be returned 
to government. In ratings terms, the ABC dominated, attracting an 
even larger audience share than for the 2016 election, and averaging 
1.34 million viewers nationally through the combined audience of its 
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main channel and News 24. It was well ahead of Nine (597,000), Seven 
Network (489,000) and Network 10, whose figure of 170,000 was just 
3.6 per cent of the free-to-air audience (Burrowes 2019). 
It may not have figured in the ratings, but election coverage also featured 
on community television stations delivered by The Junction, a network 
of students involved in a reporting project of journalism schools at more 
than 20 Australian universities. The world-first election programming was 
broadcast on Melbourne-based community TV station Channel 31 and 
relayed to Adelaide and Perth as well as via the Community Broadcasting 
Association of Australia’s network of radio stations.
Political messaging on social media
As noted earlier, this was a campaign fragmented across multiple 
dimensions: time, with school holidays distracting voters and early voting 
interrupting campaign messaging for some; geography, with different 
issues gaining traction in different States, such as the Adani coalmine in 
Queensland; and media platforms, with political messaging shaped by 
both traditional and social media logics. 
Different media logics present obvious resourcing challenges and costs 
for political parties, which aim to tailor political messaging to different 
users of social media sites, whether it be Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, 
YouTube or Snapchat. According to Facebook analytics (using the tool 
CrowdTangle), the official pages of the two major political parties and 
their leaders attracted 2.29 million user interactions during the official 
campaign. Interactions included shares, comments and reactions such 
as ‘likes’. 
Analysis of these data shows that Labor and Bill Shorten were attracting 
more interactions than the Coalition before and during the first week 
of the campaign. However, as Figure 22.6 shows, this quickly reversed 
by the second week, notwithstanding that Morrison had fewer Facebook 
followers than Shorten at the outset of the campaign (148,000 versus 
235,000). One of the reasons for this change was the increased 
frequency  of postings and strategic use of video by Morrison and the 
Coalition on Facebook. 
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Figure 22.6 The total number of online interactions with the major 
political parties and their leaders’ political communications before and 
during the 2019 election campaign
Source: Authors, using CrowdTangle data .
An analysis of the types of messages shows that the Liberals’ Facebook 
page posted more content than Labor’s (671 versus 435 posts), as was the 
case with Morrison’s page compared with Shorten’s (175 versus 165 posts). 
Morrison’s posts were often more personal in nature, including about how 
Morrison proposed to his wife, Jenny (posted the day after calling the 
election). The election itself was called by Morrison using a Facebook 
video post before alerting reporters. In the final week of the campaign, 
‘ScoMo’, as Morrison labels himself on Facebook, posted 30 videos 
compared with Shorten’s 14, garnering 1.4 million views compared with 
Shorten’s 236,000 views. The same pattern occurred between the Liberals’ 
official Facebook page and Labor’s. Between the day the election was called 
and polling day, 173 videos were posted on the Liberals’ Facebook page, 
attracting 7.94 million views compared with Labor’s 154 videos, which 
were viewed 2.77 million times. While these metrics do not include paid 
online advertising or other social media sites, the Facebook data show 
that the Liberals reached a larger audience through their strategic online 
communications during the campaign despite having fewer followers. 
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Labor was highly critical of some of the online election campaign 
content—notably, references to the so-called death tax, which appeared 
following a Seven Network news story on its breakfast program Sunrise 
in July 2018, which, in turn, followed up on a Daily Telegraph story 
speculating about unions wanting to reintroduce an inheritance tax 
(Holderhead 2018). The Seven Network segment was reposted by Labor’s 
opponents, including Pauline Hanson, along with commentary that 
Labor would introduce a death tax if elected (Hanson 2018). While the 
‘death tax’ was fake news, it did evolve from mainstream media coverage 
and was therefore difficult for some viewers to discern as false. As argued 
elsewhere in this volume, this reinforced a negative campaign message 
that a vote for Labor meant an increase in taxes.
Conclusion
The political communications of the 2019 campaign were fragmented 
not just across the traditional media platforms of radio, television and 
the press, but also across social media sites and paid and free media. They 
were also interrupted by major news events and holidays such as Easter 
and Anzac Day. These distractions disrupted news reporting and possibly 
voters’ attention to election news during segments of the campaign. Early 
voting also saw a record number of Australians (see Chapter 3, this volume) 
make up their minds before the campaign had concluded. Election 
coverage also varied between States in story selection and intensity.
This theme of fragmentation brings us back to the plausibility of the claim 
made by Bill Shorten after the election that the media was implicated in 
his election defeat, through opponents with deep pockets ‘telling lies’ and 
‘spreading fear’. 
While it is impossible to refute or defend these claims with precision, 
the newspaper data presented here show election coverage of Labor was 
quantitatively no more negative than the press coverage of the 2016 
election campaign when Labor won more seats. However, the types of 
stories that made front-page headlines in 2019 more often amplified 
issues that the Coalition was promoting in its campaign messaging 
than those perceived to work more strongly for Labor. The front-page 
emphasis on tax increases and Labor spending at a time of economic 
uncertainty for Australians supported the Coalition’s campaign narrative. 
Moreover, the diversity of topics was further compromised by newspaper 
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stablemates syndicating the same page-one stories. The coverage of Labor 
on Sky News’s programming and its free-to-air broadcasting into regional 
areas via the WIN network (albeit to a small audience) also reinforced 
negative messages about Labor.
Whether these media choices were an artefact of the agenda-setting 
effectiveness of the Coalition or of the media itself, they served to 
complement the key slogan of the Coalition: ‘The Bill Australia can’t 
afford.’ Further, the Coalition’s tactical use of social media, particularly 
its use of video posts, saw Morrison and his party attract more viewers to 
their election stories on Facebook than their political opponents. Social 
media also provided a platform that enabled third parties and other actors, 
in addition to the Coalition, to spread a fear campaign falsely claiming 
that Labor would introduce a ‘death tax’. While these different media 
platforms reach different publics, stories about extra taxes and Labor 
spending—whether true or not—coalesced to serve the Coalition’s key 
message, giving some credence to Shorten’s criticism of election coverage.
As noted in the introduction, however, caution is needed in any estimation 
of the overall impact media coverage has on voters’ choices, particularly 
with record numbers of Australians voting before the campaign concluded. 
Examining media content provides some indication of what election 
issues voters may have encountered in the 2019 campaign, but it does not 
tell us how they responded to them at the ballot box. 
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Election campaign communications—the most visible public 
manifestation of an electoral contest—paradoxically remain somewhat 
obscured from academic analysis. This is because the central element of 
a communications project, its strategic rationale, remains tightly held 
among the rival elite campaign professionals. We can, however, by working 
backwards from the observed communications output, infer many of 
the strategic considerations that went into the design of the campaigns. 
Applying this method to communications by the two major parties in the 
2019 election campaign helps explain the unexpected Coalition victory.1 
Analysis of Liberal and Labor communications—especially television 
advertising and direct voter contact—suggests the parties adopted 
fundamentally different strategic approaches. To draw on international 
frameworks for the analysis of campaign communications (for example, 
Trent and Friedenberg 2004), we can say Labor selected a challenger-
style, policy-centred communications strategy, incorporating a largely 
positive and broad-based message of change. The Liberals—content with 
a narrower electoral victory—opted for a fiercely negative style, contrasting 
the risk of Labor and the unpopularity of Opposition leader Bill Shorten 
1  The author expresses his gratitude to representatives of both major party campaigns for their 
input. All judgements remain the responsibility of the author.
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with its own, largely policy-free agenda, emphasising incumbency and 
leadership. As a result, the campaign was fought over the promises 
and leadership of the Opposition rather than the record and prospects of 
the Coalition Government. 
It also seems clear that the Liberals executed their strategy with greater 
consistency and impact than did Labor. Liberal ads carried the message 
that Prime Minister Scott Morrison had stabilised a divided government 
and delivered a surplus Budget with imminent tax cuts, while also 
highlighting the risk posed by Labor to the economy and to families, 
small businesses and pensioners. Labor’s extensive package of spending 
promises proved unfocused and unwieldy and its key revenue initiatives 
fatally vulnerable to scaremongering and exaggeration, while its attack on 
the government misfired. 
Strategic approaches
For campaign managers, strategy is defined as the path to electoral 
success (Mills 2014). Different campaign organisations identify different 
goals: in the 2019 campaign, the Coalition and the Labor Party adopted 
office-seeking strategies, contesting every seat in both chambers of 
parliament and campaigning in every medium to form government; the 
Greens and Independent candidates pursued seat-winning strategies; 
activist groups such as GetUp! and the ACTU aimed to defeat certain 
incumbents; Clive Palmer’s big-spending populism aimed to defeat 
the ALP. 
Strategic-level choices are ultimately determined by each party’s campaign 
director, supported by an elite assemblage drawn from the parliamentary 
wing, federal and State branch head offices and external experts in market 
research, advertising, digital media and the like. Their choices are driven 
by collective professional judgement, informed by market research and 
other data about the relative and changing strengths and weaknesses 
of the  campaign contestants. In 2019, the Liberals’ campaign director 
was the party’s federal director, Andrew Hirst; Labor’s was its national 
secretary, Noah Carroll (Williams 2019a; Patrick 2019). 
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The two teams adopted starkly different strategies. Labor entered the 
election year with a proven strategy of contrasting the ‘cuts and chaos’ 
under a disunited Coalition Government with their own political stability, 
well-signalled revenue measures and a promised raft of welfare and other 
initiatives. Labor’s expectation—supported by polling and key by-election 
results—was for potentially substantial electoral gains in Queensland, 
Victoria and Western Australia. The Liberals were more parsimonious. 
Never aiming for a big win, they sought to protect all their existing seats 
and win a targeted handful of Labor and Independent seats. After the 
tumultuous cycle of leadership change and internal division, this strategy 
depended on Morrison stabilising the government, silencing internal 
critics, hiding vulnerable ministers in ‘witness protection’ (away  from 
media scrutiny) and setting up a favourable ‘one on one’ leadership 
contrast of Morrison with Shorten. A pre-election Budget promising 
a return to surplus and tax cuts would also allow a fierce attack on Labor’s 
supposedly unaffordable policy agenda.
Campaign managers can select from a repertoire of strategic designs, 
refined in previous electoral contests and adapted to current requirements 
in ways most likely to persuade target voters (Trent and Friedenberg 
2004: 81; Mills 2014: 178–79). Available designs include incumbency 
or  challenger campaigns (Trent and Friedenberg 2004: 80–111), 
positive or negative campaigns (Nai 2018) and leader-centred or policy-
centred campaigns. In their study of campaign communications in the 
US electoral context, Trent and Friedenberg (2004) provide a checklist of 
communications typically associated with the challenger and incumbency 
strategies (Table 23.1). Labor’s communications output—its attack on 
the government, its optimism and moderate tone, its change orientation 
and Shorten’s careful delegation of attack lines to key shadow ministers—
represents a good fit with many of the challenger criteria (shown in bold in 
Table 23.1). The incumbency checklist likewise elucidates several aspects 
of the Liberals’ campaign (also shown in bold). 
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• Attacking the record of 
opponents
• Taking the offensive position 
on issues
• Calling for change
• Emphasising optimism for 
the future
• Appearing to represent the 
philosophical centre of the 
political party
• Delegating personal or harsh 
attacks in an effort to control 
demagogic rhetoric
• Speaking to traditional values 
rather than calling for value 
changes
• Creating pseudo‑events to attract 
and control media attention
• Creating special task forces to 
investigate areas of public concern
• Appropriating federal funds/grants
• Emphasising accomplishments
• Interpreting/intensifying a foreign 
policy problem
• Making appointments to State and federal 
jobs/party committees 
• Consulting or negotiating with world 
leaders
• Manipulating the economy 
• Endorsements by party and other leaders
• Creating and maintaining an ‘above the 
fray’ posture
Source: Adapted from Trent and Friedenberg (2004) .
Tactical executions: Labor
Within these strategic parameters, party campaign managers need to make 
tactical decisions about how to execute the strategy and express its narrative. 
The checklist in Table 23.1 illustrates the linkage between strategic choice and 
tactical execution: challenger and incumbent strategies find their expression 
in forms of communication such as attacks, calls for change, interpretations 
and so on. Likewise, strategic choice gives rise to the campaign’s overall 
message or narrative, which can also be drawn from a repertoire of available 
options (Bartlett and Rayner 2014; Medvic 2018: 270–72).
Tactical decisions are technical in nature. Specific messages—slogans, TV 
advertisements, social media posts, news media stories, leader speeches, 
debate responses and so on—are crafted for execution on digital, 
electronic, print and interpersonal channels that best link the campaign 
with its target voters. Thus, tactical executions are visible manifestations of 
the more covert strategic deliberations. Given the finite financial, human 
and intellectual resources available to the campaign organisation—based 
on its size, structure, membership, wealth, political orientation and level 
of professionalisation—these tactical decisions necessitate trade-offs and 
strong organisational coordination to deliver with consistency. In fact, 
both major parties organised themselves in 2019 in broadly similar 
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fashion, with separate teams responsible for news media, electronic 
advertising and digital media; Labor also had a separate team for direct 
voter contact (DVC).
The contrasting Labor and Liberal strategic approaches gave rise to 
strongly contrasting tactical executions. This can be illustrated by 
considering four 30-second television advertisements, two Labor and 
two Liberal. Television advertising continues to be the most expensive 
item in campaign budgets, though its share shrank in 2019 relative to 
radio and print (Pash 2019). Both parties used it to hammer home their 
main arguments and to frame themselves and their opponents. Each ad 
considered here was widely broadcast on TV during the election campaign 
and also distributed on YouTube.
The first ad, titled ‘Scott Morrison—Only for the Top End of Town’ 
(Plate 23.1), served as the vehicle for Labor’s negative attack on Morrison’s 
political character and policy record (ALP 2019b). The ad uses black-
and-white images of Morrison, Tony Abbott and Peter Dutton to link the 
Prime Minister with the Liberals’ unpopular and divisive right faction. 
The voiceover opens with ironic praise: correcting an impression that 
Morrison ‘hasn’t done very much’, it asserts ‘he’s done plenty’. The audio 
continues by blaming Morrison for cutting funding for schools and 
hospitals, supporting cuts to penalty rates and pensions, supporting 
corporate tax cuts and opposing the banking royal commission. ‘When 
it comes to what matters to working and middle-income Australians’, it 
concludes, ‘Morrison is out of touch and only for the top end of town’. 
Plate 23.1 ALP 30‑second television commercial, ‘Scott Morrison—
Only for the Top End of Town’
Source: www.youtube.com/watch?v=5baNQ4gSxaU . Reproduced with permission 
of the ALP . 
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The second ad, ‘Labor: A fair go for Australia’ (ALP 2019c), presents 
Labor’s positive policy message built on the central theme of fairness and 
introduces its senior leadership. Bill Shorten is depicted in a powerful role 
(office, desk, urban background) opening and closing the ad, and is seen 
in a ‘high-vis’ vest in the community. Five senior shadow ministers appear 
in outdoor settings, summarising policies on health and hospitals, energy 
prices and climate change, school funding, wages and job creation. Each 
successive speaker adds to the previous speaker’s sentence and the last 
four repeat the slogan ‘for a fair go’, demonstrating the unity and rapport 
of the team and the breadth of the policy package. 
Taken together, these ads express the party’s strategic intent. What they 
suggest, however, is that the strategy itself was flawed. As a result, both 
ads misfired. Considering the negative ad, it seems that Labor, having 
used the ‘top end of town’ tag effectively against the previous prime 
minister, Malcolm Turnbull, who was lampooned as the top-hat-wearing 
‘Mr Harbourside Mansion’, sought to carry forward and apply the same 
critique to the current Prime Minister. Yet the baseball-cap-wearing 
dad from ‘the Shire’ proved to be a different and more elusive target; 
Labor’s strategy had not taken account of the new reality. Likewise, the 
strategy recycled Labor’s previously successful attacks on Liberal cuts to 
welfare spending, but this also faltered in the wake of the 2019 federal 
Budget, which had not announced new cuts. Indeed, the ‘cuts and chaos’ 
theme Labor had been promoting since before the campaign began2 was, 
according to Labor’s market research, failing to hurt Morrison (Williams 
2019b). On the evidence of this ad, then, Labor’s strategy seemed flat-
footed—reluctant to shift from attack lines that had damaged Turnbull and 
unable to identify and target the vulnerabilities of Morrison. Ultimately, 
with the campaign half-over, Labor did switch its line of attack, pivoting 
to tarnish Morrison by association with Coalition preference deals with 
PHON and Clive Palmer. But this proved insufficient in itself and was 
swamped by Palmer’s advertising barrage in the campaign’s final weeks.
The positive ad also exposed a deeper communications problem about 
Labor’s impressive range of policy promises. Its strategic intent is clear: roll 
out the positive benefits of Labor’s platform; present a stable and united 
team, ready to govern; and push back against Shorten’s poll-demonstrated 
2  See, for example, Shorten’s video posted on Facebook (Shorten 2019a). Shorten continued the 
theme in his speech in Burwood, in Sydney, on 14 April: ‘After six years of cuts, chaos, of division—
friends, it is time for change. It is time, friends, for a stable, united Labor Government’ (Shorten 2019c). 
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unpopularity as leader by emphasising his capable team.3 But in 
enumerating the individual policies, it fails to demonstrate (as opposed 
to assert) how these constitute an overall ‘fair go plan’ or to prosecute 
(as opposed to assume) the overall case for expansive policy change. 
This problem was perceptively foreshadowed by Trent and Friedenberg 
(2004), who warned that challengers taking the offensive position on 
issues should probe and question the incumbent but should ‘never present 
concrete solutions for problems’. Yet Labor entered the campaign with 
a set of detailed policy promises, on both the revenue and the spending 
sides, and continued to announce new spending commitments during 
the campaign. Indeed, Labor offered the biggest policy offering of any 
Opposition party since Liberal Leader John Hewson’s Fightback! package 
in 1993. At the end of the 2019 campaign, Labor’s website featured no 
less than 178 separate commitments. 
Labor, and Shorten, however, appeared to lack an overarching theme or 
narrative for these policies. This was not for lack of trying. At a rally at 
the Revesby Workers Club in Sydney in October 2018, Shorten launched 
Labor’s ‘Fair Go Action Plan’. Six months later, delivering his Budget 
reply speech in the House of Representatives, he declared the election 
would be a ‘referendum on wages’ (Shorten 2019b). At a campaign rally 
in Sydney on 14 April 2019, he declared: ‘After six years of cuts, chaos 
and division, it is time for change.’ In his final campaign speech, on 
16 May, at a Whitlam-style rally in Blacktown, he declared a Shorten 
government would take the climate change emergency seriously. But, as 
with the TV ad, the speeches failed to encapsulate the disparate elements 
of the platform in a compelling rationale for change. On 28 April, for 
example, Shorten (2019d) declared it was ‘time to draw the threads 
of the story together, to explain to the Australian people the vision we 
offer’.4 But he then listed nine separate ‘threads’ without providing the 
story. His Blacktown rally concluded with a stirring peroration that listed 
3  Likewise, Shorten’s travelling party on the campaign bus also saw him surrounded by senior 
female leaders—Tanya Plibersek, Penny Wong and Kristina Keneally—demonstrating Labor’s 
stronger representation of women and allowing Shorten to delegate attack roles to others. Labor used 
the same technique in 1980, positioning Opposition leader Bill Hayden in a ‘triumvirate’ of the more 
popular NSW Premier Neville Wran and ACTU President Bob Hawke (Weller 1983: 72).
4  The nine threads were jobs, wages, Medicare, education, infrastructure, the NDIS, tax fairness, 
a better deal for pensioners, help with the cost of living and ‘real action on climate change’.
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16 separate policies.5 Crikey commentator Guy Rundle was surely right 
when he observed mid-campaign that Labor’s campaign was ‘big ticket … 
not big picture’ (Rundle 2019). In the immediate campaign post-mortem, 
Deputy Labor Leader Tanya Plibersek acknowledged: ‘When you’ve got 
such a large agenda, it’s sometimes hard to explain all of the details to all 
of the people who benefit’ (ABC 2019).
Tactical executions: Liberal
Turning to the Liberal Party’s television advertising, we see a simpler, 
stronger and more impactful form of campaign communication. The first 
ad, titled ‘Labor can’t manage money’ (Liberal Party of Australia 2019c), 
uses a violent image—the smashing of a piggy bank and theft of its 
contents, repeated three times—and colloquial language to frame Labor 
as the party of financial mismanagement and deficit (‘breaking the bank’) 
and of leadership turnover. By contrast, the post-Budget Coalition is the 
party of surplus (‘turning it around’). The ad concludes with a black-
and-white image of Shorten and a clever pun that brought together the 
unpopularity of Shorten with fear of the Opposition’s economic policies: 
‘Labor: The Bill Australia can’t afford.’
The second Liberal ad, titled ‘Australia can’t afford Labor’ (Liberal Party 
of Australia 2019b), features another image of violent destruction: framed 
family photographs being squeezed and broken in a vice labelled ‘Labor’ 
(Plate 23.2). The contrast between the photographs, representing the 
domestic sphere, and the rusty vice, representing the industrial sphere, has 
conceptual echoes of Robert Menzies’s ‘Forgotten People’. The point of 
the ad is to personalise the hurt of Labor’s revenue measures (colloquially, 
‘put the squeeze on’) on Australian families, small businesses and retirees. 
To substantiate this claim, the ad ruthlessly reduces Labor’s complex range 
of fiscal initiatives to ‘taxes’: limits on negative gearing concessions become 
‘housing taxes’; elimination of cash rebates from franking credits becomes 
a ‘retiree tax’; a commitment to carbon emissions targets becomes an 
‘electricity tax’, and so on. While technically flimsy, the argument has 
5  The text of the Blacktown speech was not posted on Labor’s website but was carried in full 
by The Guardian (Remeikis 2019). The 16 reasons were wage rises, Sunday penalty rates, childcare 
assistance, Closing the Gap, Indigenous constitutional recognition, the NDIS, restoration of school 
funding, tertiary education access, apprenticeships, dental care, cancer treatment on Medicare, 
a national integrity commission, having an Australian head of state, infrastructure spending, arts 
spending and saving the ABC.
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rhetorical strength and throws Labor’s disparate policies together into 
a single comprehensible category—something Labor could not do. 
Invoking the deep-seated popular view about Labor’s skills in economic 
management, the ad closes with the damning conclusion: ‘Labor can’t 
manage money. That’s why they’re coming after yours.’ The final few 
seconds are devoted to the same image of Shorten and the same pun.
Plate 23.2 Liberal Party 30‑second television commercial, ‘Australia 
can’t afford Labor’ 
Source: www.youtube.com/watch?v=eWcTKF6G66E . Reproduced with permission of the 
Liberal Party of Australia . 
Characterising Shorten as an unaffordable ‘bill’ was a masterstroke that 
became the unifying message for the Liberals’ entire campaign. It was 
widely used on Liberal Party direct mail, along with dark images of 
Labor’s threatened ‘taxes’, and appeared on the bunting adorning polling 
stations on election day. In the wake of the election victory, Adelaide ad 
agency KWP was quick to claim credit for the slogan, as well as ‘marketing 
strategy, strategic messaging, creative execution and production’ for the 
Liberals’ federal campaign (Cheik-Hussein 2019).6
If simplicity of language, starkness of image and consistency of argument 
are hallmarks of effective advertising, these ads suggest a Coalition 
win. But Trent and Friedenberg’s analysis also helps to explain their 
effectiveness. First, they suggest challengers such as Labor face a double 
hurdle: the need to persuade voters of the need for change, while also 
6  This treatment is reminiscent of the Coalition’s 2004 attack on then Labor Leader Mark Latham 
as inexperienced; his name was featured with a learner driver’s L-plate.
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demonstrating that they are capable of bringing it about. Labor may 
have cleared the first hurdle, but it fell at the second, thanks to Shorten’s 
longstanding unpopularity and the ruthless way this was exploited by the 
incumbent. At the same time, Trent and Friedenberg (2004: 101) warn 
challengers that ‘the more detailed [they] become in offering solutions, 
the more material they provide to be attacked themselves’. Labor’s policy-
rich package indeed offered abundant material for the Coalition’s attack. 
The Coalition’s simple, consistent, focused, negative communications 
proved more effective than the cluttered policy-heavy messages from the 
Opposition. Morrison, a former Liberal campaign director in New South 
Wales and tourism advertising executive, proved a capable marketer. 
By the time of the federal Budget, Labor’s spending initiatives had lost 
much of their original rationale—as a solution to Liberal cuts—and, 
during the course of the campaign, had been transformed by negative 
attacks into an extravagant, unaffordable risk.
Liberal attacks were strengthened by the party’s active social media 
campaign (further discussed in Chapters 14 and 22, this volume). 
The Liberal digital team appears to have been given creative license to post 
shareable ‘boomer memes’ on Facebook around Game of Thrones episodes 
(Bourke 2019), and to provide rapid response to campaign events, such as 
a tweet mocking Bill Shorten’s ride on a merry-go-round (Liberal Party of 
Australia 2019a). The Liberals also produced effective US-style ‘snackable’ 
ads (The Halo Group 2019)—for example, a six-second ad that simply 
used one cycle of the piggy bank being smashed. By contrast, Labor’s 
attack ad could not be similarly cut down; its ironic praise of Morrison 
might inadvertently impress an inattentive listener who does not wait for 
the litany of unpopular decisions that follows. 
Alessandro Nai defines negative campaigning as ‘competing candidates 
and parties … attack[ing] their rivals’ ideas, policy proposals, past record 
and character flaws’ (Nai 2018: 1). The Coalition’s ads certainly fit that 
definition. Yet in their reductive simplicity, these ads are more than merely 
negative. They sit firmly in an increasingly acrimonious and tendentious 
Australian electoral tradition of ‘scare campaigns’, designed to incite fear 
through exaggerated claims about opponents’ policies. Was labelling the 
abolition of a cash rebate on franking credits a ‘retiree tax’ merely robust 
electoral critique or was it factually inaccurate—a lie? The difficulty of 
answering that question underlines the challenge facing post-election calls 
for tighter trade practices–style regulation of misleading and deceptive 
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claims in election campaigns. Yet there is surely a need for a broader critical 
vocabulary that covers the spectrum of attack, from acceptable negative 
critique and exaggeration to questionable incivility and misrepresentation 
and fearmongering and to outright falsehood and lying. 
Labor, of course, could have done more to immunise itself against what 
it must have expected as inevitable attacks on any campaign promise to 
change revenues or taxes. Yet this seems to have been a strategic blind 
spot. Its efforts to do this on negative gearing, for example—such as 
a 15 May Facebook post, ‘Attention Property Investors’, and a website, 
www.negativegearing.org.au, to ‘explain the facts on negative gearing’—
were too little and too late. Some of the attacks, however—notoriously, 
the shadowy digital scare campaign for a non-existent ‘death tax’ (Murphy 
et al. 2019; Koslowski 2019)—were more difficult to deter or refute, as to 
do so served only to draw attention to the falsehood.
Tactical executions: Direct voter 
contact (DVC)
While most tactical executions are channelled through some form of 
mass media, parties and campaign organisations, especially on the 
progressive side, have over the past decade invested significant effort 
in a form of unmediated campaigning, DVC. In this form of ‘micro-
targeting’ (Issenberg 2012) or ‘personalised political communications’ 
(Nielsen 2012), voters are identified through party databases for individual 
contact by campaign volunteers, who seek to engage them in persuasive 
conversations in their homes, either face-to-face or by phone. 
The practice was pioneered by the campaigns of Barack Obama in the 
United States in 2008 and 2012 (McKenna and Han 2014) and has 
been adopted in Australia by Labor. DVC contributed to Labor wins in 
Victorian State elections in 2014 and 2018, Queensland State elections 
in 2015 and 2017, in New South Wales in the 2016 federal election 
and in the June 2018 ‘Super Saturday’ by-elections—notably, in the 
seat of Longman. Organisationally, Labor’s DVC effort is managed by 




Table 23.2 Direct voter contact: ALP
2019 2016
Phone calls 1,100,000 536,497
Doorknocking 1,000,000 1,083,000
Total voter contacts 2,100,000 1,619,497
Numbers of volunteers 25,000+ 16,200
Source: Data provided by ALP .
Labor’s DVC effort in 2019 was significantly larger than in 2016 
(Table  23.2). Labor’s federal head office had proclaimed the 2016 
campaign would be ‘the biggest grassroots effort in Australia’s history’, 
with volunteers conducting ‘one million conversations’ (Erickson 2016). 
But in 2019, more than 25,000 volunteers organised 10,000 events at 
which they conducted around 2.1 million voter conversations in more 
than 15 key seats. 
The ACTU, the Greens, online activist group GetUp! and several 
Independent candidates also invested effort in DVC in previous elections, 
and all did so again in 2019. The ACTU’s experience in fieldwork dates 
back to its successful ‘Your Rights at Work’ campaign in 2007. In 2019, 
the ACTU mounted a substantial fieldwork effort under the banner of its 
‘Change the Government, Change the Rules’ campaign, using predictive 
modelling based on surveys of 120,000 union members nationwide 
to identify and target persuadable voters for volunteer conversations 
(Workplace Express 2019). ACTU volunteers conducted doorknocking 
and phone banks in 16 target electorates. In a parallel effort, Victorian 
union organisers targeted seven seats. 
Yet, as Table 23.3 shows, these efforts were largely unsuccessful. Of the 
10 electorates in which Labor mounted its largest DVC efforts, measured 
by the raw number of phone calls and doorknocks, only one (Gilmore, 
ranked 10th) changed hands from Coalition to Labor. Two others 
(Bass and Braddon) shifted the other way. The ACTU’s efforts succeeded 
in only three electorates, two of which (Dunkley and Corangamite) had 
already been redistributed to become notionally Labor. The Victorian 
unionists’ effort failed in every seat (Karp 2019a, 2019b).
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Table 23.3 Electorates targeted for direct voter contact, 2019











Qld: Forde, Capricornia, Flynn, 
Petrie, Leichhardt, Herbert
NSW: Banks, Gilmore, Reid, 
Robertson 
Vic .: Dunkley, Corangamite 
WA: Swan, Pearce 
Tas .: Bass 
SA: Boothby
Kooyong, Higgins, Flinders, 
Menzies, Deakin, La Trobe, 
Chisholm
Note: Seats underlined won; seats italicised lost .
Source: Column one: Data provided by ALP; Columns two and three: Data provided by 
Karp (2019b) .
GetUp! also substantially lifted its DVC effort compared with 2016 
(Vromen 2018) but was successful in only one of its seven targeted seats, 
Warringah (further discussed in Chapter 21, this volume). The two 
successful volunteer-based campaigns by Independent candidates—Zali 
Steggall’s in Warringah and Helen Haines’s in Indi—are also dealt with 
elsewhere (see Chapter 18, this volume).
There are several possible explanations for Labor’s DVC failures. 
Organisationally, Labor had lost a key figure with the retirement in 
February of Victorian Assistant State Secretary Stephen Donnelly. Over 
seven years, Donnelly had been the driving force in Victoria behind the 
creation of the ‘Community Action Network’, which was modelled on his 
experience as a union organiser and then an Obama volunteer in 2012. 
Perhaps in part due to his departure, Labor’s massive electoral win in the 
Victorian 2018 State elections did not carry over into the federal results.
A further possible factor may lie in the changing mix of phone calls and 
doorknocking. US experience suggests a doorknock conversation with 
a persuadable voter is more effective than a phone call. Yet, as Table 23.2 
shows, Labor doorknocking declined relative to phone calls, from two-
thirds of the total output in 2016 to less than half in 2019. This may have 
been driven by the vagaries of the electoral calendars: doorknocking tends 
to occur on weekends, and the 2016 double-dissolution campaign ran 
over seven whole weekends, while the 2019 campaign ran over five, one 
of which was Easter, when most campaigning was suspended. Further, 
telephones are becoming more congested with political messaging during 
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elections, with marginal-seat voters already anecdotally unhappy with 
robocalls and robopolls; volunteer-led persuasion calls may be unable to 
compete for attention.
The most likely explanation, however, is that the electoral effectiveness 
of DVC is highly dependent on the prevailing political context. When 
voters are already dissatisfied with a leader or party, DVC conversations 
will encounter greater barriers. This appears to have been the case with the 
big but unsuccessful DVC efforts mounted by the British Labour Party’s 
‘Four Million Conversations’ campaign on behalf of Ed Miliband in 2015 
(LabourList 2015) and by Hillary Clinton’s US presidential bid in 2016 (Allen 
and Parnes 2017). Like Miliband and Clinton, Shorten’s campaign struggled 
to counter negative campaigns and to articulate its agenda persuasively. In 
these circumstances, the personalised messaging of DVC apparently could 
not be heard against a louder or more urgent national message.
The Liberals, for whom DVC has never been a major campaign focus, 
attempted a larger effort in 2019. Labor has its traditions of community 
and union organising and its energetic volunteer base of Young Labor 
activists; GetUp! has mobilised its own digitally savvy support base. But 
with an older membership, the Coalition has typically preferred a more 
mediated campaign style of advertising, direct mail and social media. 
Despite possessing a formidable database, Liberal DVC efforts have also 
been fragmented among State divisions, some of which remain unready to 
devote resources to the effort. Yet Labor’s effective management of its data 
and volunteers has been noted by conservative campaigners with some 
envy (Murphy 2016), and Liberals acknowledge the need to compete in 
some way in every form of campaigning. Previous DVC efforts have seen 
organised phone banking and flying squads of volunteers arriving in target 
seats. Among Liberal DVC efforts in 2019, a volunteer phone bank was 
set up in the Liberal Party’s Canberra headquarters, R.G. Menzies House. 
In summary, Labor entered the 2019 election campaign with a stable and 
united leadership, a credible and extensive policy platform, solid polls 
and great expectations. Its unexpected defeat can be attributed in part to 
a failure to recalibrate its campaign strategy after the advent of Morrison 
and the delivery of the pre-campaign federal Budget. Shorten struggled to 
articulate a vision behind the policy platform and a rationale for change 
and to prosecute Labor’s claim to govern; he never overcame his deep-
seated unpopularity. Labor could not overcome the determined negativity 
of a more strongly motivated incumbent. 
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These particular shortcomings—serious enough in themselves—point 
to a more generalised failure of strategy. In previous elections, campaign 
directors of both major parties have made it their personal and distinctive 
responsibility to formulate and execute a campaign strategy, defining 
the path towards electoral success and centrally focusing all the party’s 
resources on achieving that goal. Strong and successful campaign 
directors have made it their business to harness the party leadership in 
a joint effort of disciplined coordination (Mills 2014: 179, 258). In 2019, 
Labor’s campaign strategy appears not to have followed that proven 
path. As noted at the outset of this chapter, strategic failures can only 
be inferred from tactical communications executions, but in the case of 
Labor’s 2019 campaign, they seem abundantly clear. Indeed, they have 
been subsequently confirmed by its election campaign post-mortem, 
which found there was no documented strategy, no body responsible 
for strategic deliberation and decision, no unifying campaign narrative 
and no identified pathway to victory (ALP 2019a). While the Liberals 
have not seen it necessary to publish a similar review of their campaign, 
one would likely have applauded its documented campaign strategy, its 
narrow but identified path to victory, its unifying narrative and its leader 
working in disciplined harness with the party’s campaign team. 
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Prior to the 2007 federal election, which saw the emergence of web 
2.0 technologies in political campaign communication and democratic 
discourse, political satire was mediated almost exclusively by the media 
troika of television, newspapers and radio. The increasing hybridisation 
of media platforms popularised a new form of political satire: the video 
mash-up. A defining moment of the pre-campaign period in 2007 was 
when then Prime Minister John Howard launched a new climate policy 
in an ill-judged and awkward first foray on to YouTube, giving tech-savvy 
citizen comics an opportunity to lampoon the release with their own 
satirical videos. This episode amplified a narrative that the incumbent 
government was out of touch, adding to a palpable mood for change in 
the electorate (Flew 2008; Williams 2008). 
More recently, a newer brand of online visual satire has arrived in the form 
of image macros. These are culturally familiar images with brief, witty 
captions superimposed on them and popularly known in their replicated 
form as ‘memes’. It has been widely remarked that memes are the new 
political cartoons. However, memes are produced by anonymous amateurs 
and gain legitimacy from repeated online transmission rather than location 
in legacy media. Their capacity to influence political discourse was first 
observed in the 2012 US presidential campaign, when ‘Big Bird’ and 
‘binders of women’ memes proved so damaging to Republican candidate 
Mitt Romney (Tay 2014; Graeff 2015; Rentschler and Thrift 2015). 
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In Australia in 2015, ‘Choppergate’ memes were credited with helping 
bring down then Speaker of the House of Representatives Bronwyn 
Bishop (Turton 2015; Purcell 2015). Memes have become part of the 
fabric of everyday political engagement (Dean 2018) but they also have 
the potential to be weaponised by political parties and to polarise and 
misinform the electorate (Renner 2017).
In this chapter, I examine how the satirical mosaic of cartoons, memes 
and videos circulating throughout the 2019 federal election responded 
to and illuminated the key themes and events, and to what extent the 
imagery was a reliable gauge of the public mood heading into the polls. 
In  determining what images among the extensive volume of material 
should be included in the sample, I have given preference to content with 
broad public reach. Current newspaper readership and viewing figures 
validate the inclusion here of cartoons published in the editorial pages of 
the nation’s metropolitan daily newspapers and video content broadcast or 
streamed on network media platforms. Also included are selected videos 
from the satirical ‘Honest Government Ad’ internet video series. Created 
by film and media company The Juice Media, these videos—which mimic 
the imagery and prosody of government advertising—have attracted 
millions of views across Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube and 
a dedicated audience of more than 300,000 subscribers.
The memes that featured in the mainstream news media were sourced 
almost exclusively from a pool of 618 memes mediated by six Facebook 
groups: ALP Spicy Meme Stash, The Simpsons Against the Liberals, 
Innovative and Agile Memes, Clive Palmer’s Put Australia First, Australian 
Green Memes for Actually Progressive Teens and Australian Young Greens. 
These groups have an aggregated subscriber base of over 500,000 people, 
each of whom is a potential link to additional social networks. The sharing 
and reposting of these memes, as well as their intermediation with legacy 
news media, extend the reach of these images from beyond their partisan 
base to a wider mainstream audience. I have observed that the memes 
mediated by these groups provide a comprehensive cross-section of the 
more popular memes proliferating online in discussion forums and feeds 
on Twitter, Instagram and Snapchat, and on this basis present a  viable 
sample for this analysis. In aligning the satirical responses with the 
election outcome, the images collectively frame a narrative of voters who 
were unimpressed with the incumbent government’s infighting and lack 
of a coherent climate policy but not so much as to seriously consider an 
alternative they did not trust or did not understand.
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Heading into the campaign
In addition to offering a choice between two unpalatable options, the 
campaign straddled the public holiday periods of Easter and Anzac Day 
and was punctuated by significant newsworthy events. The retirement of 
a champion racehorse, the first image of a black hole, the Notre-Dame 
Cathedral fire, terrorist attacks in Sri Lanka, the birth of a royal baby, 
the Eurovision song contest, the final episodes of Game of Thrones and the 
death of beloved former prime minister Bob Hawke presented satirists 
with a rich vein of metaphors, but distracted fatigued voters from assessing 
platform and policy differences between the parties. 
The first event to capture the 
public’s imagination was a meme-
rich exchange that occurred in 
the lead-up to the campaign. 
Tony Abbott’s Twitter video 
documenting his delight at 
discovering a street library while 
doorknocking in his Warringah 
electorate presented a gift to citizen 
satirists (Plate 24.1). The 20 March 
video attracted more than 1,000 
replies in the first 24 hours, almost 
all of them mocking Abbott’s 
ignorance of a well-established 
community initiative (Plate 24.2). 
The meme responses became the 
story, reinforcing a perception 
that Abbott was an out-of-touch 
conservative standing in an 
electorate increasingly concerned 
about the progressive issues of 
climate change and refugees. 
It was a free hit for his opponent, 
Independent Zali Steggall, before 
the campaign had even begun. 
Plate 24.1 Tony Abbott, Tango 
Avenue Street Library
Source: Tony Abbott, Twitter account, 
20 March 2019 .
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Plate 24.2 Various responses to Tango Avenue Street Library, 
Tony Abbott, Twitter account, 20–21 March 2019
Sources: @MattBasely; @Mason Hell‑Cat; @LezBeFranc; @EllieCarless .
A dirty campaign
Two early satirical interventions by activist groups foreshadowed the ugly 
campaigning that was to be endemic throughout the campaign as a whole. 
Advance Australia’s video featured their mascot suggestively rubbing up 
against a photoshopped billboard image of Steggall and Bill Shorten 
(Plate 24.3). Ten days later, activist group GetUp! misfired with its video 
portraying Tony Abbott as a surf lifesaver refusing to save a drowning 
swimmer (Plate 24.4). Both videos were retracted after public outcry. 
Cartoonist Jon Kudelka sums up the efforts of the respective groups with 
his own satirical intervention (Plate 24.5).
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Plate 24.3 Still showing an image sequence from Captain GetUp video, 
13 April 2019 
Source: www.news.com.au/video/id-5348771529001-6026202939001/captain-getup-
accused‑of‑sexism‑with‑billboard [video removed] .
Plate 24.4 Still showing an image sequence from GetUp! Australia 
video, 23 April 2019 
Source: www.youtube.com/watch?v=3-MKqCGY5bs [video removed] .
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Plate 24.5 Jon Kudelka, ‘Modern campaigning’
Source: The Australian, 25 April 2019 .
Voter uninterest and pre‑polling
When Bill Shorten bit into his democracy sausage on 18 May, he declared 
that it tasted like ‘a mood for change’ (Coughlan 2019). Every major 
opinion poll seemed to confirm this judgement and the bookies were 
not even at the institutional sizzle; they had paid out punters betting 
on a Labor victory three days earlier. And yet the supposed mood for 
change was not borne out by the major parties’ seat-by-seat polling, the 
reporting of journalists ‘on the road’ or citizen chatter on social media 
(Koslowski 2019)—all of which indicated that the prevailing flavour was 
one not of change but of uninterest. Two cartoons, by David Pope and 
Michael Leunig, bookend the campaign period and sum up the apathy 
that undermined Shorten’s case to voters (Plates 24.6 and 24.7). 
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Plate 24.6 David Pope, ‘Economic inputs of Australia!’
Source: The Canberra Times, 12 April 2019 .
Plate 24.7 Michael Leunig, ‘Short story’
Source: The Age, [Melbourne], 15 May 2019 .
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Plate 24.8 Cartoon by Andrew Dyson
Source: The Age, [Melbourne], 27 April 2019 .
Plate 24.9 Cartoon by Mark Knight
Source: Herald Sun, [Melbourne], 5 May 2019 .
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Voter uninterest was signalled early and throughout the campaign by an 
unprecedented number of people casting pre-poll votes. Nearly 5 million 
people cast an early ballot, with the Coalition doing significantly better 
than Labor among early voters (see Chapter 9, this volume). Pre-polling 
attracted attention from cartoonists but was not addressed at all in memes. 
Andrew Dyson (Plate 24.8) anticipated this dynamic with his portrayal 
of the lone polling-day voter as a progressive with a vegetarian dog, while 
Mark Knight (Plate 24.9) commented on the potential ramifications of 
pre-poll voting on candidate choice by touching on another one of this 
election’s features: the disendorsement of candidates by their party due to 
compromising social media histories.
The leaders
Bill Shorten and Scott Morrison entered the campaign with substantial 
baggage. Despite an ambitious and expansive suite of policies, Shorten’s 
wooden public persona compounded residual trust issues over his role 
in the downfall of two Labor prime ministers. A disastrous intervention 
by Sydney’s Daily Telegraph about Shorten’s mother afforded him the 
opportunity for a heartfelt rebuttal that connected with many voters, 
but its humanising potential was neutralised by the sympathy directed at 
Morrison after an attempted egging at a Country Women’s Association 
event  the same day. David Rowe, in inimitable style, articulates both 
Shorten’s inability to cut through to an uninterested electorate and 
the fickle  nature of public opinion (Plates 24.10 and 24.11). On the 
incumbent’s side, Morrison was an accidental prime minister bereft of 
a  reform agenda and commanding an unpopular and chaotic ministry. 
The  cartoons by Pat Campbell (Plate 24.12) and Cathy Wilcox 
(Plate  24.13)  neatly capture the bunker vibe underscoring Morrison’s 
presidential-style campaign. A high proportion of memes appearing 
on the main party-affiliated Facebook sites personalised the campaign 




Plate 24.10 David Rowe, ‘Packing room …’
Source: Australian Financial Review, 3 May 2019 .
Plate 24.11 David Rowe, ‘Hold the front page!’
Source: Australian Financial Review, 9 May 2019 .
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Plate 24.12 Pat Campbell, ‘Army of the un‑policies’
Source: The Canberra Times, 15 April 2019 .
Plate 24.13 Cathy Wilcox, ‘Team ScoMo’
Source: Sydney Morning Herald, 1 May 2019 .
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Plate 24.14 Meme by Innovative 
and Agile Memes
Source: Facebook, 23 April 2019 .
Plate 24.15 Meme by ALP Spicy 
Meme Stash
Source: Facebook, 5 May 2019 .
Two companion videos produced by the ABC’s satirical news program 
The Weekly with Charlie Pickering highlighted the challenges each of the 
leaders faced in elevating their public image. The first video, ‘Australian 
Labor Party Robotics’, presents Shorten as ‘The Billbot’, an automaton 
whose failed programming initiates maladroit behaviour that fails to 
convince voters that it is human (Plate 24.16). Many of the awkward 
actions and utterances satirised in this clip as examples of a malfunctioning 
robot were also featured in an unembellished montage released by 
the Liberal Party on the same day as The Weekly’s clip. ‘Ladies and 
Gentlemen, Mr Bill Shorten’ became the most-watched video produced 
by a political party, garnering more than 1.1 million views. The reductive 
characterisation of Shorten’s public persona in the two videos leverages the 
popular perception that he is not authentic, not ‘one of us’. In reference 
to the consistently poor personal approval ratings that plagued Shorten 
throughout his tenure as Opposition leader, Sunrise program host David 
Koch observed in an interview with Shorten that ‘the more people see 
you, the more they don’t like you’ (Seven Network 2019). 
The second ABC video, ‘Rebranding Scott Morrison’, presented 
a  fictitious public relations (PR) company’s response to the brief 
of ‘turning  a  terminally unpopular politician into a vote winner’ 
(Plate 24.17). The clip lists all the electoral challenges facing Morrison, 
from his refusal to support a banking royal commission to the perception 
that ‘the party’s got a problem with women’—and frames a PR strategy to 
mollify them in the minds of voters. Says one half of the PR duo: 
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The hardest part of this brief was that if ScoMo talks about the past 
it reminds voters about the spills, but if he talks about the future 
it could trigger another one. He needs to keep voters hypnotised 
in the present. 
Plate 24.16 Still showing an image sequence from The Weekly with 
Charlie Pickering’s mash‑up video ‘Australian Labor Party Robotics’, 
10 May 2019 
Source: www.youtube.com/watch?v=ecbDqnsdfVM .
Plate 24.17 Still showing an image sequence from The Weekly with 
Charlie Pickering’s mash‑up video ‘Rebranding Scott Morrison’, 




The premise of the clip, which was viewed nearly 800,000 times on 
Facebook, cleverly alludes to Morrison’s former role in successful marketing 
campaigns for New Zealand and Australian tourism. Fashioning himself 
as a folksy, daggy dad and reducing his platform to a lexicon of catchy 
phrases were deft smoke-and-mirrors manoeuvres that camouflaged 
ministerial liabilities and paucity of vision.
The climate election
Alongside the respective personal characteristics of the leaders, the climate 
issue dominated progressive social media (Plates 24.18 and 24.19), 
but it did not take long for Labor’s climate platform—a putative party 
strength—to be derailed. When the ALP led into the campaign with 
a proposed target on electric car sales, small business minister Michaelia 
Cash immediately reframed the initiative as a threat to tradesmen, 
announcing that the Liberal Party would ‘stand by our tradies’ and 
‘save their utes’ (ABC 2019a). Kudelka illustrates the implied messaging: 
that snide, sanctimonious, inner-city progressive types want to run over 
the livelihoods of honest, hardworking Aussies (Plate 24.20). 
Plate 24.18 Meme by ALP Spicy 
Meme Stash
Source: Facebook, 19 April 2019 . Plate 24.19 Meme by Australian 
Young Greens
Source: Facebook, 2 May 2019 .
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Plate 24.20 Jon Kudelka, ‘Election game changer: The vegan ute’
Source: The Australian, 11 April 2019 .
Variations of this narrative were effectively transferred to every plank of 
Labor’s climate platform—most notably, with respect to the proposed 
Adani Carmichael coalmine. Labor’s ambivalent support of the project 
offered little reassurance to voters concerned about climate change, on 
the one hand, or those prioritising jobs in the mining sector on the other. 
The ‘Adani convoy’ galvanised the positions of both sides and left Labor 
with no clear strategy for securing the Queensland seats needed to win 
government (see Chapter 11, this volume). At the same time, Labor’s 
decision to support fracking in the Northern Territory’s Beetaloo Basin and 
promise of $1.5 billion towards a gas pipeline development in northern 
Australia left it open to accusations of inconsistency on greenhouse 
emissions (ABC 2019c). In his cartoon, Dyson (Plate 24.21) reminds 
us that Morrison was managing his own balancing act, toning down 
his support for the Adani mine so as not to alienate climate-conscious 
Victorian voters. With both leaders having little to say about an issue that 
was expected to dominate the campaign, David Pope draws on Anzac 
imagery to depict this curious truce (Plate 24.22).
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Plate 24.21 Andrew Dyson, ‘Balanced diet’
Source: The Age, [Melbourne], 11 April 2019 .
Plate 24.22 David Pope, ‘The great “climate election” Anzac Day truce …’
Source: The Canberra Times, 25 April 2019 .
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Shorten’s inability to provide clear costings on Labor’s climate change 
commitments in a tetchy exchange with journalists on day five of the 
campaign gifted Morrison the opportunity to paint Labor as economically 
irresponsible. Coupled with Shorten’s gaffe the following day over taxes 
on superannuation and another gaffe in the second week over tax cuts for 
people earning more than $250,000 a year, Morrison was able to conflate 
broad public distrust of Labor’s economic management with broad public 
distrust of Shorten. Mark Knight’s cartoon at the start of the Easter 
weekend summarises Shorten’s predicament (Plate 24.23), while meme 
creators seized on Shorten’s interview presentation as being indicative 
of his policies as a whole (Plate 24.24).
Plate 24.23 Mark Knight, ‘Scrutiny’
Source: Herald Sun, [Melbourne], 19 April 2019 .
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Plate 24.24 Innovative and Agile Memes, ‘Who’s the bigger flake?’
Source: Facebook, 28 April 2019 . 
Baby boomers
Morrison presented himself as not just the leader who could deliver job 
security to ‘hardworking Australians’; he was also the leader who could 
deliver incentives and rewards to workers and protect the entitlements 
of self-funded retirees and pensioners. In a move telegraphed a year 
earlier when he was still treasurer, Morrison gathered up Labor’s tax 
policies—including the aforementioned curtailing of superannuation 
tax  concessions, withdrawal of dividend imputation (or ‘franking’) 
credits,  cessation of negative gearing and winding back of the capital 
gains tax concession—and neatly repackaged them as a ‘retiree tax’. 
The Australian’s Johannes Leak—in characteristically partisan style—shows 
Shorten winning a debate few people seemed to care about but losing an 
argument a great many people cared very much about (Plate 24.25). The 
idea that Shorten was robbing pensioners gained traction (Plate 24.26). 
By the time someone finally managed to explain in simple terms what 
franking credits were, voters had stopped listening (Plate 24.27).
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Plate 24.25 Cartoon by Johannes Leak
Source: The Australian, 6 May 2019 .
Plate 24.26 Meme by Innovative 
and Agile Memes
Source: Facebook, 18 May 2019 .
Plate 24.27 888 Memes for Oldest 
Continuously Functioning Trades 
Hall Teens, ‘Franking credits’




While the question of preferences was of no discernible interest to 
internet satirists, a suite of 25 cartoons interrogated the spectacle of Clive 
Palmer’s $60 million intervention in the campaign. Brisbane’s The Courier-
Mail unsurprisingly focused on Palmer’s failure to pay entitlements to 
Queensland Nickel workers, while other newspapers looked at how the 
flow of UAP preferences to Morrison might impact the election result and 
what concessions might be demanded in return. The Hobart Mercury’s 
Christopher Downes channels Norman Rockwell in a beautifully rendered 
image showing a nervous Morrison observing Palmer’s political track record 
(Plate 24.28), while Rowe pairs Palmer with the embattled Pauline Hanson 
in illustrating Morrison’s poll-driven compromise (Plate 24.29). 
Ultimately, UAP and PHON preferences in Queensland contributed to 
a 9 per cent swing to the Coalition in the five ‘Adani seats’ (see Chapter 11, 
this volume). In the lead-up to polling day, a prescient Mark Knight 
cartoon employs the metaphor of a topical Australian Football League 
controversy in describing the impact of Palmer’s campaign on Shorten’s 
prime ministerial ambitions (Plate 24.30); while in the aftermath of the 
election, Pope summarises the irony of a political party leader achieving 
his policy ambitions despite not having secured a single seat (Plate 24.31). 
Plate 24.28 Cartoon by Christopher Downes
Source: Mercury, [Hobart], 30 April 2019 .
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Plate 24.29 David Rowe, ‘Live poll dancers’
Source: Australian Financial Review, 1 May 2019 .
Plate 24.30 Cartoon by Mark Knight
Source: Herald Sun, [Melbourne], 14 May 2019 .
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Plate 24.31 Cartoon by David Pope
Source: The Canberra Times, 23 May 2019 .
The outcome
As seen in preceding chapters, Labor failed to make a compelling 
case for  change. Despite a host of Coalition failures and missteps in 
government—articulated in excoriating detail in The Juice Media’s 
‘Honest Government Ad: 2019 Election’ viral video (Plate 24.32)—
Labor was unable to match Morrison’s strong messaging (see Chapter 23, 
this volume). ABC TV video editor Huw Parkinson’s take on the election, 
published on polling day, was conceived at least one week before the 
result was known—and yet the metaphor he chose to frame the election 
was, very aptly, the Back to the Future movie trilogy (Plate 24.33). While 
Parkinson had his tongue firmly in his cheek, Scott Morrison was deadly 
serious when he announced in a debate few cared about that he had 
‘brought the Budget back to surplus next year’ (ABC 2019b). 
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Plate 24.32 Still showing an image sequence from The Juice Media’s 
mash‑up video, ‘Honest Government Ad: 2019 Election’, 6 May 2019
Source: www.youtube.com/watch?v=OJrXI3rBbSA&t=3s .
Plate 24.33 Still showing an image sequence from Huw Parkinson’s 





The above examples demonstrate the various ways in which cartoons, 
memes and videos responded to the key themes and developments of 
the federal election. The cartoons—authored by professional satirists 
and located in immediate textual proximity to the reported news of the 
moment—covered a broad range of campaign topics and were acutely 
responsive to events playing out within the 24-hour news cycle. A cross-
platform newspaper readership of around 16 million suggests that reports of 
their demise are an exaggeration—but perhaps only slightly. For example, 
the audience trend is away from print media and towards online editions 
where the cartoon does not enjoy the same prominence on the op-ed page. 
Inevitably, if not already, they will give way to memes and videos as the 
default satirical images. The memes circulating throughout the campaign 
were narrower in topical scope than the cartoons and distilled the 
concerns of the electorate into the issues of taxation, the economy, climate 
change, Liberal leadership and voter distrust of Bill Shorten. Interestingly, 
Andrea Carson and Lawrie Zion write in Chapter 22 (this volume) that 
the front-page stories appearing in Australia’s major daily newspapers 
were—with the notable exception of Liberal leadership—dominated by 
much the same topics. At their best, memes can be an effective satirical 
and democratic tool through their participatory modes of production and 
dissemination. They can promote broad public discourse and scrutiny 
of political players by mirroring some voter sentiments and highlighting 
policy positions. The temporal nature of videos makes them more labour-
intensive to produce than cartoons and memes, but also affords a more 
expansive canvas on which to lampoon their targets. The adverse public 
response to the video satire produced by political lobby groups presents 
a cautionary note for would-be satirists promoting a partisan agenda. 
The increasing prominence of memes in democratic discourse raises 
some interesting points for discussion that are beyond the scope of this 
chapter. For example, political players and citizen comics alike now share 
a common publication and communication platform. The proliferation 
and weaponisation of memes produced and disseminated by partisan 
groups, rather than engaged citizens, are blurring the lines between 
propaganda, advertising and journalism—and may have significant 
implications for satire specifically and democratic discourse more 
broadly. In addition, the capacity for memes to reinforce insular online 
communities (or ‘echo chambers’) and promulgate misinformation is an 
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emerging field of research that, in light of the ‘death tax’, has particular 
relevance to this campaign. Notwithstanding these concerns, when viewed 
collectively, the visual satire produced and disseminated throughout the 
campaign not only presented a clear and critical engagement with the 
events as they transpired, but also provided a reliable gauge of the electoral 
mood. Consequently, the body of satirical work can reasonably be seen as 
having succeeded as one of the more dependable predictors of the final 
result when many of the traditional indicators got it so famously wrong. 
After a campaign in which the two major parties presented the clearest 
policy differences in decades, voters decided they were not that interested 
in either of them. The result seemed to surprise a great many people. 
Looking over their aggregated contributions to the election campaign, 
it’s difficult to imagine that the satirists were among them. 
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